

Attack and Defence

The fifth and final session from the world-famous chess school

Attack and Defence

How Creative Thought Develops in a Chess Player

Mark Dvoretsky and Artur Yusupov

With contributions from:

Mikhail Krasenkov Beniamin Blumenfeld Sergei Dolmatov Vladimir Vulfson Igor Belov

Translated by John Sugden



B. T. Batsford Ltd, London

First published 1998

O Mark Dvoretsky and Artin Yusupov 1998

English language translation O John Sugden 1998

Reprinted 1999

ISBN 0713482141

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Edited by Graham Burgess and typeset by John and Petra Nunn for Gambit Publications Ltd, London.

Printed in Great Britain by
Redwood Books, Trowbridge, Wilts for the publishers,
B. T. Batsford Ltd,
9 Blenheim Court,
Brewery Road,
London N7 9NT

A member of the Chrysalis Group plc

A BATSFORD CHESS BOOK

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Symbols

```
check
++
         double check
         captures
Х
0-0
         castles kingside
         castles queenside
0-0-0
         brilliant move
!!
         good move
!?
         interesting move
?!
         dubious move
?
         bad move
??
         blunder
         the game ends in a win for White
1-0
1/2-1/2
         the game ends in a draw
         the game ends in a win for Black
0-1
(n)
         nth match game
         diagram follows
(D)
```

Preface

Mark Dvoretsky

The book you have before you is the fifth and final volume in the series 'School for Budding Chess Champions', based on material from the Dvoretsky/Yusupov school for gifted young chess players.

Our little school existed for only three years (1990-2). Its sessions were attended by 10-15 young people. Nearly all of them first joined us at the age of 12-15 years. Five years on, I am proud to be able to say that eight of our students have become grandmasters, some of them very strong ones enjoying world fame. Here are their names: Alexei Alexandrov, Inna Gaponenko, Vasily Emelin, Vadim Zviagintsev, Ilakha Kadymova, Sergei Movsesian, Ella Pitem and Peter Svidler. In the very near future I am sure that Vladimir Baklan and Peter Kiriakov will attain the grandmaster title too. Hardly any other children's chess school can boast of such a high success rate.

In listing the school's achievements I am nonetheless perfectly aware that the successes were gained first and foremost by the students themselves and their regular coaches. Was there much that we could teach (for instance) Peter Svidler – three-times Russian Champion – at the three ten-day sessions of the school which he attended (the second, fourth and sixth)? The chief ingredients of Svidler's successes were of course his own immense talent and the help of his outstanding coach Andrei Lukin.

Yusupov and I saw our role as that of stimulating the young players' further development; helping them to come to terms with themselves, with their own strengths and weaknesses; formulating plans for the future; discussing the problems they faced at the chessboard, and the means of overcoming them; pointing out the basic policies and methods for perfecting their chess. That was all. It was not an immense amount, but it was not negligible either. The students' results confirm that this was the right approach, and that as a whole we performed our task successfully. Among other things, it was at a session of our school that Peter Svidler was advised by me to turn to Lukin for assistance.

This same approach is reflected in our books. We have not attempted to write textbooks to clarify this or that topic fully and precisely. Our aim has been to equip our readers with high-quality material and a variety of ideas conducive to independent thinking and work along the lines we have mapped out. The ideas are not all our own; they include those of other specialists (particularly trainers working together with us at the school). Naturally this method of exposition requires readers to adopt an inventive (and sometimes critical) attitude to the text they are studying; it is unsuited to lovers of ready-made precepts. To judge from the popularity of our books, a great many chess players like this approach.

The issues discussed in this book are not confined narrowly to chess; they are all situated on the border between chess and psychology. The chess player's thoughts at the board, the characteristic processes of decision-taking in a variety of situations – this, in a nutshell, is the basic content of the book. Many of the examples that are offered for your attention are highly complex and ambiguous; they require deep investigation of a position, ingenuity and bold, risk-taking actions. In comparison with its predecessors, then, this volume has less to do with instruction and more to do with creative problem-solving.

The division of the book into six parts is to some extent arbitrary, since the themes of the chapters are closely interrelated. It is obvious, for example, that the discussion about the accurate and deep analysis of variations is merely begun in Part 1 and continues right to the end of the book.

The analysis of variations is by no means an omnipotent force; in the course of a game a player needs to guess as well as calculate. The problem of developing your intuition has hardly attracted any serious discussion in chess literature. I am not a professional psychologist and make no claim to treating the subject scientifically, but I hope my practical ideas and recommendations will prove useful to the reader.

Many chess players make the serious mistake of devoting their free time solely to the study of opening theory. The fact is that errors committed at later stages have just as much bearing on the result as a poor start to the game. Some weaknesses which can and must be overcome with intensive will-power and persistence are shared by chess players of all levels. To emphasize this point, the book includes critical analyses of games not only by young masters and candidate masters but also by high-ranking grandmasters – such as Artur Yusupov (who performs the task himself, in Chapter 9, Missed Brilliancy Prizes) and Garry Kasparov.

Opening theory is subject to speedy revision, so that opening manuals are sometimes out of date even before they are published. By contrast, astute observations and conclusions about the game of chess as a whole retain their value over a period of many years. You may confirm this by acquainting yourself with the two articles written some decades ago by Beniamin Blumenfeld, a master who was also a penetrating researcher into practical chess psychology. Don't be put off by the mode of presentation, which seems slightly outdated by present-day standards. The writer's thoughts are what matters, and they remain as relevant as ever.

I have already devoted one book – Secrets of Chess Tactics – to the problems of attack and defence. However, these themes are inexhaustible, and I hope that the fresh material discussed in the relevant chapters will be useful to you.

In what has become in this series the traditional concluding chapter, Yusupov analyses some games by our students. Whereas in our previous books he placed the emphasis on instructive errors, this time the grandmaster concentrates on displaying the young players' creative achievements. The book ends with a brilliant game by Vadim Zviagintsev, which the experts rated as the best in *Informator 62*. It is extremely rare for young players to receive this honour, given the jury's susceptibility to titles and big names. I wish our readers the same competitive and creative success as our best students. I hope you will be aided in this by ideas that you derive from the books in our series.

1 The Technique of Analysis and Decision-Taking

Mark Dvoretsky

What do we think about during a game of chess? We look for promising possibilities, compare them with each other, work out variations, try to neutralize our opponent's counterplay, and so forth.

All this is a creative process which admits of no recipes suited to all cases. Yet there definitely do exist rules, precepts of thought, which in some way help us to organize and regulate this process, to make it more reliable, to avoid the simplest mistakes and economize our thinking time — in short, to raise the level of our decision-taking.

A fair amount has been written on this subject. Grandmaster Alexander Kotov, for example, has set out his ideas on the technique of calculation in *Think Like a Grandmaster*. I would also advise you to consult the interesting article by Mikhail Krasenkov included in the next chapter; and also the old but by no means antiquated articles by Beniamin Blumenfeld, a master

who perceptively investigated the psychology of chess thought.

The problem of thinking about moves has always interested me. I have devoted a number of articles to it, as well as several chapters in my previous books. I have studied some methods and devices (for example 'prophylactic thinking' see the book Positional Play) in considerable detail, others only in broad outline. I cannot formulate a precise scheme for optimal thinking at the chessboard (I am convinced that in principle no such scheme exists), but I will give you some advice which I hope will be of use to you in future contests.

The thought-processes which we are going to examine can be conveniently divided into two categories:

- 1) Methods of searching for a move and calculating variations;
- 2) Means of economizing time and effort; rational thinking.


Technique of searching for moves and calculating variations

1. Candidate moves

Kotov was perhaps the first to highlight this device of calculation. He recommended that you should immediately identify all the possible candidate moves, not just for your first move but for subsequent ones - and not just for yourself but for your opponent. If you read the article by Krasenkov that I mentioned, you will see that this principle (like others that we shall discuss) by no means always 'works'. Nonetheless it is very good advice for many situations.

Why is it so important to apply the principle of 'candidate moves'? In the first place, it helps us to survey the variations rationally, to single out all the continuations that have to be calculated.

Black is two pawns up, but his opponent's pieces are very active. The g7-pawn is under attack. If Black defends it with 33...\black b1+ 34 \$\degree g2 \$\degree g6\$, then after 35 \$\degree cd7\$ d3 36 \daggerdd d5 White wins back the dpawn and will probably soon liquidate to a drawn ending with three pawns against two on the same



В

Alexander - Euwe Nottingham 1936

side. Also 33... 對d5 34 對xd5 其xd5 35 Zed7 leads to roughly the same thing. The attacking try 33... Zd5 (reckoning on 34 \(\mathbb{I}\)xg7 \(\mathbb{I}\)xg7 35 □xg7 曾b1+ 36 曾g2 旦h5) is refuted by 34 \(\mathbb{\su}\)c8!. Finally, if Black plays 33.... \$\bar{2}\$b8, White should not reply 34 \(\mathbb{\text{W}}e4?\)\(\mathbb{\text{X}}\)\(\text{xb4}\)\(\text{(threatening)}\) 35... **岁**b1+) or 34 **쌀**a7? **基**xb4 35 **□**xg7 **□**b1+ 36 **□**g2 **⋓**d5+, but 34 ₩c6! is a perfectly playable move (34...里xb4 35 里xg7!; 34...豐b1+ 35 \$\pmug2 \pm\xb4 36 \pm\xf6!; 34...d3 35 \$\deg{\text{d}}\deg{\text{g}}2!? d2 36 \$\deq(\text{d}\text{c}\d)\$.

I wouldn't say it was essential to work out all these variations accurately. You only need to satisfy yourself that the opponent retains possibilities of defence. The point is that Black has just one more resource available: he can simply

push his passed d-pawn, allowing Exg7 and defending h7 from b1 with his queen. This is the most forcing and hence the most tempting line, and naturally the one to examine first. It is important to decide whether the opponent has perpetual check. If not, Black should definitely play this line as he will acquire an overwhelming material plus. If there is no escaping the perpetual, he can go back to the other continuations and study them more thoroughly.

The precise order of moves is important. On 33...\bulletb1+? 34 \dots g2 d3, White has the additional possibility of 35 \(\mathbb{Z}\)cd7! d2 36 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd8 ■xd8 37 \dd d7!, leading to a draw. After the text-move, however, 34 **Z**cd7 is useless, as after 34...d2 the pawn will queen with check.

> 34 **E**xg7 **Exg7** ₩b1+ 35 **Exg**7

Black's next move will be 36...d2. This is where we have to concentrate on picking out the candidate moves. White has two ways of continuing the attack: 37 \(\bar{2}\)g4 (threatening mate on g7) or 37 \frac{\psi}{16}f7 (with the idea of 38 **I**g8+ or 38 **I**xh7+). In each case the white king may be on either g2 or h2. So there are four possibilities, and it was essential to calculate all of them before playing 33...d3.


Let us begin with the queen's move to f7:

- a) 36 含h2 d2 37 豐f7 豐f5!. Now 38 Exh7+ is impossible as the rook is taken with check, while on 38 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g4 Black has the decisive 38... 對xf2+ 39 含h3 對f1+ 40 含h2 營h1+! (or 40...營e2+ 41 含h3 ₩xg4+!).
- b) 36 \$\dip g2 d2 37 \$\dip f7\$. This time 37...\forall f5? is bad due to 38 罩xh7+! 營xh7 39 營xf6+ 營g7 40 ₩xd8+ and 41 ₩xd2, when White comes out a pawn up, while the line 37...d1豐? 38 里g8+! 里xg8 39 ₩xf6+ leads to perpetual check. However, Black can win by inserting 37... 數e4+!. Then 38 \$h2 數f5 transposes to variation 'a'. If 38 f3, the simplest answer is 38... \wxf3+! 39 ⊈xf3 d1∰+ leading to a quick mate, though another possibility is 38... **營**e2+ 39 **含**h3 **營**f1+ 40 **含**h2 ₩h1+! 41 \$\pi \text{xh1 d1}\psi + 42 \$\pi \text{h2}. 單d2+43 \$h3 \$\mathre{m}\$h1+44 \$\mathre{m}\$g4 h5+! 45 會f4 Zd4+ 46 會e3 營g1+.

We will now look at the rook's move to g4.

- c) 36 曾g2 d2 37 **以**g4 **智h**1+! 38 \$\pright\right
 - d) 36 \$h2 d2 37 耳g4 (D).

The h1-square is controlled by the white queen. Black gets nowhere with 37... **肾**g1+? 38 **\$**h3! ₩f1+ 39 \$h4. The only possibility is 37... \(\mathbb{U}\)g6! 38 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg6 hxg6. Let us see if White can give perpetual




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check with his lone queen: 39 \mathbb{\mathbb{W}}f7 d1\\ 40\\ xf6+\\ h741\\ e7+\(after 41 \\ f7+ \cdot h6 42 \\ f4+ \cdot g7 43 ₩e5+, Black has either 43...\$\phih7 44 \(\psi e^7 + \(\psi \)h6 – see the main line – or 43...\$f7 44 \\$f4+ \\$g8 45 \\$c4+ ₩d5) 41...\$h6 42 ₩h4+ (after 42 ₩e3+ \$h5! 43 ₩e5+ g5 the checks run out) 42... 45, and the rook cannot be taken because the queen is pinned. We can now see why, after 36 \$\preceq\$g2 d2 37 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$g4, the reply 37... \#g6? would be insufficient to win; the sole correct move is 37...\\hat{\psi}\h1+!.

It remains to add that in the game, after 36 2h2 d2, White resigned (0-1).

Thus, a preliminary review of the candidate moves ensures precision and reliability in our calculation of variations. However, the 'exploratory function' of this method is

even more important. It enables us to avoid a typical mistake that nearly all chess players make time and again - plunging straight into analysing the first continuations that come into their head. That way some powerful possibilities may be neglected, resulting in a great waste of time and energy. If we have concentrated on seeking out all the sensible candidate moves. we sometimes discover resources the existence of which we never suspected at the outset.



W

Najdorf - Kotov Mar del Plata 1957

The first thing that strikes you is that White can win the h-pawn with check: 21 2xf6 2xf6 22 \wxh7+ \$18. There is nothing to calculate here - the resulting position just needs to be assessed. White has no

chance of giving mate (the kingside is solidly defended by the f6bishop). Black keeps some positional compensation for his pawn, in the shape of control of the c-file and the weakness of the white pawn on d4.

Another, more tempting, continuation is 21 2 g4. Obviously 21...h6? 22 ②xh6+ leads to mate. It is also easy to see the variation 21...\(\mathbb{L}\)xb3? 22 \(\overline{\Delta}\)xf6+ \(\mathbb{L}\)xf6 23 ₩xh7+ \$\psi f8 24 \psi h8+! \$\psi e7 25 ₩xg7 and wins. However, we must not jump to conclusions. First we need to check that we have taken all the defensive resources into account (we have to look for the opponent's candidate moves as well as our own). We find the sole defence in 21... \$\precept{\precept{21...}}\$f8!. There are various ways to win the h-pawn, but none of them are entirely clear. For instance, after 22 2xf6 2xf6 23 **≜**xf6 **₩**xf6 24 **₩**xf6 gxf6 25 \(\text{\textbf{\textit{a}}}\) \(\text{\textbf{\text{a}}}\) \(\text{\textbf{\text{a}}}\) \(\text{\textbf{\text{a}}}\) \(\text{\text{b}}\) \(\text{\text{a}}\) \(\text{\text{b}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{a}}\) \(\text{\text{b}}\) \(\text{\text{a}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{c}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{c}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{\text{c}}\) \(\text{c}\) \(\tex come is obscured by the activity of Black's rooks on the open c- and e-files.

Of course, no one guaranteed that we could do more than win a pawn here. The knight's move to g4 looks very strong, especially if we notice that after 21... \$\precepter f8\$ White can continue the attack with 22 \(\textit{\rm h6!?}\). Wait, though. A little belatedly (which is quite excusable - 21

\(\text{\tinx{\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\texit{\texi}\text{\texit{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\t too tempting) let us recall the principle of 'candidate moves', and look for some other possibilities for White.


It turns out that there are two other methods of conducting the attack:

- a) 21 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{21}}\$}}\) d1 (with the idea of 22) **L**h5).
- b) 21 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)c2 (with the threat 22 ♠xh7+ and justified by the variation 21... xc2 22 xf6 xf6 23 **豐xh7+ and 24 豐xc2**).

Method 'b' is more forcing, so we should consider this one first.

21 \(\text{\text{\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\chcetet{\$\text{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\$\ext{\$\ex{\$\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit Exc2 Not 21...g6 22 2xf6, or 21...h6 22 2xh6. On 21...\$f8, White wins with 22 2xh7 2xh7 23 \timesh5!.

22 Axf6 h6 23 Wh5! **≜xf6** (D) Or 23... If8 24 Axg7,



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25 **Exh6+! \$**xh6 26 營度6#


This winning combination (as pointed out by Igor Zaitsev) immediately settles the question of the strongest way to continue the attack. There is no need to analyse any of the other lines. As you see, it is not only important to draw up a complete list of candidate moves; you must also decide on the best order in which to examine them.

The combination would be much easier to find if White clearly had no other promising possibilities. However, in this case he did have some, and they began by distracting our attention. In such circumstances you could easily miss 21 \$c2!! even if you were an excellent tactician. The search technique that we have been practising ('candidate moves') significantly increases our chances of success.

However, no technique is any help if a player lacks keen combinative vision. This quality must be developed and trained by regularly solving appropriate exercises.

In the actual game, Miguel Najdorf played the weaker 21 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\)d1?!. His opponent could have parried

White's threat by giving advance protection to the f7-point: 21...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c7! (22 皇h5 包xh5 23 豐xh5? 皇xg5). Instead Kotov carelessly played 21... \(\mathbb{u}\) a5?, and after 22 \(\mathbb{L}\) h5! the white attack was irresistible. The concluding moves were: 22... Zed8 (22...包xh5 23 豐xh5; 22...耳f8 23 **≜**xf6 **≜**xf6 24 **≜**xf7+ **⊑**xf7 25 **豐xh7+) 23 皇xf7+ 曾f8 24 皇h6!** ②e8 25 對f4 息f6 26 息xg7+ 當e7



В

Dvoretsky - Butnorius Dubna 1970

I had mishandled the opening, and at this point Black could have obtained an excellent position with the simple continuation 16...dxc4! 17 bxc4 විc6, forcing 18 වි4b3 or 18 ②4f3 (not 18 ②xc6? bxc6 19 里e2 豐d3 threatening 20... 豐xh3 and 20.... Id8). Without a doubt,

the game would not yet be won for Black - it would 'merely' be excellent. Alternatively he can try for more by playing his knight to e4, but in that case he is falling behind in development, so the consequences need to be calculated in detail. Luckily for me, my opponent made his move without properly examining the variations.

16 9)e4?

Clearly White must sacrifice the exchange (17 ②4f3? ②xd2 18 2xd2 dxc4 is thoroughly bad for him), but which way should he do it? Once we locate all the candidate possibilities, it is fairly easy to decide which is strongest:

- a) 17 Exe4 dxe4 18 2xe4:
- b) 17 ②xe4 ②xe1 18 徵xe1 dxe4 19 \(\mathbb{W}\)xe4;
 - c) 17 ②xe4 Axe1 18 cxd5.

In the first two cases, all we can speak of is some compensation for the lost exchange; whereas in the third case a double-edged position arises, and it is not clear whose game is preferable.

So you see that sometimes we are not looking for candidate moves but for 'candidate possibilities' - short variations which may begin identically.

> 17 ②xe4! ≜xe1 18 cxd5!

White's pieces dominate the centre, and his d5-pawn is preventing

the normal development of Black's queen's knight.

18 ... **≜h4** 18...**⊈**a5!?. 19 **Df3!** Ee8 20 Wd4 ₫f8

What does Black want to do now? To bring his knight out to d7, of course. Can this be stopped?

> 21 De5! ₩b6?!

Black would lose at once with 21... ②d7? 22 ②xd7 **豐**xd7 23 2)f6+!. It was worth considering 21...f5, but White would then have maintained the advantage with 22 ②g3 **쌀**f6 23 f4.


22 **当d3**

Black has no moves. If 22... 20a6. then 23 Ød7 followed by 24 Øf6+ is decisive.

I must explain that despite the obvious excellence of my position, I wasn't at all in an optimistic mood. In the Dubna Young Masters' Tournament I had been playing atrociously, constantly committing oversights which were chiefly due to a lack of patience, a wholly unjustified haste in the taking of decisions. In the previous game I had thrown away what was virtually a won position with a single hurried move. In the present game, my opening play had been abysmal. It was sheer luck that my opponent had handed me the initiative for the proverbial 'mess of pottage'.

"Sure", I thought, "I've got a decent position, but I bet I'll lose my nerve again and make some blunder. Well, whatever he plays, I'm going to take a full five minutes over my next move! I've got loads of time in hand - I must use it."

After a long think, Butnorius played:




This actually disconcerted me. "It's quite clear - I take on g6, he develops his knight on d7, and then there'll be something to think about, but right now, what am I supposed to do with my five minutes? Well never mind, I'm sticking to my word all the same."

Just for something to do, I started going over some other possibilities apart from 23 Dxg6. (There we are - candidate moves!) The result was that after thinking for not just five minutes but twenty, I worked out a winning combination.

23 d6!! Tye5

On 23...fxe5 I intended 24 ②f6+! (24 ②g5! is equally strong) 24...gxf6 (24...\$f7 25 \$\times \text{xe8}\$ 26 \psi xg6+ \psi d8 27 \psi g5+!) 25 ₩xg6+ \$h8 26 ₩xe8 ₩xd6 27 Ic1 ₩e7 28 ₩c8, and Black is defenceless.

	24	.£xe5	fxe5
	25	₩c4+	⊈h7
	26	₩c8	₩d4 (D)
2	6\$	xd6 27 🖸	g5+ and mates



W

27 **包g5+**

White takes it into his head to give up another rook for luck. The sacrifice leads to a forced mate. In principle, however, this kind of "combination for combination's sake" (the phrase is Grandmaster Vladimir Simagin's) should on no

account be commended. After all. on the elementary 27 Le1 (with threats of \wxf8 and \wxb7) Black could only resign. The best way is always the simplest!


27	***	\$ h6
28	包f7 +	⊈h7
29	₩xf8	₩xa1+
30	⊈g2	€)c6
31	₩xa8	g5
32	②xg5+	⊈ g6
33	₩e8+!	1-0

2. What could I have missed?

Sometimes during our analysis we need to come back to the task of looking for candidate moves. (We may simply have forgotten to perform that task at the right time; but then again, we can't always be sure that our list of possibilities was complete.) If the variations aren't turning out in our favour, it makes sense to go back to the beginning and ask, "What else could there be in the position? What idea could I have failed to notice?" Conversely, if the prospects look particularly bright, we should turn the question round - what other resources might the opponent have? From time to time, try throwing off the burden of the lines you have analysed, and take a look at the position with fresh eves. This practice often gives excellent results.

Here is another aspect of the same rule. Don't be in a hurry to calculate too far ahead. If problems arise that demand analysis in depth, don't rush to do it. First ask yourself how essential it is. Are there any improvements for yourself or your opponent at an earlier stage? New ideas at the start of a variation are a good deal more important than refinements at the end of it; they are far more relevant to the process of fighting.

I once gave Artur Yusupov this study to solve:



W

A. Wotawa Deutsche Schachzeitung 1938 Draw

Artur thought for a long time, vainly trying to find salvation among the intricacies of the unpleasant rook ending.

\$h5

⇔h6

Calculating variations right to

9 **Zh8+** and wins

⊈ g 6+

"Stop analysing!" I said to him at last. "Just look at the position and think what you might have missed."

All at once Artur hit on the solution.


1	e4!!	fxe4
2	⊈ g7	L h5
3	⊈ g6	Ze5
4	\$ f6	ℤe8
5	⊈ f7	

The king endlessly pursues the rook.

3. Should we re-check our calculations?

Another of Kotov's principles - to go down each branch of the 'tree of variations' once and only once seems to me dubious. After all, we are not disinterestedly exploring possibilities - we are looking for the strongest moves. They don't always come into our head immediately, and sometimes there is no reason why they should do so before our analysis of the position has reached a certain point. Suppose the variations are not turning out right for us because some detail is lacking. It then dawns on us that this detail can be supplied by inserting some intermediate move which looked pointless at first sight.

How is White to stop the enemy pawn? In the event of 1 2d5 2xd7



W

F. Bondarenko and A. Kuznetsov Commendation. Gorgiev Mem 1977

2 a5, Black manages to bring his bishop to f3: 2... \$\dot{b}53 \dot{b}7 \dot{e}24 a6 皇f3 5 皇xf3 gxf3 6 a7 h1豐, and Black has the advantage. The zwischenzug 1 Ad5+ (with the idea of 1...\$26? 2 \$\mathbb{I}\$d6+ and 3 \$\mathbb{L}\$d5) is met by 1...f5! 2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf5+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)g6, for example: 3 4 h 5 4 x h 5 4 d d 5 2 x a 4 followed by bringing the bishop to f3, or 3 ad5 axf5 4 a5 ae5 5 ab7 \$£7 6 a6 \$d5, and Black wins.

There remains 1 Id1, but then 1... @xa4! 2 Ic1 @c6+3 &b8 h1 W leads to a drawn bishop endgame.

This appears to be the best White can do - but the appearance is deceptive. Let's not be in such a hurry to agree a draw. Let us try to invent something. This of course is

where some imagination is called for, but the accurate analysis we have already performed will also be of use.

We can find the solution if we think of the move 3 Exc6 (instead of 3 \$\displaystyle b8) in the last-mentioned variation. Unfortunately it doesn't work, but the idea can be improved.


1 単d5+!!

We already know that this is the only move.

2 **E**d1! **⊉** xa4

Here again, our foregoing analysis established that Black has no choice. If the a-pawn stays on the board, White easily wins the bishop ending.

3	E c1	. ⊈. c6+
. 4	Exc6!	h1₩
5	≜ f7+	\$25 (D)



W

6 f4+!

gxf3

the end, one after the other, is, then, something we rarely have to do. After putting together the list of candidate moves, perform a quick assessment, a preliminary examination of them. Your provisional conclusions are sure to come in useful as you pursue your calculations further. You may be able to gauge how promising some particular variation is, and establish a rational order for your further analyses. Perhaps (as in Najdorf-Kotov, for instance) one move will prove so strong that it is simply not worth analysing the others.

4. Keep a mental note of the results of your calculations; terminate each variation with a definite conclusion

Sometimes a completely precise verdict is required, as when analysing 33...d3! in the Alexander-Euwe game. In that case an exact result - win or draw - had to be reached. If we had broken off the calculations only half-way through, with the verdict 'a bit unclear', we could not have taken the right decision.

However, a precise evaluation is by no means always essential. For example, you may come to the conclusion that a certain position arises by force but is difficult to assess and would require additional calculations. If necessary you will carry them out later, starting from the position in question and not repeating the analysis that led up to it. That is the point of retaining your conclusions from the variations already studied.


5. Prophylactic thinking

It often helps to begin thinking about the position by asking, "What does my opponent want? What would he play if it were his move?"

Readers familiar with my earlier books will surely need no convincing that a capacity for prophylactic thought is of immense value. All the same, let me give one more example.

What does Black want? Advancing the f-pawn would only weaken his position. A much better idea is to bring his bishop into play via c8 or b7. To do this, he first has to protect his knight with ...b5.

This tells us how White should handle the position.



W

Lerner - Lukin **ÚSSR 1977**

21 a4!


One threat is 22 \(\mathbb{L} f1. \) If 21...b5. then 22 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}}\$} \) (22...\(\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt 2)d4 2)xe5 24 Wf5 f6 25 axb5 **\$b7 26 ■**xa7) **23 ₩f4 a6 24 \$xc4** bxc4 25 \wxxxxxxxxx leaves White with an extra pawn.

The question arises whether White can reach the same position with 21 \(\mathbb{Q} f1 \) (and if 21...b5, then 22 a4). Which move-order is more accurate? Here we have to concentrate on looking for resources for the opponent. We are bound to give preference to the pawn move once we notice that 21 \(\textit{n}\) f1 can be met by the unexpected 21... Wa3! - even though, as Utut Adianto pointed out. White still retains the better chances with 22 axc4 axc4 23 2g5! b5 24 2e4.

In the game, Konstantin Lerner didn't think about prophylaxis. He simply played 21 Zad1?!. His opponent replied 21...b5!, not worrying about 22 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7 \(\mathbb{L}\)c8! 23 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe7 (or 23 e6 \(\text{\text} \text{xd7 24 exd7 \(\text{\text} \text{xe1+} \) 25 ②xe1 Ixe1+ 26 Af1 Id8) 23... axg4 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xa7 \(\alpha\)xf3 25 \(\alpha\)xf3 ②xe5 with approximate equality.

6. What is the drawback to my opponent's move?

If he makes an unexpected and disconcerting move, ask yourself this question. Logical considerations sometimes help you to find the weak spot in your opponent's idea and the best way to counter iŁ



В

Ciocaltea – Liberzon Netanya 1983

16 ... Eab8

Let us apply some 'prophylactic thinking' and ask ourselves what Black wants. Obviously, to play ...b5, open the b-file and pressurize the b2-pawn. How can this be opposed?

Now 17...b5 will be answered by 18 axb5 \(\boxed{\pi}\)xb5 19 \(\boxed{\pi}\)c2. Then the bishop will go to c1, solidly defending the pawn, while the rook is transferred to e2 on the open file. A fine concept!

Let us now put ourselves in Black's place and try to detect the minus side of White's plan. With the white rook on c2, Black has ...d4 with the threat of ... \(\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{a}}}}\)b3. However, White replies c4, when the blocking of the queenside should be to his liking.

Another point is that after \(\mathbb{\pi}\)c2 the a4-pawn is vulnerable. How can Black exploit this? If he is giving up the idea of ... b5, there is nothing for the rook to do on b8. So 17... be8 seems indicated, and if 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 then 18...\(\alpha\)d8!. On the other hand if White tries 18 \(\Preceq e 3 \) b6 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2?, our previous idea will work: 19...d4! (with tempo) and then ... **≜**b3.

17 ... 9)c8?!

This is another way to attack a4 (18 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 \(\Q\)b6), but a less effective one. What is its disadvantage? The

knight has left the kingside, where it was needed for defence.

18 **2** g5!

Threatening 19 Wh5 and 20 **夕g6#**.

18 ... g6?!

18... If 6 is better. Now the alh8 diagonal is weakened. How can White utilize this weakness?

19 c4! **d4**


19...dxc4? is unplayable due to 20 ≜xc6. By forcing his opponent to close the queenside, White has freed his hands for active operations on the other wing. His advantage is now beyond doubt.

20 We2 分b6 21 b3 Lbe8 22 **對f2** ②c8 23 **Qf3 Z**xe1+ 24 **Z**xe1 **ILe8 25 IXe8 對xe8 26 g4! ②d6 27** gxf5 2xf5 28 2e4 2e3 (28...2ce7 is more tenacious) 29 &xc6! bxc6 30 ②e4 ②g4 31 豐g2 ②h6 32 豐g5 **幽f8 33 幽xc5 幽xc5 34 约xc5 1-0**

7. What am I trying to achieve?

This too is a useful question. Clarify your aims. Do you want to exchange a pair of pieces, seize an important square, prevent some active undertaking by your opponent, or what? A logical examination of the position may suggest a direction for further analysis.

Black has a healthy extra pawn. It is tempting to go into action at



Kotkov - Dvoretsky Moscow Championship 1972

once with 54... La3+. That move must be adequate to win, and yet to me it seemed technically imprecise. Black's king is stuck on the edge of the board and at the moment is taking no part in the game. Here is a sample variation (though of course it is not forced), in which this defect makes itself felt: 55 \(\delta\)d2 のxd4? 56 のxd4 単d3+ 57 堂c2 ■xd4 58 ■e1!, and White actually wins.

Black would first like to bring his king a bit nearer, so as to support the c-pawn or stop the opponent's passed e-pawn if the need arises. I therefore started considering a rook exchange.


其b5!?

Now if 55 \(\mathbb{\square}\) a1+, then after 55...\$b7 the king has moved closer

to the centre, and Black will still get his check on the third rank. The only question is what happens if White exchanges on b5 and picks up the d-pawn with his knight. Let us try to find theanswer, but it will have to be convincing and relatively uncomplicated. The initial position is too good to warrant the slightest risk.

⊈xb5 55 **Exb**5 56 Dc3+ **\$**b4 57 9xd5+ **ф**b3 58 e6 (D)

If 58 \$\d2 \Omega xi4, the outcome is obvious.



After the text-nove, Black may play 58...De7!?, but first it is better to look at something more forcing - winning the white knight.

58 ... **c3** 59 ②xc3 \$xc3 60 d5

Quickly reaching this position in my calculations, I had a momentary fright - I didn't see how to stop the pawns. However, I then asked myself, "Where should my knight be going?" To d6 of course. and if possible with tempo. So its route became clear.

> 60 ... 9)a5! €)c4+ 61 e7 62 **⇔**e2 4)d6

This whole episode is instructive from the viewpoint of the technical exploitation of an advantage. Black is clearly more comfortable playing with his king on b7. Once it turns out that White cannot afford to exchange rooks, Black can make life easier for himself by playing 54...\subseteq b5. For that reason it is worth making the effort and calculating the forced variation, especially if you are able to do it quickly and accurately (in my case it took about three minutes). I think we are now better placed to understand that good technique is in many respects founded on short, precise tactical calculations.

It remains for me to show how the game concluded: 54... Zb5! 55 **Za1+ \$b7 56 \$f2 Zb2 57 \$e3** 型b3+ 58 含f2 罩b2 59 含e3 罩b3+ (sealed). Another point about technical exploitation: in won positions it doesn't pay to force events before the adjournment - though

of course new regulations to eliminate adjournments make this advice redundant.

60 \$\psi f2 h4 61 e6 \$\psi c7\$ (this is where Black's 54th move brings results!) 62 La8 h3 63 Lg8 De7 64 Ih8 \$\pside d6 65 \$\Qig1 c3 66 \$\psie e3\$ c2+ (another way is 66... 151 67 ②e2 h2 68 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xh2 c2 69 \(\frac{1}{2}\) d2 c1\(\frac{1}{2}\) + 70 公xc1 里b2+) 67 全d2 里g3! (but not 67... 프b1? 68 신e2 h2 69 신c1!) 0-1

Let us now proceed to examine the other aspect of decision-taking technique. This aspect is even less well studied.

Principles of rational, economical thinking

First, the most general statement of aims. When thinking about your move, your task is not at all to calculate every variation to the end and attain an exhaustive understanding of the position. You have one task, and one only: to take the correct decision, to play the best move. As far as possible, try to minimize your expenditure of time and effort. You should only calculate the minimum number of variations necessary for making the right decision.

How is this to be achieved? Here are some suggestions.

1. What should you think about first?

In Krasenkov's article you will find some interesting ideas on this topic, but they are partly at variance with my own recommendations. It is up to you to choose which ones you think are nearer the truth.

If there is an attractive continuation which forces the play, then of course it makes sense to begin your calculations with this line (as we saw, for example, when analysing Alexander-Euwe). It is usually sensible to start by examining the forcing moves such as exchanges, moves that win material, or the opposite - sacrifices. Calculating a concrete line is often simpler than appraising the consequences of a quiet continuation.

Once I was talking to Mikhail Katz, the famous draughts trainer who has coached an entire galaxy of Women's World Champions (Elena Altshul, Zoya Zadovskaya and others). He told me he taught his pupils to start by considering all possible moves that put men en prise. As a result it was extremely rare for them to miss unexpected combinations.

If you discover a combinative idea and feel it is probably sound, it makes sense to examine the opponent's weakest-looking answers

first. (Again, let us recall Alexander-Euwe. We did things in that order when we studied the position after Black's 35th move.) Quickly looking over the easiest variations. you narrow down the field of investigation, possibly restricting it to one or two continuations. After that it is easier, from the psychological viewpoint, to concentrate all your efforts on the crucial lines.

Conversely, if you suspect the combination will not work, begin by concentrating on the defence that looks best. If it refutes the combination, that is enough; there is no point in examining any other resources the opponent may have.

Obviously these recommendations are far from having absolute validity. In chess the most varied situations arise, and you may have to cope with them in completely different ways, but the guidelines I have given will apply to the majority of cases.

2. The 'emergency exit'

I shall not give any examples of this, but simply explain the idea.

Suppose an obscure position has arisen and it is not clear who is better. You start to work out a complex combination and notice that at some point, if you want, you can

force perpetual check or (for instance) a level endgame. You are now justified in breaking off and saying "Right, then - I'll play the combination! I've got perpetual check in hand. There should be some more attacking chances, but I won't finish calculating them - I can do it later, or force the draw if there's nothing else for it."

The 'emergency exit', which allows you to do without calculating the critical variation in advance. doesn't have to be a forced draw. It is enough to note that somewhere along the line you have a move which may actually be second-rate but which you nonetheless judge to be perfectly acceptable. A few moves later you will find it much easier to decide whether to go into the main variation or be content with a reasonable deal.

3. Process of elimination

Sometimes there is no point in precisely calculating the line you intend to play. You just need to conclude that the line makes some sense, that there is no immediate refutation, and that you have nothing better anyway - all other moves are bad. By such means you may be able to save a great deal of time and energy. Some chess players are prone to

forget this method of selecting a move, or apply it ineptly.

In the years 1973-5 I worked with Valery Chekhov, preparing him for the World Junior Championship. We gave a lot of attention to perfecting his technique for decision-taking and especially for making economical use of his thinking time (Chekhov was then a time-trouble addict). An instructive episode occurred in one of the training games we played.

Dvoretsky - Chekhov Moscow 1974 Réti Opening

1 2f3 9)f6 2 g3 **g**6 3 b3 **⊈g7** 4 **♠**b2

Valery had a reason for asking me to play this particular system (of which I didn't know the theory at that time). This was how Alexander Kochiev, his chief rival in the coming qualifying tournament, liked to play with White. It must be said that this kind of opening scheme, for all its unassuming appearance, contains a fair amount of poison. If Black has no precise plan, he can soon land in a strategically difficult situation - he only needs to commit two or three barely perceptible inaccuracies.

That is exactly what happened, for example, in the very important game Yusupov-Zapata played in the 1977 World Junior Championship at Innsbruck. The Colombian Alonso Zapata played magnificently in the second half of the tournament (scoring 6 out of 7) and took second prize. His only loss towards the finish was against the player who went on to win the Championship - but see how easy this win was for Yusupov: 4...d6 5 d4 0-0 6 2g2 2bd7 (if Black is intending ...e5, it is better to play it at once -6...e5 - and meet 7 dxe5 by 7...公fd7) 7 0-0 e5?! (7...里e8!?; 7...c6!?) 8 dxe5 @g4 9 @c3 dxe5 10 2d2 Ze8 (10...f5 would be answered by 11 e4, but perhaps that was the lesser evil) 11 2c4 2b6 12 ②xb6! cxb6 (12...axb6 13 ∰xd8 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xd8 14 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)fd1, and 14...\(\mathbb{\pi}\)e8 fails to 15 约d5) 13 豐xd8 里xd8 14 里ad1 \$£f5 (good ideas for Black are already hard to come by) 15 \(\text{\Omega} \text{xb7}\) **Zab8 16 e4 ≜d7 17 &d5**, and White went on to exploit his extra nawn in comfort.

0-0 4 ...

Occasionally even such a natural move as castling can prove a loss of time. The most precise move-order is 4...d6! (intending 5...e5) 5 d4 c5!. The point is that White has to do something about 6...cxd4 7 2xd4 d5, but 6 c4 can

be answered either by 6...cxd4 7 ②xd4 d5 8 ag2 dxc4, or by 6... De4 with the unpleasant threat of 7... $\forall a5+$ (if the moves 4...0-0 5 \$22, had been inserted, White could simply castle here). Nor does White achieve anything with 6 dxc5 營a5+7 包bd2 營xc5 (threatening 8... 22g4; 8 a3 would now be a mistake due to 8...0-0 9 \(\textit{\textit{g}}\)g2 ②g4! 10 ②e4 ②xf2!!) 8 单d4 豐h5 (8... **世**c7 is also good) 9 皇g2 **②**c6 10 \(\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

Another way of carrying out the same idea is 4...c5! (threatening 5...d5) 5 c4 d6! (with a view to 6...e5) 6 d4 (2)e4!.

In such positions ...e5 is an unpleasant positional threat, since the b2-bishop would be shut out of the game. White could only activate it with e2-e3 and d2-d4, which would be difficult to carry out.


The game Korchnoi-Gligorić, USSR-Yugoslavia match 1956 continued 9 e3 2g4 10 \(\text{\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}} c1 \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$} xf3 11 \) **\$xf3 2**g5 12 **\$xc6** bxc6 13 dxc5 dxc5 14 \(\hat{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\)xg7 \(\hat{\text{\text{2}}}\)xg7 15 f4 \(\hat{\text{\text{2}}}\)e4 with equality.

After 9... 2xd2 10 \wind xd2 the pin on the a1-h8 diagonal disappears

and White will aim to gain a space advantage with d4-d5.

10 ②h4!? (D)

The e4-knight is attacked. How would you continue for Black? What position would you aim for?



В

Sharp attempts like 10... 25? 11 f4 ②h3+ 12 ★h1 and 10...d5? 11 cxd5 \wxd5 12 g4 clearly fail. 10... 2)f6? is also bad; the spacegaining d4-d5 (either at once or after exchanging on f5) guarantees White a positional plus. That leaves only 10...2xd2.

When playing 10 4h4, I was intending to investigate whether I could spoil Black's pawn formation by inserting an exchange on f5. The complications following 11 Dxf5 Dxf1 12 Dxg7 might turn out in my favour, due to the powerful b2-bishop. But of course I didn't start working out the variations

beforehand; I merely satisfied myself that the simple 11 \wxd2 (the 'emergency exit'!) was perfectly playable.

In general terms 11 2xf5 looks a suspect idea; therefore, as I have said before, we should begin by looking for the simplest refutation. There is no hurry to study the position where Black is the exchange up (even if that position is in his favour). First ask yourself what the candidate moves are. I saw the reply 11... 2xc4!, keeping a sound extra pawn for Black, and broke off my calculations at that point.

So 11 \wxd2 is forced. Most likely Black should not allow the advance d4-d5 (although 11... 2d7 is possible) so he should choose between 11...cxd4 12 20xf5 gxf5 13 2xc6 bxc6 14 2xd4 and 11... 2xd4 12 公xf5 公xf5 13 单xb7. Which of these positions should Black prefer? What is required now is not calculation but sure positional assessment.

I think the second possibility is the right one. White has to conduct an attack on the kingside with h4h5 or f4-f5 as appropriate, but the success of such an attack is very doubtful, because there are not all that many pieces left on the board and meanwhile Black is ready to counter-attack on the queenside at once by advancing his a-pawn.

Objectively the chances are about level here.

Taking on d4 with the pawn is weaker, since pawn weaknesses are formed in the black camp. The better pawn structure guarantees White a small but lasting advantage.

What happened in the game? After I played 10 2h4. Chekhov sank into thought. I spent a couple of minutes looking at the consequences of 10...2xd2 11 2xf5. Then, having convinced myself (in his thinking time!) that that line was unplayable, I got up and walked about. There was nothing more to think about - it was up to my opponent to choose his move.

Ten minutes passed, then another ten. This rather began to irritate me. What was he thinking of? By process of elimination it is quite easy to see that Black must exchange knights. Why waste any time on it, then?

约xd2 10 ... 11 Wxd2

As you would expect, I made my move instantaneously, whereupon Chekhov once again immersed himself in thought for twenty-five minutes or so. Evidently he had still not come to a definite conclusion. or else some new doubts had arisen, bringing him back to the problem he had been struggling with.


Of course, it was sheer waste to spend nearly an hour on such a relatively uncomplicated problem. What's more, Chekhov's solution was by no means the best.

11 ... cxd4?! 12 Dxf5 gxf5 13 Axc6 bxc6 14 2xd4 **≜**xd4?! 14...e5 15 **≜**b2 **₩**e7 was prefer-

able.

15 Wxd4 c5?(D)

After this Black has a difficult position. He had to choose between 15...\delta'd7, intending ...e5, and 15...e6, preparing ...d5. But then, there is nothing surprising in my opponent's weak play. If you use up too much time and energy at one particular stage, you won't have enough left to solve your problems afterwards.



W

16 Wf4 ₩d7 17 Had1

This threatens 18 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)d5, winning a pawn.

> ₩e6 17 ...

18 **Efe1**

Black has to contend not only with \$\mathbb{\pi}\d5. but also with the lineopening move e2-e4.

18 ...

If 18... #f6, White plays 19 #d5 e5 20 \dd d2 (from this variation we can see why 18 e3?! would have been less exact).

> 19 **E**d5 я5

Black could put up stiffer resistance with 19... We4 20 Xxf5 Wxf4 21 \(\pi\)xf4 a5. The advance of the apawn would promise him some counterplay in the endgame, but is not much use in the middlegame. White replies by organizing an attack on the king.

20 Exf5 24 21 e4 axb3 22 axb3 IIfh8 23 **Ee3**

White has a strategically won position. He aims to open lines on the kingside with g4-g5.

After the game I naturally asked Chekhov what he had been thinking about when he took such a long time over move 10.

"Well, you know," he replied, "I was deciding what to do afterwards."

"But 10... 2xd2 was forced, wasn't it?"

"Yes, it was."

"Were you risking anything when you played it? Could it have lost outright?"


"No."

"Then why didn't you play it and think afterwards, in the position where you actually had to make a choice? With that position in front of you on the board, it would be easier - there would be less chance you'd miss something. In any case, you might have been able to do some of your thinking in my time. If you'd taken on d2 at once, I'd still have been looking at 11 2xf5."

Oddly enough, these arguments were new to Chekhov at the time. He was wholly unfamiliar with such time-saving devices as the process of elimination. But then, large numbers of players are prone to this same kind of inefficient thinking.

As a result of analysing his typical mistakes in the taking of decisions. Chekhov almost eliminated the desperate time-scrambles that had characterized his earlier games. In the following year (1975) he successfully came through the elimination process and went on to gain the distinguished title of World Junior Champion.

In Part 3 of Secrets of Chess Training I described an interesting type of exercise - playing out endgame studies over-the-board. In this way you can develop your imagination and your analytical technique; in particular, you can learn to make sensible use of the process of elimination.



W

G. Kasparian 1st Prize, '30 Years of Soviet Armenia' Tourney 1950

White's knight is trapped and will hardly escape alive. The attempt to extricate it with the aid of the bishop is easily refuted: 1 \(\triangle d5\)? \$\frac{1}{2}\$ (not the immediate 1...e6? 2) £xe6 \$xe6 3 ②g6) 2 £c4 e6 3 \$\preceq\$g3 \(\text{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\text{\tin}\exitite{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\tittt{\text{\texit{\ looks tempting in view of the lines 1... 皇g7 2 e5+ and 1... 曾g7 2 曾g4 ②f6+3 \$f5. However, Black has

the much stronger 1... 2f4+2 \dig g4 e5! followed by ... 2g7. Playing it this way. White has no chance.

What else can he do? The only continuation to offer any hope is 1 e5+ \prescript{\$\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\pr ②f43 當g3 or 2 \$\delta\$xh3 \$\delta\$xh83 \$\delta\$g4 ②g7 4 \(\delta\)g5, trying to exploit the temporary lack of co-ordination of the black pieces. Of course, we have to be quick to unearth the little traps that make life easier for us in some variations, for instance 2 \$\documens\$xh3 & f4+ 3 & g4 and then 3... 2d3 4 2g6! or 3... 2e6 4 2f7! \$xf7 5 \$d5 with a draw.

Thus our first move is clear.

1 e5+! **\$**27

Now which way do we go? If 2 ≜f3? Øf4 3 \ g3, the black knight finds an extra square, g2. After 3... Øg2! 4 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}}\$ and defended our defended sive resources are exhausted. Therefore we must capture the pawn at once.

2 \$\price xh3! ⊈xh8

An immediate draw would result from 2... ②f4+3 \$\dig 94 \Oze2\$ (we already know how to meet 3... 2d3 or 3... (2)e6) 4 \$\dip g5 \dip xh8 5 \dip g6, and Black cannot stop the threatened 6 \$\displaystyle f7 (e.g. 5...\displaystyle g8 6 \$\displaystyle d5+).

3 **⊈g4 ②g7**

Now Black must have a long think, as it is not at all simple to convert his extra knight into a win.

While he is at it, we shall work out some variations too. After 4...\$28 5 \$26, he can only strengthen his position by 5...e6 6 \$66 \$b4. Now 7 \(c8\)? would be a mistake, as after 7... \$\displays f8 the e6-pawn cannot be taken because of 8... 2e7+; while on 8 \(\text{\$\text{\$d}} \)7 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$e}}} \)7 + 9 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\ex{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exit{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$ ≜h4 (zugzwang) 11 ≜d7 Black places his king on e7 and consolidates his forces. We must attack the pawn from the other diagonal: 7 \(2a6! \(\delta f8 \) 8 \(2c4 \(2e7 + 9 \) \(\delta g6 \) ♠h4 10 ♠a2, and Black is unable to improve his position any further.


4...\$h7 does not alter matters: 5 호e4+ 호g8 6 호g6.

Black's only remaining try is to remove his knight from g7:

> 4 ... 6)e6+

5 **⊈**g6 皇g7! (D)

5... 2 d8 is useless: 6 **2** d5 (intending 7 e6) 6...e6 7 2xe6! 2xe6 8 **\$**f7.



Seeing that 6 \$f7? 20d8+ is unplayable. White must move his bishop, renewing the threat of \$\dot{\dot} f7. Black will reply 6... 2d8, and then we play 7 e6!. However, where

should the bishop go?

If 6 \(\textit{\$\alpha}\)c6?, Black replies 6...\(\textit{\$\alpha}\)d8 with tempo. Other tries that fail are 6 \(\alpha a 8 ? \(\Delta c 7 \), 6 \(\alpha e 4 ? \(\Delta c 5 \), 6 \(\alpha f 3 ? \) ②d4 and 6 ≜g2? ②f4+. That leaves only 6 \$c8 or 6 \$h1, but after 6 \(\delta c 8 ? \) \(\delta d 8 ! 7 e 6 \(\delta g 8 \) the black knight comes into play via c6 or b7. The bishop is compelled to remain on the long diagonal.

6 &h1!! &\48

⊈h2 7 e6!

8 \$45!

Not 8 \$a8? ②xe6 9 \$f7 ②c7.

8 ...

9 \$\psi\h6 **\$**c1+

9... \$\document{2}{9} g8 doesn't help: 10 \$\document{2}{9} g6 \$\psi f8 11 \$\psi h7\$. An amusing sight: the black knight and king are prisoners in their own camp!

10 **\$**26

⊈d2

11 **A**h1!! (D)


Again the only safe square for the bishop.

> 11 ... **©e**3

12 Ad5!

The drawn result is now obvious.

We have thus traced roughly what a chess player would be thinking if he had to play the position in Kasparian's endgame study. As you



can see, there is no need to analyse any long and complicated variations 'to the end'; it is much more important to examine the


essential short variations precisely, while trying to register all **≙a3** the vital resources both for our-

selves and for the opponent.

4. Comparison

This is quite a sophisticated device. Sometimes a quick choice of move can be made purely on the following lines: you realize that this move brings about a situation which is in no respect worse, and in some respect better, than the one you would obtain from a different continuation. For example, it was just in this way that we arrived at the correct order of moves (33...d3!, not 33...\bubble{1}b1+?) in the game Alexander-Euwe.

Let us consider the following study.



E. Bondarehko and M. Liburkin 2nd Prize, All-Union Physical Culture and Sport Committee 1950

White has two moves, 1 2h4 and 1 2e1. They come to the same thing in the case of 1... \$\dot\graphg1 2 Øf3+ \delta g2 3 Øxh2. However, after 1 Del 2c3! White again has to play 2 \$\alpha\$f3, whereupon 2...\$\alpha\$g2 brings about the same position only with the black bishop on c3. We don't even need to figure out whether this has any significance. Why should we give the opponent an additional defensive resource? What we should play is clear.

1 9h4!


When thinking about a move in practical play, you aren't called

upon to elucidate how the game is meant to end. Starting by comparing the two possibilities, you quickly place the knight on h4 and leave it to your opponent to look for a way to save himself. In his thinking time you can form a better picture of the ensuing variations.

\$221 1 ... 9)f3+ **\$**2 3 2 xh2 **⇔**xh2

Now if White goes after the apawn, Black will lock him in by running across to c7 with his king. How can this be prevented?

> **≜**xe5 (D) 4 e5!



W

\$e6!! \$23 **\$**f4 6 **\$**d7

7 \$\doc{\phi}{2} \c8

Black's bishop gets in the way of his own king.

Observe what happens in the case of 4...2c3 (instead of 4...2xe5) 5

e6 &b4 6 &e5 &g3 7 &d5 &f4 8 \$c6 \$e5 9 \$b7 \$d6, and this time the king hampers the bishop: 10 e7! and wins.

From this last variation it emerges that if White mistakenly starts with 1 Del?, the tempo Black gains by 1... ac3! is of vital significance: 2 2f3 \$\preceq\$g2 3 2xh2 \$xh2 4 e5 \$g3 5 e6 \$b4 6 \$e5 호f8 (or 6...할g4) 7 할d5 할f4 8 \$\psi_c6 \psi_e5 9 \psi_b7 \psi_d6 10 \psi_xa7 \$c7 and draws.

5. Don't spend too long analysing extremely complex variations - in such cases, rely on your 'feel'


Ouite often we encounter obscure situations where it is practically impossible to arrive at the truth in conditions of limited thinking time. Even if you find the right move, the price for using up an immense amount of energy may prove too high. Most likely you will have too little time and strength left for later decisions.

In what cases does it make sense to spend a lot of time thinking about a move? The answer is, when you understand that vou may find a precise solution to the problem that faces you, and that this solution will decisively affect the further course of the game - in other words, at the key moments of the struggle (the ability to identify them is very important); alternatively if you can't see a continuation that is at all acceptable, and need to discover one.


With that, this chapter closes. I don't recommend that you restrict yourself to the above advice; delve into the matter more deeply, evolve new principles of your own. Study examples which illustrate the rational technique of searching for moves and taking decisions. Solve special training exercises; analyse your own performance in tournament games. I hope that this manner of working at your chess will gain your interest. But are we talking about chess alone? After all, rational, precisely organized thought is of value in any sphere of life.

In conclusion, here are some quite difficult exercises for you to solve independently.


Exercises




1. White to move



3. White to move



2. Evaluate 1 Wh5



4. Black to move

2 Wandering in the Jungle

Mikhail Krasenkov

The calculation of variations is one of the fundamental elements determining a chess player's choice of move. The ability to calculate accurately a long way ahead, in conditions of limited time on the clock, is the paramount factor in your standard of play, and depends to a large extent on organizing and disciplining your thoughts. Perhaps the foremost specialist in this field was Grandmaster Alexander Kotov, the originator of a theory of chess analysis which ought to be familiar to every accomplished player. (All my quotations are from his book Think Like a Grandmaster.)

The fundamental concept in Kotov's theory is the 'tree of variations'. "All possible continuations in a given position can be visualized as a 'tree' in which variations and sub-variations are represented as branches and twigs." Kotov distinguishes between different types of 'tree' - between a 'bare trunk' (a single variation or branch), a 'coppice' (lots of short lines) and 'impenetrable thickets' or 'jungle

undergrowth' (masses of long, involved variations). In his opinion, the chief rule for calculation is "to go down each branch only once. No going over things twice, no going back! Only in a few individual cases, in especially complicated positions, will a grandmaster check through his chosen variation a second time. As a rule, he will not keep climbing all over the tree."

I would observe that, essentially, the tree of variations is formed during the process of calculation itself, so that we can speak of a particular order in which it takes shape.

On the very important question of assembling the branches of the tree - that is, deciding on the moves which call for examination in any particular position - Kotov formulates the following rule: "When beginning our analysis we must first of all mentally enumerate, and make an exact note of, all the possible candidate moves in the given situation... Having defined and collected them, we start working out one variation after

another in turn." This must, of course, apply not only to the initial position but to any position reached in the analysis, where one side has a choice of continuations. Thus, all possible candidate moves are determined once and for all, in advance of your analysis of the position. They are selected on the basis of general considerations, intuition, and so forth.


Basically, these two rules of Kotov's are applicable to the majority of positions in practical play, and if a chess player is able to obey them as a matter of second nature, this constitutes an immense step forward in his mental development.

Yet these rules also have significant shortcomings which emerge particularly in complex, obscure positions. International Master Boris Zlotnik, who has investigated this question, writes as follows:

"1. In complex positions it is extremely difficult to compile the list of candidate moves at the very outset of your calculations. In practice, the candidates come to light during the process of fathoming the position.

"2. A fine point in the analysis of one variation often dawns on you in the course of calculating a different line. Therefore in difficult situations, repeating your calculation is essential."

Here is a very simple example to illustrate Zlotnik's first point.



W

Alexander - Marshall Cambridge 1928

From examining the line 1 \(\mathbb{I}\)f4 exf4 2 gxf4, to which Black replies 2...dxc3 - controlling the g1-square - you could hit on the idea of sidestepping with the knight first, by 1 ②d5 or 1 ②a4! (and then 2 If4). The move 1 2a4 is indeed the quickest way to win. But without any analysis (however rudimentary) of the 1 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f4 line, it is hard to see what reason there would be to include 1 2 a4 among your candidate moves.

Zlotnik's second remark points to such characteristics of human thought as the workings of the subconscious and the faculty of association. Another major defect of Kotov's theory is also readily apparent: he ignores the problem of the order in which to examine the candidate moves, asserting that this "depends on the character and habits of the player, and on the peculiarities of the position". If, as Kotov assumes, it is obligatory to examine all the candidate moves. then of course the order hardly matters. In fact, though, there are many cases where, in the interests of economy, the analysis of some candidate moves can be dispensed with; it has no bearing on your decision, which can be reached simply by analysing the other moves. In such cases the order of analysis is of supreme importance.

In this chapter I shall try to present a more complex (though admittedly none too schematic) algorithm for calculation. This algorithm, which I shall illustrate by an example, is in fact used (unconsciously) by many chess players in obscure positions (of the 'jungle' type).

1. Define the aim of your analysis - in other words the criterion by which you will judge the variations and decide whether they satisfy you or not. The aim might be, for example, to attain a decisive material plus; to increase your positional advantage; to equalize the game; to put up resistance in a bad

position; and so on. The aim must be realistic, that is, it must be based on your assessment of the position and on intuitive considerations. Your sights may be raised somewhat higher if enough thinking time is available, or lowered if time is short.

- 2. Look for ideas to achieve the aim; select appropriate candidate moves, and (this is very important) decide on their order of priority; that is, decide which ones are most or least likely to succeed.
- 3. Analyse the variations (as deeply as possible) in order of priority (starting with those which seem most likely to achieve the aim). Similarly, at each point in the analysis where a choice arises, the order of calculation should depend on the priority of the possible moves (with your specific aim in view).
- 4. If you find a continuation which achieves the aim, what follows depends on your available thinking time. If time is short, the main part of your analysis should stop at this point (though there still remains the essential 'Blumenfeld re-check' - see point 8 below). If there is plenty of time, the aim may be adjusted (that is, raised); the list of candidate moves that remain to be considered may be revised, and

the analysis may continue. Should the new aim not be attained, you will fall back on the line already found.

- 5. If as a result of your analysis no way is found to achieve the aim, your further action depends once again on the clock situation. With a time shortage you must lower your sights, correct the list of candidate moves, and resume the analysis. It often happens that your new aim is already satisfied by a line you have examined - or a suitable continuation is relatively simple to find. The essential thing is not to make your move 'on spec', without any calculation.
- 6. If on the other hand there is plenty of time left, and your intuition suggests that the aim ought to be attainable (an accomplished player should put more faith in his intuition, which after all embodies his accumulated understanding of chess) - then you may (and must) deliberately perform a 'repeat analysis' of certain lines. In so doing you will be looking for new ideas to achieve the aim. Accordingly, you will find new candidate moves and 'candidate variations'. Let me explain what this means. In many variations, when analysing the first time round, you will already have discovered your opponent's strongest, or only, replies;

some forced lines of play will have emerged. Often the new idea - the new candidate - will not be found in the initial position but at the end of a series of moves; together with them, it will constitute a 'candidate variation'. You will now start calculating the new possibilities (compare point 3); this is stage two of the analysis. (Sometimes, though not often, you will go through this cycle a third time.)

Generally speaking, a repeat analysis is an admission of partial failure. Ideally, all ideas for pursuing your aim should be incorporated in stage one of the analysis. However, as we have seen, this is not always possible.


- 7. It may be that while analysing one variation you hit on a new idea. a new candidate move, which does not apply to this particular variation. In that case, decide where the new move comes in order of priority, but don't start to examine it before finishing with the line you are currently calculating. An exception may be made when it is obvious at first glance that the new idea is better (not just worthy of higher priority) than the line you are looking at.
- 8. One of the major defects in the mental equipment of many players is 'chess blindness', a proneness to overlook elementary replies for the

opponent at a distance of one or two moves. An antidote to this failing is 'Blumenfeld's rule' (of which Kotov also speaks): on completing your calculations and making your decision, pause for a moment (write the move on your scoresheet) and look at the position with the fresh eyes of an outsider. Could the move you intend be a blunder leading to immediate disaster? Check that it is not, and only then make your move. If you see that the move is an error, you will have to renew your analysis. In this case, as a rule, you will need to lower your 'aim' and seek simplifications, since a crude oversight signifies your unreadiness for a complex struggle.

Blumenfeld's rule is well known to the majority of accomplished players, but ... in the heat of battle they often forget it.

I would like to illustrate the foregoing by showing the conclusion of one of my own games. I consider the winning manoeuvre I found in this game to be one of my best creative achievements.

The awkward placing of White's pieces and the weakness of his first rank prompted me to look for a forced win, in other words a large material gain (this constituted the 'aim' of my analysis). The idea was



Lagunov - Krasenkov Dnepropetrovsk 1985

to combine attacks on the bishops with threats to penetrate on the back rank. I listed the following 'candidate moves' in order of priority:

- a) 23...**\#**d1.
- b) 23...₩b4.
- c) 23...\#a4.
- d) 23...\#g4.
- e) 23...\#e5.

Stage one of the analysis then began.

- a) 23...\dd 24\dd f1, and now:
- We2, and Black has nothing.
- a2) 24...\#h5 25 \Qmathbb{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}2, and Black has two choices:
- 27 \$\psi_f2 \psi_h4+ 28 \$\psi_f1 \psi_c4+ 29 ₩e2.

27 ♠e3 and then 27...₩c3 28 ₩f1. or 27... 對b4 28 對c1 耳c7 29 對d1.

a3) 24... wa4 25 ad2 wb5+ 26 \$21, transposing to 'a22'.

In the above variations, Black merely gains a second pawn - the aim is not achieved.

- b) 23...費b4 24 費c1 豐c5 (or 24...單c7 25 豐d1) 25 桌c2 罩c7 26 ₩d2! f6 and after 27 \(\mathbb{Q}\)b3! or 27 **\$**f4!. Black gains nothing.
- c) 23... wa4 24 2d2 (but not 24 b3? \was, and there is nothing to be found.
 - d) 23...\#g4 24 \@d2.
 - e) 23...**\#**e5 24 **_**e3.

In these last two lines, Black's possibilities are clearly exhausted.

So stage one of the analysis has failed to give the desired result. If Black were now short of time. he would have to revise his aim - let us say, by seeking the best way to win a second pawn. In that case, incidentally, he would have an extra 'candidate move' to consider:

f) 23...\wxb2 (which clearly falls short of the original maximum aim).

His choice would be between 'a21', 'a22' and 'f'. Fortunately, however, I had enough time in hand (the tournament was played at the 'good old' rate of 40 moves in two and a half hours), and I resolved to look for new ideas. The thought occurred to me to re-position my

queen behind the rook: I would have to do this without allowing White to defend d1 by \(\mathbb{L}\)c2. The following 'candidate variations' suggested themselves:

- A) 23... wd1 24 of1 wa4 25 **≜**d2 **≡**d6:
 - B) the same, but with 25...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d5;
 - C) the same with 25... \(\mathbb{I}\)d4.
 - D) 23... ya4 24 单d2 里d6;
 - E) the same, but with 24... \(\mathbb{Z}\)d5;
 - F) the same with 24... \(\mathbb{I}\)d4.
- G) 23... 增d1 24 全f1 省h5 25 **2**d2 **₩**b5+ 26 **\$**g1 **Z**d6;
 - H) the same, but with 26...\(\mathbb{I}\)d5;
 - I) the same with 26... \(\mathbb{I}\)d4.


In all cases Black threatens ... \d7. I quickly rejected the first trio of variations in view of 26 ₩e2. The third trio was discarded if only because of 27 \(\mathbb{L} \) c3. In the remaining cases, what I discovered was as follows:

- D) 23... Wa4 24 Qd2 Zd6 25 ₩e2! (25 \$f1? ₩b5+ 26 ₩e2 ₩xb2 27 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitity{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitity{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitity}\$\$}}\$}}}}}}} \ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exitititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititititint{\$\exititit{\$\exitititit{\$\exiti 25...\daggedd del or 25...\daggedd a6 26 ₩e1 (better than 26 ₩e3 ₩b6!). intending to defend everything with \@c3 and \@c2.
- E) 23... wa4 24 ad2 Id5 25 2e4! and then 26 2f3, as 25... **Z**e5? fails to 26 \(\delta\xh7\)+.

In all variations Black is at a loss how to win. So stage two of the analysis has also ended without producing the results.

Should Black after all renounce the maximum aim and revise his analysis accordingly? I decided to keep on searching, and I was not disappointed. An idea came into my head like a flash of lightning.


23... **\#**a4 24 **_**d2 **\#**d6 25 **\#**e2 **\#**d4!! (D).



W

Yes, the idea of going back with the queen is far from obvious. I believe it would have been impossible to find it without calculating many other lines first — without exploring the jungle of multiple attacks and defences. On the other hand, the remaining calculation (stage three already!) is not complicated. With White's queen on e2, the black queen's penetration to d1 is decisive: 26 鱼e1 豐d1 27 豐e4 f5, or 26 豐b5 里d8 27 鱼e1 豐d1 28 豐a5 b6.

The entire three-stage analysis (including re-checking) took exactly an hour. The game continued 23... 營a4! 24 全d2 互d6! (D).



W

Now my opponent from Novosibirsk unfortunately played 25 \$\psigma f1(?)\$, and after 25...\$\psi b5+\$ he resigned (0-1). Black's main idea, alas, remained off-stage...

I may say with some pride that out of the many strong players (masters and grandmasters) to whom I have shown this position, only one managed to find the solution on his own. An interesting point is that even one of the latest 'Mephisto' model computers (admittedly not the strongest) failed to find the right continuation, though you might think this would not be difficult for a computer.

I am far from imagining that my proposed algorithm is applicable to all complex positions. Like any other algorithm, however – in fact,

like any method of organizing one's thinking – it can yield good results once it is absorbed into a player's subconscious and he follows it automatically. However, this can only be achieved by special training, a matter to which too few players, alas, give sufficient attention...

3 Visual Imagination and Chess **Analysis**

Benjamin Blumenfeld


Note: This article was first published in 1936

The prime concern of chess theoreticians is the study of openings. In practical chess, opening knowledge undoubtedly plays a major role - but not a decisive one. Even in the recent Alekhine-Euwe match (1935), for all Euwe's massive opening preparation and Alekhine's dubious experiments, we can point to very few games in which defeat resulted solely from a bad opening. At any rate, in the vast majority of games the result was - or could have been - affected in the later stages by errors or superficiality on the part of one (or often both) of the players.

From this it follows that correcting the faults in our processes of thought is no less significant than perfecting our opening knowledge.

I hope the chess press and organizations will consider the possibility of investigative work on this subject. The ideas of practical players on how to eliminate errors and improve their thought-processes may also be significant, even if only as material for future research.

My first example illustrates the theme of visual imagination.



 \mathbf{B}

Blumenfeld - Zhivtsov Moscow Championship Semi-final

In this position Black put his bishop en prise with 1... 2e4?.

This blunder astonished me all the more since my young opponent had made a good impression both in this game and in the tournament as a whole. He was not short of time on the clock, and had taken quite a long time over his faulty move. As I discovered from talking to him after the game, he rejected 1...\$h3 (1...\$b7 2 2g4) 2 ₩xh3 ₩xe5 3 ₩xh6 ₩e1+4 其xe1 gxh6, when the advantage is rather with White, who has bishop for knight and a queenside pawn majority. When making the move 1... 2e4 he imagined that White was unable to win a piece in view of 2 axe4 \wxe5 3 ah7+ \wxh7 4 ₩xe5 \(\Odd{\)d3+, regaining the queen with a knight fork. He overlooked that after 2 \(\textit{\textit{x}}\) xe4 the a8-rook is attacked.

At first sight it seems incomprehensible that the player with Black should see comparatively far ahead in the two variations quoted, and at the same time miss the perfectly obvious attack made by his opponent's very next move.


As far as I can judge from my own experience in analogous cases, the reason for this mistake was as follows. When Black was calculating the line 1... 2e4 2 2xe4, etc., he didn't mentally place the bishop on e4 but kept it so to speak in mid-air, pointing at h7, ready to give check with a discovered attack on the queen.

Conceptually, the movements of the bishop could be formulated like this. From c2 the bishop is directed against h7, where it then lands; all the while you are aware that on its way to h7 it has a stopping place on e4, but this halt at e4 is not actually visualized by your mind's eve. Similar errors are quite common in practical play.

An especially frequent occurrence is this: when pondering a variation, you forget to move a piece or take away a captured one in accordance with one of the moves; in your mind, the piece mistakenly remains on its original square.

It should be observed that in the majority of cases, such errors result not from weakness of the visual imagination, but either from nervous haste or else from an insufficient effort of concentration. When mentally playing a move, it is tiresome to have to register the change immediately in your mind's eye. Often you will take a short cut by making the move on the basis of an internal dialogue. This may take the form of mentally recording the notation of the move; or a spatial movement may be traced out in your mind, without however yielding a firmly fixed image of the resulting position.

Let us move on to another example of a similar theme.



В

Sergeev - Blumenfeld Moscow Championship Semi-final

This position was reached in my last-round game in the same event. In view of the tournament situation, a draw was enough for me. As we all know, playing to draw is not so easy: the urge to simplify and the fear of complications have a harmful effect.

In this position I played 1... 2d4. I had used up more than half an hour on it, since I was in a quandary. White was threatening to exchange my fianchettoed bishop with £h6. I was not interested in wasting time preventing this with 1... **E**e8, especially since the rook might come in useful on the f-file to support ...f5. On the whole I came to the conclusion that White had a clear plan for attacking

Black's castled position by advancing his f-pawn and, if appropriate, his g-pawn. Not knowing what to do about it, I played 1...2d4 to postpone the decision.

In view of the threat to win a pawn with ... 2xf3+ followed by ... De5, etc., I was convinced when I played my move that White would reply 2 \$\delta\$h2 - and I thought to myself, "Too bad that after 1...Od4 2 \$\dot{\phi}h2 Oxf3+ 3 \$\dot{\phi}xf3 2)e5 4 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)2 \(\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$xh3}}, he takes on h3}}\) with his king (not his bishop), and I can't make anything of his exposed king position."

In the event White answered 1... 2)d4 with 2 2)d1?, and now it was a full five minutes before I realized I could win a pawn with 2...②xf3+, etc. These five minutes of thinking-time were spent in dithering over what plan to adopt, and as I couldn't make up my mind. I took a breather from these oppressive thoughts and came back to my previous theme: "Too bad, after 2... ②xf3+3 ②xf3 ②e54 **2**g2 **2**xh3 he takes with his king", etc. Then suddenly I saw that he couldn't, as his king was on g1, not h2.

In my mind, then, during those five minutes, the white king was not on g1 - where I could have seen it was, by simply looking but on h2, the square where I had

mentally placed it in anticipation of my opponent's move. Suppose that after 2 2dl I had found it easy to take a decision, and hadn't come back to my old idea - "Too bad", etc. Then it is quite possible that I wouldn't have played 2... 2xf3+ winning a pawn.

The present example is all the more interesting since the threat to win a pawn was in my mind when I played 1... 2d4, and yet, after mentally moving the king in the course of my analysis, I forgot to put it back; the image created by my mind's eye prevented me from objectively registering the king's location.

However, the explanation I have just given is not the only one. The following is also possible. When I was thinking about 1... 2d4, I decided that since White was going to reply 2 \$\delta\$h2, I could gain nothing from 2... 2xf3+; this readymade conclusion stuck in my mind even though the premise (2 \$\dispha\$h2) was lacking.

Of course it is hard to decide which explanation is correct in this particular instance. At any rate, as far as I can judge from my own experience, there are moments when an image created by the mind's eye succeeds in supplanting reality.

But if such cases are infrequent, it is surely a common occurrence

that the movements in the mind's eye when pondering one variation hinder the correct visualization of a position arising in a different line. It is clear that the more variations and the greater their length, the greater is the possibility of error.

A further point should also be borne in mind.

Each time you mentally execute a move in a long variation, the resulting position differs more and more from the one currently on the board; hence the image in your mind becomes paler and paler. Here and there, you may find a chess player with a particularly strong visual imagination, who is confident of correctly 'seeing' a position reached at the end of a long variation; yet there can be no assurance that his evaluation of that position will not be adversely affected by the paleness of the image. This is something that happens to every chess player - after working out a variation correctly, you cannot decide whether it is in your favour or not. The chief explanation for this, as far as I can judge from myself, is the inadequate clarity of the picture received by the mind. A chess player's thought is bound up with visual imaginings. Therefore, the brighter and more distinct the visual picture,

richer it will be.

There is another danger entailed by long variations: the psychological strain of having to register the changes, move by move, in your mind's eye is so great that fatigue from this exertion can affect your subsequent play.

Every practical player should clearly take stock of the role played by visual representation, and of the hazards inseparable from tactical analysis; from this he should draw the appropriate conclusions, bearing in mind, of course, the quality of his own visual imagination.

For our own part, our conclusions are as follows:

After your opponent's move you must begin your deliberations not from any ready-made decisions previously arrived at, but so to speak afresh; before anything else, let your eyes take the current position in. However strongly developed your visual imagination may be, it is perfectly obvious that an image in the mind is less distinct than one received by direct perception. Thus, when your opponent moves, it never pays (except when in severe time-trouble, of course) to reply instantly, without any further thought -

even if his move was the one you expected, and you have your reply ready. Your reply was, after all, prepared when the current position existed only in the imagination. It is quite possible that once your eyes can see the new position directly, with all its peculiarities - including your opponent's last move - new thoughts will arise owing to the greater clarity of the picture.

You must exercise strict selfdiscipline when analysing variations. In particular, don't let your thoughts skip from one line to another and return to the same line several times over. Instead. start by deciding the order (geared to the specific context) in which the variations should be examined. Then proceed systematically from one variation to the next. In each line, at every turn, carry out and register the movement of the piece in your mind's eye. At the end of the variation, carry out a résumé. Only then proceed to the next variation.

In establishing the order of analysis, your basic purpose must, as far as possible, be to restrict the quantity and length of the variations. When considering the opponent's possible replies to a move you are contemplating, the one to examine first is the one which at

first sight looks most dangerous. It is only if you find a counter to this reply that you should consider other, less obvious moves for your opponent. Similarly, if you judge that a clear, decisive advantage emerges from a variation a few moves deep, there is no point in mentally extending that variation by thinking about the detailed exploitation of the advantage.

If the move you are playing is completely forced, so that a branching of variations occurs only after this move and your opponent's reply, there is no point in immersing yourself in analysis as yet. After your forced move and the opponent's next one, the picture will be clearer and the analysis easier. The same reasoning applies if you are contemplating (for instance) a variation eight moves deep, and realize that after the first few moves you can force a repetition, i.e. a return to the current position. In that case it is as well to play the first few moves without a long think, and afterwards calculate the variation to the end. If it turns out to be unfavourable, you can return to the point of departure by repeating moves.

In situations that are not sharp, where there cannot be any forced variations, your calculations should be confined to a

few short lines which serve to bring out the characteristics of the position.

If there is a choice between two continuations which carry roughly the same result (equality, edge, decisive advantage), preference should be given to the line that involves less tactical analysis and consequently less danger of error. This principle should be rigorously applied and should override any 'romanticism'. For instance, if the choice is between reducing to a clearly won pawn ending with an extra pawn and playing a mating combination with sub-variations several moves deep, it is more sensible to choose the former. There are familiar cases from tournament practice where a player has announced mate in a few moves and then gone on to lose, since the mate turned out to be illusory.

Our arguments, especially this last one, will undoubtedly meet with opposition from the partisans of 'beauty' in chess. In our view, the analysis of variations is merely an indispensable technical procedure, and if this procedure can be simplified or made easier, so much the better. Beauty in chess is a matter of the inner logic and richness of ideas, which in most cases can be adequately disclosed by a deep study of the position; calculation is

necessary only to verify that the ideas are correct. Chess is a game of purpose – the point is to achieve the desired result with the greatest certainty. That is why we think our argument is right.

Visual imagination is so important for chess thought that physical conditions which assist vision are bound to make a difference. In particular, this means adequate lighting during play, a board and pieces of the correct relative sizes, and a colour scheme that is pleasing to the eye. From personal experience I know what happens at a simultaneous display if the lighting is bad, the pieces are painted in irritating colours, or the boards are the wrong size for the pieces: the result, even against a weak contingent, can be worse than in a display against stronger opponents in surroundings more congenial to the eyesight. I suggest that chess organizations ought to consult specialist physiologists and psychologists, and draw up a standard pattern of equipment following their guidelines.

4 How Chess Intuition Develops

Mark Dvoretsky

Chess players of universal style, who handle any type of position with equal competence, are extremely rare. Bobby Fischer was one such. So, in his best years, was Boris Spassky. As a rule, everyone's play, even that of the top grandmasters, has weak points of one kind or another. It is very important to eradicate them in good time, to bring the backward areas of your game 'up to scratch' — without of course renouncing your creative individuality.

Traditionally, chess players are classed as combinative or positional. At one time it was relatively simple to categorize them on these lines, but today things are different—there are hardly any purely positional or purely combinative players left. In any case, this classification refers only to the outward manner of play, not to the underlying qualities of thought. It gives you too little to go on when it comes to choosing the form and content of a training course suited to a particular player.

To me it seems more helpful to categorize players according to their predominant style of thinking, their characteristic approach to taking decisions – the intuitive or the logical.

Grandmasters of an intuitive bent – Capablanca, Tal, Petrosian, Karpov are examples – have a delicate feel for the slightest nuances of a position, while possessing a keen eye for combination. They are relatively weaker when it comes to planning and strategy; they are none too fond of working out variations, and commit errors in their calculations.

At the opposite pole there are players like Rubinstein, Botvinnik and Kasparov. They conceive profound plans in the opening and ensuing phases; they think in a disciplined manner and calculate variations precisely. Yet now and again they miss unexpected tactical ideas; they sometimes prove too single-minded and insufficiently alert to the critical moments of the struggle.

Of course, all this is no more than a rough-and-ready sketch. To 'diagnose' a player I am coaching — whether a young candidate master or a grandmaster — I usually apply a much wider set of parameters. Nonetheless, the classification I have suggested does seem to me to have a good deal of practical use.

It is a great boon for a chess player to be naturally blessed with a highly developed intuition. Yet there is also a serious psychological danger lurking here, as Alexander Alekhine observed: "Speed of comprehension; the ability to see, almost instantaneously, a whole range of the tactical possibilities inherent in any complex position; economy of thought, and resulting self-confidence - the obvious advantages which these factors bring are almost inevitably associated with temptations. A player can easily adopt a false attitude: on acquainting himself with a position, he may assume that the good moves he sees instantly, or almost instantly, must be the very best. In consequence, his play loses in depth as much as it gains in facility. Unfortunately (for the art of chess), this gradual renunciation of the search for the absolute, this tendency to be satisfied with moves that are merely good, characterizes

the present phase of Capablanca's career." (From Alekhine's famous article The 1927 New York Tournament as a Prelude to the World Title Match in Buenos Aires.)

Chess players of the intuitive cast of mind do well to train by solving strategic problems (such as the choice of plan in the transition stage from opening to middlegame). They can usefully apply themselves to exercises in the calculation of complex variations, demanding concentrated, painstaking attention. I once suggested to Alexander Chernin that he should try working along these lines. He soon made substantial progress, quickly graduating from a run-of-the-mill master to a strong grandmaster and participant in the World Championship Candidates Tournament.

For a player whose intuition needs to be developed, things are more complicated. Some chess players, and even their coaches, have no idea how this problem can even be approached. In this chapter I shall offer some thoughts on it, based on my own coaching experience.


Chess intuition is the ability to perform easily and swiftly – sometimes instantaneously – the mental act of grasping the character of a position, identifying the main ideas in it, assessing how promising some particular continuation is. Intuitive insight helps us to dispense with lengthy and complicated calculations; it facilitates our search for the right move; it suggests where a solution might be unearthed.

Serious study of chess, of the kinds of rationale governing the struggle - intensive analysis of specific concrete situations - this significantly develops and enriches our intuition. I am not going to prove this assertion; it is illustrated in Part One of my book Secrets of Chess Training - see the chapter 'On the Usefulness of 'Abstract' Knowledge'. I also advise you to consult Eduard Gufeld's articles 'Intuition and Inspiration' and 'How to Develop Intuition', which are included in his book of selected games, My Life in Chess.

Throughout the whole course of a game we rely on our intuition (with a greater or lesser degree of frequency and success). It reveals itself in the most diverse forms. Consider some of the concepts which we constantly employ: 'positional flair', 'the spirit of the position', 'an eye for combination', 'a sense of danger', 'a feeling for the initiative (the dynamics of the game)' – from the very forms of

expression it is apparent that these are all various manifestations of intuitive perception as applied to chess. In principle it would be useful to discuss each of them separately, but that would be the subject of a special investigation.

In chess literature, oddly enough, intuition tends to be equated simply with the capacity to embark on material sacrifices which don't lend themselves to exact calculation. Essentially, two concepts are confused: the risk which goes with the impossibility of calculating variations to the end, and intuition.



 \mathbf{W}

Suetin - Bagirov USSR Championship, Leningrad 1963

Vladimir Bagirov has just played 17... 2e7-d6!. 'Normal' continuations lead to exchanges, and Black

obtains an excellent position. He has nothing to fear from either 18 or 18 基xf6 Qxe5 19 基xc6 豐xb2!. Alexei Suetin wrote: "What was I to do? I didn't want to go in for simplifications. Suddenly I was attracted, indeed thrilled, by the prospect of a queen sacrifice. I feverishly calculated variations. The hands of the clock kept turning relentlessly, while the calculations grew more and more complicated. All I could do was either settle for a draw or take the risk, relying on my intuition."

It is clear from his comment that Suetin spent a large amount of time trying to work out the sacrifice precisely, but failed. Of course, the bold decision that he took contained an element of intuitive judgement, but no more than an element. At heart, he was proceeding not intuitively but analytically - and he was certainly right to do so, given the large material plus which Black receives (a queen for just one piece). Any defensive resource that White had not accounted for, permitting Black to parry the immediate threats, could instantly have ended the game in Black's favour.

Nevertheless, it is likely that some players would approach the problem differently, in a genuinely intuitive manner. For instance, it is

certain that after sizing up some variations Mikhail Tal would quite quickly have decided that the sacrifice was promising (that is the point - not provably correct, but promising) and that he ought to go in for it. Or, instead, he would have assessed its consequences as favourable to Black, and played differently.

18 ₩xg7+!? \$\prec{1}{2}\$xg7 19 **≜**xf6+

Suetin wrote: "Now it was my opponent's turn to cogitate. As later became apparent, this may well have been the decisive moment of the struggle. Where should the king go - to h6 or g6? Bagirov thought for a whole hour, and he too made his move chiefly on the basis of intuition..."

A strange conclusion, isn't it? He "thought for a whole hour", and played by "intuition"! In actual fact Black attempted to calculate everything precisely, but was unable to do so, and made a mistake. What has this to do with intuition? We can see that Suetin is talking about it without having a clear notion of what it is.


As it happens, the sacrifice was objectively unsound, as Andrei Lilienthal demonstrated. The refutation is 19...**\$**26!:

a) On 20 Ad3 Black has the powerful reply 20... 2e7!, attacking

the d3-bishop with his rook. For example, 21 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) xe7 \(\textit{\textit{Z}}\) xd3 22 \(\textit{\textit{Z}}\)g5+ \$\footnote{1}6 23 \cxd3 \overline{1}\text{E}6! 24 \overline{1}6 \overline{1}6.

- b) The main line is 20 Laf1 **豐e3 21 单d3 \$h6!**, and now:
- bl) If White follows Tal's recommendation with 22 2 d d 1 \ d d 2 23 \(\begin{aligned} \begin{a 23... 對xf2! 24 萬xf2 萬de8 25 皇c3 f5! with advantage.
- b2) 22 **Q**xd8 **Z**xd8 23 **Z**xf7 (after 23 單f6+ 含g7 24 罩xf7+ 含g8 25 ≜xh7+ \$\displaysh8 White's attack is repulsed) 23...\(\begin{aligned}
 \begin{aligned}
 24 \lefta d5!? (or 24 **国**1f6+ **\$g5** 25 **国**f5+ **\$h4!**) 皇xg2+! 26 曾xg2 曾g5+ 27 曾f3 豐f4+ 28 含e2 豐g4+, or 25 里1f6+ \$\psig5 26 \boxed{\boxed}\$f5+\$\psigh\$h4 27 \boxed{\boxed}\$xd7 \boxed{\boxed}\$c1+ 28 单f1 (28 單f1 皇xg2+ 29 含xg2 **豐g5+**) 28...**皇**xg2+! 29 **\$**xg2 ₩xc2+ and Black wins.

19 ... **\$h6?** (D).



W

20 Haf1!

White intends 21 \(\mathbb{L}\hbar h5+\pig6 22 \) In 1. 23 **皇h5**+.

₩e3

20... ≜e7! was stronger; it practically forces the draw with 21 \(\begin{align*} \pm \hspace{1} \pm 2xe7 f6! 22 2xf6 \(\square xf6 \) 2xf6+ \$\psign 24 \boxed{\textit{g}}f7+ \psign h8 25 \\ \textit{d}d3 \\ \boxed{\textit{g}}d7 (or 25... wxb2) is hardly dangerous for Black.

> 21 **Zh5+ \$**g6

≗f4 22 **Zh4!**

The only defence.

23 **L**hxf4

Not 23 耳fxf4 豐c1+ 24 皇f1, which fails against 24...h5! 25 De2 ₩xc2.

23 ... h5 23...費h3 24 约e4!.

> 24 \(\text{\pi}\) xd8 XbxII 25 **≜**d3+ Exd3!

In time-trouble Black hastens to simplify the position. A weaker line is 25...\$\pmg7 26 \boxed{\boxed} xf7+ \boxed{\boxed} g8 27 单c4 曾h8 28 單7f5 皇e8 29 包d5. with dangerous threats.

Yxd3 26 cxd3


27 **L**f6+ **\$**25 28 ¤xf7

h4 **쌀e3+** 29 \delta g1

30 **Z7f2** (D)

30 ... **\$**h5?

White now obtains a decisive advantage. Black had to open up his opponent's king position: 30...h3!



В

31 gxh3 2f3!, with a probable draw.

31 De2! \$\psi h6 32 Df4 a5 33 里d1 a4 34 h3 中h7 35 公d5 學c5 36 🗗 f6+ \$\psig g7 37 a3 \$\psig g6 38 \$\psig g4\$ \$\psi\$h7 39 \(\mathbb{I}\)e1 \(\mathbb{U}\)d6 40 \(\Omega\)e3 \(\mathbb{D}\)e3 \(\delta\)g6 41 ②f5 ₩d8 42 Ie6+ (42 ②e7+ \$g7 43 Le6 is even stronger) 42...\$f7 43 Ød4+ \$27 44 Ie4 \$d7 45 分f3 全f5 46 里d4 豐e8 47 里xh4, and White gradually exploited his material plus.

Let us return to the position where White was faced with his problem. Pondering this kind of obscure position is one way to develop your intuition. You would think about the position for a while and try to 'guess' whether the sacrifice was sound, and whether it was worth going in for it. Obviously you could not entirely do without calculating some variations. (Incidentally, this same position is

perfectly suitable for training in analysis; it all depends which mental approach you are adopting.) When exercising your intuition, you should not be trying to calculate everything 'to the end'. Instead, looking at the indispensable minimum of variations, you should try to reach a definite conclusion as quickly as possible. Then compare your verdict with the 'right answer', and you will see whether you were searching along the correct lines, or whether from the outset you were missing some relevant ideas either points of judgement or of concrete tactics.

In the same way, you could try to select the right square for the black king on move 19.

Some exercises of a similar kind (classified by theme) are to be found in the book, Secrets of Chess Training which I mentioned earlier.

Why did White's attack succeed in the example we have examined? The key factors were not purely technical (objectively the queen sacrifice was incorrect), but psychological - the kind you must take into account when intuitively weighing up the prospects offered by this or that solution to your problem. The effect of surprise

was important (Bagirov had studied the position after 17... 2 d6 in his home analysis, but hadn't noticed the queen sacrifice), but the peculiarities of Bagirov's style were the main thing. He is a strong positional player but usually performs much more weakly in obscure tactical situations.

I once managed to profit from this myself:

Dvoretsky - Bagirov USSR Championship (First League), Tbilisi 1973 Alekhine Defence

1	e4	Df6
2	e5	€)d5
3	d4	d6
4	c4	€\2b6
5	exd6	cxd6
6	Dc3	g6
7		⊈ g7
8	€)f3	0-0
9	⊈e2	Dc6
10	0-0	≜ f5
11	≜e 3	d5
12	c5	Dc4
13	⊈xc4	dxc4
14	₩a4	≜d3

This is a well-known variation of the Alekhine Defence, of which Bagirov is a connoisseur. Subsequent games have convinced me that Black equalizes with 14...e5!.


15 **Efd1** ₩a5!

Now, however, 15...e5? is met by 16 d5 2d4?! 17 2e1!. Another bad line is 15...f5? 16 d5, when 16... De5 is met by 17 Dg5! (or 17 ②e1!) 17...f4 18 \(\mathbb{L}\)d4! (but not 18 \$xf4 \ \ xf4 19 \ De6 \ \ \ b8 20 \ \ \ xf4 ②f3+21 gxf3 \\ xf4), while 16...f4 is no help due to 17 \(\mathbb{\pi}\xd3!!\) cxd3 18 dxc6 fxe3 19 cxb7 exf2+ 20 \$\precent{\$\precent{\ up the exchange) 20...**□**b8 21 **⋓**c4+ \$\prescript{\prescrip

16	₩xa5	②xa5
17	De1	≜ f5
18	Eac1	

Not as strong as 18 d5!, which I later played against W. Martz at Wijk aan Zee 1975.

18	***	②c6!
19	g4	⊈ d7
20	d5	包b4 (D)



W

If now 21 a3, then after 21... 2a6 and 22... Lac8, the c5-pawn is very

weak. Overall, Black has an excellent position. With this - and my opponent's style - in mind, I decided to complicate and provoke Bagirov into a piece sacrifice.

> 21 b3!? Dxa2

21...cxb3 22 axb3 e6! was simpler, with an approximately equal position; however, the temptation proved too strong.

> 22 ②xa2 cxb3 23 Dc3 Ifc8?!

This is the kind of thing I was banking on - Bagirov already commits a serious inaccuracy. He hopes to prevent 24 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{2}}}\)d4, but his move fails to do so.

23...a5 was stronger; then on 24 2d4. Black has either 24...a4 25 2xg7 \$xg7 26 \$b1 \$fc8 27 \$\dd3\$ ■a5! (intending ...■xc5 or\$b5), or 24...e5 25 dxe6 2xe6 26 2xg7 \$xg7 27 \$\mathbb{I}\$d4 \$\mathbb{I}\$fd8 28 \$\mathre{O}\$f3 h5!? 29 gxh5 \$65 30 2a4 gxh5, with chances for both sides.

24 \(\text{\$\partial} \) d4! ⊈xd4 25 Exd4 Exc5 26 Hb4


I considered 26 4)d3 less accurate on account of 26...b2! 27 ②xb2 \ \ ac8.

26 ... Eac8 Or 26...b5 27 \(\bar{\textb3}\) a5? 28 \(\bar{\textb3}\) d3 and, when the rook moves, 29 ②xb5.

> 27 Exb3 **b**5 28 **2**)d3 **□**5c7

29 **Z**a3 h5(D)

It was worth considering 29...a5 30 ②a2 \(\textbf{\textit{Z}}\) xc1+ 31 ②dxc1 a4. The pawns would be blocked, but at least they would be that bit further advanced.



W

30 gxh5

30 f3!? is more solid.

30 ... gxh5 单f5?! 31 h4

It is incomprehensible why Black refrains from 31...a5!? 32 2 a2 Exc1+ 33 2 dxc1 a4 (threatening 34... Ic4) 34 2d3 2f5 (34... Ic4? 35 De5). With 35 De5! White would preserve some winning chances, but nothing more. We can see that in a complex position Bagirov is unsure of himself. He usually avoids such situations and has inadequate experience of them. Hence his intuition fails him here.

32 De2 $\coprod xc1+?$


After this, Black's position is hopeless. The indicated line was a5. In the endgame, passed pawns must be pushed!

33 Ddxc1 耳c7 34 Db3 ⊈e4 9)bd4 ≜xd5 36 (2)xb5 ¤c4 37 9 bd4! ℤc7 37...e5 38 \(\max_{a5}\)!. 38 \$\pmu\$h2 e5?! 39 Xa5! exd4 ¤c2 40 Exd5 41 Øxd4 **罩xf2+** 42 \$23 Id2 43 **Eg5**+ **⊈f8** 44 Øf5 a5 45 Xxh5 **\$28** 46 **Eg5**+

The sealed move. It was a good moment to adjourn. The position is definitely won for White, but at this stage he has to figure out the right plan for realizing his advantage, and this is best done 'at home'.

> 46 ... **\$f8** (D) 47 IIh5

At first it seemed to me that 47 h5, was the simplest way to win, e.g.: 47...\alphad1 48 \dispg2 \did2+ 49 堂h3 Id1 50 包g3 (now the a-pawn is attacked) 50...a4 51 h6 \(\bar{2}\) d6 52 h7. However, I then discovered that after 47... Idl 48 rg2 Black



W

has 48...f6! 49 **\(\beta\)**g6 (49 h6 **\(\beta\)**d7!) 49...**\\$**d7! (but not 49...**\\$**f7? 50 **Z**g7+ \$\displayse 651 h6!). The rook exchange after 50 Exf6+ Ef7 leads to a draw, but otherwise Black obtains counterchances with 50... \(\mathbb{Z}_a 7\). Incidentally, it is essential for Black to insert 47... Id1!, because the immediate 47...f6 48 Ig6 Id7 allows White an easy win with 49 **X**xf6+ 重f750 基xf7+ 含xf751 ②d4 (or 51 2d6+) 51...a4 52 2b5 \$f6 53 \$g4.


47	•••	⊈g8
48	Xh6	a4
49	Z a6	Z a2
50	⊈g4	a3
51	\$ h5	f6

51... \sum a1 52 \subsetent h6 leads to the same thing. The most stubborn defence was 51...\$h7 52 \$\mathbb{I}_a7 \$\mathbb{I}_f2!, but even then White would win by 53 基xf7+ \$h8 54 \$g6 基g2+ 55 \$\disph6 \displag8 56 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}a7 a2 57 h5 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}b2 58 ව්h4 \$f8 59 ව්g6+ \$e8 60 ව්e5!

(preparing 61 \(\dot{g} \) 5) 60...\(\dot{g} \) 2 61 4)d3 and 62 4)b4.

52	≡ a7!	≡ a1
53	\$g6	Щg1+
54	\$xf6	Ha1
55	Dh6+	\$ h8
56	包f7 +	1-0

The type of inscrutable position which can serve to test and refine your intuition is often, but not always, bound up with sacrifices of material.



Kasparov - Karpov World Championship match (6), Moscow 1984/5

Black is a pawn up, but the activity of White's pieces more than compensates for the small material deficit. Clearly White must now move his knight forward. But where to - f5 or c6?


On c6 the knight attacks the a7pawn. It restricts the mobility of Black's rook, and of his minor pieces too. On the other hand, from f5 the knight would control d6 and prepare the advance of the passed d-pawn. What is more important? To work out the variations accurately over the board is quite impossible - after going through a few tentative lines, you are bound to fall back on intuition.

In his book The Test of Time Kasparov repeatedly points out how, in complex situations, his intuitive appraisal of a position would turn out to be right. He is evidently proud of his intuition and considers it his strong point. Clearly, though, any top-rank chess player can boast of plenty of cases where he solved complex problems correctly. To form an objective judgement of how well developed a chess player's intuition is, it is more important to trace how often it lets him down. The young Mikhail Tal, for example, would almost always hit on the strongest course in sharp positions, finding the most dangerous attacking resources. Nevertheless a careful study of Kasparov's games has convinced me that his flair is by no means impeccable. Even in his best games he would often 'lose the thread' at some point and give his opponents

extra chances (which, to be sure, they didn't always utilize).

So it was in this example. Kasparov 'guessed wrongly' and missed the win. Afterwards he failed to sense when the moment had come to force a draw, and ended up losing. You will find the game in the Supplement to this chapter.

Correct intuitive appraisal of a situation helps a player to apportion his thinking time rationally; it tells him when he needs to concentrate and examine the variations thoroughly, and when, on the contrary, for one reason or another, there is no point in going in for detàiled calculations.



В

Tal - Dvoretsky USSR Championship, Leningrad 1974

21 ... **⊉ f**8!?

When I made this move I was very much hoping that the ex-World Champion would be tempted to start an attack on my king with 22 @xe5 @xa2 23 @a1! (threatening not only to take the bishop but also the deadly 24 \(\mathbb{U}\)c3) 23...\(\mathbb{U}\)b3 (the only defence) 24 \delta d2. The variations would seem to turn out in his favour, for instance 24... \(\sigma xc5\) 25 \wg5 (with threats of 26 \wxc5 and 26 \(\mathbb{U}\)f6), or 24...\(\mathbb{I}\)xe4 25 \(\mathbb{L}\)f3 ■xe1+ 26 ■xe1 (threatening 27 ₩d4) 26... \(\textit{Q}\)g7 27 \(\textit{Q}\)xg7 \(\textit{S}\)xg7 28 ■a1, and Black loses a piece. Such an attack would be wholly in Tal's style.

After a little vacillation, however, the grandmaster chose a quiet continuation in preference to sharpening the struggle.

坐d7 22 **Hb1!** 23 **Hed1** _exd6 24 cxd6!

White went on to realize his positional advantage by technical means.

The grandmaster's feel for the position had not deceived him. On 22 \(\textit{xe5}\)? I had prepared the unexpected stroke 22... 2b3!!, equalizing. Even though Tal didn't see this, he intuitively made the right choice.

His decision was based on a true assessment of the situation on the

board. Tal writes that he didn't want to "give the black pieces free rein". Why indeed should he go in for complications, at the risk of making mistakes in calculation, when his opponent's pieces are already condemned to passivity and White's obvious advantage can be preserved by simple methods?


I dare say it is now time to surface from the stormy ocean of combinative complexities and talk about the placid positional tasks and relatively simple tactical problems that we encounter almost at every step.

In some books you can read that the process of evaluating a position consists in isolating and weighing up all the positional factors that play a part in it. Nonsense! In actual fact, most of this task is performed subconsciously. The art of evaluation lies in understanding the essence of a position - identifying the crucial problem (either positional or tactical) that needs solving - sensing the right direction for our investigations and detecting the desirability or otherwise of a particular operation. It is clear that a well-developed intuition will enhance the speed and accuracy of our perceptions.

You may have heard the old chestnut about some grandmasters

who were deep in analysis of a difficult position and asked Vasily Smyslov for his advice. After a short think the latter said, "You should place the rook on the fifth rank." This recommendation appeared all too abstract, yet after a while he repeated it: "Come on, rook to the fifth!" They started analysing along these lines and soon understood that Smyslov was absolutely right.

You can find examples of this kind of judgement by studying game annotations, especially those written by the intuitive type of player.



В

Nimzowitsch - Capablanca New York 1927

Capablanca wrote: "White has finally prepared the freeing manoeuvre b2-b4 followed by \(\Delta b2. \)

Black has occupied both open files with his rooks, and is ahead of his opponent in development. He now has to realize his advantage one way or another, before White finishes developing his position."

20 ...

"A subtle move with the purpose of gaining time to bring the queen into the fray. Black wants to occupy the seventh rank with one of his rooks, and the queen's help is essential for this. The text-move prevents the immediate 21 b4, as there would follow 21... 2d6 22 g3 We4, and Black gains control of the seventh.

As you see, Capablanca has formulated his chief goal: seizure of the seventh rank. (It is also clear what White wants: to complete his development and start exchanging rooks.) Without concrete analysis it is hard to foresee who will be more successful in carrying out his plans. But what the players must aim for is at any rate clear.

21 g3 **쌀d5!** 22 h4 **≙f8** 23 \(\mathbb{Q} \) b2 **₩a2!** 24 Ha1

Alekhine suggested 24 **Zbd1!?** ■xd1 (if 24...a5 at once, then 25 **Z**xd8 **Z**xd8 26 **Q**d4!) 25 **Z**xd1. After 25...a5 26 bxa5 bxa5 (26...\@xa3 27 \dogsar a6!) White cannot, unfortunately, play 27 營a6? 基c2 28 基d8


(counting on 28... \(\bar{\pi} xb2? 29 \(\bar{\pi} xf8+ with perpetual check, or 28... 對xb2? 29 **對d6**) because of 28...**對b**1+! 29 當g2 豐xb2. The right continuation is 27 \(\mathbb{L}\) d2, and if 27...\(\mathbb{L}\) xa3, then 28 學a6!: 28...互f8 29 學xa5 學b1+ 30 曾g2 皇xb2 (30... 曾e4+? 31 f3) 31 對b4 or 28... 基b8 29 對xa5! and the b2-bishop is invulnerable.

> 24 ... **₩**b3 25 \(\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t

Amazingly, Nimzowitsch doesn't understand that he must try to save himself by exchanging rooks. 25 Hac1! was essential.

> 25 ... Ec2 26 學a6? (D)

White could defend more stubbornly with 26 瞥f1 or 26 瞥d1, preparing 27 Le2. After the move played, Black gives a text-book demonstration of the power of seventh-rank control.



26	•••	e5!
27	⊈xe5	 ■dd2
28	当 为7	

If 28 \(\mathbb{I}\)f1, then 28...\(\mathbb{W}\)xe3! 29 \(\textit{\text{\pi}}\)f4 \(\text{\pi}\)xf2! is decisive. On 28 \(\text{\pi}\)f1. Black has 28... 對d5 29 单d4 對h5! (more precise than 29... #f3 30 **Z**ac1) 30 h4 (otherwise 30...**Z**xf2) 30...\#f3.

28	$\mathbf{I}_{\mathbf{x}\mathbf{f}2}$
29 g4	₩ e6
30 ≜g 3	Exh2!
Better than 30	₩xg4 31 耳f1.
31 ₩ f3	

Or 31 @xh2 Wxg4+ 32 Wh1 Wh3, forcing mate

	₩xg2 •xg2	₩xg4
34 35	¤ad1 ¤d4	h5 ₩g5
36	⊉h2	a5
37	ℤ e2	axb4
38	axb4	≜ .e7
39	ℤe4	⊈ f6
40	IIf2	₩ d5
41	Ee8 +	⊈h7
0-1		

Various training exercises which force you to take decisions quickly, without thorough reflection, are very useful for developing your intuition.

At the first session of our chess school, Grandmaster Yusupov recommended a 'guessing' game. Take a good game by a grandmaster, with his own detailed notes. After playing through the opening, start trying to guess his moves, one by one. Give yourself a very short time (for instance half an hour) for the whole game. Then compare your guesses with the grandmaster's actual moves and comments.

I once played an interesting kind of game with Sergei Dolmatov. It was aimed at developing his feel for the endgame. I would open a volume of Informator at the Endings section, pick a number at random, take the position with that number and set it up on the board. Dolmatov would play the side which had to achieve something a draw from the worse position, or a win from the better position. To begin with he would think for five minutes, then we would play the position as a blitz game, with the trainer making use of the analysis in the book. In some cases we would introduce an extra rule whereby Dolmatov had the right to stop the clock once in the game, in a position he considered critical, and think for another five minutes. If you like, you can compete against a friend at this game. Use two separate volumes of Informator, and take it in turns to play the role of trainer.

However, the most effective form of training for the fast appraisal of positions was a game I shall now describe to you. Unfortunately you cannot play it without a coach or partner, and without a ready-made stock of special positions. (This need can be met, however, by a computer using the coaching program I have developed.)

Give yourself (let us say) 15 minutes on the clock. Within this time you have to find the right move in five different positions. The first position is set up on the chessboard and the clock is started. On reaching your decision, play the move on the board and stop the clock. Then the next position is set up – and so on. All five positions have to be solved before your flag falls. The tasks (whether positional or tactical) should not be too complicated or demand deep calculation, yet some should be simpler and some more difficult. You will need to economize your time to the full, to avoid getting into bad time-trouble over the final positions. But playing too quickly is dangerous too - you could easily make a silly mistake. You have 'won' if you solve all five positions correctly. Otherwise you have suffered a greater or lesser defeat.

There is also another version of this game - a version which, as it

happens, I have played with Dolmatov, Yusupov and other chess players I have coached. Your overall thinking time is slightly increased, to 20-25 minutes (only grandmasters are restricted to 15 minutes). You play the same way as before, except that if you get an answer wrong, your clock is put forward by one third of your original thinking time (i.e. by 5 minutes if you started with 15, by 61/2 minutes if you started with 20, etc.). To 'succeed' in the series, you have to get through the five positions without overstepping the time-limit. As you will have grasped, under these rules you can 'win' even if you make one mistake. You can hardly win with two mistakes (you would be left with too little thinking time), and with three mistakes a win is logically impossible.


The game ends the moment your time runs out. On the other hand it is possible to win 'prematurely' - if the thinking time you have in hand for the last one or two positions exceeds the penalty that you would suffer for giving wrong (but instantaneous) answers. In this case you are not required to complete the solutions.

You may also, of course, carry on playing if your flag falls before you finish the series. It makes sense to do this if you have a rule (aimed

at increasing the seriousness and responsibility of your decisiontaking) which lays down a 'penalty' for losing on time, dependent

on the number of excess minutes you require.


Now let us solve one such 'series'




1. White to move




3. White to move



2. Black to move



4. White to move



5. White to move

Solutions are given on pages 273-5.

Practice has shown that this form of training is extremely useful if you take it seriously. It develops a number of important chess skills at once:

- It improves your intuition, your capacity to grasp both the tactical and the strategic details of a position quickly and reliably.
- It cultivates your thought processes. It nurtures the habit of instantly picking out the available 'candidate' moves as well as the opponent's main threats. Without this you cannot achieve success - with limited thinking time, mistakes will be inevitable.
- It increases your resoluteness. There is simply no time

for an exhaustive scrutiny of variations - you have to have confidence in yourself and take decisions boldly.

- · It helps you to combat timetrouble, since you continually have to regulate your time expenditure.
- · It gets you into good competitive shape before a tournament. It enhances your reflexes and speed of thought; there is no chance of emotional fatigue setting in, as the game is lively and exciting.

In conclusion I would like to draw together the basic ideas advanced in this chapter, to form something like a set of rules for independent work along the lines I have indicated.

Aide Memoire: **Recommended Precepts** for Developing Your Intuition

- 1. Pay careful attention to your impressions; try as often as possible to predict your conclusion in advance. To learn to guess right, you have to practise guessing constantly.
- 2. Don't just remember your first impressions – observe how

- 3. On discovering the 'right answer', don't forget to compare it with your hunch. Ascertain what ideas and themes prove to be the most important and influential in a particular position, and ask how far you took them into account in your deliberations.
- 4. A very wide spectrum of intuitive perceptions is possible. They may not always tell you the best move; they may relate to some specific points of evaluation, the desirability of some particular operation, a feeling for danger, etc.
- 5. Relative evaluations are generally more use than absolute ones. Verdicts such as 'the position is drawish' or 'the opponent's position is hopeless' are rather crude and by no means always conducive to a solution. Of much more importance are specific inferences which have to do with comparing various moves, plans. ideas and prospects, or assessing the dangers and difficulties that face you.

- 6. Consider not just the purely technical factors, but competitive ones - the situation in the tournament, your reserves of time and energy, your opponent's personality, the likelihood of errors on his part, etc.
- 7. 'Meta-intuitive' considerations are very important. For example: in a given situation, can intuition be trusted? Does the position on the board lend itself to precise calculation, and how much point would such calculations have - how much time would you be likely to need for thinking about your move?
- 8. Analyse your own performance; if necessary, modify the recommendations laid down here, and work out fresh rules.
- 9. Try to find the types of chess exercise that have the maximum effect on developing your intuition. Try to guess the right move quickly in relatively simple situations and also, conversely, in positions that defy exact calculation. Devise training exercises and games which require you to take intuitive decisions. It may be useful to play games at fast time-controls and study the games of intuitive players, etc.

10. Don't expect immediate results, but have firm confidence in eventual success. Purposeful efforts along the lines I have indicated are certain to develop your intuition. As a result your play will be more relaxed, more assured. quicker and sounder.

Supplement

Kasparov - Karpov World Championship match (6), Moscow 1984/5 Queen's Indian Defence


1 d4 2 f6 2 c4 e6 3 2 f3 b6 4 g3 \$\frac{1}{2}a6 5 b3 \frac{1}{2}b4+ 6 \frac{1}{2}d2 \frac{1}{2}e7 7 **\$g2** 0-0 8 0-0 d5 9 **€**e5 c6 10 호c3 ②fd7 11 ②xd7 ②xd7 12 ②d2 Ic8 13 e4 b5

The consequences of 13...c5 were examined by Artur Yusupov at the second session of our chess school, in his comments on the encounter Yusupov-Sax, Rotterdam 1989. See the chapter 'Unexpected Moves in the Opening', in our book Opening Preparation.

Incidentally, our discussion of this Kasparov-Karpov game will be based on Yusupov's deep analysis published in Sovietsky Sport within a day of the end of the game.

14 **H**e1 dxc4 15 bxc4 **②b6?!**(D)

15...bxc4 is better.



W

16 cxb5?

The first (and by no means the last) occasion when Kasparov's positional flair lets him down. White could have gained the advantage by 16 c5!: 16... 2 a4 17 ₩c2 (threatening 18 e5!) 17...e5 18 **2**f3, or 19 **省**c2 **身**b5 20 a3.

16	cxb5
17 E c1	≜ a3
17b4!?.	
18 E c2	⊘a4
19 🙎 a1	Exc2
20 ₩xc2	₩a5?

20... We7! was stronger, not only preparing 21... Ic8 but also preventing the d4-d5 break.

21 Wd1!


21 d5 is premature on account of 21... \(\bigsiz c8 22 \) \(\bigsiz d3 (22 \) \(\bigsiz d1 \) \(\bigsiz c1) 22... 4 b2!. White wants to play 2b3 and only then d4-d5.

> 21 ... **Ec8?!**

21...Dc3 is strongly met by 22 ②b3! 對b4 23 對c2 (23... ②xa2? 24 Ee3). Instead Black should play 21....全b2 22 分b3 學b4

22	Дb3	₩b4
23	d5	exd5
24	exd5	包c3
25	≝d4!	營xd4
26	②xd4	②xa2 (D)

26... £ f8 and 27...b4 was more cautious.



In this position, Yusupov has shown that 27 2f5! gives White a decisive plus:

- a) 27...g6? fails to 28 d6 gxf5 29 d7.
- b) If 27... 2f8, then 28 d6 is again very strong.
- c) On 27...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c1, White has 28 (30...单d8 31 包e7+ 曾f8 32 包c6 2e8 33 2h3!) 31 hxg5 2xf5 32 \$c6 \$f8 33 \$d4 \$2b4 34 \$xb5.

- d) The zwischenzug 27...\264!? is more tenacious, but White simply replies 28 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e2:
- d1) Black cannot save himself by the exchange sacrifice 28...20c3 29 ≜xc3 ≜xc3 30 4e7+ \precenter f8 31 ②xc8 ≜xc8, since he loses a pawn as well: 32 d6 \(\textit{\textit{d}}\)b4 (32...b4 33 \$e6 34 d7 \$e7 35 \$xb5.
- d2) All that remains is to try 28...包c1 29 罩e4:
- d21) 29... **公**b3 30 **皇**xg7! **二**c1+ 31 皇f1 罩xf1+ 32 含g2!.

De7+ 2xe7 32 Exe7 b4 33 d6 \$\psi f8 34 \pm e3! \Qc5 35 \pm d4 \pm xf1 36 \(\text{\text}\) xc5 \(\text{\text}\) xc5 37 d7.

d23) 29...\$f8 30 d6 b4 (or 30...2b3 31 d7 Ic1+ 32 of1 Id1 33 **2**d4 **2**xd4, and now not 34 2d3+ 37 2f2 2xe4 38 fxe4 b3. but 34 **E**xd4! **E**xd4 35 **2**)xd4 **2**e7 36 Dc6) 31 Dh6+! (31 d7?! is weaker: 31... Id8 32 2h6+ gxh6 33 翼g4+ 鱼g7 34 鱼xg7 h5 35 罩g5 2)e2+36 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h1 h6 37 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xh6+\$\frac{1}{2}\$h7. when 38 \(\textit{\pi}\)g7? fails to 38...f5! 39 31...gxh6 32 耳g4+ 皇g7 33 耳xg7+ \$\f\$ 34 \(\text{\$\text{d}5} \) \(\text{\$\text{Q}e2} + 35 \) \(\text{\$\text{g}2} \) \(\text{\$\text{Q}c3} \) 36 基xf7+ 曾g8 37 单xc3 bxc3 38 基xa7+ 含f8 39 基xa6 c2 40 d7 c1 學 41 dxc8\\ + \\ xc8 42 \\ a8.

Now let us look at what happened in the game.

27 Dc6? **≜c5!**

27...单d6? would be a mistake in view of 28 &e5! #E8 29 #a1 &xe5 30 **基xa2 息b7 (30...皇c8 31 基e2 f6** 32 f4 \(\text{\textit{g}} \)g4 33 \(\text{\te\ 32 dxc6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f8 33 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h3! \$\frac{1}{2}\$e7 34 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d7. and Black will have to give up his bishop for the rampaging pawn.

28 Ah3?!

Though natural, this move is in fact dubious. It will soon become clear that the bishop has switched to a worse diagonal, while the black rook withdraws to a more advantageous square. However. White no longer had a win:


- a) 28 \(\exists d4 \(\exists xd4 \) 29 \(\exists xd4 \) (29 ②xa7+ \$f8 30 ②xc8 \$xc8 31 d6 \$\\\\\$£6! 32 \$\\\\\$c6 \$\\\\\$e6\$) 29...\$\\\\\$c1!? 30 Ixc1 ②xc1 31 d6 \$\displaystyle{\text{d}}\$f8 32 d7 (32) 2c6 2c8!: 32 2h3 2b7!: 32 2c6 g6!) 32...\$e7 33 \$\infty\$c6+ \$\dispx\$d7 34 ②b8+ \$c7 35 ②xa6+ \$b6. and Black's two united passed pawns fully compensate for the piece lost.
- b) 28 \(\textit{\$\tex alternatives are 28... 4 b4? 29 d6 ②xc6 30 d7 ②xe5 31 dxc8豐+ 单xc8 32 罩xe5 单f8 33 罩xb5, and 28...\(\textit{\textit{b}}\) b7? 29 d6 \(\textit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\$a}}}}\) c6 **Exc6** 31 d7 **2**e7 32 **2**f6 gxf6 33 耳xe7 耳d6 34 耳e8+ 含g7 35 d8豐 罩xd8 36 罩xd8 a5 37 \$f1) 29 罩a1 2b4 30 2xb4 2xb4 with equality.
- c) 28 De7+ (probably the most dangerous try) 28... 2xe7 29 Exe7

31 里xa7) 30 h4! 包c3 31 d6 (31 里xa7?! 单c4 32 d6 包b5) 31...单b5 32 里xa7 里d8! (32...會f8? 33 里b7! with the threat of 34 d7 and 35 £xc3; 32... **Z**b8? 33 d7 **Z**d8 34 ♠h3 with advantage to White) 33 型b7 鱼e8 34 罩xb4 包b5 35 鱼e5 f6! (35...\$f8 36 \$\delta d4! gives Black a difficult position) 36 2d5+ 2f8 (stronger than 36...\$f7 37 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xb5 fxe5 38 \(\extit{\textit{e}}\)e4) 37 \(\extit{\textit{e}}\)b2 and now 37... \(\beta\) xd6! with a draw, but not 37... ②xd6? in view of 38 ≜a3! intending 39 Hb8!.

> 28 ... ¥a8 ŵxd4 29 **2**d4 30 ②xd4 **⊈f**8

31 d6(D)

31 Ial 2b4 32 2c6 2xc6 33 dxc6 \(\textit{\$\text{c}}\)c8 is in Black's favour.



31 ... 4)c3!

Black could already have made certain of the draw with 31... Ad8

32 d7 \$b7 33 \$\times xb5 \$\times c6\$, but Karpov astutely senses that the position has turned in his favour as a result of his opponent's unsure play, and he decides to try for the win.

32 Dc6?

At this stage Kasparov was oblivious to the danger. He should have forced a draw by 32 \(\frac{1}{2}g2!\) **Id8** 33 **2c6** (threatening 34 d7) 33...**£**c8 34 **②**xb5.


There was also another, less obvious, method, which was pointed out by Vadim Zviagintsev: 32 d7 \$b7! (defending against 33 \$\overline{2}\$)c6 or 33 \(\mathbb{Q}\) g2), and now not 33 \(\mathbb{Q}\) f5 **Id8** (since on 34 ②xg7 or 34 ②d6 Black has the simple 34...2c6), but 33 La1!. The point is that 33...a6 is answered by the pretty 34 ②c6! ≜xc6 35 \(\) xa6. The interesting try 33...a5?! is met by the zwischenzug 34 Za3! (stronger than 34 **E**xa5 \$\preceq\$e7) 34...b4 35 Exa5. Hence Black's best course is to settle for the draw with 33...\$\dot\epsilon^7 34 **E**e1+ **\$**f8 (but not 34...**\$**d6? 35 耳e8 \$\preceq\$c7 36 \$\Q\$c6!) 35 耳a1. The moves could also be transposed, of course: 32 **Z**a1 **2**b7 33 d7.

≜b7! (D)

A draw would result from 32...b4 33 d7 b3 34 d8豐+ **基**xd8 35 Øxd8 **\$**d3.

33 🙎 g2 He8!

Kasparov may have been counting on 33...b4? 34 d7 b3 35 4b8!



W

xb8 36 **x**b7 b2 (36...**x**d8 37 \$c6) 37 \$c8, and White wins. However, Karpov is fully alert to the danger.

34 De5?!

34 **Z**a1 **2**xc6 35 **2**xc6 **Z**e6 36 Exa7 was a more resilient line, although it isn't at all simple to hold the endgame after 36... Exd6.

f6!

35 d7


White can no longer save himself. 35 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)xb7 \(\textit{\textit{Z}}\)xe5! 36 \(\textit{\textit{Z}}\)a1 b4 and 35 20d7+ \$f7 36 \$\mathbb{Z}\$a1 \$\oldsymbol{\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\$} 37 \$\preceq\$xg2 \$\preceq\$e6 are equally bad continuations.

> 35 ... **Md8**

> 36 Axb7 fxe5

37 **\$c6 \$e7?** (D)

A time-trouble error. There was an easy win by 37...e4! 38 Za1 \$e7 (38...\$e2+ 39 \$f1 \$\text{Q}\$d4 is also possible) 39 Exa7 &d6 40 **Z**a6 **\$**c7 41 **\$**f1 b4.



 \mathbf{W}

38 \(\text{\text{\text{\$a}}} \text{\$xb5!} \) **€**0xb5 38... **全**d6!? 39 **皇**d3 **其**xd7! 40 **≜**xh7 a5.

> 39 **Xxe5+** \$xd7

40 Exb5 **\$**c6 41 Hh5?!

41 Ee5! was stronger, and if 41... \(\mathbb{L}\)a8, then 42 \(\mathbb{L}\)e6+ \(\price\)c5 43 Ze7 a5 44 Zxg7, attacking the hpawn too.

> **h6** 41 ... 42 He5 Ha8

The sealed move: 42... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begi not bad either. The endgame is quite interesting, but we will break off here, since from this moment on the contest depended on adjournment analysis rather than the ability to find the strongest moves over the board. Black won on the 70th move.

5 Chess in the Style of Jazz

Sergei Dolmatov

I want to show you some games of mine in which a fierce fight erupted literally in the first few moves - in the opening itself, or the early stage of the middlegame. The struggle to seize the initiative was conducted with sharp and for the most part highly unconventional means.

The games were all played years ago, when I was taking my first steps in big-time chess. This is no accident. The characteristics of youth are freedom from routine, optimism, and faith in our own powers (a faith which is sometimes excessive and comes from underestimating the opponent). Our thoughts take flight unburdened by experience and knowledge; no dogma stifles our inward freedom; interesting, striking games are often the result. With the passing of years, alas, this 'nonchalance' wanes.

A capacity for original thought is of paramount importance for beating a strong opponent. This is something difficult to learn and probably impossible to teach. Try

to develop this quality in yourself by analysing the early games of famous players who made their mark at a young age - such as Boris Spassky, Mikhail Tal and Alexei Shirov. Their ideas, conceived over the board rather than in quiet pregame study, have an air of naïvety and directness. Sometimes they fail to stand up against dry mathematical scrutiny, but refuting these ideas proved so complicated that their opponents missed their way.

Allow me to make a comparison: this light, improvising manner has the same place in chess that jazz has in music. And jazz, of course, continues to be played today.

Dolmatov - Lerner

National Qualifying Tournament, Daugavpils 1978 Philidor's Defence


1	e4	e5
2	থিf3	d6
3	d4	exd4
4	②xd4	D f6
5	Dc3	.≜e7

I suspect my theoretical knowledge ran out at this point, but that scarcely bothered me. After all, in this position common-sense moves are not hard to make. Just stick to sound principles - develop your pieces, fight for the centre - and you have nothing to fear.

6 ≜ e2	0-0
7 0-0	ℤe8
7 ∮)c6!?.	
8 f4	≙f8
9 £f 3	

White has obtained a powerful centre. Today I still cannot fault my opening strategy.

11 \(\text{\text{\text{e}}}\)



В

I played the rook to el so that on 11...②c5 I could defend my pawn


with the simple retreat 12 \overline{9}f2. After 12...包e6 13 營d2 White would bring the queen's rook to d1 and only then start to think about further plans - whether to break in the centre with e4-e5 or prepare a kingside pawn advance with h2-h3 and g2-g4.

My opponent wasn't in the mood for patient defence; he decided to give battle in the centre at once.

12	e5	c5?
11	•••	d5?

It was better to settle for the modest retreat 12...2 d7.

Do you believe Black's action can succeed, with his bishop on c8 and his knight on a6? You don't? Then the refutation must be found!



W

At the moment I am the exchange up, but two of my pieces are attacked. If either of them is taken, the material advantage passes to Black.

15 Axd5!


Now both pieces are immune due to 16 \(\Delta xf7+. \) Also 15...\(\Delta xf6 \) 16 \(\Delta e4 \) is bad for Black. To protect his queen he needs to develop his queen's bishop – but where? You can see at a glance that any move with this bishop has its drawbacks: 15...\(\Delta d7 \) 16 \(\Delta h5 \) g6 17 \(\Delta xf7+, \) 15...\(\Delta e6 16 \Delta xe6 \) or 15...\(\Delta g4 \) 16 \(\Delta xg4 \) dxe3 17 \(\Delta xb7.

15 ... \$f5 16 **Z**e5 \$g6

I have removed one piece from attack, but extricating the other is more complicated. 17 De4 is possible, when 17...gxf6 fails to 18 Le8, but I chose another route.

18 **②e4!** f6 19 ₩xd4! (D)

A picturesque position! The centre is wholly occupied by white pieces. If the rook is taken, then



В

even if there is no mate, White can regain his material by capturing the b-pawn with his bishop.

19 ... \(\hat{\mathbb{L}}\xe4\)

If 19...fxe5 20 ₩xe5+ \$\psi\$h6, then 21 \$\overline{2}\$f6 wins on the spot.

20 **對xe4** ②c5

My opponent was relying on this zwischenzug. Instead, 20...fxe5 21 豐xe5+ 豐f6 (21...堂g6 22 豐e6+) 22 豐xf6+ 堂xf6 23 皇xb7 is hopeless for Black.


Black has won a piece after all, but his king can't escape a mating attack.

22 ... **\$\pi**h6

23 He1!

All White's pieces must take part in the assault! He threatens both 24 \pm xe5 and 24 \pm e3.

23 ... **公d7** 24 **\$h1!** In such cases you need to calculate the variations right to the end. To make this task easier, I recommend that you start with moves against which your opponent has a single forced reply. For instance, the queen check on e6 looks inviting, but you would have to examine not only 24...\$\delta g7\$ but also 24...\$\delta f6\$ and 24...\$\delta f6\$; in some lines you might miss the retort ...\$\delta b6+. The king move, renewing the threat of \$\mathbb{L} e3\$, gives the enemy no choice.



W

25 **Hd1!**

Again White threatens to bring his rook to h3, but now there is the additional possibility of taking on b7 with tempo.

25 ... **包**f8

26 **≜**xb7 1-0

The next example, like the foregoing one, is a specimen of what you might call the lightweight genre—it features a quick overrunning of the black position. Incidentally, it shouldn't surprise you that I am not showing any games I lost. Of course you must carefully study your losses to detect the reasons for your errors. But right now, why should I spoil my pleasure by recalling my own failures?

Dolmatov – FranzoniWorld Junior Championship,
Graz 1978


Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 \$\times f3\$ e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 \$\times xd4\$ \$\times f6\$ 5 \$\times c3\$ \$\times c6\$ 6 \$\times e2\$

This is rarely played (the usual continuations are 6 \(\Delta\) db5 and 6 \(\Delta\) xc6 bxc6 7 e5). While offering to transpose into the Scheveningen (6...d6), White allows a bishop sortie to b4, after which he will have to sacrifice a pawn. I had analysed this sharp variation with my coach Mark Dvoretsky, and then used it a couple of times with success. I don't know why no one

plays this way today; in my opinion the line gives White a highly promising position.

> **≜b4** 6 ... 7 0-0 **≜xc3** 8 bxc3 9 xe4 9 Ad3 (D)



В

Ø\xd4

Here my knowledge ended. I knew that 9... 2xc3?! was danger-We1, and had only analysed 9...d5. I was acquainted with only one game in which that move had been played. This was Geller-Khasin, USSR Championship, Riga 1958, which went 10 **2a3 2a5** 11 **2c1** ②xd4 12 cxd4 **2**d7 13 **2**b1 **2**c6 14 **2**b4 **当**c7 15 **当**a3 a5 16 **2**xe4 dxe4 17 c4 f6 18 2d6 \dd7, with about equal chances. I don't remember exactly how I was going to improve on White's play, but

there was a way - you can try to find it yourself. I later used my improvement successfully against Sergei Gorelov, but unfortunately I haven't kept the score of that game.

10 cxd4

It was worth considering 10 ≜xe4!?, but I was hoping to transpose back into my analysis after 10...d5 11 \\ a3.

> 10 ... 9)f6


White is a pawn down. As yet he has no attack, but he possesses two bishops and a certain advantage in space and development. In addition, as I recall, I had a healthy optimism and confidence in my powers - which is of considerable importance in this kind of situation. Incidentally, I would still enjoy playing such a position today. White's initiative is of an enduring nature and not easy to neutralize.

11 **Q**g5 **豐a5!?** (D) · 12 f4!

An unorthodox decision (it isn't usual to put a pawn on f4 with your bishop on g5), but evidently the correct one. White shouldn't be in a hurry to exchange on f6. By advancing his f-pawn, he brings his king's rook into the attack. In answer to 12... b4 I would have given up a second pawn with 13 f5.

> 12 ... **b6**

13 **≜**xf6



W

But now it is the right time to exchange. This enables White to gain a tempo with 14 \mathbb{\mathbb{H}}f3.

> .ي 13 gxf6 14 學f3 **¤**b8

After 14... add 15 add exd5 16 Zae1+ \$\precepf{8}\$ 17 \square f3. Black would have the worse endgame. He isn't yet ready to fight such a patently rearguard action.

> **盒b7** 15 f5 16 **≜e**4!

It is important to dash the opponent's hopes based on counterpressure against g2. With heavy pieces on the board, Black's position is difficult - his king is under attack and his rooks are disunited.

> 16 ... **⊉ ve4** 17 **当xe4** ₩d5 18 Wh4 Ig8


To me, this game contains a kind of riddle. It looks as if Black keeps making good, logical moves,

yet imperceptibly his game deteriorates to the point of hopelessness. Why this happens, where his play could have been improved - I don't know myself!

19 If2

 $\mathbb{Z}g5(D)$

How is White to continue the attack?



W

The pressure on g2 is fettering my pieces. I need to deflect the enemy queen from the long diagonal, even if only for a moment.

20 c4!

₩xc4 dxe6

21 fxe6

21... wxe6 was a more stubborn defence.

22 当f4!

A double attack on f6 and b8. But couldn't it have been carried out without the diversionary pawn sacrifice?

> 單b7 22 ...

23 Ec1!

This is the point! All my pieces are now in the attack. White's threats are irresistible.

23	•••	₩d5
24	₩xf6	ℤ e7
25	₩h8+	1-0

Dolmatov - Flesch Bucharest 1981 Caro-Kann Defence

1	e4	с6
2	d4	d5
3	exd5	cxd5
4	c4	1,


Against the Caro-Kann I always play the Panov Attack, and quite successfully too - it has brought me a large number of wins to date.

4	•••	€)f6
5	Dc3	е6
6	Df3	. ≜ .b4
7	₫ 43	

The encounter Dolmatov-Kharitonov, World Junior Championship qualifying tournament, Sochi 1978 went 7 cxd5 exd5!. At that its infancy, and Black's recapture on d5 with his pawn took me by surprise. I went on to win a good game, but acquired nothing from the opening. Since then I have started playing 7 \(\text{\$\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} \) d3, transposing to a variation of the Nimzo-Indian. The resulting positions suit me very well. Why, then, do I avoid 1 d4,

which is not at all a bad opening move? I can't understand it myself.

. 7	•••	dxc4
8	♠xc4	0-0
9	0-0	≜ xc3?!
10	bxc3	₩ c7 (D)



W

At the end of the 1970s, World Champion Anatoly Karpov successfully employed a plan based on exchanging his dark-squared bishop followed by developing his knight on d7 and bishop on b7. Janos Flesch is aiming for a similar set-up, but goes about it inaccurately: the premature exchange on c3 increases White's options. The plan has to be initiated with either 9...b6 or 9...4 bd7. The latter move. incidentally, was played against me by Jonathan Speelman in a game I demonstrated at the second session of our school (see the book Opening Preparation).

11 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} \) 11

A natural and logical move, withdrawing the bishop from attack. I confess that at the time I didn't even look at the reply 11... wxc3. (Today I am not quite such an optimist - I'm sure I would examine it.) After 12 \(\textit{\textsuper}\)f4! (but not 12 2g5 Øbd7, transposing to the Speelman game), White has a huge lead in development, ensuring him more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

11 **包bd7**


Black hopes to arrange his pieces on the Karpov model after 12 c4 b6 13 \(\textit{\textit{g}} \textit{5} \(\textit{\textit{b}} \text{b} \text{7}, \text{ but I don't} give him the chance.

12 **a**a3! (D)

An unconventional development for the bishop in this opening system. In his youth a chess player has fewer dogmas and more energy it's easier for him to think up fresh ideas. At a more advanced age he knows exactly how players have played before in similar cases, and this knowledge sometimes prevents him from approaching the position without limiting preconceptions.

Here I succeeded in pinpointing the main weakness in the opponent's camp - the vulnerable d6square. Actually, even after the normal bishop development on g5, White often tries to exploit this

same weakness later, with the manoeuvre 2g5-h4-g3!



В

12 ... ΞeS

The usual square for the rook in this variation (this is where Karpov used to put it). It would have been better to move it to d8, but my opponent didn't figure out my intention.

13 Ød2!


What is he to do now? The knight is heading for d6, and after 13... 對xc3 14 ②c4 Black may well lose his queen. I am sure he should coolly play 13...b6, although after 14 2 c4 2 b7 15 2 d6 White has an obvious plus.

> **8**6 13 ... 14 \\frac{\pi}{2}f3

On 14 Dc4 Df8, the d6-square would be covered. Therefore I activate my queen, guarding the cpawn at last, and stopping the black bishop from developing to b7.

> 14 ... 2) f8 (D)

Now what would you play for White?



W

15 9)e4!

A typical stratagem! In such cases it's useful to exchange some of the opponent's developed pieces - then your own lead in development can be utilized more easily. I suggest an analogy with hockey: if one player is sent off, the advantage of five against four is palpable but not decisive. Remove another pair (one from each side), and defending becomes much more difficult with three against four. With two against three it is all but impossible.

Of course, when White played this move there were also considerations of a more concrete kind.

In particular, I wanted to make development difficult for the black bishop. However, knowledge of general laws such as the one just mentioned tends to make the decision easier - it gives us an idea of what to look for.

> 15 ... 9)xe4 16 & xe4 \$\d7

A sorry spectacle – the black pieces scurry back and forth. He evidently wants to play 17... 2f6, but of course I don't allow it.

> 17 \\ \mathbb{e}e7! He8 18 **♠**h4 f5?!

Anyone would surely have played this - it's hard to endure such powerful pressure for long. Nevertheless it would have been better to show patience and refrain from weakening the position.

> 19 **≜**c2 Ø)b6

20 \Datab3 **≜d7**

21 🚊g3

Before taking the f5-pawn, it helps to improve the position of the bishop. It is amusing that this piece has, after all, made its way round to g3, the customary square for it in this variation.


> 21 ... ₩c6 22 **對xf5** ₩xc3

23 \@e5!

White has protected his d4pawn and parried the threat of 23... which would now be

23 ... **₩h4** The queen returns to the defence. 24 **對h**5 $\mathbb{Z}ac8(D)$

How should the attack be continued?



W

25 f4!

I usually find it hard to decide on a change in the structure of the position - I prefer piece-play. However, this pawn move is very strong. The threat is not only to bring the rook into action via f3, but also to play f4-f5.

> 25 ... g6?!

25...**≜**c6 is bad due to 26 **₩**g4! ₩e7 27 \(\textit{\righta}\) xe6+, but after the move played White can still demolish his opponent's defence by force. The most tenacious move was 25...4 c4.

26° 學h4 ₩e7 27 \(\Delta f6 **坐f7 包d5** 28 f5 29 fxg6 ₩xg6 30 If3

He has to give up his queen, which is tantamount to resignation.

31	≝g 3	⊈ g7
32	H f1	If8
33	Exg6+	hxg
34	₩g5	 □c6
35	₩e5!	¤ b6
36	g4	≌b5
37	d5!	1-0

Take note: having achieved a material plus, White didn't relax the pressure but looked for the most direct and energetic path to victory. In such situations a player sometimes feels that his work is essentially done, he eases off and starts to play carelessly. Consequently his opponent succeeds in organizing a defence or even obtains counter-chances.

The following game (one year earlier) was played in a similar vein: the same opening, the same energetic exploitation of the opponent's opening inaccuracies. I was then an international master, taking part in a strong grandmaster event for the first time. Bent Larsen was one of the favourites. Experienced grandmasters are prone to underestimating young and ambitious opponents. We had already crossed swords in the first round, when I managed to crush him

quickly with Black. As this was a double-round tournament, our next encounter soon came - again with a favourable result for me.


Dolmatov - Larsen

Amsterdam 1980 Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4

Of course, Larsen didn't suspect how dangerous it was to play this opening against me.

2	d4	d5
3	exd5	cxd5
4	c4	2 16
5	ව c3	е6
6	ᡚf3	≜ b4
7	⊈d3	dxc4
8	≜xc4	0-0
9	0-0	a6 (D)



W

I didn't know anything about this move. Later I discovered that

it makes sense to prevent ... b7-b5 by playing 10 a4!?, along the lines of the Queen's Gambit Accepted, but at the time I didn't feel like weakening b4, and thought up a different idea.

10 a3!?


This too is prophylaxis against ...b5, but of a more sophisticated kind. In reply to 10... 2e7 I planned to withdraw my bishop to a2 first, and then answer the flank thrust 11...b5 with a counter-blow in the centre: 12 d5!. On the other hand if 10... \alphaxc3 11 bxc3 b5, then after 12 \(\textit{\textsq}\)d3 the threat of 13 a4 is unpleasant.

All the same, this last variation looks like the most logical reaction to White's idea. In lines where Black swaps on c3, White's a2-a3 is a wasted tempo: the pawn should either stay on a2 or be advanced to a4. At the 1982 Zonal Tournament in Erevan, Lev Psakhis had done some good preparation for his game with me, and headed for the position in question. There followed: 12... \dd d5 13 a4 \dd b7 14 ₩e2 Ec8 15 axb5 axb5 16 Exa8 2xa8 17 2d2 2e4 18 2xe4 \ xe4 19 豐xb5 点d5 20 黑e1 豐g6 21 ₩e2 ②c6, and Black had sufficient compensation for the pawn sacrificed. The game was soon drawn.

Of course, a clear-headed examination of the position is much

more difficult at the board, with the clock ticking away, than in home analysis. So if you manage to think up a sensible idea like 10 a3, its practical chances of success are very considerable - even if there is a solution to the problem facing your opponent.

10 ... _**⊈e7** · 11 \\ \mathred{\mithred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mathred{\mtx}\and{\mthred{\mtx}\end{\mthred{\mtx}\and{\mthr **b5?!** (D) 11...එc6 is better.



W

12 d5!

What is Black to do now? He doesn't want to allow the capture on e6 – he would have to spend the whole game defending a clearly inferior position.

12 ... exd5 13 9 xd5 **⊉b7?**

Larsen had to exchange with 13... \(\Omega\) xd5. He was afraid of the answer 14 \wxd5 (stronger than 14 Axd5 Za7, threatening 15...Zd7).

Black would have to swap queens, as 14... 47 is too risky: 15 4 f4 (15 豐h5!?) 15...基d7?! 16 豐h5, with strong pressure on Black's kingside. After 14... \widetilde xd5 \pm a7 16 \(\text{16} f4, Black can't play 16... \(\text{9}b7? \) 17 \(\mathbb{Q} \) e3, but 16...\(\mathbb{Z} \) d7 17 \(\mathbb{Q} \) xf7+ \(\Pi\xf7\) 18 \(\Pi\xb8\) is also bad for him. He can only settle for a permanently inferior ending with 16... \$\delta e6 17 ≜xe6 fxe6. That was the least of the evils, though. Objectively, Black would be justified in counting on a draw. "But why should I deal with a little boy so timidly?" the grandmaster must have thought.

14 ②xe7+ **当xe7** 15 Ag5

The two bishops in an open position guarantee White an overwhelming plus. All I need to do now is play natural attacking moves and make sure my opponent does not manage to jump out of the trap he has landed in.

15 ... **夕**bd7 16 He1 ₩c5

more resistance.


17 **≜e**3

Not, of course, 17 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)c1? \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xf3.

17 ... ₩f5 (D)

17... wh5 was relatively better, although after 18 2g5 \wxd1 19 Maxd1 Black has a difficult ending.

18 包h4!



W


Black's queen is almost trapped. Of course, the routine 18 2d4? is weaker on account of the reply 18...**₩**g6.

18	•••		₩e4
19	≜g 5	٠.	₩ c6
	Ic1		₩b6
21	0.2		

The game takes a highly amusing turn. My dark-squared bishop moves back and forth, gaining tempi all the time.

Since move sixteen, as you can see, only White has been playing. My opponent has roamed all round the board with his queen and finally brought it back to its starting square. In the meantime I have brought all my pieces into the attack.

22		ı⊈e4
23	⊘d6 ∕	≜g6 (D)



W

The bishop has come across to guard f7. Of course White has various ways of winning, but I recommend that you always look for the kind of solution that I chose in this game.

Total domination! There is no hurry to pluck the apple – it will fall of its own accord. First deprive the opponent of all reasonable moves, then finish him off. I was even sorry to play the remaining few moves; I just wanted to gloat over the ideal placing of the white pieces, since I could no longer do anything to improve it.

警b8 24 ...

It was not for nothing that I had trained myself in 'prophylactic thinking'. I understood at once that Black was planning 25... Zd8. The winning variation had to be calculated to the end (which is very easy

when the opponent's possibilities are so limited). It was now time to pick up my point and go home.

25	f4!	Z d8	
26	f5	. ≜. h5	
27	h3	∕ 2)b6	
28	₩xb6	₩xb6	
29	≜ xb6	E xd6	
30	⊈e3		

It is usually after this kind of precise move that your opponent capitulates. (If the bishop had gone anywhere else, Larsen would have started thinking about 30...\mathbb{\pi}d2.)

No doubt you have gained the impression that I only win with White. Then let me show you a game in which I had Black.

Van der Sterren – Dolmatov Amsterdam 1979 Réti Opening

1	Df3	d5
2	b3	⊈g4
3	⊉ b2	\$\d7

3... ≜xf3 would lead to a wholly unexplored situation - the kind I try to avoid. Black's plan, which had brought me success a few times already, is simple: ...e6, ...c6, ...包gf6, d6, ...0-0, ... e8 and at some point ...e5.

	4	c4	- e6
×,	5	e3	වුgf6

⊉d6


6...c6 may be a little more precise, so as to recapture on d5 with the c-pawn.

> 7 cxd5!? exd5 Ø\d4

A typical device in Réti's Opening - the knight heads for f5.

> ≜xe2 9 掌xe2(D)

What would you play now?



В

Of course Black could simply castle (9...0-0), but after 10 **2**f5 White would be a little better. I didn't want to concede the initiative to my opponent, and chose the most thematic continuation - although a slightly risky one.

> 9 ... _e5! 10 f4

I also had to take 10 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}} a3 into account. If then 10...c5, White has 11 f4! \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\text{c}}\$}\) 12 \(\textit{\$\text{0}\$}\)f5. I planned

10... De4!, with 11 f4 \(\alpha \) f6 or 11 豐b5 ≜xd4 12 exd4 豐g5 to follow. **≜**xd4 10 ...

Once again I may remark nostalgically that young players are apt to play without prejudices. You might feel reluctant to leave your opponent with a strong bishop on the long diagonal. A mature player might not have risked this exchange (and would therefore have refrained from 9... 2e5). In actual fact, Black's sturdy position in the centre and the slight vulnerability of White's set-up (weakened by f2-f4) ensure me adequate counterplay.

After the anti-positional move 11 exd4+? Black would gain the advantage by 11... We7 12 Wxe7+ \$\psi xe7 13 \(\mathbb{2} a3 + \psi d8 14 0-0 \) \$\mathbb{Z} e8\$ 15 ②c3 ②b8!, to be followed by 16...2c6.

11	•••	c5
12	ı⊈b2	0-0
13	0-0	≖ e8
14	PECKUE	

14 ₩d3?! It was better to place the queen

學b6


White will soon have to worry about either ...d4 or ...c4.

15 Dc3 (D)

on f3.

Now what would you play?

It's no good trying to come up with a brilliant idea at this stage.



B

First see if you can solve your problem (the d5-pawn is en prise) with some normal, useful move.

> Had8! 15 ...

All my pieces are now in play. After 16 2xd5 2xd5 17 \(\mathbb{U}\)xd5 2)f6 Black wins his pawn back with the better game.

16 **Eab1**

Van der Sterren has decided to guard against any tries with ...c4. However, it is not only my c-pawn but also my d-pawn that is ready to advance. You can see how useful it is to have a number of strategic threats in reserve at the same time. while not hurrying to put any of them into action!

> ₩c6 16 ... 17 **Ef3** d4!

The moment has come! With his last move. Van der Sterren revealed his wish to start a flank attack: I respond with a central counterstroke,

which, by the way, required precise calculation.


There was also another tempting possibility: 17... De4!?. White can't reply 18 2xd5? because of 18... #d6 with a lethal pin on the d-file, but after 18 2xe4! dxe4 19 ₩c3 f6 20 Zg3 he would maintain a playable position. I wanted more.

18 exd4 cxd4

19 4 b5

Not 19 包e2 包c5 20 豐c4 豐e4 21 Tel d3 22 Wxc5 Wxe2!.

> 4)c5 19 ... 20 \(\mathbb{\text{\psi}}\)c4 (D)



B

My pieces are excellently placed, but the d4-pawn is under attack. In this sharp position Black had already foreseen a purely positional solution.


> 20 ... **₩**ħ6!

By placing my queen on the same diagonal as the white king, I defend the d-pawn indirectly: 21 **a**xd4 is strongly answered by 21... \(\bar{\pi}\)xd4! 22 \(\O\)xd4 \(\O\)e6 23 \(\Bar{\pi}\)d3 Id8 At the same time I avoid the exchange of queens which might otherwise have occurred after 21 Щc1.

> 21 Ec1 €)e6 22 d3

On 22 f5, Black has the very strong 22... 2g5 23 Id3 a6! and then 24 2xd4 2g4! or 24 2c7 **Z**e4. The move White plays weakens the e3-square; a black knight immediately heads for it.

22 ... ②g4 23 f5! (D) Now what would you play?



В

23 ... 4)f8!

A sober response. In answer to 23...De5? White had prepared to give up his queen with 24 fxe6! ②xc4 25 exf7+ \$\dot{\phi}h8 26 fxe8\dot{\pm}+

24 单xd4 当h6!


White's h2-pawn is attacked. In addition his back rank is weak; the position of his rook on c1 is shaky. On 25 單h3, Black would not play 25...豐d2?! 26 豐c3, but 25...單xd4!! 26 氫xd4 豐d2 27 單f1 罩e1 28 豐c2 (28 罩f3? 罩xf1+ 29 歐xf1 豐f4+.

25 h3 a6!

The overloading of White's pieces makes itself felt. If 26 hxg4, then 26...axb5 27 \(\mathbb{U}\)c3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd4. Nor is 26 \(\mathbb{Q}\)b2 any help: 26...\(\mathbb{Q}\)e5! 27 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe5 axb5 28 \(\mathbb{U}\)f4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe5!.

26	≜ xg7!	₩xg7
27	I g3	axb5
28	₩xg4	₩xg4
29	Exg4+	⊈h8
30	$\mathbf{Lc5}(D)$	2

White has only two pawns for his piece. Nonetheless Black still has some difficulties in realizing his advantage. His pawns are all shattered and his knight is out of play.



В

30	•••	¤ d6!
31	Exb5	b6

Black has given up a third pawn, but now his b-pawn can be defended from d7 by his knight.


32	He4	ℤed8
33	Hee5	⊈g 7

33... 2d7 can be answered by 34 Med5. There is no need to hurry with the knight move; the best thing just now is to bring the king nearer the centre. In the endgame you should utilize any breathing-space to strengthen your position to the maximum.

34	学f2	\$ f6
35	∐e3	⊘d7
36	g4	ℤc8
37	a4	ℤc5
38	I b4	Zcd 5
39	⊈e2	②e5?! (D)

So far my play has been logical enough, but at this point I weaken and start to play carelessly. There

was an easy win with 39... ②c5 40 d4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd4.



W

40	d 4	is.	②c6?!
40 E	xd4	was	stronger.

41	□c4	€)xd4+
42	\$ f2	Dc6
43	ģ g3	De5
44	Zce4	. ⊈c 6
45	\$ h4	包d7
46	⊈h 5	⊈ 27

The impression is that Black has dithered a little, and made the win more complicated. The important thing in such cases is to keep calm and try to regain the thread of the game, without being in a rush to force events.

47	\$h4	E c1
48	∐b4	h6
49	₩ g3	 ⊈cd1

I now understood that I had to exchange a pair of rooks.

50 ⊈f3 **2**5d4?!

Another inaccuracy! The correct 50... Id4! would have forced the rook exchange in more favourable conditions — on the fourth rank.

51	≝ b5	Zd 5
52	 ∡xd5	¤xd5
53	b4	ℤ d4!
54	Te4	2 731

Of course Black must retain one pair of rooks. After an exchange on e4 the two pawns would be no weaker than the knight.

55	h4 ·	\$ f6
56	⊈ f4	⊑ f1+
57	⊈g3	②e 5
58	ℤd4	 ⊑ g1+
59	\$ h3	⊈ e7


Black has achieved a great deal; he has stopped the white rook from penetrating, activated all his pieces and cooped up the enemy king on h3. The threat is 60... \(\bar{\pma} \) a1.

60	a5	bxa5
61	bxa5	¤ a1
62	⊈g3	≝ xa5
63	g5(D)	
63	•••	h5!

When exploiting a material advantage you should avoid exchanging pawns. The fewer pawns on the board, the greater the drawing chances!

64 \$f4 \$f8

Again Black allows the game to drag on. Bearing in mind the principle I have just stated, I didn't



В

want to play 64...f6, and yet this would have led to a quick win: 65 gxf6+ \$xf6 66 \$\mathbb{I}\d6+ \$\mathbb{G}7 67 \$\mathbb{I}\e6 ②f7 68 **I**g6+ **\$**f8 69 f6 **②**d8!.

> 65 **H**d6 **₽**27

66 Th6

On 66 Th6. I intended to imprison the rook with 66... 2g6+! 67 fxg6 fxg6, after which the game is decided by zugzwang: 68 \(\precent{\ ■a4 69 \$\dot{g}\$3 \$\dot{g}\$b4 70 \$\dot{g}\$h3 \$\dot{g}\$\$4.

> 66 ... ②g4 IIa3 ДЬ4 68 Ec4?! **Hb3?!**

We both missed 68...\(\mathbb{I}\)f3+! 69 \$\price xf3 (69 \$\price e4 \price xf5!) 69... \De5+.

> 69 Ha4 9\f2!

Black threatens 70... \$\mu\$b4+!.

70 IIa7 **Ib4**+

71 ⊈f3 ②g4

72 **Ee**7

Or 72 g6 2)e5+.


72 ... IIb1! Now the threat is 73... If 1+.

IIa7 **Th3**+ **क**f4 **Eb4**+ .**₩23** De5 **Eg4**+ Ha5 фf2 **IIf4+** 78 \$\doc{1}{2}e3 67c4+ 0 - 1

Dolmatov - Lerner Tashkent 1983 Sicilian Defence

1	e4	c 5
2	Df3	d6
3	d4	cxd
4	②xd4	Df (
5	ව c3	包c
. 6	_ ≜ .g5	eб
7	₩d2	a6
8	0-0-0	h6
9	≜e3 (D)	

Today I usually choose the more cautious 9 \(\textsquare{1} \) f4.



В

⊈e7 40xd4 10 f4 11 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xd4

In our day this system is very popular, but at that time it was still in its infancy. The next phase of the game, then, is a case of improvisation at the board - by both sides. I should point out that today White more often places his pawn on f3, rather than f4.

> **b**5 11 ... **₫ h7** 12 &d3 13 **⇔**b1 **≜c6?!**

Black is preparing ... b4, and first prevents the knight from sidestepping to a4. The immediate 13...b4? would be met by 14 ②a4 (after 14...2)xe4 15 \widetilde{\pi}xb4, not only the bishop but also the g7-pawn is attacked). Nonetheless the move Black plays has a serious drawback, which is underlined by my reply. It was better simply to castle.


14 We1!?

Now 14...b4 can be answered by 15 2xf6 2xf6 16 5)d5. Furthermore there is e4-e5 hanging over Black's head, utilizing the opposition of the white rook and black queen on the d-file.

[As Grandmaster Kindermann has indicated, after 14...b4 15 \$xf6 16 4 d5 a5 Black would maintain a defensible position. Therefore instead of 14 Wel!? he same defence would not be available owing to 17 Dxf6+ \subseteq xf6 18 $\mathbf{W}b6$ – Dvoretsky.]

> 14 ... 0-0 **≜xf**6 **≜**xf6 15 16 e5 **≜e7** (D)

After 16...dxe5?! Black would not obtain enough for the queen, but 16... h4!? deserved serious consideration. There could follow 17 \(\psi\)e3 b4 18 \(\phi\)e4 dxe5 19 fxe5 ₩a5 20 ②d6 \(\)e7, though after 21 2e4 White's position would still be preferable.



 \mathbf{w}

17 f5!

The standard method of attack when Black has not been able to exchange pawns on e5. Of course, the move required exact calculation.

How does White continue the offensive if Black now takes the epawn? I hardly looked at 17...dxe5 18 f6 2xf6 19 2h7+. Black's rook. bishop and two pawns are stronger than the queen. The correct move is 18 fxe6!. Then giving up the queen (with 18...fxe6 19 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{q}}}} h7+} \) would be unfavourable, but otherwise Black would face serious difficulties.

17 ...

This is the move Lerner was counting on. What now? 18 20e4 exf5 is not good for White. I confess I am proud of my next move.

When conducting a sharp fight you need a high degree of alertness and ingenuity to exploit all your resources. If at some point your play is not energetic enough, your attack may come to a dead end and your opponent will seize the initiative. In the present case, Black has the bishop-pair; all he needs to do is beat off the immediate threats without suffering too much damage...

18 9 e2!

An unpleasant surprise. The fearsome f5-f6! is threatened, for example: 18... \\delta a 5? 19 f6! gxf6 20 ₩g3+ \$\prescript{\$\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\prescript{\prescript{\prescript{\$\prescript{\ 19 f6! gxf6 20 当g3+ 含h8 21 当f4 \$\dot{g}7 22 \dot{2}\text{g}3. If 18...dxe5, then 19 fxe6 is strong, as before.

> 18 ... exf5 19 Ød4

Here is a consequence of Black having his bishop on c6! The knight approaches the key point f5 with tempo.


> 19 ... **坐c7**

After 19... 2e4 20 2xe4 fxe4 21 sive: 21...d5? is refuted by 22 \(\textbf{\textit{\textbf{\textit{Z}}}\) xd5. If 19...\(\textit{\textbf{\textit{Q}}}\) d7, then 20 \(\textit{\textbf{\textit{Q}}}\) xf5 is strong.

> 4)xf5 20 dxe5 21 學23 **g6**

21... 2g5 22 h4 2f6 23 2xh6+ \$\preceph{8}\$ h8 is a more resilient defence.

> 22 Øxh6+ **含h8**(D)



W

Black's king is vulnerable; I have excellent attacking prospects. How do I keep up the pressure? Don't imagine that a stroke of genius is called for. Sometimes you do need to look for difficult, concealed solutions, but more often you simply have to play logical, precise moves one after the other, without making any mistakes.

23 Inf1

The hitherto inactive rook joins in the attack. The position is not yet ripe for combinations like 23 约xf7+.

> 23 ... **⊉**d5

Black had to protect his f-pawn. How should White continue now?


A good idea that suggests itself is 2f5!. But if we are playing it, let us do so with tempo!

> 24 **對h3 ⊉**27 25 Øf5+! gxf5

If 25... \$\dot{g}8\$, White has the decisive 26 營h6 皇f6 27 包e3 (simultaneously attacking d5 and f6) 27... 2g7 2& 2xd5.

> 26 **營g3**+ **\$h6** (D)

After 26... \$\dispha 27 \boxed{\square} xf5, mate is inevitable.



W

Here White has three continuations, two of which win. Unfortunately I chose the third, and botched

everything. Let me explain how this happened. In one sense, I was getting carried away - I thought I must be close to a beautiful finish to a game where everything had gone so well. On the other hand I didn't quite feel confident enough, and was on the lookout for some convenient way to go into a safe endgame with an extra pawn. I fell between two stools. My conflicting motives took their toll; they made me use up an inordinate amount of time. and at the crucial moment (when I was already in time-trouble) they stopped me from selecting and calculating the right line.

The first possibility is 27 \(\mathbb{Z}\xf5\). After 27... Ig8 the black king aims to escape to f8. To carry on the attack, White must sacrifice a rook with 28 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h5+.

The second way is 27 \(\mathbb{L}\xxf5.\) Black's only reply - 27...\\degree c4 leads to an endgame where White has an extra pawn: 28 營h3+ 營h4 29 對xh4+ 全xh4 30 罩xd5.

Finally, White can give an intervening check with 27 \bigwhat h3+ \bightarrow g7. and only then play 28 2xf5. This time 28... #c4 is no good, and in addition to 29 \bigwh7+ White is simply threatening 29 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd5. Black has only one defence: 28... 2xa2+! 29 \$\presexa2 \presexa2 \presexa4c4+ and 30...\presexa6h4.

I saw all this clearly, but still couldn't make the right choice. Undoubtedly the simplest solution (and the one most in keeping with my style at the time) was 27 \(\omega\)xf5, heading for an ending where there would only be a few technical difficulties to cope with.

I couldn't decide on the rook sacrifice, but didn't want to swap queens. That is why I plumped for the third possibility.

I thought it would be hard for Black to defend, given his exposed king and the presence of opposite-coloured bishops, which in the middlegame ought to strengthen the attack. However, this verdict is false; I didn't consider that by posting a rook on the d-file Black could prevent me from making aggressive use of my rooks. Besides, the position of the white king is by no means secure, especially after the e5-pawn is captured.

31 ... **Z**ad8!

With opposite-coloured bishops you shouldn't always cling to material; the initiative is more important. Black is quite happy to offer his e-pawn – it is only getting in his way.

32 \#xe5+

What else?

32	•••		⊈f 6
33	₩c7	•	¤xd1+
34	Xxd1		当f2!


Active defence! Black not only attacks the bishop but also threatens 35...b3!. This explains my next move.

I had foreseen this counterstroke, but thought (quite rightly, I am sure) that I had to allow it.

36	\$xb2	₩f6+
37	⊈ b1	₩xeб
38	$\mathbb{Z}d3(D)$	
38		Tc8?

With 38... **2**e8! Black could have maintained the balance. The threat to exchange queens (39... **2**e1+ 40 **2**b2 **2**e5+) would have tied White down and given him no time to develop an attack.

My opponent's moves just before the time-control prove weak,



В

and land him in a lost position again.

The right tactics! With the opponent in time-trouble, avoid forced variations; play them only if they win. Of course Lerner was expecting me to check on g3, and would have moved his king instantly in reply. But how should he now react?

This is where you can't help losing your head. It's so easy to blunder, for instance with 40... 數d5? 41 數g4+ and 42 數xc8.

40	•••	Ec4 ?
41	≝g3 +	₩g4
	₩d6	_

It's all over! With your flag dangling, you only look at checks and captures. Lerner, of course, simply had no time to assess the consequences of my quiet move.

The game was adjourned. It didn't last long after resumption.

42	•••	Ec3
43	₩ e7+	⊈ g6
44	₩e8 +	\$ f5
45	₩e6+	⊈g5
46	≝xg4+	\$xg4
47	Exc3	bxc3
48	⊈ a2	∲ f4
49	⊈b 3	⊈e3
50	⊈xc3	f5
51	h4!	1-0

6 Practical Chances in Chess


Benjamin Blumenfeld

Note: This article was first published in 1934

Purely specialized factors (positional understanding, the ability to calculate far ahead, etc.) are not in themselves sufficient for success in chess; you also have to apply those faculties which make for success in other forms of sporting contest and in real life: quickwittedness, the habit of speedily finding your bearings in a new context; the ability to take weighty decisions that have immediate effects, in circumstances that defy analysis; total dedication to a given aim, whether victory or salvation from defeat; in a bad positión, self-control and endurance; in a good one, refusal to let your achievements go to your head.

In the chess press, games are mainly discussed with a view to determining the theoretical correctness of the play. Yet this kind of elucidation does not always faithfully reflect the actual course of the struggle. An experienced chess player will sometimes opt for a particular continuation without

being at all convinced that it is the best of all those available; he merely judges that it gives the most chances in practice.



В

Kmoch - Nimzowitsch Niendorf 1927

From the diagram, play proceeded 44...b4 45 2a4 (not 45 cxb4 ②xd4 46 bxa5+ ②b5, when Black emerges with two strong passed pawns). At this point, the obvious-looking continuation was 45... € xe5 46 xd7 (no better is 46 dxe5 2xa4 47 cxb4 2b3 48

bxa5 \(\mathbb{X}\)xa5, which leaves Black with an extra pawn and winning chances in spite of the oppositecoloured bishops).

[After 45... Dxe5 46 2xd7 Dxd7 47 cxb4 a4 Black wins without trouble. A more tenacious line is 46 \(\alpha xe5 \(\alpha xa4 \) 47 cxb4 \(\alpha b3 \) 48 bxa5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xa5 49 \(\mathbb{Q}\)f4, preparing for \$\dispha^2 h4-g5 or \displae3 followed by \displae3f4. --Dvoretsky]

Instead of this, Nimzowitsch answered 45 \(\text{\pma}\)a4 with 45...b3, and there followed 46 \(\textit{\textit{xc6+}}\) \(\text{\text{cc6-}}\) The position now looks dead drawn; the black passed pawns on the aand b-files are easily stopped, and a kingside breakthrough is impossible.

The game continued:


47 g5 Xa7 48 **Eb2**

White blockades the black pawn. There was danger in sticking to purely waiting tactics, for instance 48 曾f3 單b7 49 曾g3 a4 50 皇a3 b2! 51 \(\mathbb{Z}\) \(\mathbb{Z}\) b3! 52 \(\mathbb{Z}\) xb3 \(\cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \) 53 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b5 54 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e3 b2 55 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xb2 \$\ddots c4 56 \ddots d2 \ddots b3, and Black wins the bishop.

> Lb7 48 ... 49 **⊈**f4 **≜c8**

Black's aim seems to be to try to penetrate on the h-file with his rook, so White's next move is natural. Yet Black provoked this reply so as to draw the white king away from the queenside and carry out a prepared combination.

50 **含g3** (D)



 \mathbf{B}

50 ... **Zh4!**


Black aims to obtain passed pawns which will advance with tempo, owing to the awkward placing of the white rook on b2. We now see why he didn't do the obvious thing and push his a-pawn at any time in the last few moves.

> 51 cxb4 а4 52 b5+

White gives up a pawn to open a path for his bishop; yet the rook and bishop prove helpless.

52...\$xb5 53 \$a3 c3 54 \$\mathbb{Z}b1\$ \$c4 55 f4 \$xd4 56 \$f2 \$c4 57 \$\dd d4 58 \dd e2 \dd d5 59 \dd f3 \dd b7 60 He1 \$\dig c4+ 61 \$\dig f2 b2 62 f5 exf5 63 e6 \(\text{\ti}\text{\texi{\text{\texi{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\titt{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tint{\text{\texi

From the combination that Black carried out, we can see what dangers were lurking for White in a position that looked harmless. Nimzowitsch was therefore right to think that the continuation he chose gave the best practical chances.



Kmoch - Yates San Remo 1930


White has obtained a decisive advantage by fine play. He should now continue simply with 32 \(\mathbb{I}\)6xe5 dxe5 33 Exe5 [33 De7!? is simpler - Dvoretsky], and if 33... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{align then 34 ②e7!. In this variation both players have approximately equal forces. Although doubled and isolated, the white queenside pawns are fulfilling their function perfectly well-holding up Black's pawns on the same wing. On the kingside, White can create two united passed pawns. The game would win itself.

Instead of this simple variation that leaves Black with no chances. White devised a combination. The game continued: 32 2 e7 2 xe6 33 ②xg8 ②xc4! (White was evidently counting on being able to meet 33...\alpha xg8 by 34 f4).

Thanks to his combination White has come out the exchange up, yet Black has acquired definite counter-chances in the shape of mobile queenside pawns supported by the two bishops. Black even went on to win.

The conclusion from this is that given a sufficient advantage, we should select those continuations which enable us to achieve the win without allowing the opponent any counterplay.

We may also draw a further conclusion which is less of a platitude. Suppose there is the choice between two continuations: the first gives a decisive positional advantage with a balanced distribution of material; the second gives roughly the same amount of advantage, but with a material imbalance (as in our example with rook and knight against two bishops). In this situation it pays to select the first continuation. With balanced material the devices of attack and defence are more familiar; there is less scope for the unexpected.



W

Yates - Ahues Hamburg 1930

White could have decided the game immediately with a fairly simple combination: 41 ②g6+ hxg6 (41... \widehat{w}\text{xg6 loses a piece)} 42 \widehat{w}\text{h4+,} etc. Instead, probably without giving it a thought, he played 41 2h5, which at first sight looks very strong too.

There followed 41... \subseteq 65! (not etc.) 42 \$\dot\nu\$h1 \dot\nu\$xc3! 43 \dot\nu\$xe5 \dot\nu\$xe5. White now has queen against rook and minor piece, but his kingside attack has evaporated and Black can work up active play. White eventually suffered defeat.

In connection with this example, we can make the following general observation. When an attack culminates in material gain. it is too early to be celebrating victory. In such cases you often find that the whole character of the battle is altered; pieces that were well positioned for conducting the attack turn out to be on the wrong squares once the specific goal is attained; the play shifts to another sector of the board where the opponent's forces are more numerous or better placed. You should therefore exercise particular caution at critical moments when the win of material is possible, and carefully consider whether gaining a material plus is worth a deterioration in your position.


In the foregoing example White overlooked a line that was immediately decisive. Quite often, however, a player will deliberately reject a simple winning line because he wants to win 'brilliantly'.

The following game (see diagram overleaf) was a particularly sorry case.

In this position Black played an interesting combination:

31... 2g5 32 2xb7 f3 33 2xf3 (the only way to avoid mate or loss of a piece) 33...2xf3+ 34 \(\prec{1}{2}\)xf3 单c6! 35 单xc6 罩d3 36 豐b2

All Black had to do now was gain a clearly won position with the natural 36... 2xc6, which is



Sergeev - Grigoriev Masters' Tournament. Moscow 1932

what Grigoriev would surely have played in a blitz game. To the general amazement of the spectators, however, he sank into thought, and after some reflection played the unexpected 36... \wxg4+. There followed 37 2g2 Iff3 (aiming for a 'pretty' mate by bringing his knight to f4 or h4) 38 2c5 2f5 39 Ie4 (the refutation Black had missed) 39... **營g5 40 ②xd3**, and White won.

In his quest for beauty Black forfeited his well-earned win. This example should be a lesson to many. The best continuation is the one which leads most surely to the goal - of victory. The inward beauty of chess lies in purposefulness and in choosing the most economical means to achieve the


aim. Striving for dramatic effects - which stems from a false understanding of chess beauty - often has lamentable consequences.

If simple, clear solutions are what you should seek in a won position, the converse applies: in a lost (or considerably worse) position you should try to stir up complexities. In a situation where natural continuations condemn you to defeat, you shouldn't shrink from material sacrifices: the main thing is to obtain active counter-chances.

In particular, it is worth noting a characteristic feature of Alekhine's play: in inferior positions he doesn't allow his opponent's advantage to grow, but seeks to disrupt the natural course of events; he steers the game into a new channel and conjures up sharp play, if necessary by sacrificing. This hallmark of Alekhine's style remains particularly clear in my memory from the large number of games (mostly off-hand) which I played against him when he had yet to scale the summits of chess fame.

Similarly in Aron Nimzowitsch's games you may observe that he doesn't go to pieces in lost positions and sometimes saves hopeless situations by unearthing some practical counter-chance.

The following example is characteristic.



Nimzowitsch - Euwe Karlshad 1929

White looks doomed. His position is undeveloped. Black has a strong pawn on e3, which threatens to queen. White cannot take this pawn: 23 Exe3 is answered by 23...\wxd4, winning a piece. Another bad line is 23 \(\mathbb{I}\)xf7+\(\mathbb{I}\)xf7 24 ₩xc8 e2. Yet in this gruesome situation Nimzowitsch kept his head and played 23 ©c3, putting his knight en prise.


If Euwe had reacted to his opponent's desperate stroke with due attention, he would of course have found the winning continuation: 23... **賞**xd4 24 **罩**af1 **賞**e5+ 25 **含**h1 **I**c7, etc. Not suspecting any danger, however, he played the obvious

23... Ixc3?, and after 24 Iaf1 e2 25 互xf7+ 互xf7 26 当xf7+ 含h6 27 ₩f8+ he had to resign.

Some would say that Nimzowitsch scored an undeserved win. but I find it impossible to agree. Even the strongest master cannot calculate everything to the end; hence he will sometimes obtain inferior or even lost positions, not only against his peers but also against very weak opponents. Keeping calm and finding counterchances in a difficult position is a distinct virtue. In such circumstances, a mistake on your opponent's part is highly probable: having achieved a decisive plus in a long and tiring struggle, he will have exhausted most of his energy and will be in a mood for demobilization, imagining that all his difficulties are behind him. Thus it is incorrect to speak of luck and chance when a player saves a lost game. Luck favours the strong!

Not all top-class players have their wits about them at all times. as we see from the next example.

Janowski resigned in the diagram position overleaf. Tarrasch rightly remarked: "Demoralized, Janowski laid down his arms too early. Instead he should have




Em. Lasker - Janowski World Championship match (7), Paris 1909

played his last card, by no means such a bad one. With 63...c5 64 42d5? (the obvious-looking move, as Black seems to have no defence against mate) 64... 1xf3+65 2xf3 2xe4+ 66 \$xe4, he might have achieved a pretty stalemate. His opponent could of course have avoided this with 64 \$\mathbb{Z}\$b7. Still. in the heat of battle the stalemate might have escaped him."

My own experience has repeatedly confirmed that practical chances can be found in the most hopeless-seeming position. Here is quite an interesting case.

Black's position is hopeless; the strong pawn on c6 should decide



Orlov - Blumenfeld Semi-final, Moscow Championship 1932

the game. White played the striking move 36 \(\frac{1}{2} \)c4.

If Black takes the knight he is blocking the c-file for his rook, and there is nothing to stop the white pawn from queening. Of course Black can play 36... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c3, but then White replies 37 2 xa5 and the win is a matter of fairly simple technique. Similarly, 36... Za4 is hopeless after 37 **2**e5 or 37 **2**b6.

In any of these lines it is hard for White to go wrong - everything is simple and clear. I therefore decided to let him queen, at the price of allowing Black some practical counter-chances.

Play continued:

36... \(\beta a 2 + 37 \) \(\delta d 1 \) \(\delta b 4 38 \) c7 dxc4 39 **Lb8**

It seems to be time for Black to resign, because White will queen next move. Black has, however. one concealed chance to make the win difficult for his opponent.

39 ... **Zd2+**


There is no hope in 39...c3 40 c8豐 c2+ 41 豐xc2 罩xc2 42 尝xc2. when White has a technically easy win.

40 \psic1?

After this natural reply, the win is doubtful. White should have played his king to e1 without being afraid of the discovered check, for instance: 40 \$\preceq\$e1 \$\box\$xh2+ 41 \$\preceq\$f1 c3 42 c8\degree c2 43 \degree h8+ \degree h6 44 Exc1 47 ₩f6, and the win is guaranteed. However, to decide on this line. White would need to perceive what complications arise after the 'natural' move.

40 ...

Ee2! (D)



W

Black threatens to give perpetual check on e1 and e2. White must sacrifice the exchange.

> 41 **Exb4** axb4

42 c8\mathred{\psi}


White has to give up his e-pawn. as 42 e4 is met by 42... Ze1+, and Black draws either by perpetual check or by the pawn advance ... b3.

42 ...

Exe3

43 f4 (D)

Now Black can force a draw. White should have gone for 43 ₩c5 Xxf3 44 ₩xb4, when Black plays 44...h5 followed by ...\sum f5; in this line White does have winning chances, though they are difficult to exploit.



В


43... 其c3+ 44 \$b2 耳b3+ 45 \$c2 耳c3+ 46 \$d2 耳d3+ 47 \$e2 耳c3! (not 47... **基**xd4 48 **對**c5) **48 含d2** 耳d3+49 \$c2 耳c3+50 \$d2 耳d3+ 1/2-1/2

Indeed White can achieve nothing, for example: 51 \$e2 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c3 52 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c2+53 \$\mathbb{Z}\$d1 b3 54 d5 exd5 55 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xd5 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xh2, and if 56 \$\mathbb{Z}\$xc4 then 56...b2, while 56 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c1 is met by 56...\$\mathbb{Z}\$c2+57 \$\mathbb{Z}\$b1 c3!, and it is White who must seek salvation in perpetual check.

The ability to realize one's advantage coolly in a won position and keep one's presence of mind in a lost position are common to most experienced chess players; yet in clearly drawn positions, a loss of concentration and weakening of the will to win can be observed relatively often. In his tournament book of New York 1927, Alekhine reproached Spielmann for agreeing a draw in some games where he had practical chances – however minimal – of winning.

To illustrate how the dogged pursuit of victory can bring the desired result even in a drawn position, I append the following example.

As is well known, endings with rook and knight against rook (without pawns) are drawn. You would not think that having a pawn could harm Black's cause. Fahrni is a sufficiently experienced master to avoid blundering. It looks a waste




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Rotlewi – Fahrni Karlsbad 1911

of time for White to continue the fight.

Yet Rotlewi did play on. He had spotted a practical chance based on the very fact that Black has a pawn.

Subsequently, the position in the next diagram arose.



В

Black played the natural move 79...a3, whereupon a study-like finish ensued:

80 **\$f7 \$h6** (if 80...**프**h1, then 81 **2**d5!, followed by 82 **2**f6+, is decisive) **81 \$g8! 1-0**

The interesting point is that without his pawn, Black could save himself by playing for stalemate with ... Ig1.

It would be wrong to conclude from the foregoing that we ought to play in anticipation of our opponent's errors. A reader who carefully ponders the examples will realize that practical chances can be created only by accurately assessing the position and taking due account of its characteristic features.

7 Is it Worth Complicating?

Vladimir Vulfson

This is a question we often have to face, but there is no ready-made formula for answering it. Everything depends on the concrete circumstances. We shall learn to cope with this problem better if we look at how other players have solved it and elucidate their decisions critically. It will be interesting to trace the influence of a player's character and style on his choice of moves, and to detect those situations where owing to individual bias he fails to find the objectively best path.

Let us start by analysing two games by Mikhail Tal. The first was played in his heyday, the second many years later (I hope you will perceive the difference). In examining the games, we shall train ourselves to search independently for answers to the difficult questions which will inevitably arise.

Vasiukov – Tal USSR Championship, Baku 1961 King's Indian Attack

2	d3	d5 .
3	Ød2	ᡚf6
4	回gf3	Dc6
5	g3	dxe4
6	dxe4	≜ c5
7	≜ g2	e5
8	0-0	0-0
0	W_2	0.6

In this scheme of development Black usually plays ...a5, ...b6 and ... 2 a6. By placing his bishop on e6 Tal practically condemns it to being exchanged for a white knight.


10 c3 **a**5

In this kind of position Black must not allow b4, which would guarantee White the initiative on the queenside.

> **约d7** 11 9c4 12 2 g5 (D)

Black must part with his bishop. If it is exchanged on e6, he can recapture with a piece or with the fpawn. A third option is to give up the bishop for the c4-knight. Which would you prefer?

The white knight on c4 is the more dangerous of the two. It



В

might transfer itself later via e3 to d5 or f5. It is true that with a doubled pawn on e6 Black would be defending these squares and the ffile would be opened. Nevertheless, after the continuation 12... \wedge e7 13 ②xe6 fxe6 Black's position looks suspect. Apart from playing to simplify with 14 \(\Delta e 3 \), in the hope of subsequently exploiting the weak pawns. White could also seriously consider 14 \$\precent{ by f4. With the opening up of the game, the power of the white bishop-pair would tell.

> 12 ... ≗xc4! 13 Wxc4 ₩e7

At this point Evgeny Vasiukov could have returned his knight to f3 and then played it to h4, provoking ...g6 - after which his bishop would obtain the excellent square h6. However, he was reluctant to retreat without special prompting.

14 **≜**d2

White's plan is clear: Zad1. with \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$c}\$}\$ l to follow.} \)

> 14 **Had8**

15 **Zad1 ②b6**

16 **營e2**


Not 16 對b5? 基xd2!.

16 ... ¤d6

At this point, quite a good line is 17 全c1 (17 夕f3!?) 17...耳fd8 18 follow, gradually taking control of the queenside squares. With such a build-up, the two bishops would ensure White a slight but lasting positional edge. A good textbook example of how to handle such positions is the game Petrosian-Sax, Tallinn 1979 (see the supplement to this chapter).

17 单h3 (D)

What do you think Tal played here?



В

17 ... 罩xd2!?

An unexpected combination though not for Tal, who had foreseen it before his previous move. Here is his own comment: "Looking at the position, you get the impression that the game must carry on in the same quiet strategic channel. There seems to be no place here for combinations. But that is false. When I started thinking about my 16th move I automatically turned my attention to 16... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd2, but very quickly realized that Black achieves nothing with this move, since after 17 \wxd2 \mathbb{I}d8 18 \wc1 Xxd1 19 Xxd1 he remains the exchange down.

"Then a flight of fancy intervened. I saw that with the white bishop on h3 instead of g2, the combination would be playable. I spent 40 minutes on move sixteen. At first I wanted to play 16... \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7. provoking 17 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}} \) (with tempo!). but I decided that that would be too superficial. White could simply continue with 17 \(\Delta c1, preserving \) a minimal positional plus.

"In the event I chose 16.... Id6. whereupon to my astonishment Vasiukov quickly played 17 \(\textit{\Omega}\)h3. The retort 17...\sum xd2! was instantaneous..."

> 18 \wxd2 ¤d8 19 ₩c1 **Zxd1** 20 **Exd1 当f6!**

Black's idea is now clear. He threatens both 21...h6 (the white knight has nowhere to retreat) and 21... **對xf2+ 22 含h1** 拿e3.

Without doubt, Tal's ingenious combination is highly attractive. But is it sound? After all, even after capturing on f2 Black will only have one pawn for the exchange.


Tal gives the variation 21 \(\Delta\)g2 豐xf2+22 \$h1 \$e3 23 分h3 \$xc1 24 ②xf2 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}}\)xb2, with the better ending for Black. Another try - 21 - is refuted by 23... ≜xg5! with the deadly threat of 24... 響f3+.

Yet White has a stronger defence. The players and annotators all overlooked the fairly simple 21 Zd3!, taking control of the important squares f3 and e3. After 21... **当**xf2+ 22 **\$h**1 **2**c4 (22...h6? 23 耳f3 豐e2 24 鱼f1, and the queen is trapped), White has the pleasant choice between 23 耳f3 豐xb2 24 豐xb2 公xb2 25 罩xf7 (25 公xf7!?) 25...h6 26 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}} \) e6 hxg\(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}} \) 27 \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}} \) f2+, and 23 數f1 數xf1+ 24 exf1 约xb2 25 \(\beta\)d7. In either case Tal could hardly have saved the game.

Vasiukov thought of a defensive idea that was not bad either, but decidedly inferior to 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d3!.

21 **Qf**5?! **g6** 22 b4! (D)

The play suddenly takes on a sharper character. Tal now has the choice between several possibilities. Which is the strongest?



 \mathbf{B}

The game continuation was 22...axb4 23 cxb4 ≜e7. But why not place the bishop on d4? The answer is that after 23... ad4 24 b5 ②a5 25 鱼g4! 豐xf2+ 26 會h1 \$e3, White has the defence 27 2h3!. White's position hangs by this tactical finesse.

Is it better to withdraw the bishop to e7 at once, or after exchanging pawns on b4? What is the difference? Either way Black can obtain two pieces for a rook if he wants, but the important thing is to stop White from activating his forces. After 22... 2e7!? 23 2d7 the c-file is not yet open, and Black has the excellent resource 23... 4\(\delta\)b8!. Not that the consequences are by any means clear: 24 皇g4 豐xg5 25 **豐**xg5 **皇**xg5 26 bxa5 **②**c4 27 **皇**c8!

②xa5 28 Qxb7! (28...②xb7 29 ∐b1).

[With 28...c6! 29 \(\hat{\rm c} \)c8 (threatening 30 \(\bar{2}b1 \) 29...\(\bar{2}e7! \) Black would retain the better chances. since the rook is prevented from penetrating and the passed apawn is securely blockaded. -**Dvoretsky**1

> 22 ... axh4 23 cxb4 **⊈e7**

[I suggest it was worth seriously considering the simple 23... \(\textit{\textit{a}} \text{xb4}\), with good compensation for the exchange. - Dvoretsky]

24 gd7 9)d4

Tal writes: "Black doesn't want to simplify the position. He rejects Exc1 bxc6 27

Exc6

d6, and continues to focus his attention on the kingside."

There was no point in going in for 24... ②xd7 25 罩xd7 豐xg5 26 豐xg5 皇xg5 27 罩xc7 (stronger than 27 b5 2 a5 or 27 a3 \(\frac{1}{2} \)c1) 27... 2xb4 28 a3!, when White obtains a dangerous passed a-pawn.

25 **資xc7** 85⊈ 26 **學xb7** ₩xg5


Objectively Tal has taken a risky decision. He has allowed his opponent not one, but two passed pawns on the queenside. He has, however, kept the queens on the board. In an ending with rook and pawn against two minor pieces, the presence of

an outside passed pawn becomes the key factor for assessing the position: but in the middlegame there are chances for an attack on the king - after all, Black has one piece more (though it is by no means a simple matter to bring the b6knight and the d8-bishop into the attack). Moreover, Tal always handled his strongest piece with great dexterity - suffice it to recall his famous game against Oscar Panno in the 1958 Interzonal Tournament at Portorož.

₩f6 27 \@e8 28 a4 **\$**f8!

It is important to drive the bishop away and free the queen for active operations.

> 29 **全b**5 **豐d6**(D)



W

Attacking b4 and threatening 29...5)f3+.

30 \(\mathbb{I} \text{c1?} \)

With both players in timetrouble. White blunders away his best pawn - the a-pawn. After 30 單b1 ②xb5 31 axb5 數d3 32 罩c1 wxb5 33 罩c8 Black would have no advantage. The simple 30 \dot{g2} (30... 對xb4 31 對b8 對e7 32 a5) looks even stronger.

4)xa4! 30 ... 31 🕏 g2 31 ≜xa4 ②e2+. 9)b6 31 **当f6?** 32 Ic5

Black in turn goes wrong. Here is Tal's explanation: "At this point White unexpectedly offered a draw. Distracted, I forgot about the immediate 32...\$27, which would have ensured an easy win, and instantly played 32...\forall f6?."

We could draw an obvious conclusion about the importance of being 'distraction-proof'. By the way, take a good look at the position after 32... \$\div g7!. See how effectively the black knights are placed. Together with the other pieces they control all the entry squares!

33 ₩b8!

White acquires the counterplay to save himself.

33	•••	坐f3 +
	⊈ g1	₩ d1-
35	⊈g2	₩f3 +
36	⊈g1	De6
	I c6	₩d1-

38	⊈g2	₩ d4
39	Zd6	₩ xe4+
40	⊈g1	쌀 b1+
41	⊈g2	1/2-1/2


Throughout the game Tal was constantly taking risks. To begin with, he upset the balance by conceding the advantage of the bishop-pair in the interests of rapid development. Then he went in for a decidedly dubious combination. Finally, in his search for attacking chances, he allowed his opponent to obtain two united passed pawns. Such was his style of play at that time!

Ribli - Tal

Candidates Tournament. Montpellier 1985 Réti Opening

1	2 f3	d5
2	g3	. <u>⊈</u> g4
3 .	⊈g2	с6
4	b 3	⊘d7
. 5	⊉ b2	Øgf6
6	0-0	e 6
7	d3	≜c 5
8	包bd2	0-0
9	e4	dxe4
10	dxe4	e5 (D)

The structure of the position is more or less the same as in the last game, isn't it? The only difference is in the placing of the black



W

queen's knight (it was on c6 before, whereas now that square is occupied by a pawn) and the white dark-squared bishop. Both these differences rather count in Black's favour

Once again Tal will probably have to exchange his light-squared bishop for a knight, conceding the advantage of the bishop-pair to his opponent – not that that is of much significance here.

11 h3

11 **幽**e2, followed by ②c4-e3, was preferable.

11	•••	≜ xf3
12	營xf3	≝e 7
13	2 9d12!	

Another routine move, after which some difficulties already arise for White. He should have put his a-pawn on a4, preventing not only the exchange of darksquared bishops with 13... 2a3, but also the move 13...b5, which robs the knight of its rightful square c4.

b5!

13 ...

14 h4?!

One error often leads to another. Evidently Zoltan Ribli has thought about his light-squared bishop and decided to bring it out to h3, but in so doing he weakens g4.

White's top-priority task is to re-deploy his knight that is poorly placed on d2. For this, there is only one route: via f1 to e3. Hence the right move is 14 \(\mathbb{I}\)fe1!.

14 ...

Immediate occupation of g4 is not feasible: 14... e6 can be met by 15 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}f5!. For the moment, therefore, Tal gives his opponent some worries on the queenside. He plans 15...a4.


15 c3

So as to meet 15...a4 by 16 b4. However, the opening of the a-file would surely have been the lesser evil, as another important square d3 – has now been weakened.

> 15 ... 9)b6 16 **Life1?** (D)

Better is 16 \(\mathbb{\text{W}}\)e2 or 16 \(\mathbb{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$h}}\$}\).

White's whole attention has been fixed on the queenside in response to his opponent's last few moves. Ribli is oblivious to possible diversions on the other side of the board. and incautiously weakens the f2point. This is promptly exploited



В

by Tal, who never seems to forget about the enemy king.

> 16 ... ₩e6! **坐f5** ②g4 18 He2 **Had8**

Already White's position is difficult. On 19 2h3, Tal was intending 19... Zd3! (with the threat of ... 異xg3+) 20 含g2 對xf5 21 exf5 ②xf2 22 **Z**xf2 **Q**xf2 23 **Y**xf2 耳fd8 24 堂e2 e4.


> 19 **\$**f3 **Zd3!** 20 \document{\phi} \text{g2} **分xf2!**

It must be said that Tal likes sacrificing two pieces for a rook. In other words, the previous game where the distribution of forces was the opposite - was rather an exception.

> 21 Exf2 **≜xf2** (D)

Can White somehow organize a defence?

22...fxe6 23 \$\prixf2 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}fxf3+ 24 \(\varphi\)xf3



W

罩xd1. After 22 含xf2? 對d6 White succumbs to a lethal pin on the dfile. The best defensive chances lay in 22 **@e**2! **\(\mathbb{Z}**xd2 23 **\(\mathbb{Z}**xd2 **\(\mathbb{Q}e3\)** (23... 全c5 24 對xe6 fxe6 25 皇g4) 24 **基**d3 **Q**c5 (24... **W**xf5!? 25 exf5 皇c5 26 皇f3 罩c8) 25 豐xe6 fxe6 26 \(\text{\(\ext{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\ext{\(\text{\(\text{\(\ext{\) \exitin\) \exitin}\} \exiting \exiti extra pawn, but the win is still a long way off. It is astonishing how resilient a chess position can be; for all White's numerous mistakes, he could still have held on!


当d6 22 \$\primex xf2? 23 \(\mathbb{L} \)c1 **g**6

23... **省**c5+, with 24... **省**xc3 to follow, is also strong.

> 24 \\gs **f6!** (D)

Black must deflect White's queen before opening the f-file. The immediate 24...f5 is unconvincing: 25 曾g2 基xf3 26 曾xf3 智d3+ 27 當f2 fxe4+ 28 當g1 e3 29 對xe5.

25 Wh6 f5



W

26 \preceq g2?!

If 26 \$\dispersecond{\text{e}} e1 \text{ or 26 \$\dispersecond{\text{e}}} e2, then 26...f4 27 gxf4 \sum xf4 is strong. Perhaps it was worth trying 26 \(\mathbb{Z} e1! ?.

> 26 ... Exf3! 27 9 xf3

In this case, if White continues 27 gxf3 gd3+ 28 gf2 fxe4+ 29 \$\delta\$g1, then Black has 29...\delta\$xg3+ 30 \$h1 耳f2.

> 27 ... ₩xd1 28 **②g5** 0 - 1

White resigned as after 28... Wh5 or 28... Wd7 he is the exchange and a pawn down.

As you can see, the mature Tal had lost none of his imagination, and still had the same penchant for attacking and playing combinations. Yet he did so on a sound positional basis – he tried not to take the same liberties that had been characteristic of his youth.

The next game is quite different in character from the ones already examined. It has a direct bearing on the problem of prophylaxis. No wonder – the white side was played by Tigran Petrosian.

Petrosian – Ivkov Nice Olympiad 1974 Nimzo-Indian Defence


1	d4	D f6
2	c4	еб
3	Dc3	_ _b 4
4	e3	c5
5	≜d3	Dc6
6	Df3	_ ≜ xc3+
7	bxc3	d 6
8	e4	e5
9	d5	②e7
10	Dd2	

If 10 0-0, Black has the prophylactic reply 10...h6!, so that a knight move can be met by 11...g5, stopping White from opening the game with f4. Spassky-Fischer, World Championship match (5), Reykjavik 1972 continued 10 4 h4 h6 11 f4 (reckoning on 11...exf4 12 \(\textit{\texts}\)xf4 g5 13 e5! with complications favourable to White) 11... 296! 12 2xg6 fxg6. Here Spassky committed a serious strategic error by exchanging pawns on e5, leading to a static position where the white bishops had no scope. Fischer outplayed his opponent and won.

10 ... 0-0

Black also has other options. The move played clearly reveals his intentions – to prepare the advance ...f5.

11 ②f1 (D)



В


Petrosian realizes what his opponent is planning, and takes counter-measures in good time by transferring his knight to g3. It might have paid Black to switch plans with 11... 2g6, so as to jump to f4 with his knight if the occasion arose. White in turn could respond to this move flexibly by placing his knight on e3 and his pawns on g3 and f3, then pushing his h-pawn profiting from his delay in castling. The opening move-order that Petrosian selected contains a fair amount of poison, yet for some reason it has not been used lately.

11 ... ₩a5

Black has decided to play on the kingside, so it is incomprehensible that he brings his queen out on the other wing. If he wanted to develop his queen on a5 he should have done so last move, when for one thing the reply \$\Delta d2\$ was not possible, and for another Black still had the possibility of castling queenside.

12 单d2 包e8 13 包g3 f5 14 exf5 包xf5 Or 14...单xf5 15 包xf5 包xf5 16 豐c2.

15 **豐c2!** g6 · **16 0-0 单d7** (D)



W

An important point is that in contrast to the King's Indian, the black knight cannot reach d4 – that square is covered by a white pawn.

17 De4

17 f4! looked attractive, so as to open up the game and exploit the


power of the two bishops. Perhaps White was put off by 17... 2xg3 18 hxg3 e4!? (18...exf4 19 2xf4, intending Zael and at some point 2xg6) 19 2xe4 2g7! (19...2f5 20 g4!?; 19...2f6 20 2xg6!? hxg6 21 \text{\text{\text{\$\superpsilon\$}}} xg6+ \text{\text{\$\superpsilon\$}} kg 22 f5 with a formidable attack). However, Black's compensation for the pawn is scarcely adequate.

Petrosian wants to preserve his knight from exchange and is therefore in no hurry to start decisive operations. His opponent, however, is given time to strengthen his position.

> 17 ... ②f6 18 ②g5


The knight is very strongly positioned here, as any attempt to drive it away with ...h6 will weaken the black kingside.

18 ... **Lae8**19 f3! (D)



В

A typical Petrosian move. Taking control of the e4- and g4squares, he prepares to play g4 at a suitable moment, to deprive his opponent's pieces of the f5-point.



The ex-World Champion of course prevents the bishop exchange with 20... £15, which his opponent intended. All Black's minor pieces are now shut out of play. Despite this, the position still remains unclear. To be completely happy, White would have to clamp

a4.

down on the queenside too, with

Borislav Ivkov misses an excellent chance to confuse the issue, as indicated by Petrosian: 20...b5!? 21 cxb5 c4 22 \(\text{\text} \text{xc4} \(\text{\text} \text{xb5} \)

> 21 **對b3!** ≌b8


22 \(\hat{c} \)c2! ₩a5 23 24

White has thus succeeded in limiting his opponent's possibilities on the queenside. Yet even now the struggle is not over.

24 h3

White needs to bolster his gpawn, so as to prepare f3-f4.

Otherwise he would have to reckon with 26...b5 - followed by ...c4, if White took on b5 with his c-pawn.



В

25 ... **b**5 26 axb6

Which piece do you think Black should recapture with? Who benefits from a queen exchange?

The answer, of course, is that Black does. In a cramped position

you need to exchange pieces! I believe that after 26... 響xb6! (27 響a2 ₩b2) Black would preserve excellent drawing chances.

Now recall the situation before White's 17th move. The question is, have Petrosian's refined manoeuvres been justified? Wouldn't it have been simpler to play 17 f4!?, 'cutting the Gordian knot' at once?

26	•••	¤xb6?
27	₩a3	

White will bring his queen across to the kingside for the attack, while the black queen lacks all scope.

27	•••	₩48
28	₩c1	₩e7
29	₩e1	¤b2

"A lone man on the battlefield is no warrior." White will soon drive the rook off the second rank.

30	⊉d 3	≜c8
31	≜c1	≝b3
32	0 02	11h6

The work of prophylaxis is successfully completed. What now follows is, essentially, the first active move of the game.

33	f4!	h6
34	fxe5	₩xe5
35	_₩xe5	dxe5
36	De4	h5
37	≜.a3	

The harvest commences.

37 ... **∮**)xe4

38	 ⊈xf8+	⊈xf8
39	.⊈xe4	¤b3
40	⊈ xc5+	⊈e8
41	Zf1	1-0

In conclusion, I venture to show you a game of my own.

Tsariov - Vulfson Moscow 1989 Sicilian Defence

1	e4	c5
2	Dc3	②c6
3	f4	e6
4	包f3	d5
5	43	

White was evidently happy with the ending after 5...dxe4 6 dxe4. I was aiming for a more complex game.


5	•••	Df6
6	e5	Dd
7	g 3	b5!?

Usually this advance needs to be prepared, but here I had the chance to carry it out at once.

It was better to carry on in the same spirit with 9...a5 and then ... Db6. However, I thought it was important to restrain White's kingside pawns.

10 0-0 h5(D)

White's standard plan in such positions involves a kingside pawn advance: h3, g4 and eventually f5. In the present case, however, he has another highly promising plan. Have a try at finding it.



Taking into account my backward development, it wouldn't be a bad idea to strike in the centre by pushing the c-pawn. Black's pawn on b4 makes it a little harder to implement this idea, yet White could very well play 11 c4 bxc3 12 bxc3, intending 13 c4. My opponent found a more cunning way to carry out the same plan.

11 a3!? bxa3

It was worth thinking about 11...a5 12 axb4 cxb4. Still, after 13 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}}\)e 3 (stronger than 13 c4 bxc3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}\)a6) White would be better.

12 bxa3!

I had only reckoned on 12 **Z**xa3 **W**b6 13 c4 d4, with obscure consequences.

12 ... **2**a6 13 **2**g5!

Another powerful move. We now see that 13... 2e7 can be met by 14 c4! 2xg5 15 cxd5!. Black therefore guards his c6-knight.

Think what happens if the pawn sacrifice is accepted.


If 14...dxc4, then 15 wa4. Then after 15...cxd3 16 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)c3, there is, for example, 16...d2 17 wa6 or 16...\(\tilde{\Delta} \)b7 17 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)b5 followed by 18 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)e4. This all looks extremely dangerous for Black, yet his defence can be strengthened. Instead of taking the second pawn, he should play the immediate 15...\(\tilde{\Delta} \)b7! 16 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)c4 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)b6 17 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)c2 \(\tilde{\Delta} \)d4, with a tenable game.

I preferred to close the position. Alas, this failed to get Black out of serious trouble.

14 ... d4? (D)

I had pinned my hopes on the inactivity of two white pieces: the e2-knight and the c1-bishop. Yet after the positional pawn sacrifice 15 f5, these pieces come to life. Another way for White to develop his initiative is 15 #a4 \$\mathbb{L}b7\$ 16 \$\mathbb{L}b1\$.

So White has two continuations to choose from. Which would you have preferred? Calculating the variations to the end would be



W

fairly complicated (especially in the 15 f5 line). At a certain point you would have to trust to intuition.

After 15 f5!? gxf5 16 ②f4 the threat is 17 ②fxe6, when there would be no rescuing the black king. The best defence is 16... Ih6, but then comes 17 ②xf7!! ②xf7 18 ④xe6!:

b) 18...\$\preceq\$xe6 allows White two strong replies: 19 \$\preceq\$d5+ \$\preceq\$e7 20 \$\preceq\$g5+ \$\preceq\$e8 21 \$\preceq\$xh6 or 19 \$\preceq\$f3! with irresistible threats.

To be quite honest, I hadn't seen the pawn sacrifice. Tsariov did see it, and made a conscientious effort to calculate it. However, he got bogged down in the mass of variations, and eventually didn't risk it. "I had the feeling I ought to play it, but I couldn't work it all out," he explained after the game. "Why should you work it all out?" I asked in amazement. "If an idea like that came into my head, I'd be sure to play the sacrifice."

Shying away from the sacrifice, my opponent persuaded himself he could win with 15 \mathbb{\su}a4.

[He was right, too. This way White does indeed get a large plus, and he does it by simple means, without taking risks. From the practical viewpoint, White's decision was the most expedient. – Dolmatoy]

15 **豐a4 息b7** 16 **里b1 ②b6** 17 **豐b5 里b8**

Black's gaping wound – the b-file – needs covering up.

18 **2**e4 **2**d7


Otherwise the c5-pawn can't be defended.

19 **2**f6+! (D)

The point of White's play. If 19...②xf6, then 20 \(\alpha\)xc6+ is decisive. However, he clearly underestimated my reply.

19 ... **\$**d8!

It turns out that there is no forced win: 20 ②xd7 \$\precent{xd7}\$ (intending 21...\$\precent{e}e7\$) 21 \$\precent{xc6}\$+ \$\precent{w}xc6\$ Black threatens



20... 2.a8, and the e2-knight is out of play just as before.

В

20 &d2


≙a8

Not 20... 2xf6? on account of 21 ≜xc6!.

Increasing the pressure is not simple, but my opponent sets a cunning psychological trap. He defends against ...h5-h4, which might in some circumstances be playable, and thereby seems to demonstrate that his queenside initiative has dried up. I rose to the bait and incautiously made the natural move.

24 ... ⊈d7?! 25 ⊈a5! (D)

[Allowing a blow like this is unpleasant, of course, but how else was Black to bring his rook into play? White was threatening to strengthen his position with \$\frac{1}{2}h2\$ and \$\frac{1}{2}g1\$-f3, or \$\frac{1}{2}b5\$ and \$\frac{1}{2}c1\$-b3. The f6-pawn is seriously cramping Black, whose king feels highly uncomfortable in the centre. It must be acknowledged that White has a distinct plus. — Dolmatov]



В

Again we face a dilemma. If 25...\$\cong c8\$, White will strengthen his position with \$\mathbb{L}b5\$ and \$\overline{Q}c1-b3\$. The alternative is to give up the queen with 25...\$\mathbb{L}b8\$. From the practical standpoint it is usually best to choose the most active continuation. Let us see: 25...\$\mathbb{L}b8!? 26 \$\overline{Q}xc7 \$\mathbb{L}xb1+27 \$\overline{Q}xc7\$. It would now of course be absurd to win the a7-pawn with 28 \$\overline{Q}xc6?\$. After 28 \$\overline{Q}g1\$ [28 \$\overline{Q}c2\$ first is technically better - Dolmatov] 28...\$\overline{L}b2\$ the advantage is certainly on White's

side, but in mutual time-trouble Black should have played this way all the same.

A picturesque position would arise after 26 国b5! 營a6 (I was banking on this pin when I played 25...党c8) 27 ②c1 国b8 28 ②b3 党c8. Now 29 ②xc5? fails against 29...国xb5 30 ②xa6 国xa5. However, what move is Black to make after, say, 29 党h2 ...? He turns out to be in zugzwang in the middlegame! For example 29...国b6 30 国xb6 axb6 31 ②xc6, or 29...②f8 30 国xb8+ ②xb8 31 ②c7+.

 26 ...
 響b8!

 27 食e1
 a6

 28 學xb8
 黑xb8


 29 異xb8
 全xb8

By forcing the queen exchange Black has attained equality. Subsequently my opponent became too obsessed with searching for winning chances – which have already melted away – and actually lost.

Supplement

Petrosian – Sax
Tallinn 1979
Pirc Defence

1 ②f3 g6 2 e4 êg7 3 d4 d6 4 ②c3 ②f6 5 êe2 0-0 6 0-0 êg4 7 êe3 ②c6 8 쌓d2 e5 9 dxe5 dxe5 10 里ad1 豐c8 11 豐c1 里d8 12 里xd8+ 豐xd8 13 里d1 豐f8 14 h3 全xf3 15 全xf3 (D)



В

15 ... a6?!

A move recommended at that time by theory, on the basis of Timman-Matulović, Wijk aan Zee 1974, which continued 16 ②d5? ②xd5 17 罩xd5 ②d4 18 এxd4 exd4 19 豐f4 豐e7 20 e5 罩e8 21 豐xd4 鱼xe5 with a quick draw.

The straightforward 15... 量d8 leads to an ending which is favourable for White: 16 罩xd8 豐xd8 17 豐d1 豐xd1+ (17... 豐e7!?) 18 盒xd1. Andersson-Hazai, Pula 1975 went 18... ②d4 19 f3 ②e8? (19...a6 20 ②a4 ②d7) 20 ②d5 c6 21 ②e7+ 全f8 22 ②c8 a6 23 c3 ②b5 24 a4 ②bc7 25 鱼b3 鱼f6 26 ②b6 ②e6 (26... 皇e7 27 鱼c5+) 27 鱼xe6 fxe6 28 鱼c5+ 全f7 29 ②d7 全g7 30 全f2 鱼h4+31 g3 鱼f6 32 全e2 鱼d8

33 \$f2 \$f6 34 \$\overline{9}\$c5 \$\overline{9}\$d6 35 \$\overline{9}\$xe6+ \$\overline{9}\$f7 36 \$\overline{9}\$c5 \$\overline{9}\$d8 37 b3 \$\overline{9}\$a5 38 b4 \$\overline{9}\$c7 39 a5 \$\overline{9}\$b8 40 \$\overline{9}\$e3 1-0.

In Petrosian's view Black should attempt to exchange dark-squared bishops with 15...h5!? followed by ...\$h7 and ...\$h6.

If the queens are exchanged Black has an unpleasant ending, much as in Andersson-Hazai.

21 **些c2** ②d8

If 21...2c5, then 22 2g5 followed by a queenside pawn advance with a2-a4 and b2-b4.

22 当b3 当d3?! 23 当c4 当d6 24 当e2 当e6 25 当d3 ②c6 (better is 25...当e7 followed by 26...②e6) 26 a3 当e7 27 b4 ②d8 28 ②c4 ②d7 29 全g4! ②e6 30 ②a5! b5 31 ②c6 当e8 32 c4! ②f6 33 cxb5 axb5 34 当xb5 ③xe4 35 当c4 ②d6 36 当d5 h5 37 全xe6 fxe6 38 当c5 ②f5 39 当c2 全g7 40 b5 ②d4 41 当c4 当d7 42 a4 ②f5 43 当e2 1-0

8 Thoughts about a Book

Mark Dvoretsky

There are no hopeless positions; there are only inferior ones that can be saved. There are no drawn positions; there are only equal ones in which you can play for a win. But at the same time, don't forget that there is no such thing as a won position in which it is impossible to lose.

Grigory Sanakoev

In all my life I have only played two games by correspondence, and I am unlikely to play any more. Despite this, when I heard about the publication of *Third Attempt*, a collection of games by Grigory Sanakoev, the twelfth World Correspondence Chess Champion, I immediately acquired a copy. There were several reasons why.

In the first place, I recall that when Grandmaster Vladimir Simagin won the USSR Correspondence Championship in the mid-1960s, he spoke with great respect about the class of play of one of his opponents – Grigory Sanakoev. Acquainting myself with the book, I

can state with great pleasure that Simagin was right.

Secondly, as a chess trainer, I am in constant need of fresh, high-quality material. There is no lack of interesting games played in the chess world, but once published – in magazines or *Informator* – they become familiar not only to a coach but also to his students. However, the world of correspondence chess is almost entirely ignored by over-the-board players – unjustly, for plenty of ideas can be gleaned from it, striking and profound ones, diligently worked out in home analysis.

Books that confine themselves to giving the moves of games with explanatory variations may be instructive but are not very interesting. Happily, the book in question acquaints us not only with some fascinating duels but with the living human being who fought them – his experiences and thoughts, his opinions, his advice. One thing I find particularly impressive about the book is its use of quotations (always relevant, I may add) by

famous thinkers of the past. Chess is one of the branches of universal human culture, and we ought not to impoverish ourselves by focusing solely on its narrowly professional aspects.

Contrary to the author's conviction, I am sceptical about the prospects for correspondence chess. The appearance of computers capable of analysing at grandmaster level will inevitably tempt players to use their services to attain good competitive results. We know that many leading over-the-board grandmasters, including the thirteenth World Champion, have succumbed to the temptation and make every possible use of powerful computers for opening analysis. (The adverse effect of this process on the popularity of chess is obvious - after all, the fans are interested in a contest of personalities, not of machines.) And in correspondence chess the computer can be used throughout the entire game.

Yet there is no doubt that Sanakoev has always played independently and always will. What attracts him in chess is first and foremost the creative endeavour, the single combat of intellects; the result is only secondary. A reading of the book conjures up a highly congenial image of the author as a bright, uncompromising, self-confident

chess player, a man of wide learning whose thinking is nonetheless original. (I am sure this image is faithful, though I don't know Sanakoev personally - you cannot deceive an experienced reader!)

I could not help beginning by setting down my overall positive impression of Sanakoev's book, but that was not at all the reason why I 'took up my pen' (an outdated cliché in the computer age!). The theme of this chapter lies in certain fundamental problems of chess intelligence which my reading of the book prompted me to think about.


I chose what seemed to me the most notable encounters in the book, and gave them to Grandmaster Vadim Zviagintsev for study. His task was to look at the critical moments of the games and work out the difficult decisions for himself (without moving the pieces on the board, of course) - or sometimes to find the complete sequence of moves in the crucial phase, when the outcome of the game was decided. In many cases the young grandmaster at over-the-board play came to different conclusions from the experienced correspondence player. We singled out these situations for further analysis, discussion and clarification.

Let me state that even the most conscientious analysis, if scrutinized in depth, will prove to contain controversial points, sometimes downright errors - such is the complexity of chess. For that reason, the following critical examination of certain episodes from Sanakoev's games is by no means intended to cast a shadow over his book. I have adopted the same approach before, when writing about excellent works by Jan Timman and John Nunn - which I had used for training purposes with Sergei Dolmatov. Less significant books would simply not have come within the orbit of our attention.

A penchant for brilliant moves

If a chess player discovers a striking, outwardly attractive possibility, he often falls under its spell and can no longer resist its temptation. This must have caused every one of us to drop points at some time or other. I can't help showing you a memorable example from one of my own games.

The position looks won for White. Admittedly, 29 罩b6? 營c5+ is useless: 29 c4 ₩a6! is unconvincing, and so is 29 \\alpha a8+\alpha c7 30 ₩a5+ b6. A very strong move,



W

Dvoretsky - Peev European Champions' Cup. Ploydiv 1975

however, is 29 \(\mathbb{I}\)f4! with the terrible threat of 30 **二**c4. If 29...**公**d6. then 30 **基**b6 **数**c5+ 31 **基**d4, and Black has no moves: while if 29...\(\boldsymbol{\boldsymbol variation 30 營a8+ 含c7 31 基xb7+! 曾d6! 32 單d7+! 豐xd7 33 豐a3+ 堂e5 34 ②xd7+ 尝xf4 35 豐c1 堂e3 36 De5 and wins.

Unfortunately I was enticed by a flashy move which I had been planning but which turned out to be none too effective.

29 \$\d7?!

Into a threefold attack!

其xd7!


The only defence; 29... wxd7 loses to 30 \wallaa, while 29...\warphaxd7 is met by the decisive 30 \(\mathbb{Z}\xb7+\) \$\delta e8 31 \(\textbf{\textit{Z}}\) xf5!. If 29...\(\textit{\textit{Q}}\) d6, then if nothing else White has 30 20e5 **省5** 31 ②xf7.

After Black's move. I decided that the line I had planned - 30 not 31...基d2? 32 豐e5+ followed bv 33 其f2) 32 \$h2 \$\d6+ 33 \$\d21 豐c5+ 34 嶌f2 嶌d2 35 嶌f1 ②g3 36 學f6 夕xf1 37 豐xf7+ \$b8 38 \$\prixf1 \maxf2+39 \maxf2 \maxf2 \maxc3. However, my attempt to carry on the fight with 30 Xxf5?! gxf5 31 ₩a8+ &c7 32 ₩xh8 proved even weaker on account of 32... e4!. After 33 **Lf1 Ld2** 34 **Lg7** peace was concluded, though Black's position is already slightly better.

My examination of Sanakoev's games showed me that one of his characteristics is this same tendency to select pretty moves - even at the expense, sometimes, of quality.

White intends 25 Wh3 followed by 26 hxg6. How substantial are his threats? They must certainly be taken seriously. For instance, the natural 25... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 is answered by 26 hxg6 fxg6 27 \hspace h3 \dd d5 28 \dd b1!, preparing 28 ②xd5.

In general terms, the knight is well placed on c3. From here it deprives Black of the convenient possibility of strengthening the



Engel - Sanakoev Romanian Chess Federation Jubilee Tournament 1976-9

e6-point with ... 2d5, and if the case arises it can move forward to e4. Hence 24...b4 seems indicated. In Sanakoev's view, after 25 2d1 Ic8 26 De3 White has a clear plus. (The knight, indeed, looks likely to jump to g4.)

But why should Black allow the knight to leave d1? Instead of 25... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8, a much stronger line is 25...全c5! 26 對h3 单d5. Now the black rook is ready to go to c8. On 27 hxg6 fxg6, Black has everything securely defended, and ②e3 will always be met by ... \(\textit{\Pi}\) xe3. The consequences of 27 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\genty}\$}} \) xb4 \(\text{\$\text{\$\genty}\$} \) xb3 (27... 2xb4 28 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xb4 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)c8 also merits attention) are uncertain. Black would clearly be justified in playing this way.

The above considerations are prosaic. The solution found by Sanakoev is, on the contrary, highly dramatic.

24 ... **\$**a3!!

Black aims to answer 25 bxa3 with 25... \(\bar{\pi}\)xd2! 26 \(\pi\)xd2 \(\bar{\pi}\)d8+ 27 ♠xf3 30 \(\bar{\text{L}}\) 1h3 \(\bar{\text{L}}\)e2, when Black has the advantage. White does even worse with 25 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)1h2 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xd2! 26 ¤xd2 ₩xc3.

In the game, there followed 25 **②b1?! \$c5!** (this time Black overcame the temptation to play for a 'brilliancy' with 25... xd2? 26 ②xd2 \counting on 27 bxa3? 耳c8! 28 對d1 耳d8! — the attack can be repulsed by 27 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)d3!) 26 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)h3 **豐c6!** 27 hxg6 **豐xf3!** 28 gxh7+ \$\psi h8 29 \psi xf3 \textra xf3 and Black had an obvious endgame plus, which he duly converted into a win.

Zviagintsev too thought about 24... 2a3, but had doubts about playing it, because he saw that White could force a draw. He was unsure whether to go into the complicated position that results from 24...b4!?.

> 25 hxg6! Exd2! ₩xc3! 26 **Exh**7

\$27 27 Hh8+


28° 單1h7+

28 \(\mathbb{Z}8h7 + \text{ gives the same result.} \)

\$xg6 28 ... 29 Xh6+ **⊈**27

It would be wrong for the king to go forward (29...\$\psi f5? 30 \psi h3+ \$\preceq\$f4 31 \$\preceq\$h4+ \preceq\$e3 32 \$\preceq\$e4+! \$\preceq\$xe4 33 fxe4+ and 34 \(\mathbb{U}\)xc3), so the game ends in perpetual check.

Sanakoev, of course, saw this variation and mentioned it in his book. He is a highly combative player, and in other circumstances he would hardly have given his opponent the chance to 'bail out' like this. In the present case, though, the magic of the beautiful move must have influenced his conclusion that other continuations gave White the advantage.



В

A. Zaitsev – Sanakoev 6th USSR Championship 1963-5

> ⊈xh4 26 Hh1 鱼xg3!

The exclamation mark was added by me. Sanakoev himself considers

this move dubious. Here is what he writes:

"The temptation was too great... I recalled that 'the wise man understands it is simpler to deny himself a passion than to struggle against it afterwards' (La Rochefoucauld), but with the chance of a sacrificial attack against Zaitsev, I thought 'No! I can't chicken out.'

"If you assess the manoeuvre ... 2xh4xg3 in purely objective terms, you have to conclude that 26... \(\dot{\partial}\)g5 was stronger. After the modest reply 27 Exh5, Black would continue 27... 2xd2 28 2xd2 bxc4. with a queenside initiative; White would have no serious counterplay. This would have guaranteed me long months of very pleasant analysis, with evaluations ranging from 'better' to 'much better'. On the other hand, the more uncompromising 27 cxb5 would allow the pawn sacrifice 27...h4! 28 bxa6 ₩e7 followed by ...hxg3, with a dark-square attack that would not be too simple to resist."

To me, the emphasis here seems wrong. After 26... 2g5 27 Ixh5 **2**xd2 28 **2**xd2 bxc4 29 bxc4 Black has a good game, but nothing more. By contrast, the piece sacrifice is not only tempting but very strong. You only have to look at the position after two or three more moves to be convinced of the

total correctness of Black's formidable attack.


In situations like this, postal players are probably intent on analysing the variations as deeply and precisely as possible. An over-theboard player, on the other hand, with neither sufficient thinking time nor the right to move the pieces about, is obliged to break off his calculations at the earliest suitable moment and apply his positional judgement. That is why the ability to judge correctly is perhaps more weakly developed in correspondence chess specialists than in ordinary players; the former simply have less practice, as they solve most of their problems by analytical means.

Still, even if valid as a whole, no remark of this type can cover all cases. For example, acquainting myself with the games of Mikhail Umansky, another World Correspondence Chess Champion, I was impressed precisely by their deeply conceived strategy.

27 🕏 xg3 9)f4 28 \(\mathbb{W}\)e3 ₩e7 29 \(\dot{\phi}f2 **學g5** 30 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{9}}}}\) (D)

30 \(\mathbb{L}\) h2 is bad on account of 30...h4 31 ②f1 bxc4 32 bxc4 \$\text{\$\text{\pi}}xc4 33 全xc4 基xc4 34 費b3 基ec8 35 ⊈xf4 exf4.

> 30 ... h4



В

Sanakoev makes no comment on this move, though it is open to question - for after 31 \(\bar{2}\)g1 the queen must retreat, the check on h4 being unavailable. However, ...h3 presently follows, and h4 becomes accessible to the queen again.

Black had another attractive attacking possibility, suggested by Zviagintsev: 30...bxc4! 31 bxc4 鱼xc4 32 包xc4 耳xc4 33 肾b3 耳ec8. In my view, White would have no real saving chances after either 34 **2**xf4 **2**c2+ 35 **2**e2 exf4, or 34 鱼xc4 当g2+35 含e3 当xh1 36 鱼b2 $\forall g2(h2)$ – and if 37 $\Box c1$, then


> 31 **Eg1 學h6** 32 ₩b6!

White must prepare to withdraw his king to e1, which is no good at present owing to 32... 2g2+.

> **32** h3 **Ec5!**

An excellent move, cutting the white queen off from the important square e3. If 34 \wxd6, there follows 34... 当h4+35 含d1 当f2, and then ... \(\mathbb{I}\)cc8-d8.

34 \(\D \)a3 (D)



 \mathbf{B}

In such tense situations you can rarely succeed in conducting the attack by simply making one common-sense move after another. A moment comes when you need to exert yourself, to discover and calculate a clear-cut path to your goal. Doing this in a correspondence game is of course far easier than in a normal one. Sanakoev saw the correct solution, but then Zviagintsev found it too: 34... 2g2+! 35 \$\dd1 (35 \textit{\textit{L}}\xg2? loses quickly to 35... #e3+ 36 &f1 hxg2+ 37 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg2? \(\mathbb{L}\)h3, while 35 **I**xg2 hxg2 36 **Q**xg2 **W**e3+ 37 **\$\ddl** amounts to a transposition)

35... je3 36 其xg2 hxg2 37 鱼xg2 bxc4 38 \(\text{\ti}\}}}}} \ext{\ti}}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tin}}\tint{\text{\ti}}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ti}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}} 全xc4! (39...對d4? 40 單c1 單d8 41 **豐a5) 40 ②xc4 豐d4+! 41 ②d2 (41** \$e2 or 41 \$c2 would be very bad due to 41... wxc4+) 41... wxa1+ 42 \$\dot{e}2 \$\dot{\text{\$\psi}}\$xa2, and Black undoubtedly has a winning position.

Why, then, did Sanakoev reject this line? For one thing, he was not entirely sure how to assess the end position. But the main reason was the alluring prospect of playing for a 'brilliancy'.

> 4)d5? 34 ... 35 exd5!

"White has no reason to plunge into a jungle of variations such as 35 \wxd6 \we3+ 36 \wd1 b4 37 cxd5 \wxg1 38 \overline{\textit{L}}xb4 \verline{\text{L}}cc8, or to try to clear up the position with the dubious 35 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xc5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xb6 36 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xb6 either case it is not exactly clear what he does about the pawn on h3." (Sanakoev)

₩e3+ 35 ... ₩xg1 36 **⊈**d1 37 dxe6

Black has no time to recapture on e6, e.g. 37...fxe6 38 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)xc5 dxc5 39 \$\psic2! h2 40 \pib1! h1\pi 41 \overline{a}d3. Otherwise, however, White takes on f7 and Black's king becomes highly insecure. On reaching this position in his analysis, surely, an over-the-board grandmaster would

intuitively reject 34... 2)d5 and look for something else.

	_	
37	•••	h2
38	exf7+	\$xf7
39	₩xd6	≝d4


Concrete analysis convinced Black that after 39...\(\subseteq cc8 40 \)\(\subseteq d5+\) his king would be exposed to a decisive attack.

40	≜xc5	₩xd6
41	≜xd6	h1₩
42	⊈ c2	₩ h6
43	c5	₩e3
44	24!	

White now has an advantage which is both material (three minor pieces for the queen) and positional, and which he duly conducted to victory.

Limits of calculation

As already noted, it is natural for over-the-board players to want to conclude their analysis of variations as soon as it is feasible. That way they save time and energy, yet sometimes they fail to probe into the position deeply enough; they will fail to notice some concealed tactical or strategic resources, and hence miss the strongest continuation. This cannot be helped: "Real life is, to most men, a long secondbest, a perpetual compromise between the ideal and the possible." (Bertrand Russell).



Razuvaev - Beliavsky USSR Championship, Minsk 1979

Yuri Razuvaev settled for the immediate win of a pawn with 18 ②xe4?!, which allowed Black to equalize with 18... 2xe4 19 \wxe4 ₩d5!. The remaining moves were 20 **要xd5 exd5 21 耳fd1 \$e6 22** \$\psi \text{\$\psi\$ d6 23 \$\psi\$ xd6 \\ \psi \sigma \text{\$\psi}\$.

An intermediate rook move to d1 looked attractive, but in the case of 18 Ifd1 Black has the strong reply 18... ******e8! 19 ******d7+ ******g6, when 20 4)xe4? fails to 20... xf2+. White must attack the queen with the other rook.

18 Ecd1! ₩e8?!


18... b6 is a better chance, although after 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7+ followed by 20 ②xe4 the initiative remains with White.

> **⊈**g6 20 2xe4 **e**5

Razuvaev analysed this far and rejected 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\)cd1. He was wrong!

> 21 9 xc5 Exc5

22 **Exg7+!** (D)




B

22 ... \$xg7 23 \wxa7+

White wins his rook back and emerges with two extra pawns.

Many correspondence games supply us with excellent training material for overcoming this psychological barrier and widening the analytical horizon. After all, postal players normally continue analysing where over-the-board players would be certain to stop. The important thing is merely to choose examples where the difficulties facing the player are not analytical in nature, but conceptual and psychological.

"In the following game I pulled off what was probably the longest and most complicated trap of my career." (Sanakoev)



Sanakoev – Ševeček 6th World Championship 1968-70

How should we assess this position? Sanakoev writes: "Black appears to have got what he wants. The knight remains out of play on a5; next move Black will carry out the long-awaited advance ... d6-d5. In the ensuing fight White will certainly have the better chances on account of his healthy extra pawn, but the outcome is wholly unclear."

I would alter the emphasis. White has a positional plus as well as a material one. After, for instance, the prophylactic 29 \(\mathbb{Z}e3!\)? Black cannot play 29...d5 because of a line that Sanakoev gives: 30 g3

(he reaches this position by another move-order: 29 g3 d5 30 翼e3) 30...包xh3+ 31 曾g2 包g5 32 ②xg5 hxg5 33 \(\bar{2}\) h1+.

Another dismal prospect for Black is 29...e4 30 2 d4 d5 31 h4 (31 g3!? ②xh3+ 32 \$\dot{g}2 \Qg5 33 豐xd5) 31... **Z**ad8? 32 g3 **公**d3 33 ②ac6 里d7 34 里dxd3. After other moves White will drive the knight back with g3 all the same, and obtain a won position.


However, why not expel the knight at once? The point is that Black has a neat tactical resource from which he emerges a pawn up.

Here is a psychological barrier for an over-the-board player: on spotting this blow, he would be almost certain to break off the analysis and look for a more solid continuation. Sanakoev continued studying the position and came to the conclusion that White can now win by force.

That being so, 29 g3 was an excellent trap - creating the perfect illusion of a blunder. Black must have concluded that White simply missed the capture on f2.

31 \$\preceq\text{xf2} **₩**b6+ 32 🕏 g2 Xxa5 33 **省f7 Baa8** The only defence.

34 (D)



B

"The end position of the trap", according to Sanakoev. That is not strictly true; the analysis is not finished yet. What is White aiming for? Not 35 包g6+ 含h7 36 豐f5, which is harmless due to 36... \$\ding{\delta}g8. The real threat is 35 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g4 followed by 36 2g6+ \$h7 37 2xf8+, but Black can parry it by pinning the rook.

34 ...

We now encounter a second psychological barrier; this, incidentally, is where Zviagintsev stumbled, having overcome the first one.

It turns out that with his queen on c6 Black cannot defend himself, since 36... \$\docume{2}g8\$ now comes up against 37 營xf8+! 基xf8 38 包e7+. A splendid conception!


36 ... **豐xc3** 37 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c4! 1-0

Black resigned due to 37... wxc4 38 ②xe5+ or 37...⊌b2+ 38 ℤc2 豐xb4 39 ⑤xf8+ 含g8 40 豐h7+ 當xf8 41 單f1+ 當e7 42 對xg7+. This variation is not an integral part of the trap, since it is not compulsory - White has other ways of winning.

The attentive reader may be wondering why I did not award two exclamation marks to 29 g3, as Sanakoev does. The answer is that I have doubts about the move's objective strength. Black had an extra defensive possibility in 34...\alphaa7!. Sanakoev considers that after the continuation 35 2g6+ \$h7 36 ②xf8+ Ixf8 37 Yxa7 Ixa7 38 **Exd6** White wins easily, since the counter-attack on the second rank is useless: after 38... **Za2+39 Ph3**. if 39... Iff2 then the king escapes the checks via g4. In fact, though, a counter-attack is also possible on

For example, 40 \(\bullet 6 \) (40 \(\bullet d7! ?) ℤxc3 41 ℤg4 �h8 is not convincing either) 40... \(\begin{aligned} \(40... \) \(43!? \end{aligned} \) 41 c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)cc3 42 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g4 g5.

Is there a win here? If there is, it can perhaps only be established in correspondence play - the problem has become purely analytical, and everything hangs by a hair. After 43 b5 If2 44 Ie4! Iff3 (44...h5 45 **Exe5**) 45 **Exe5**!? or 45 **Eg4**!?,



W

White seems to win. The same result is reached after 43... Ife3 44 c5 e4 (44... **Z**e2 45 **Z**a4!) 45 b6 **Le2** 46 b7 **Lcc2** 47 **Lxg5**. However, there is still 43... If5!? 44 c5 if 46 b6?!. Black has 46...\(\mu\)c2! (threatening 47...g4+ 48 \$\disph4 \boxed{\square}\$ g7) 47 **X**a7 **X**xa7 48 bxa7 **X**a2. The play can surely be improved for both sides, but all this is too complicated and unclear.

We can now see why it was so important to arrive at the right evaluation of the position before White's 29 g3. In an over-theboard game, a player with such a big advantage would hardly have any reason to go in for complications whose outcome he could not predict, however hard he tried.


Sanakoev's play was wholly true to his style - he usually favours a tactical solution to his

problems. The question of chess styles is very important and deserves a few remarks, however brief.

Logically, it is clear that if a continuation - whether positional or tactical in nature - is indisputably strongest, it ought to be selected by a player irrespective of his style. If it is not selected, then we are no longer talking about style but about a limitation in his manner of play. Style comes to the fore, above all, in a situation where there is a choice between possibilities of roughly equal worth (particularly a choice of opening strategies). Of course, this is just a rough outline - in actual fact everything is much more complex. There are very many controversial borderline situations, and anyway decisions are sometimes taken on psychological grounds. There is nothing wrong with that. "An experienced chess player will sometimes opt for a particular continuation without being at all convinced that it is the best of all those available; he merely judges that it gives the most chances in practice" (Beniamin Blumenfeld). You may consciously select a line which you know is not strongest, just so as to give the game a character that suits you and is unwelcome to your opponent. The question here is merely how far

this psychological approach can legitimately go, where the line should be drawn.

An analysis of concrete examples to trace how a player's style influences his decisions would be very interesting and useful. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no one has vet carried out such an investigation. Some speculative attempts have been made to establish a classification of styles, but that is all.



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Sanakoev - Ljungdahl 6th World Championship 1968-71

White stands better, of course. The only question is how he can extract the maximum from the position.

"After 18 cxb4?! \widetaxd4+ 19 耳xd4 耳c2 20 单d3 耳xb2 21 耳c1 \$\d7 22 \square c2 \square xc2 23 \square xc2 White would forfeit most of his advantage" (Sanakoev).

Let us try to refine this variation by playing first 18 \wxc5 \xxc5. and only then 19 cxb4 \(\begin{aligned} \textbf{\textit{Lc2}} 20 \text{ \textit{Lc2}} \(20 \text{ \textit{Lc2}} \)? (20 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\} \) \(\text{\$\geq}\} \) when after 20... Exb2 21 Edb1 IIxb1 22 IIxb1 \$\dot d7 23 IIc1 White has, this time, occupied the c-file and moved his king nearer the centre; his advantage is quite substantial. However, Black can improve his defence by sacrificing a pawn with 20... \$\div e7!, so as to retain control of the open file and White's second rank. For example, 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)dc1?! 国hc8 22 国xc2 国xc2 23 b3 d4! 24 Id1 Ixa2 (now we understand why the black king didn't go to d7) 25 **X**xd4 **Q**xg2.

A dangerous plan was suggested by Grandmaster Stefan Kindermann, also starting 18 世xc5 里xc5, but then deviating with 19 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)ac1!? bxc3 20 b4! \(\mathbb{I}\)c7 21 \(\mathbb{I}\)d3:

a) In the bishop endgame that arises from 21...\$\daggerd7 22 \boxedsdaggerdxc3 国hc8 23 国xc7+ 国xc7 24 国xc7+ ahead of him. His only hope, 25...\$b6 (followed by 26...\$c6 or 26...a5), is easily dashed by 25 a4! and then a5 and \$f2-e3-d4-c5. The pawn ending after 25... 2c6 26 a5 \(\text{\tin}\exitite{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\tilit{\text{\texi}\ti}\titt{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\tex{ lost for Black (as readers may verify for themselves).

b) Black does better to refrain from the rook exchange and play 21...d4!? 22 **Exd**4 \$\dot e7. It is then unclear how significant White's advantage is.

18 **Zab1!!**


A 'mysterious rook move', to use Nimzowitsch's phrase. Sanakoev writes. "Such a continuation is more difficult to find than a forced combination involving several piece sacrifices." He is right, although it seems to me that the main difficulty lies not in finding White's move but in assessing its consequences.

18 ... ₩xd4+

18...bxc3 19 bxc3 營xd4+ is less precise, because White can choose between 20 \(\mathbb{I}\)xd4 (as in the game) and 20 cxd4. Black cannot avoid opening the b-file; 18...a5? is entirely bad: 19 對xc5 基xc5 20 cxb4 axb4 21 \(\bar{L}\)d4!? or 21 \(\bar{L}\)bc1!.

> 19 **X**xd4 hxc3 20 bxc3 耳c7 21 Hdb4 **Ac8** (D)

On arriving at this position in his analysis, an over-the-board player would most probably cut short his calculations and reject the plan beginning with 18 Hab1 (this is what Zviagintsev did). Indeed, what has White achieved? He has seized the b-file, but there is nothing there to attack. White's queenside pawns have been weakened,



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which promises Black real counterchances even in the (highly likely) event of his losing the a6-pawn. No, Sanakoev's decision does not look convincing - it is somehow strategically suspect!

This verdict can be amended if only we continue our study of the position and discover White's plan here. In itself, the plan is nothing unexpected; Nimzowitsch, after all, stressed that "breaking into the opponent's camp, usually on the seventh or eighth rank, is the logical culmination of effective manoeuvring in an open file". However, it is quite impossible to see in advance how dangerous the doubling of rooks on the eighth rank will be. For that, we need a detailed analysis, which is not easy to perform even in a postal game. Playing over-the-board with limited thinking time, it is not worth even trying


to work out the variations accurately. You have to put your faith in your intuition. It is interesting to see what it tells you here.

22 **Lb8!**

Why doesn't White defend his c3-pawn? Surely because he wants to give his opponent no time for the following deployment of his forces: 22 \(\begin{aligned} 會f2 is better) 23... Id8 24 Ia8 d4!.

The tempting 22 c4 would work in the case of 22...dxc4 23 \(\maxxxxxxx4 **里xc4 24 单xc4 单d7 25 里b8 罩d8** 26 \(\mathbb{\textbf{\pi}}\) a8 \(\mathbb{\ph}\) b7 27 \(\mathbb{\pi}\) a7 and 28 \(\mathbb{\ph}\) xa6. However, exchanging on c4 is not obligatory, Black has the stronger 22...\$e7! 23 cxd5 exd5.

> 22 ... **含e7**(D)



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23 Ha8!

Sanakoev consistently pursues his plan. After 23 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)xa6?! \(\textit{\textit{Z}}\)d8 (or 23... \(\mathbb{\pi}\) e8) he would either have to settle for an exchange of bishops that favours his opponent, or else give up the c-pawn.

23 ... **¤e**8

Let us look at 23... \(\maxxx2\):

- a) The obvious reply is 24 ②xa6, but after 24... Ze8 25 Za7+ (25 罩bb8 臭d7) 25...當f8 26 阜b5 (26 皇xc8 里exc8 27 里bb7 當g8! 28 其xf7 其c1+ 29 含f2 其1c2+ 30 曾g3?! 罩8c3+31 曾h4 罩xg2 gives White nothing) 26... \(\begin{aligned}
 \begin{aligned}
 \begin{ tion is not entirely clear. Black's pieces are tied down as before (his bishop doesn't have a single move), but the advance of his dpawn, and a kingside break with ...g5 where suitable, promise him distinct counter-chances.
- b) A stronger line is 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a7+! **含d8 (24...含d7 25 罩bb7 罩d8 26** \(\textit{\textbf{\pi}}\) xa6 \(\textit{\textbf{\pi}}\) e8 27 \(\textit{\pi}\) xd7 \(\textit 25 耳b8! (25 耳xf7? 耳c7) 25...耳c7 26 Laa8 (threatening a permanent pin on the eighth rank after 27 ♠xa6) 26...a5 27 **□**xa5 and then 27... 其b7 28 其ba8 or 27... 其c1+ 28 曾f2 罩c2 29 曾e1 (not 29 罩aa8? 할c7 30 할e1 翼xe2+ 31 할xe2 **≜**a6+) 29...**⇔**c7 (the threat was 30 □a7 or 30 □aa8 followed by 31 **2a6**) 30 **3b**3 and 31 **3a**7+. It would seem that in this variation Black cannot break free.

24 **Lb3 f**6

If 24... 2d7, then 25 Exa6 Eec8 26 Laa3. This is stronger than 25 基xe8+ 鱼xe8 (25... \$xe8) 26 鱼xa6 **■**a7 27 **■**b6 **■**c7, when 28 **■**b7 fails to 28... **Exb7** 29 **2xb7 2b5!** followed by ... \(\dot{\phi}\)d7-c7.

25 &d3!

Not at once 25 \prescript{\prescr

> 25 ... fxe5 26 fxe5 h6 27 \$\psi f2

By now White's advantage is beyond dispute; he went on to exploit it convincingly:


27... Ic5 28 re3 Id8 29 rd4 **Ia5** (29...**I**c7 30 **I**bb8) **30 IIbb8** \$d7 31 \$\mathref{4}a7+\$\displace6 32 \displace2 xa6 \$\mathref{4}a4+\$ 33 \$\dd3 ? \dankara6+ 34 \textbf{\texib}\eta}\textbf{\ **I**xa6 35 **I**xd8 **I**xa2) 33...d4+ 34 cxd4 \(\mathbb{A} a 3 + 35 \) \(\mathbb{P} e 4 \) \(\mathbb{A} x a 6 \) 36 **Exa6+! Exa6** 37 **Exd8 Exa2** 38 1-0

Black went under without a fight. What became of our impression that he could hope for counterplay, that White's decision was 'strategically suspect'? Were those really just empty words?

They were not; we were basing our evaluations on objective factors in the position, and were therefore right to suppose that Black had far more stubborn ways to defend himself. Here are some considerations to make the search for a defensive plan easier. First, Black should not be afraid of losing the

a-pawn, especially if the bishops are exchanged in the process. Secondly, it is important to hinder the white king's advance to the centre of the board.

Let us return to the position after 26 fxe5 (D):




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Instead of the colourless 26...h6 it was worth trying 26... If 8!?, with a view to 27 axh7 d4. After 27 h3 h6 (27...g6) 28 **L**bb8 (28 **A**xa6? @xa6 29 Exa6 Ef5) 28...Ee8, Black can defend successfully. It is clear that White should, after all, prefer 27 Axh7!? d4 28 c4! Exc4 29 **Z**a7+ **2**d8 30 h3.

Zviagintsev suggested 23...f6!? (D) (instead of 23... Ee8). Let me show you some variations we discovered together.

a) 24 Xbb8 Xe8 25 2xa6 2d7 26 Exe8+ 2xe8, and if 27 Ec8. then 27... **2**a7.




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- b) 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b3 fxe5 25 fxe5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f8!. The rook restricts the mobility of the king, with the additional threat of 26....If5.
 - c) 24 2xa6 Ze8, and now:
- c1) 25 \(\textit{\texts}\) xc8 \(\textit{\texts}\) exc8 \(\textit{\texts}\) 26 \(\textit{\texts}\) xc8 **I**xc8 27 **I**b7+ **2**f8 28 exf6 gxf6 29 Exh7 Exc3, and Black retains genuine saving chances in the rook ending.
- c2) The same goes for the variation 25 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)b3 fxe5 26 fxe5 2xa6 27 Exa6 Ecc8 28 Ebb6 **黨xc3 29 黨xe6+ 全f7.**
- c3) 25 \(\text{2d3}\)!? fxe5 26 fxe5 \(\text{2d7}\) (26...**x**c3 27 **x**a7+ is dangerous for Black) 27 Exe8+ (it is also worth considering 27 Za3 Zec8 28 **□**bb3) 27... • xe8 28 **□**b3. White's advantage here is considerable, although the result of the struggle still remains unclear.

Another possible defensive approach (which, strictly speaking,

we ought to have considered first) involves taking the c3-pawn in some circumstances or other. Let us go back to the position after White's 22nd move.

In reply to 22...0-0!?, Sanakoev gives 23 La8, with the variation 23... ad7 24 Ibb8 Ixb8 (24... Icc8) 25 Exc8 exc8 26 &f2!) 25 Exb8+ Ic8, and now not 26 Ib7? ♠b5! 27 **axb5** axb5 28 **axb5** h5 29 **b**3 \(\begin{align*}
\begin{align*}
\be but simply 26 **Exc8+! exc8** 27 \$12, and the penetration of the white king decides the game. However, Black can play 23... Exc3!? 24 \(\text{Lbb8} \) \(\text{Lc6} \) (D).



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How do we assess this position? Black keeps his extra pawn and is in no immediate danger, but his forces are completely tied down. The attempt to untangle with ... Ze8 (aiming for ... \$\delta f8 and ... \$\delta d7) fails

against 2xa6. Black must play ...g6 and ... \(\delta \)g7, and then be content with waiting tactics. The question (to which I have yet to find a clear answer) is whether White's resources are adequate to breach his opponent's defence.

However, a general point is that once Black has castled. White is not obliged to sacrifice his c-pawn; he can keep the advantage with 23 ■1b3!?. It therefore makes sense for Black to take the pawn a move earlier.

Let us look at 22... \(\mathbb{Z}\) xc3!?. The reply 23 2xa6 seems obvious, on the grounds that after 23...\$\dd7 24 Ia8 Id8 25 Ibb8 the permanent pin on the eighth rank will guarantee White a decisive plus. (He will bring his king to the centre and then advance his passed a-pawn.) If Black tries to untie himself with 23... **2**e7 (with the idea of 24... **2**e8 and 25... 2d7), he comes up against a tactical stroke pointed out by Yusupov: 24 \(\mathbb{I}\)1b7+!!, which wins a piece after 24... axb7 25 \square xb7+ and 26 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)b8+. However, Black has a saving line in 23...0-0!, and if 24 ♠b5 then 24... Za3, attacking the a2-pawn and preparing to bring his bishop out to a6.

23 Las! is an improvement. We have already discussed the situations arising from 23...\$\dd7 24 **≜**xa6 **Z**d8 25 **Z**bb8 and 23...**⊈**e7


24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a7+! – they are decidedly in White's favour. The best defence is 23...0-0! 24 **Labba Lc6**. This brings us once again to the position in the last diagram. The objective verdict on White's whole idea starting with 18 Zab1 evidently depends on the assessment of that position.

Let us state our conclusions. The complicated (and surely not infallible) analysis we have just performed illustrates once again that even the most difficult-seeming positions may be viable. Nevertheless it does not cast doubt on the brilliant decision taken by Sanakoev on his 18th move. The defence, after all, is extremely hard, White always retains chances of success. and in any case we did not see anything more convincing for him.

Realizing an advantage

In examining the last two examples we have already broached this subject, which is of immense importance to every chess player. So is another which is closely linked to it - finding defensive resources in difficult positions.

Referring to the diagram overleaf, Sanakoev writes: "The critical position; essentially, it is the play from this position that makes the game notable. By means of a cunning regrouping, Black has set



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Sanakoev - Engel 10th World Championship 1978-84

his opponent a concrete problem what to do about the g- and hpawns. The black bishop may be shut out for the time being, but will White's passed pawn on the queenside outweigh his material losses on the kingside? After all, the black pieces may regain their activity with an eventual ...f4."

First let us see how the game ended (with notes based on Sanakoev's judgements and some of his variations).

> f4+! 42 d5! 43 \$\psi_f2

On 43 \$\dd4?! \boxed{\subseteq} g4! 44 \$\dip c5 cxd5 45 axd5 \(\mathbb{Z}\) xh4 46 b4 \(\mathbb{L}\) h1 Black retains good chances of saving the game.

cxd5

Not 43...c5 44 2d3 Zh6 45 d6+! \$\d8 46 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\general}\$}} \text{ with a won rook endgame.

44 \(\omega\) xd5 Ig4 **Xxh**4 46 \(\mathbb{g} \) g1!

The point of White's play becomes clear - the rook is trapped.

> 46 ... **⊈**f5

46... Ig4 puts up more fight, although after 47 axg4 hxg4 48 b4 f3 49 b5 &e4 50 b6 White should win all the same.

47 **Ed4**

It is important to stop 47... 2g4.

47 ... Феб


47... **2**d7!? 48 b4 **2**e6 is a shade more accurate, but this too promises no saving chances. White continues 49 Zd1! Qb5 50 Zd8 and 51 IIb8.

> 48 h4 **\$e5 \$**e6 49 **Zd5**+ **Qg4** 50 b5 51 **b6!** ≜xf3 1-0 52 gxf3

Black resigned on account of 55 **岁b7+**, or 52...**二**h3 53 **二**d8! (but not 53 b7? \(\bar{g}_3 + 54 \\ \dec{g}_{h2} \) (or 54 \$f2} 54... \$\mathbb{Z}\$g8 followed by ...**\B**b8 and ...\\delta\d6-c6).

Zviagintsev rejected 42 d5 due to the reply 42...c5!. He was doubtful about the bishop ending that arises from 43 d6+! (we will take Sanakoev's word for it when he

says that "after other moves Black is out of danger", even though 43 ■a2 deserves examination). Sanakoev analysed this endgame and considered it won. Here are his variations after 43... Xxd6 44 Xxd6 \$\ddot xd6 45 \textbf{\textit{x}}xf7 \textbf{\textit{e}}e5 46 g3 (D).



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46...\$f6 47 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}}\$g8 48 \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$d}}\$1}\$ **2**e5 49 h5 and now:

- a) 49...\$h7 50 \$c2 \$g8 51 h6 **2**h7 52 g4 f4+ 53 **2**d2 **2**xc2 54 \$\price xc2.
- b) 49...\$f7.50 h6 \$\psi f6.51 \$\psi f4 \$\psig6 52 \psih5+!.
- c) 49...\$e6 50 \$c2 \$f7 51 h6 \$\psi\$f6 52 \$\psi\$f4 \$\psi\$g6 (52...\$\psi\$g8 53 **2**xf5 **2**xb3 54 g4 c4 55 g5+) 53 g4 \$\preceq\$xh6 54 gxf5! \$\textrm{\$\textrm{\textrm{\textrm{g}}}{2}\$ 55 f6 \$\textrm{\$\textrm{\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\texrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\extrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$\textrm{\$ 56 \$\docume{6}\$e5 \$\docume{6}\$g5 57 \$\docume{6}\$f5 \$\docume{8}\$xb3 58 2e6 and the f-pawn queens.

For all this, Vadim's intuition had not failed him. From the position in the last diagram, Black can

save himself with 46...f4+!! 47 gxf4+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$f6 48 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c4 (48 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xh5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c2) can verify without difficulty. White is unable to exploit his extra pawn. He is hampered by having his bpawn on a light square - the same colour as his bishop - and if his king comes over to c3, Black will have the chance to counter-attack on the other wing.


There is also a slightly different drawing line: 45...f4+! (in place of 45...\$e5) 46 \$xf4 \$e7 (alternatively, 46...\(\mathbb{Q}\)c2 at once) 47 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xh5 (47 \(\mathbb{2} \) c4 \(\mathbb{2} \) f6) 47...\(\mathbb{2} \) c2.

Zviagintsev chose another plan for realizing White's advantage, though he based it on the same idea - of trapping the black rook which Sanakoev carried out in the actual game.

42 \$\psi f2! \$\mathbb{I} g4 43 \$\mathbb{L} e2 \$\mathbb{I} xh4 44\$ **≜f3 ⊈d6** (Black can't face losing the c-pawn) 45 b4! (intending 46 Idl and 47 ★g3; the immediate 45 \(\textbf{L}\)d1 is imprecise due to 45...c5!) 45...f4 (45...\(\mathbb{L}\)h1 46 \(\mathbb{L}\)c2 \(\mathbb{L}\)b1 47 **I**xc6+ **2**d7 48 **I**b6) 46 d5! (otherwise Black brings his bishop round to the defence) 46...cxd5 47 **I**xd5+ **\$**c7 48 **I**b5! **\$**g6, and only now, finally, 49 \(\psi g1! \) with good chances of victory.

I hope you are convinced by now that Sanakoev's book is rich in content and offers us abundant food for thought. I have dwelt on a few episodes only (a further example of the author's play is examined in Chapter 13, 'Virtuoso Defence'), but of course there are many more games in the book, and in all of them the reader is sure to discover something interesting and useful.

Postscript: I would like to take the opportunity to make some corrections to some analysis of my own, published in Technique for the Tournament Player (Dvoretsky and Yusupov). This will involve us with the same problems as before: realizing an advantage, and looking for defensive resources in a difficult position.



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Smirin - Vogt Saltsjöbaden 1988/9

In the event of 33 Exa5? Ef3 34 型h5 里xg3 35 里xh7+ \$g8, Black's passed g-pawn ensures him adequate counter-chances. Ilia Smirin played 33 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{e}}\$e4?!}\), offering a bishop exchange, which looks like a perfectly sensible solution to the problem White faces.


In the game, this decision paid off: 33...\(\hat{2}\)xa4? 34 \(\boxed{\pi}\)xa5 \(\hat{2}\)e8 (or 34...\(\textit{\$\textit{\$a}}\)c6 35 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$x}}\)c6 bxc6 36 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$Z}}\)5) 35 Axb7 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\text{f1} + 36 \displayd2 \text{\mathbb{Q}}\text{g6} 37 c4 耳f2+38 \$c3 \$g739 耳g5!, and in this hopeless position Black lost on time.

How can the defence be improved? The general view is that, in such situations, going into a rook ending offers the best chances of salvation (everyone knows the saying 'all rook endings are drawn'). (34...h5? 35 **E**e5) 35 **e**d2!?, with the idea of \$\dock = 3-f4, Black is condemned to total passivity and should definitely lose.

In rook endgames it is always essential to try to activate your rook. After 33... If 1+ 34 &d2 one and then 36 \$\d3 \boxed{1}{\boxed{1}} f3+37 \boxed{1} e3 \boxed{1} f2 38 b3 \pmuggraphg7, or 36 \pmudgraphd1 h5! 37 \mathbb{Z}e5 **基h2** 38 **基**xa5 **\$**g7 (with ...**\$**f6 and ...h4 to follow), Black obtains counterplay which is probably adequate to draw. Another possibility is 34... Ig1 35 axc6 bxc6 36

罩xa5罩g2+37 曾d3 罩xg3+38 曾e4 里g2 (but not 38...里g1 39 里c5 g3 40 曾f3 g2 41 b3!) 39 其c5 其f2! 40 a5 g3 41 a6 If8 42 Ig5 Ia8 43 ¤xg3 ¤xa6.

Black may also exchange rooks and defend the seemingly difficult position with bishops of the same colour: 33... Ie8! 34 Ixe8+ 2xe8 (D).




I confess I analysed this position carelessly. I did see that after 35 \(\exists xb7 \exists xa4 36 c4 Black avoids immediate defeat by means of 36...\(\right) b3 37 c5 \(\right) g7 (and if 38 c6, then 38...\(\textit{\textit{d}}\)d5! 39 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)a8 \(\textit{\textit{e}}\)e6!). However, I was either relying on 38 \(\mathbb{L}\)c8, and underestimating the pawn sacrifice 38...\$f6! 39 \$xg4 \$e5 - or else I didn't notice that after 38 &d2 &f6 39 &c3 Black has 39... 2d1! with the idea of ... £f3. Igor Zaitsev rightly pointed

out my error (in 64 - Chess Review No. 12, 1996). Indeed I have not managed to find a win here. In the last variation, for example. White might try 40 c6 \(\hat{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}}} \) f3 41 \(\hat{\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}}} \) c4 h5 42 \$\dolda a8 \dolda e7 43 \dolda b5, counting on 43...\$d6(d8)? 44 \$b6 h4 45 c7 or 43...h4 44 gxh4 g3? 45 c7(+)! (now we see why the king avoided the squares d4 and c5 – after 45...g2 the black pawn will not queen with check). Yet after 43...h4! 44 gxh4, Black first plays 44...\$d6! - forcing the white king to b6, where it is exposed to check - and only then 45...g3.

Instead, the grandmaster proposed an ingenious breakthrough plan: 35 b4!? b6 (Black loses at once with 35...axb4? 36 a5, or 35.... ≜xa4? 36 bxa5 followed by 37 **a**xb7) 36 b5 **a**f7! (Black has to hold up White's main threat of c4-point the only continuation Zaitsev gives is 38...h6 39 c4 \$\preceq\$f6 40 c5 \$\delta\$e5 41 cxb6 \$\delta\$d6 42 \$\delta\$e3 \$\delta\$b3 43 \$\\\\\$c6 \\\\\$xa4 44 b7 \\\\\\$c7 45 b6+ \\\\\$b8 46 ≜xa4. Here, though, I disagree with him - Black's resources are not yet exhausted. Quite apart from the plausible try 38...\$2f6, sacrificing the h-pawn to bring his king to the queenside and hinder White's c4-c5, Black can play more accurately within the terms of the plan Zaitsev examines.

38...h5 39 c4 \$\dip f6 40 c5 \$\dip e7! (but on no account 40...\$e5? - the king's place is not in the centre but in front of the white pawns) 41 cxb6 &d8! (D)



How is White to win now? He doesn't succeed in queening a pawn with 42 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f5 \$\frac{1}{2}\$b3 43 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d4 êxa4 44 \$c5 \$d1 45 \$d6 \$f3 the bishop arrives in the nick of time. Moreover, the position after 42 曾e3 息b3 (42...曾c8) 43 息c6 堂c8 44 b7+ 堂b8 45 b6 单d1 is drawn.

It turns out that Black has more than one way of saving himself. This casts doubt on the plan beginning with 33 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\text{e}}}\)e4, and compels us to look for other ideas.

The strongest line was suggested by Grandmaster Viktor Bologan.

33 **Eg5!**

The most important thing is to forestall 33...\squarestall 33...\squarestall 33...

> 33 ⊈xa4 34 Exa5!

An unexpected switch of fronts - Smirin only considered 34 \$\mu_{xg4}\$ \$c6, with a probable draw.

> 34 ... **\$** c6

A tougher defence appears to be 34... \delta e8, trying to get in ...h5 at the first convenient moment.

35 **Eg5!**

This rook is like a bothersome flv.

35 ... **⊈f3** 35... Ig8 36 Ih5. **罩f7** 36 **Zh**5 37 \$\d2

Having skilfully tied down his opponent's pieces, White simply intends to strengthen his position by advancing his queenside pawns. This kind of plan for realizing an advantage (domination with no counterplay for the opponent) is wholly in the style of Anatoly Karpov. For an over-the-board player, a very important point is that hardly anything has to be calculated here (in contrast to the line with 33 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$e}}\$} 4, where we had to immerse ourselves in both the bishop ending and the rook ending). This means there is far less likelihood of errors, such as those committed by Zaitsev and me in our analysis of the bishop ending.

Incidentally, in concluding that there is only one solution, we are wholly concurring with Zaitsev's views. "Many years of experience in chess analysis have convinced me that in tense positions balanced on a knife-edge, there cannot be two paths to victory", he once wrote. Another experienced analyst, Gavriil Veresov, expressed the same thought: "In positions close to the borderline between a draw and defeat, we generally encounter a unique solution."

9 Missed Brilliancy Prizes

Artur Yusupov

Mark Dvoretsky's suggestion that I should write about some spoilt 'masterpieces' could not have been more to the point.

In the first place, there are some old games that I have wanted to analyse closely for a long time. With the passing of time the annoyance at missing the wins has subsided, and perhaps I can now look at these games more objectively and critically.

Secondly, I actually happen to be a leading expert in this field (I mean an expert in spoiling master-pieces, rather than in critically examining my own games). In the course of my career I have succeeded in creating some games which I can be proud of even now—they have stood up to the strict test of time and analysis. Yet for every such game there are ten others which were played beautifully up to a point, then hopelessly ruined.

Thirdly, I can imagine what 'pleasure' it will give my coach and collaborator (my collaborator in writing this book, that is – not in

ruining masterpieces) to observe my numerous blunders. At any rate, I can now explain them by saying that I was collecting them to put in a book.

I have a self-interested motive too. I am afraid that some tournament organizers (not without a certain justification, alas!) may have formed an unfavourable impression of my chess style. They may consider my play too solid and boring (unfortunately there is more truth in the latter). I want to turn this image into a positive one: "He plays badly but interestingly."


And finally, my woeful experiences may prove useful to others, although I have to admit that I personally have learned little even from my own mistakes.

Yusupov - Rebel 8

'Action Chess' (30 min. per game) match (13), Ischia 1997 Queen's Pawn Game

1 2f3 2f6 2 d4 e6 3 e3 c5 4 2d3 b6 5 b3 2e7 6 2b2 0-0 7 0-0 d5 8

De5 Dfd7 9 f4 Dxe5 10 dxe5 2a6 11 c4 6)c6 12 a3 dxc4 13 bxc4 f5 14 exf6 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\exiti ②a5 16 ₩c2 (D)



My most recent example of a misplayed attack occurred in a demonstration match against a computer program. In this position Black took a decision typical of a computer:

> 16 ... 9\xc4


After the 'human' continuation 16...h6 17 Zad1 We7 18 42b5 ≜xb2 19 ₩xb2, White would gain a clear plus, since Black's castled position would be weakened and his knight would be out of play on a5. Now, however, White has to calculate some variations that would prove a difficult task for me even with a normal time-limit.

> 17 \(\extit{\hat{a}}\xh7+ фh8 18 Had1

This natural move cost me ten precious minutes and turned out to be an outright error. The immediate 18 \(\boxed{\pi}f3!\) was better. I was afraid of 18... \ddd d2 - for no good reason, since the simple 19 \wxd2 \Oxd2 20 Zh3 is adequate. If instead 18... 2xb2 19 \(\bar{2}\) h3 \(\alpha\) h4 (alternatively 19... 2c4 20 We2) 20 Qe4 **ad3** 21 **y**xb2 **axe4** 22 **xe4** \$\delta\$g8 23 ₩e5, White has a fierce attack.

> 18 ... **豐e7?** (D)

The correct reply was 18... 2xe3!. If 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd8, then 19...\(\mathbb{Z}\)axd8 is not bad: 20 **肾**g6 **Q**d3 21 **肾**xd3 **Z**xd3 22 \(x\)d3 \(\alpha\)d4!?, while 19...\(\alpha\)xc2! If 2 Id8! is an even stronger line. I had of course overlooked the last move of this variation.




W

IIf3 ②xb2 Dxd1 20 Ih3

If a computer sees the chance to devour something without detecting a concrete reason not to, it will do so without fail. A human player knows that gluttony leads to no good, but the concrete proof of this principle lies beyond the computer's horizon. However, being in time-trouble, White failed to find the win and settled for a repetition of moves. The correct line was discovered the following day by some chess enthusiasts who were interested in analysing White's attack.

21 \(\text{\textit{\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\tex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\ **\$28** (D)



W

I was intending to bring the queen into the attack with 22 \widtherpoonup xd1!, but was somewhat discouraged when I noticed the defence 22... 2g5!. I did realize that White's attacking resources were not exhausted, and that I had 23 20d5!. On 23... 4d8. however, what escaped me was the

intermediate check 24 h7+!. followed after 24...\$h8 (24...\$f7 25 **營**h5+) by 25 fxg5:

- a) 25... 🖐 xg5 26 👲 g6+ 🕹 g8 (26...豐h6 27 **里**xh6+ gxh6 28 **幽al+!) 27 ②e7+! 幽xe7 28 罩h8+** 當xh8 29 營h5+ 當g8 30 營h7#
- b) 25...互f1+26 對xf1 全xf1 27 ≜f5+ \$g8 28 \$xe6+ \$f8 29 耳h8#.


I don't know which of these mates is prettier, but it's a pity I didn't manage to end the game fittingly with one or the other. Instead, there followed:

Yusupov - Xie Jun Linares 1997 Ruy Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 9 f3 9 c6 3 h5 a6 4 2xc6 dxc6 5 0-0 \delta d6 6 \delta a3 b5 7 c3 c5 8 \(\tilde{2} \) c2 f6?! (8...\(\tilde{2} \) e7; 8...\(\tilde{2} \) b7) 9 a4 \(\text{\pm} \) b7 10 axb5 \(\text{\pm} \) xe4 11 d4 cxd4(D)

Black is behind in development and White has attacking chances. Such trivialities as the loss of a pawn should not, of course, worry him.

12	Hel!	⊈b7
13	cxd4	axb5
14	 Ixa8+	⊈xa8
15	₩e2	e4



W

16 ₩xb5+ **2c6** 17 Wa5

White has already won his pawn back and continues to develop his initiative, 17 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe4+?! is weaker in view of 17...\$\psi_f7.

> 17 ... ②e7 18 **2**d2 f5


19 b3!

A good move, setting up the threat of 2a3 and preparing to transfer a knight via c4 to the central square e5.

> 19 ... ₩d7 20 Dc4! **Dg6** 21 2)2e3 **≜b**5 (D)

In the event of the optimistic 21...f4, White had prepared the powerful rejoinder 22 De5. Instead Black plays the natural and necessary move. After this her backward development assumes dangerous proportions, yet on the other hand her pawn centre should

not be underestimated! If she gets the chance to complete her development, it is White who will be badly off. I felt that the critical moment in the struggle had arrived. and immersed myself in the search for the best solution.



W

I now made an amusing mistake in analysis. I was very keen to dispatch my knight to e5, and quite quickly hit on the right method: 22 ②xf5!! 對xf5 23 ②e5 - only to discard it, with much regret and just about as quickly, on account of the simple 23...②xe5 24 \ xb5+ ②f3+. The fact that in this tempting variation Black's king is in check and her last move is therefore strictly prohibited by the rules of chess. was of course the point I overlooked. The reason for such a curious error must lie in my indistinct image of the chessboard while I

was analysing; a vital detail of the position was simply excluded from my internal field of vision.

I believe the knight sacrifice would have won. On 23...c6, White has a pretty mate with 24 \mathbb{\mat \$e7 25 \$g5+! ₩xg5 26 ₩b7+ \$\preceq\$e6 27 \$\preceq\$d7+. A stiffer defence is 23...\(\textit{\textit{d}}\)d7, but White still has a decisive attack after 24 \subseteq a8+ \overline{a}c8 25 Exe4 De7 26 2a3.

It was also worth considering 22 h4!?, which virtually forces the reply 22...h5. Then White has the same sacrifice: 23 ②xf5! \wxf5 24 ②e5 单d7 25 豐a8+, although in this case Black may get the chance to bring her rook into play via h6.


Thomas Wedberg suggested an alternative knight move: 22 2e5!. According to his analysis, after 22...4)xe5 23 dxe5 c6 (23...4d3? 24 夕d5!: 23....皇c5 24 幽a8+ 幽d8 25 当b7 with advantage) 24 互d1 2d3 25 2a3 2xa3 (25...f4 is bad because of 26 Oc4 Wg4 27 Za1 @xc4 28 @xf8 \xxf8 29 \\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\a 耳f8 28 幽c5, White maintains an advantage.

Straying from the correct line of attack, I was tempted to undermine the centre in a way that appears strategically attractive.

22 g4?

This move looks stronger than it actually is.

22 ... fxg4 ₩a8+ 23 **\$**17 24 \wxe4 **全b4!** (D)



W

Black makes use of the breathing space to finish her development at top speed. White wins a pawn, but his initiative evaporates completely.

25 Id1 He8 26 ₩xg4 ₩xg4+

Assessing the position correctly. In the endgame Black's king will be safe, and her strong bishops will fully compensate for the slight loss of material.

> 27 ②xg4 ¤e4 28 h3 h5 29 ②ge5+ ②xe5 30 ②xe5+ Феб

We can now take stock of the situation. Black has obtained sufficient compensation for the pawn. In view of his scattered position,

White has no real chance to do more than share the point - which indeed is what occurred a little later.

Yusupov – Ivanchuk

Tal Memorial Tournament, Riga 1995 Queen's Gambit Accepted


1 d4 d5 2 Øf3 e6 3 c4 dxc4 4 e3 a6 5 \(\) xc4 c5 6 \(\) b3 \(\) f6 7 0-0 \(\) c6 8 ₩e2 cxd4 9 Zd1 d3 (9... ee7) 10 罩xd3 豐c7 11 ②c3 单d6?!

11... \$c5 may be better.

12 e4

②e5

13 ②xe5 皇xe5 (D)



W


In his attempt to gain control of the b8-h2 diagonal, my opponent has rather fallen behind in development. White must of course take the initiative at once.

14 f4!

The right way! By sacrificing a pawn I increase my lead in development still more. The slow 14 g3 would allow Black to obtain a fully acceptable position after 14... 2d7 e5 2d5 18 2xd5 exd5 19 2e3 d4 20 皇xd4 劉d7 with counterplay.

14 ... ⊈xf4 15 **≜**xf4 ₩xf4 包d7(D) 16 e5!

The point of the pawn sacrifice is that the active 16... 294? is met by the simple 17 g3, and if then 17... 世f5 White has either 18 单c2 or 18 If1, when his attack proceeds unopposed.



W

17 If!

Again White adopts the most energetic solution. Of course, he could have maintained the attack without additional sacrifices: 17 里e3!? 0-0 18 里f1 數d4 19 \$h1. In

that case, however, the active black queen in the middle of the board would have been a serious hindrance to White's offensive. After the move played, White drives the queen out of the centre; the loss of the e5-pawn is compensated for by the gain of time and the opening of lines.

Instead 17 Had1 would be a cardinal error, allowing Black to bail out with a small sacrifice and beat off the attack: 17...0-0! 18 \(\maxrtm{\pi}\)xd7 ♠xd7 19 \(\mathbb{\su}\)xd7 \(\mathbb{\su}\)ad8.

> **学xe5** 17 ... ₩d4 18 **Ee**3

Naturally, 18... 對c5 is weaker because of 19 2e4. Pinning the rook is Black's best chance. He would lose at once with 18...\dot\dot\dot\dot\dot\ (18... 27 is answered by the same stroke) 19 **\(\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}{\substruction}\superstruct{\substruction}\sup** 豐d4+ 21 含h1 ②c5 22 豐f3+.

> 19 **Ed1 当97**

Not 19... wb6 on account of 20 **⊈**a4.

> 20 De4 0-0 21 **⊈**h1

White is doing everything right but expending too much effort and time on it. The only reason why I couldn't conduct the game to its logical conclusion was that I didn't trust mý judgement and was trying to calculate the variations more or less exhaustively. The result was that at the critical stage I simply

didn't have enough thinking time. I ought to have had more faith in my own powers, but just try maintaining your confidence and sangfroid when one of the world's strongest players is sitting opposite you, quickly answering your moves with an imperturbable air!

21 ... 9)e5

In answer to 21... Id8, Ljubomir Ftačnik suggested 22 4 f6+! gxf6 (22... \$h8 23 \$h5 h6 24 \$Qg4) 23 **豐g4+ 曾f8 (23...曾h8 24 里g3) 24 營**b4+, and if 24...**營**c5 (but not 24...\$\dot\equiv e8 25 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}\text{g3}\), the simple 25 豐xc5+ ②xc5 26 罩xd8+ �e7 27 ■h8 gives White a large plus in the ending.


> **②g6** (D) 22 Ih3

22...h6 would be weaker in view of 23 Exh6 gxh6 24 2 f6+, shattering Black's castled position. Black brings the knight closer to his king, but White has already concentrated nearly all his forces for the attack.

23 **對h**5

White seeks a rational continuation suited to his limited time for calculation. He could already have launched the decisive onslaught with 23 Exh7!?. According to Sergei Dolmatov's analysis, Black loses if he accepts the sacrifice at once:

a) 23... \$\dot \text{xh7 24 \$\dot \text{h5} + \$\dot \text{g8 25}\$ 包g5 里e8 26 里f1 and now:



W

al) 26...b5 27 \(xf7 \) \(xf7 \) 28 ②xf7 \$xf7 29 ¥f3+ ②f4 30 ¥xa8. a2) 26... Ie7 27 Wh7+ &f8 28 ₩xg6 b5 29 ₩h7 and wins (then 29... \$\delta e8\$ is answered by 30 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$d1).

a3) 26... De5 27 🗓 xf7 Dxf7 28 ₩xf7+ \$h8 29 ₩xe8#

What confused me during the game was that Black also has another defensive possibility, but in that case too White can find a win:

- b) 23...4)f4 24 #g4 \$\precent{g}4 \precent{g}xh7 25 包g5+, and now:
- b1) 25...\$h6 26 \pse xf4 f6 (or 26...\$\dot\dot\g6 27 \dot\g3) 27 \dot\dot\dot\dot\dot\dot\dot\g6 28 \\hbar h7+ \dots xg5 29 \\hbar xg7+ \dots h5 30
- b2) 25...\$g8 26 Wh4 Ze8 27 ₩h7+ \$\dot{\psi}f8 28 \dot{\psi}h8+ \$\dot{\psi}e7 29 ₩xg7 耳f8 30 包h7 单d7 31 ₩f6+ \$\document{\psi} e8 32 \document{\psi} xf4 with a won position.

However, the natural move I played is an equally good alternative.

23 ... h6

At this moment I only had five minutes left on the clock. I saw that my planned combination guaranteed perpetual check, and hoped for the best.

24 Øf6+?

Directly after the game, much to my annoyance, I easily found a decisive strengthening of the attack. I should have brought my bishop into the fight with 24 \(\alpha \)c2!, after which it turns out that Black is helpless against the threat of 25 2) f6+. He only has the unpleasant choice between:

- a) 24...e5 25 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f6+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$h8 (or 25...gxf6 26 **\(\)**g3 f5 27 **\(\)**xg6+ fxg6 28 \wxg6+ \what h8 29 \wxh6+ \$\delta g8 30 \delta b3+) 26 \$\mu g3\$ and now:
- a1) 26... 2e6 27 Exg6 fxg6 28 **豐**xg6 **皇**g8 29 **②**xg8 (29 **耳**d7!) 29...\$xg8 30 ¥h7+\$f7 31 \$b3+ \$£6 32 \$£1+.
- a2) 26...e4 27 \(\exists xe4\) (27 \(\pi xg6\) fxg6 28 \(\psi\)xg6 \(\omega\)f5!) 27...\(\omega\)f4 28 ₩xf7 \(\textit{Q}\)g4 29 \(\textit{W}\)e7.
- a3) 26...包f4 27 對xe5 包g6 28 ₾xg6 fxg6 29 \(\textbf{X}\text{xg6 b5 30 \(\text{X}\text{xh6+}\) gxh6 31 **Z**d7.
- b) 24...b6 25 42f6+ gxf6 (or. 25...\$\dot\delta\h8 26 \dot\delta\g5) 26 \dot\delta\kh6 \dot\delta\e8 27 \(\textit{\textit{2}}\) xg6.
- c) 24...2f4 25 2f6+ 2h8 26 豐xf7! 皇d7 27 罩xh6+.

In all these variations the black king is unable to escape a quick mate. My premature combination, by contrast, allows Ivanchuk to maintain the balance.

> 24 ... gxf6


24...\$h8? would lose to 25 ₩g5! e5 26 \(\square xh6 + gxh6 27 \(\square xh6#. \)

25 \widetaxh6

He8

26 **I**g3 (D)

Here Black can answer 26 \(\textit{\Lambda}\)c2 with 26...f5, leading to perpetual check after 27 Wh7+ \$68 28 ₩h6+.



В

學f2! 26 ...

By an irony of fate it is Black's queen that intervenes to save him. (We recall White's exertions to shut this key piece out of the game.) Black might try playing for a win, banking on his opponent's timetrouble, but the attempt would most likely boomerang. Thus, 26...b6 27 **Z**d4! **W**c7 28 **Z**dg4 is no good at all for Black. If 26...b5,

then after 27 If1! Wd4 28 Ixg6+ fxg6 29 \wxg6+ \wxg6+ 30 \wwwh6+ White can force perpetual check at will, as 30...\$e7 fails to 31 \$\mathbb{\mathbb \$\d8 32 \ \d1.

Now that Black has countered the threat of h2-h4, White has nothing better than to settle for a draw.

27	Exg6+	fxg6
28	₩xg6+	\$ f8
29	₩h6+	⊈ f7
30	业h7 +	⊈ f8
31	₩h8+	1/2-1/2

Yusupov - Hübner Tilburg 1987 Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 9 f3 9 f6 3 c4 dxc4 4 ②c3 c6 5 a4 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}} \) 6 e3 e6 7 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}} \) **Åb4 8 0-0 Øbd7 9 Øh4 Å**g6 10 2xg6 hxg6 11 f4

11 h3.

11...9d5

11...\\a5.


12 **≜**d2

12 De4!?.

12... 對a5 13 對e1 分5b6 14 全b3 c5 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)d1 cxd4 16 \(\alpha\)b5 \(\alpha\)xd2 17 耳xd2 分c5 18 单c2 耳d8 19 exd4?! (D)

A more solid line is 19 \(\maxrtm{\pi}\x\d4\) ₩xe1 20 **Exe1**, and if 20...**E**xd4 21 exd4 ②cxa4, then 22 d5.

White has rather overestimated his chances, and now the cool



 \mathbf{B}

19...0-0! might have set him some serious problems. Instead, Hübner falls in with my intentions.

GCX24

19

20 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{20}}} \)

Virtually a forced move. Sharp play suddenly flares up.

20 ... **⊈e7**

Accepting the sacrifice would have lost: 20...fxg6 21 \(\mathbb{U}\)xe6+ \(\phi\)f8 22 f5. A more circumspect line. however, was 20...0-0!? 21 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 a6, as the inviting 22 f5?! is met by the unpleasant 22... 2xb2! (stronger than 22...axb5 23 f6 or 22...exf5 23 **E**xf5).

21 **Q**xf7

It is too late for White to stop half-way (21 2d3 is no good in view of 21...a6 22 f5 axb5 23 fxe6 f6 24 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}g3 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}xd2). Both players are caught up in the surging current and have no inkling where they will manage to surface.

21 ... **2**0xf7

The consequences of 21... 響xb5 are unclear: 22 對xe6+ 含f8 23 鱼g6 豐d7 24 里e2 豐xe6 25 里xe6 ②d5 26 里fel ②f6. I think that after 27 g3!? or 27 Le7 White would have enough compensation for the piece sacrifice.

22 f5 e5

The following defences are inadequate: 22... The8 23 fxe6+ \$g8 24 e7, and 22... wxb5 23 wxe6+ \$\psi f8 24 f6 \psi d7 (or 24...\psi xf1+ 25 \$xf1 **E**e8 26 **** d6+ **c**f7 27 **E**f2), which fails to 25 fxg7+ \$\preceq\$xg7 26 **營f6+ 含g8 27 對g6+.**

23 f6

The immediate 23 \wxe5 was a serious alternative. The following variations do not, of course, exhaust all the possibilities in the position, but they do show how strong White's attack is:

- a) 23...其he8 24 夕d6+.
- b) 23... yxd2 24 f6! (24 ye6+
- b1) 24...g5 25 ②d6+! **I**xd6 (25... \$g6 26 Ye4+ \$h6 27 公f5+ \$\document{\psi}g6 28 f7) 26 \document{\psi}e7+ \document{\psi}g6 27 **營**g7+ **営**h5 28 **營**xh8+.
- b2) 24... 曾g8 25 fxg7 里h6 (or 25... 基xh2 26 營e6+ 含h7 27 g8營+ 里xg8 28 里f7+ 里g7 29 豐f5+ \$\dot\ h8 30 單f8+ 里g8 31 豐f6+ 含h7 32 里f7+) 26 豐e7+ and White wins.
- c) 23... 2d5 24 \(\mathbb{e}\)6+ \(\mathbb{e}\)f8 25 f6 g6 26 **Ze2** and now:

- c1) 26... 對xb5 27 f7 對xe2 (or 27... **對**d7 28 **對e**5! **基h**7 29 **對e**8+) 28 **營**xe2 **②**ab6 29 **營**e5 with advantage.
- c2) 26...**對**b4 27 f7 **對**e7 28 **對**g4 **a** h4 (28... De3 is answered by 29 ₩xg6 or 29 ₩f4) 29 Ze8+! Zxe8 30 fxe8豐+ 曾xe8 31 包d6+ 曾d8 32 **營**c8+ **含e7** 33 **其f7+ 含**xd6 34 ₩d7#.
- **当g5!** intending 29 **二e7+**.

The continuation I chose is probably just as good; in many lines it merely transposes.

> 23 ... 26

On 23...g5, White has either 24 dxe5 or 24 \windskip xe5 with a powerful attack.

24 Wxe5


An interesting alternative is 24 dxe5!? wxd2 25 e6+ c6* f8! 26 e7+\$f7 27 exd8分+ 對xd8 28 對b4! with threats of 29 2d6+ or 29 b3.

24 ... **包d5 ₩**b6 25 **Ee2**

If 25... \wxb5, then 26 \wedge e6+ \$\psi_f8 27 f7 \psi xe2 28 \psi xe2 with advantage to White.

Short of time, White nonetheless finds new ways to augment his attack. The threat is 27 \(\mathbb{Z}e7+\), for example: 26... wxb5 27 \(= 67 + \(\frac{1}{2} \) f8 28 \wxg6 \wxf1+29 \wxf1 \Oxe7 30 Ψ g7+ and mates.

> 26 ... 耳d7



В

27 **革e7**+ **∮**)xe7 27...**以**xe7 28 fxe7+ **公**f6 is no better, in view of 29 \square e5 with the decisive threat of 30 42d6+.

28 fxe7+


⊈e8

29 We5

29 \(\sum_{16}\) was probably an even stronger move.

¤xe7

30 **₩xh8**+ (D)



В


Playing this move in fairly bad time-trouble, I faint-heartedly offered a draw, which my opponent prudently accepted (1/2-1/2). Imagine my astonishment in the postmortem, when I realized I had an extra pawn in the final position! I had been material down for so many moves, and was so glad to have won it back, that I didn't even notice I had picked up a bonus! Of course White's sound extra pawn dictates the verdict on the position, and after the natural 30...\$\d7 31 **省**h3+ **省**e6 32 **省**xe6+ **其**xe6 33 b3. even my technique should be adequate to win.

Yusupov – Anand Linares 1991

Queen's Pawn Opening

1 d4 ②f6 2 ②f3 e6 3 e3 b6 4 \(\) dd3 \(\) \(\) b7 5 0-0 d5 6 ②e5 ②bd7 7 f4 g6 8 b3 \(\) \(\) g7 9 ②d2 c5 10 \(\) \(\) b2 0-0 11 \(\) \(\) f3! ②e8 12 \(\) \(\) h3 ②d6 13 ②df3 \(\) \(\) Le8 \(\) (D)

Both sides have more or less completed their mobilization, and White resolutely goes into action. On the other hand Black is well prepared for his opponent's attack; he has constructed sturdy lines of defence. Possibly I should have preferred the restrained 14 Zad1!?, but already I was filled with a mood for enterprise.



W

14 **②g5 ②f8** 15 dxc5

A standard exchange, opening the long diagonal for the bishop.

15 ... bxc5

16 Had1!

Bringing his rook into the game and offering a piece sacrifice, White goes all out for sharp play. It was impossible to calculate all the variations, but it seemed to me that a couple of pawns plus the initiative should be adequate compensation.

16 ... f6 (D)


Anand accepts the challenge. The unassuming 16... **E**c8!? is less in keeping with his temperament; he very rarely shirks complications.

17 **2xh7! 2xh7**

18 **②**xg6

18 ≜xg6 is weaker on account of the simple 18... ②f8.

18 ... ₩c7



W

18...里c8 19 里f3 c4 is risky in view of 20 ②e7+ 豐xe7 21 豐xh7+ 壹f8 22 皇g6 里ed8 23 里g3 or 23 皇a3 with a strong attack. But perhaps Black should have gone in for 18...f5!? 19 皇xg7 堂xg7. Then 20 里f3 ②f6 21 里g3 leads to a repetition of moves: 21...②fe4 (21...②g4? 22 ②e5! and wins) 22 皇xe4 ②xe4 23 ②e5+ ②xg3 24 豐xg3+ 壹f8 25 ②g6+; while an unclear position results from 20 豐g3 豐f6 21 ②e5+ 壹h8 22 ②d7 豐c3 23 ②e5.

19 **E**f3

19...c4 is risky because of 20 ②e7+ Ixe7 21 全xh7+ (better than 21 營xh7+ 全f8 22 皇g6) 21...全f8 22 Ig3 c3 23 皇a3 f5 24 Ig6 with an attack.

(1)e4

The rook joins in the assault on Black's weakened king position. Naturally enough, Anand tries to organize counterplay on the open d-file.

 21 ...
 異 ad8

 22 異xd8
 學xd8

 23 學g4
 學xd8


23 營h5? would be a mistake, since White would have to answer 23... 營d5 (23... 營d2!? 24 h3 營xc2) with 24 ②e5. Then after 24... 宣e7 Black retains too many defensive resources.

Black had some other possibilities here:

- a) On 23...豐d2 White would have played 24 h4, and if 24...豐xc2, then 25 公f8 星e7 26 公xh7 豐xb2 27 豐g6 星f7 28 h5 皇d5 29 h6 f5 30 hxg7 with advantage; if instead 24...f5, there would follow 25 豐h5 豐e1+ 26 堂h2 豐xg3+ 27 堂xg3 皇xb2 28 公e5 星e7 29 豐d1 with the better game for White.
- b) 23...f5 was worth considering. In my view, after the continuation 24 對h5 公f6 25 公e7+ 其xe7 (stronger than 25...對xe7 26 全xf6) 26 全xf6 對d2 27 h3 (27 互xg7+ 互xg7 28 對e8+ leads to perpetual check) 27...對e1+ 28 對h2 對xg3+ 29 對xg3 全xf6 30 對f2 White has only slightly the better chances.

24 h4

The most natural way to go about things. White gives his king some *luft* and brings his pawn into the attack. However, he had a less



W

obvious way of conducting the assault. I rejected 24 2 f8!? on account of 24... 2g5 (24... 2e7 is weaker in view of 25 ②xh7 \$\prixh7\$ 26 **A**xf6):

- a) At this point it is true that 25 fxg5 f5 26 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}\text{h5 promises nothing.} since Black would reply not with 26... Ixf8 (when 27 g6 h6 28 鱼d4! cxd4 29 對xh6 對d7 30 g7 wins for White) but with either 26...⊈xf8 or 26...⊈xb2. The former would lead to perpetual check: 26...\$xf8 27 \$xg7+ \$xg7 28 ₩h6+ \$f7 29 ₩f6+. The more interesting line is 26... \(\textit{\textit{a}}\) xb2 27 \(\textit{\textit{b}}\)h7 \$\psig7 28 \$\psi\h6+ (or 28 c3 \(\textit{\reg}\)xc3 29 ②f6 里h8 30 ②xd5 里xh5 31 ②xc3 \$c6) 28...\$f7, and it is not simple for White to demonstrate the correctness of his attack.
- b) However, there is at move 25 another, stronger, continuation which only entered my head when

the game was over. White should pursue the black knight with 25 2h7!. This time, as the following variations show, it is Black who has difficult problems to solve.

b1) 25...里d8 26 包xf6+ 鱼xf6 27 全xf6 營d1+ 28 營xd1 基xd1+ 29 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f2. White regains his piece and should win.

b2) 25...f5 26 2 f6+! (not 26 ₩e2 Qxb2 27 Xxg5+ 全f7 28 c4 營d3 29 營xb2 營xe3+) 26... 全xf6 27 **Wh5** and now:

b21) 27...**I**d8 28 **Y**g6+ (28 鱼xf6 剉d1+ 29 剉xd1 罩xd1+ 30 堂f2 里d2+31 堂e1 里xc2 32 fxg5 is not bad either) 28...\$\psi f8 29 \psi xf6+ 堂e8 30 里xg5 營d1+31 堂f2 營d2+ 32 曾g3 豐xe3+ 33 曾h4 豐xf4+ 34 \$\delta\$h3. The king is now sheltered from checks, and White wins.

b22) 27...**2**xb2 28 **₩**xe8+ **2**h7 29 h4!? with a plus (29 ₩h5+ \$\dot{\$\dot{\$}}g8 30 **\(\mathbb{Z}\)**xg5+ \(\mathbb{D}\)f8 31 h3 promises less).

b3) 25... \dd 26 h3 \dd e1+ 27 \$\frac{1}{2} \bigsymbol{\pi} xg3 + 28 \bigsymbol{\pi} xg3 \Delta xh7 29 Wel and again the advantage is on White's side.

24 ... If 24...f5, then 25 \\ h5. 25 **營d1 學d5 省f5**

You might expect the game to end in repetition, especially since, true to my usual habit, I was already running short of time.


27 **当d1 學d5** 28 **쌀e2!**

White plucks up courage and continues the fight. It isn't simple for Black to find a useful move here. Thus, 28... 對d6 is met by 29 **豐g4 里d8 30 \$h2 里d7 31 包e5 (31** 鱼xe5 ¥e7 33 鱼xg7) 32 h5 ¥a6 33 h6 with a ferocious attack; while if 28...\(\textit{\textit{2}}\)c6, White has the decisive 29 h5 曾f7 30 豐g4 **2**g8 31 h6. The line Black chooses makes hardly any essential difference to the situation.

> **⊉c8** 28 ... 29 h5

This pawn takes on the role of a battering ram. It breaks up the seemingly harmonious co-ordination of Black's pieces.

> 29 ... **\$**f7 30 ₩g4 包g5! (D)



W

Viswanathan Anand defends himself with great ingenuity. The counter-sacrifice of a piece is his best practical chance.

31 fxg5?!

Unfortunately, time shortage and fatigue had already begun to affect me - instead of searching for the strongest move, I was content with 'a bird in the hand'. The correct line is 31 ②e5+! fxe5 32 fxg5. The strong connected passed pawns should quickly decide the game, for example: 32... Zd8 33 h6 Wd1+ 34 ₩xd1 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd1+ 35 \(\mathbb{D}\)h2.

31	***	f5
32	₩e2	≜xb2
33	c4	₩ d6
34	₩yb2	651

I had underestimated this move. Of course Black would lose at once with 34... 對xg3? 35 對f6+ **堂g8** 36 **豐h8+ 堂f7** 37 **豐h7#**. Now, however, my pieces lose their co-ordination, which not only makes it hard to exploit the extra material but hands the initiative to my opponent.

35 **Th**3?!

An ineffective manoeuvre. A better move was 35 \$\pm\$h2 (35 ₩c1!?), so as to answer 35...f4 with 36 exf4 exf4 37 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}f2 e3 38 ₩xf4+ ₩xf4 39 ᡚxf4 e2 40 ᡚxe2 **Z**xe2 41 g6+ \(\dot{\text{d}}\)g7 42 \(\overline{\text{Z}}\)g5, when White has winning chances.

35 ... f4

36 Hh4

The consequences of the exchange sacrifice 36 exf4 are unclear: 36...2xh3 37 2xe5+ 2g8 38 gxh3 \dd1+ 39 \dd1+ 39 \dd1 \dd4 2 **\$**g3.

> 36 ... fxe3 37 \$h2?

In time-trouble White loses the thread altogether and blunders. The right move was 37 \\exists e2!. when at least there would be no risk of losing - as the following variations demonstrate:

- a) 37...\d2 38 \d1+.
- b) 37... \(\mathbb{\psi}\) d4 can be met by 38 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h2!? or 38 h6!? \$\frac{1}{2}\$f5 39 h7 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xg6 40 h8數 基xh8 41 基xh8.
- c) 37...\d3! 38\d3!+!\d28 39 **"**f6! (39 h6? **\"**xf1+ 40 **\"**xf1 \$\psi\h7\) 39...e2 40 \psi\h8+.

37 ... **⊈**f5! 38 ₩e2 **₩**d2 39 Wf1 фе6 40 Exe4 ≜xe4 0-1


Although White gained no reward for his boldness in this game, I was not unduly upset about the half-point I threw away through declining the draw. I would have been far more annoyed if I had settled for repetition and afterwards discovered the win. From my own experience I can assure the reader

that playing for the win in such

situations brings success more often than catastrophe; in any event it brings more creative satisfaction than prematurely terminating the fight.

> Yusupov - Gulko Novgorod 1995 Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 4)f6 2 c4 e6 3 4)c3 4b4 4 e3 0-0 5 2d3 d5 6 2f3 c5 7 0-0 b6 8 cxd5 exd5 9 ②e5 **Ee8** (D)



W

This game was played in the last round of a tournament in which I had done very badly; I was right down among the also-rans. I was therefore keen to score my first win, albeit at the very finish. I cannot say I was prepared for the variation my opponent played, but the shape of the game was more or less familiar to me - after all, the

Nimzo-Indian has a firm place in my opening repertoire. Black's somewhat mysterious ninth move is quite simple to explain: he wants to preserve the option of playing ... 2 a6 without loss of tempo. (If 9... 2 a6 at once, White has the unpleasant 10 20c6!.) However, without undue effort. I now succeeded in devising an idea which, though not original, is perfectly reasonable; in this position, as I later found out, it constituted a novelty.

10 9 e2!

After 10 ad2 Black can carry out his plan with 10... 2 a6; the reply 11 206? is no longer any good, on account of 11...2xc6 12 2xa6 cxd4 13 \(\text{\text{\text{a}}}\) b7 dxc3 14 bxc3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{a}}}\) a5! 15 2xa8 2c5. This and several other variations are taken from Boris Gulko's notes in Informator 63. On the other hand, 11 & xa6 a xa6 12 ya4 wc8 13 ac1 wb7 14 wc6 Lab8 leads to equality, Portisch-Spassky, Candidates match (14), Geneva 1977.

The point of the move White played is clear: the knight is heading for g3, where it will not only control e4 - a particularly important square in this variation - but also be ready to join in an attack on the king via f5. White's slight loss of time is fully compensated for by the precarious position of Black's dark-squared bishop, which means


that Black cannot maintain the central tension; he must either exchange on d4, thereby liberating the white queen's bishop, or release the central pressure by advancing his c-pawn.

10 ...

In the case of 10...cxd4 11 exd4 2a6 12 2xa6 2xa6, Gulko didn't like 13 \(\text{\frac{1}{2}}\)g5.

> 11 单c2 皇d6?! (D)

A loss of tempo which increases Black's difficulties. After the natural 11. 2b7 Gulko was afraid of 12 b3!?, but this would have been the lesser evil; Black could defend with 12...cxb3 13 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}} \) xb3 \(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}} \) d6.



W

12 f4!

A standard idea. This set-up is good if White succeeds in controlling e4 – as he can in the present case. It would be illogical to initiate play on the queenside: 12 b3


12 ... b5 13 Øg3 Øbd7?!

Black gives his opponent additional chances; 13.... 2b7 was more accurate.

14 Wf3

I decided not to deviate from my basic plan. The alternative 14 e4!? would have obscure consequences after 14...②b6 15 ②c6!? (15 ②xf7 全xf7 16 e5 皇g4 17 營d2 全g8 is unconvincing for White) 15...營c7 16 e5 皇g4 (Gulko gives 16...②fd7 17 exd6 營xc6 18 ②f5 全h8 19 營g4 g6 20 ②h6) 17 營d2 營xc6 18 exf6.

14 ... **2b7**15 **2d2 2f8?!** (D)
15... **2**∫f8!? is more logical.



W

16 a4!?

An interesting and somewhat unexpected decision. White is seeking something more than the standard development of the attack by 16 包f5 g6 17 營h3 gxf5 18 急xf5. By weakening his opponent's queenside he brings additional factors into play.

16 ... b4!?

The thematic continuation. After 16...a6 17 包f5 g6 18 營h3 gxf5 19 全xf5 包b6 20 互f3 White has a powerful attack.

17 a5

Not, of course, 17 ②xc4? Ic8 18 b3 \(\Delta a8, \) when White loses a piece.

17 ... IIc8

Perhaps he should have tried 17...c3. Black probably feared 18 a6, not liking 18...全xa6 19 基xa6 cxd2 20 營e2 營c8 21 全f5 營b7 22 基fa1, though 18...cxb2 19 基a2 全c8 was worth considering.

19...②e4? would be a mistake due to 20 毫xe4 dxe4 21 變g4, when 21...g6 fails to 22 ②xd7. On the other hand if 19...g6, White would have a new resource thanks to the queenside advance he has provoked: 20 毫xb4!? gxf5 (20...毫xb4 21 ②h6+ 含g7 22 ②hxf7 豐e7 23 豐h3) 21 豐g3+ 盒g7 22 ②xf5.

20 bxc3 g6 21 \(\psi\)h3! b3!

Accepting the knight sacrifice is hazardous. After 21...gxf5 22 \$\tilde{x}\$f5

②b6 23 If3 Qg7 24 Ig3 ♀f8 25 cxb4 White already has three pawns for the piece as well as a dangerous initiative. Gulko endeavours to get at least *some* counterplay.


22 ⊈xb3 ②e4

At the cost of two pawns Black has succeeded in establishing his knight in the centre. Although objectively his counterplay is insufficient, he has managed to set his opponent some serious practical problems by suddenly transforming the situation on the board. After 22...gxf5 23 wxf5 it would have been much easier for White to conduct his attack.

23 **②xf7!**

This of course is the right continuation, as the black king will now have to set off on a walk. 23 全e1 was out of the question, since Black can defend by 23...公xe5 24 fxe5 gxf5 25 豐xf5 五c7.

The critical moment of the game. White saw the correct continuation, but failed to reach the right verdict on the ending to which the main variation leads. In addition I was in a strongly combinative mood, and the temptation to draw the black king further forward was too great. Another of my weaknesses took its toll: I only have to play a couple of attractive moves,



W

and I experience the desire to 'create a work of art'. Excessive emotions during play have, alas, proved harmful to me more than once.

25 **省g8+?!**

In our post-mortem analysis we established that White should have played 25 豐xg6+ 豐f6 26 ②g7+! (26 **世**g8+ **世**f7 27 **世**xf7+ **含**xf7 28 Let Exc3 is unclear). If now 26... 鱼xg7, then 27 豐xe4+ 當d6 and wins. There is more point in 26...\$\polenger 27 \bigwedge xf6+ \langle \rangle dxf6 28 2) xe8 2) xd2 29 4) xf6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ xf6 30 ≜a4 ②xf1 31 \$\preceq\text{xf1 \maxc3, but after 32 \(\frac{1}{2}\)ec 2 (32 \(\frac{1}{2}\)b1!? \(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 33 **≜**xc6 **≡**xc6 34 **⊈**f2 is also strong) 32...單c4 (or 32.... a3 33 單b1 单c1 34 \(\bar{a}\)b3) there is no doubt about White's advantage.

Now, however, he simply has insufficient reserves to achieve more than perpetual check.

25 ... \$\psi xf5

26 g4+

26 ... \$\psi f6\$
27 f5

White had set great store by this move. On the other hand 27 \(\mathbb{L} e1 \) is bad on account of 27...\(\mathbb{L} e7 \) 28 \(\mathbb{L} h4+ \(\mathbb{L})df6 \) 29 \(\mathbb{L} xg6 \) \(\mathbb{L} xc3. \)

27 ... <u>\$g</u>7!


A sober assessment of the position: Black decides to force a draw. Instead, 27...gxf5?! 28 \(xf5 + \(e^7 \) was too risky in view of 29 \(\mathbb{L}\)xd5! 29.... xd5 30 ₩xd5. White now obtains a promising position after either 30... Def6 31 \frac{1}{2} f3 \frac{1}{2} d6 32 e4! ②xe4 33 \$\(\frac{1}{2}\)f4+ \$\(\frac{1}{2}\)c6 34 \$\(\frac{1}{2}\)e1 cause of 35... \(\(\omega c5 + 36 \) \(\omega f1 \) \(\omega d5 \). or 30...2d6 31 Zaf1! Wb6 (Black is mated after 31... (a)xf5 32 Xxf5 ₩c7 33 e4 \$\d8 34 \boxed{\square} xf8 \boxed{\square} xf8 35 34 \(\mathbb{2}\) a5+ \(\mathbb{Z}\) c7 35 \(\mathbb{Z}\) 1f6!.

28 fxg6+

28 對h7 單g8 29 對xg6+ 堂e7 30 對e6+ 堂f8 31 皇c1 fails to 31...包g5 32 皇a3+ 包c5 33 對g6 皇xd4.

28 ... \Pixg6 (D)

White now repeats moves a few times, so that he can reach the time-control and check the variations accurately. Alas, this will



W

confirm that the win, sadly, has slipped away.

\$h7 29 **賞f7**+ 30 **學f5**+ œg8 31 Wf7+ **\$**h8 32 当h5+ фg8 ₩f7+ **ው**ከጸ **⊈g8** 34 Wh5+ **≜xd5** 36 **資xd5+ ф**h8 **\$28** ₩h5+ 38 \\T+ **ф**h8


There is no sense in giving White chances with 38...\$\pm\$h7?! 39 \$\mathbb{I}\$f5 \$\overline{\Omega}\$df6 40 \$\mathbb{I}\$aa5 \$\wallet\$\$xa5 41 \$\mathbb{I}\$xa5 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xd2 42 g5.

To conclude, I will give another example of a botched attack, although this time things ended happily for the author.

Yusupov – Adams Dortmund 1994 Pirc Defence

This too was a last-round game which I very much wanted to win, to do something to rectify my tournament standing. The encounter meant even more to my opponent, who would have had a chance of first place if he had won.

1 d4 d6 2 e4 ②f6 3 ②c3 g6 4 f4 ②g7 5 ②f3 c5 6 ②b5+ ②d7 7 e5 ②g4 8 ②xd7+ 豐xd7 9 d5 dxe5 10 h3 e4 11 ②xe4 ②f6 12 ②xf6+ ②xf6 13 0-0 0-0 14 ②e3!? ②a6 15 ②e5 豐d6 (D)



 \mathbf{W}

White has played the opening confidently, the chief explanation being that I had had this variation—and the diagram position in particular—in a Bundesliga game against Vlastimil Hort. Perhaps

Adams simply didn't know about that game, which was played a few months before Dortmund.

16 Dg4

A stock idea in this variation. From g4 the knight gives quite good support to the attack, and threatens to go to h6 at a suitable moment.

An essential link in the plan. Regaining the pawn can wait (18 Exb7 would be met by 18...f5). It is far more important to develop White's kingside initiative and secure h6 for the knight.

18 ... Øc7?!

In the game I mentioned, Hort played the stronger 18... 5b4!? in an effort to obtain counterplay. Adams's move is rather passive, enabling White to dictate the further course of events.

After the text-move (18...2c7) White seems to have only too wide a choice:

- a) 19 c4 b5.
- b) 19 f6 exf6 20 \$ f4 \ d8.
- c) 19 \(\text{\Delta}\h6+!? \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\section}\$} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$}} \) \(\text{\$\delta} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$} \) \(\text{\$\delta} \) \(\text{\$\delta}
- d) 19 全f4!? 全d4+! (as Adams pointed out, 19...豐d8 is dangerous for Black: 20 全xc7 豐xc7 21 d6 豐d7 22 dxe7 全d4+ 23 全h1 豐xe7 24 f6, with an attack) 20 豐xd4 cxd4 21 全xd6 exd6 22 互xb7

■ac8! (22...• 2xd5 23 f6, with 2h6+ to follow – Black is weak on f7), and if 23 f6, then 23...h5.


During the game I was mainly choosing between this last variation, which I didn't think was too clear, and the move I actually played.

19 **Exb7!**

The start of a forcing operation. Black's reply is forced, as White threatens 20 \(\Delta f4. \)

19 ...

②xd5 (D)



.

20 f6!

The point of White's idea is to utilize the position of the queens opposing one another.

20 ...

exf6

20...全xf6 is weaker on account of 21 基xf6 ②xf6 22 豐xd6 exd6 23 ②xf6+ 望g7 24 ②g4! with a won position.

21 c4

h5


22 2h6+

But not 22 ②f2? in view of 22... \(\mathbb{g} 3 23 \) \(\alpha \) xc5 ②f4.

⊈h7

22 ...

23 **Df**5 (D)



В

White has not succeeded in winning a piece, but with this move he totally wrecks his opponent's pawn structure.


23 ... gxf5

Although Black is nominally a pawn up after 23...豐c6 24 豐xd5 豐xd5 25 cxd5 gxf5 26 魚xc5, an ending with that kind of pawn structure can scarcely give him any pleasure.

An interesting alternative is 25 2f4!? Wa6 26 Wb1, when White ignores the f-pawns altogether and concentrates his efforts on forcing his passed pawn forward. 25 ... 響a6 26 響b1 置fe8 (D)

I expected 26... we2, when the simplest way to maintain the advantage is 27 全f2. White could also play 27 全xc5 罩fc8 and then 28 罩b2—but not 28 d6? 罩xc5 29 罩xc5 we3+ 30 全h1 wxc5 31 罩b8+ 罩xb8 32 wxb8+ 全h7 33 d7, on account of 33... wc1+ (inverting the move-order doesn't work; on 33...全h6? White wins by 34 wb1+) 34 全h2 全h6 35 d8 全f4+.

The move played similarly parries the obvious threat of 27 Exh5.



W

I was in no doubt about my assessment of the position, but on analysing the variations I started to get confused. Everywhere I saw visions of some kind of counterplay for Black. Hence I decided to play something fairly simple, by analogy with 26... 27 £f2. I

should, of course, have put a little effort into checking that after the straightforward 27 皇xc5 Black's minimal activity gives no great cause for concern: 27...豐a5 is answered by 28 皇f2, and 27...里ac8 by 28 d6. The sharpest continuation, 27...里e2, leads to an easy win for White after 28 里b8+ (28 里xh5? 里xg2+) 28...里xb8 29 豐xb8+ 全h7 30 里xh5+ 全g6 31 里h4!.

27 \(\delta f2?

I reckoned that after the virtually forced exchange of rooks my passed pawn would decide the game, but I was overlooking a strong defensive manoeuvre for my opponent.

27 ... 里e5 28 耳b8+ 耳xb8 29 學xb8+ 含h7 30 學b1

A useful ploy – White repeats moves to avoid time-trouble.

I had been pinning my hopes on this move. There is no danger for Black in 35 d6 營d3 (35...全f6) 36 營c7 �g6 (36...c4 37 營xf7 營xd6 38 營xh5+ 營h6 is also playable) 37 d7 全f6. But now, seeing that White is threatening to take on f7

as well as to push his passed pawn, I was feeling optimistic - until I spotted Black's defence. My opponent spotted it too, of course - Adams doesn't miss a chance like this!


> ₩xa2! 35 ... 36 **營xf7 쌀b1+**

This is the point! The queen crosses to the kingside with tempo.

> 37 **⇔**h2 **₩g6!** 38 **營xa**7

Mindful of his bad play in the technical stage of the game, White takes a sensible practical decision - to minimize the possibility of losing. The bolder 38 Wc7 Wf5 would leave the black passed apawn alive.

38 ... **c4** 39 \(\mathbb{U}\)c7 (D)



₩d3? 39


Adams was disappointed by the way the game had gone - it had offered him no chance of first prize in the tournament. Unable to concentrate fully on fighting for the draw, he played this natural but losing move almost instantaneously. Yet Black could have saved himself by 39... #f5!!. After 40 \(\Delta\)g3 **幽e4 41 d6 (41 幽f7 also draws)** 41...h4 or 40 \@e3 \@e4 41 \@g5 ₩xd5 (41...\$g6 42 d6 \$f6 43 鱼xf6 豐f4+ 44 由g1 豐e3+ 45 由f1 ₩d3+ is also possible) 42 \(\(\oldsymbol{\psi}\)f6 \(\overline{\psi}\)g8 43 **2**xe5 **2**h8 44 **2**xg7+ **2**xg7 45 ₩xc4 ₩e5+ Black should be able to draw.

c3 40 d6

40...\$g6 41 d7 \$£f6 was rather more tenacious, though after 42 \$b6 Black's position is difficult. My opponent had obviously overlooked White's 42nd move.

41 d7

c2(D)



W

42 Ae3!

Black's downfall is due to the fact that his king is on the same rank as the white queen, so that if the black bishop moves, White has a decisive discovered check.

₩xe3 42 ...

43 \wxc2+ **e4**

44 **學c**7!

Simplest. There is no point in working out the more complicated 44 d8豐 鱼e5+ (though that too is adequate to win) when a simple solution is available.

1-0

10 A Controversial Position


Mark Dvoretsky

To risk or not to risk? To sacrifice or not to sacrifice? We quite frequently have to solve this kind of problem. Clearly there is not, and cannot be, any general recipe here. The best advice I can give my readers is to consult books and articles in which such situations are discussed. Try them out on yourself; study the position deeply and try to decide how you would handle it, then compare your ideas with the conclusions drawn by the annotator. In this way you will not only develop your technique of analysis, you will also learn to decide intuitively what degree of risk is acceptable.

I want to draw your attention to the analysis of a sharp position which occurred in a game by Vladimir Simagin (a master at the time; he gained the grandmaster title much later). Eleven years after this game, and without prior knowledge of it, Bobby Fischer reached the same position. Fischer's opinion of it differed from Simagin's. You will have the opportunity to choose between the two – to decide whose interpretation of the position was nearer the truth.

Shamkovich – Simagin Leningrad 1951 Grünfeld Defence

包fd7(D)



ı≜e3


W

9 ₩b3 ♠xf3

Black wants to develop his knight on c6, but the immediate 9... ©c6 comes up against 10 ₩xb7 △a5 11 Wa6, as in Polugaevsky-Simagin, USSR Championship, Leningrad 1960. (According to the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings, though, the position is unclear after 11...c5 12 dxc5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8.) The preliminary exchange on f3, removing one of the defenders of d4, gives White no time to take the b-pawn. The move has its drawbacks too, however; hence 9... 40b6 has become the chief theoretical continuation.

10 gxf3

包c6 (D)



W

11 **Zd1**?

This justifies Black's play. As subsequent practice has shown, White can gain an advantage with 11 0-0-0!.

11 ... e5

12 dxe5


12 d5?! 包d4 is bad for White.

2 ...

②cxe5

13 **全h3**(D)

Leonid Shamkovich goes onto the offensive; hoping to exploit the pinned d7-knight. Black can answer 13 全2 with the excellent move 13... 對 4! (and if 14 f4, then 14... ② g4).



В

13 ... ②xf3+! 14 堂e2

On 14 當f1, Simagin gives the continuation 14...包fe5! 15 鱼xd7 包xd7 16 豐b5 c6 17 豐xb7 鱼xc3 18 bxc3 豐h4! (I may add that Black also has 18...包c5!). Now 19 豐xd7? fails to 19...里ad8, while if 19 罩xd7, then either 19...里ab8 or 19...豐xe4 is strong.

14 ... **②**fe5

15 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xd7


Or 15 Exd7 Wh4! (better than 15... 2xd7 16 **■**d1). Another bad line is 15 f4 \\hat{\psi}\h4 16 \hat{\psi}\xd7 \\\Delta\xd7 17 基xd7 豐g4+.

> 15 ... **②xd7** 16 **對b**5 c6 17 ₩xb7 H_b8 18 **對xd7**

> > 耳xb2+

Not, of course, 18 \wxc6? \boxed{z}xb2+ 19 cof1 ₩b4!.

> 18 ... 19. \psi f1 (D)



B

Here is the key position, where I suggest you try to decide how Black should continue.

He has the choice between winning the knight back - which leads to an approximately level ending and trying to attack while remaining a piece down, by means of 19...\#f6 (aiming at the weak f3square). Which would you have preferred?

In the game Evans-Fischer, USA Championship, New York 1962/3 Black didn't risk the complications and settled for the simple line draw became a virtual certainty: 21 Exa7 Ee8 22 Ea4 & b4 23 & d4 \$\psig2 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}c2 \ 27 \ a4 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}d8 \ 28 \ \psig3 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}a2 29 萬c1 萬dd2 30 萬f1 萬d3+ 31 f3 **■da3 32 ■d1 ■xa4 33 ■d8+ \$g7** 1/2-1/2.

Simagin played differently. He declined the draw that was offered at this moment, and sacrificed a piece.


19 ... **對f6!?**

Fischer considered the sacrifice completely unsound; Simagin tried to demonstrate that the combination wins for Black. I suggest that the truth lies somewhere in between. Let us look at the variations.

- a) 20 2a4?. This is what Shamkovich played. After 20... Xxa2 21 ②c5 当f3 22 空g1 (22 里g1 当e2+ 23 \$\pmug2 \pmuxe3) 22...\$\pmuh6! Black's attack was irresistible: 23 ad4 ₩xd1+ 24 &g2 ₩d2 25 ₩d6 &e3!
- b) 20 包e2? 豐f3 21 包g3 皇h6 22 \(\textit{xa7}\) (22 \(\textit{c5}\) doesn't alter anything: 22... \(\begin{aligned} \text{L} c2 23 \\ \text{L} xa7 \(\begin{aligned} \text{L} a8! 24 \end{aligned} \) ■e1 ■xa2) 22...■a8! (threatening 23... xa7) 23 xe1 (23 \(\)c5 \(\)gf8 24 \(\text{\$\text{\$e}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$a}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$a}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$a}}} \) \(\text{\$\text{\$a}} \) \(\text{\$\ **≜**xf2 **≜**e3) 23...**≅**xa2 24 **≜**c5

2d2! (24...**□**c2 is also strong) 25 **□b1** □a1 26 圖b7 盒c3! with the decisive threat of 27... **Exb1**+ 28 wxb1 Za1 (analysis by Simagin).

- c) 20 **2d4!?** and now:
- to the excellent 21 2d5!, as indicated by Fischer. After 21... wxe4 (21...cxd5 22 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xb2; 21...\(\mathbb{Q}\)xd4 22 ②e7+) 22 ②e7+ 當h8 23 皇xg7+ \$\psi xg7 24 \psi d4+ \psi xd4 25 \psi xd4, White should win with his extra niece.
- c2) **20...\$\square\$ f3** 21 **\square\$ g1** (D) (better than 21 \(\dot{\phi} \) g1 c5).



В


It was because of this continuation that Fischer rejected the piece sacrifice, but he was wrong. After all, if Black wants, he can force a draw hére with 21... Ic2! 22 Ig3 (necessary) 22... **營**h1+23 **黨**g1 **營**f3. The only question is whether Black should be satisfied with a

drawn result, or whether he is justified in continuing the attack with 21...c5. Simagin thinks this is justified. He gives the variation 22 耳g3 營h1+23 耳g1 營xh2 24 耳g2 **營**h1+ 25 **基**g1 **營**h4!, with an attack. He is mistaken, though: White can play more strongly with 22 全xc5! 全xc3 23 對d3! 對f6 24 Ig3. While permitting his opponent to restore the material balance. White has activated his forces and seized the initiative. Black loses at once with 24...\(\delta\)b4?? 25 **2**d4 (this occurred in a correspondence game Maclellan-Kokorin, 1968; Black resigned). In the event of 24... 2e5 25 \(\bigsigma f3 \bigsigma h4, \text{ White} achieves no more than a draw with 26 全xf8 豐xh2 27 單d2 罩b1+ 28 會e2 響g1 29 單d1 罩b2+ 30 罩d2 **L**b1, but the simple 26 h3!! places Black in insuperable difficulties. For instance: 26... If b8 (26... Ic8? 27 \wd7 \square xc5 28 \wxf7+ and mates) 27 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf7! (stronger than 27 **對d5 皇f4! 28 皇d6? 基xf2+! 29 □**xf2 **⋓**xh3+) 27...**ゅ**xf7 28 **⋓**d7+ \$\dot{\pi}g8 29 \dot{\pi}e6+, and White wins (analysis by Larry Evans).

So with correct play, 20 \(\textit{d}\)d4 leads to a draw: in other words it does not refute Simagin's combination.

d) There is just one more possibility for us to examine; in my view it is the strongest:

21 **国g1?** would be a mistake: 21...全xc3 22 **国**xc3 **国**fb8 (threatening 23...**国**xf2+!) 23 **当**xc6 **国**d8 24 **国**c1 **当**e2+ 25 **全**g2 **当**xe3.



В

21 ... 2xc3


Simagin recommended this way of playing the attack in his notes to the game. I have also looked at 21... Ic2. Then 22 单d2? Ixd2! and 22 点c5?! 對f4 23 對d6 對xd6! 24 \(\textbf{x}\) xd6 \(\textbf{I}\) d8 25 \(\textbf{Q}\) d1 \(\textbf{e}\) e5 are both mistaken replies, leading to a pleasant endgame for Black. 22 ≜xa7 is playable, though after 22...**里**c1+ 23 **②**d1 **豐**xe4 24 **皇**e3 La1 Black retains distinct counterchances. Best of all is the immediate 22 2d1!: White isn't afraid of 22... Le2 because of 23 2d2. Black has insufficient compensation for his sacrificed piece.

22 Exc3 Ebb8

An unexpected retreat; Black sets up the threat of 23... Ifd8. Instead, 22... Ie2 fails to 23 Wd1!.

23 Ic1 Ifd8 (D)

Simagin now continues with 24 豐xc6 里dI+ 25 里xd1 豐xd1+ 26 歐g2 豐g4+ 27 歐f1 里d8! and wins. However, the defence can be improved.



W

24 **坐c7!**

By bringing his queen back to g3, White repulses the attack. Black still has some initiative, but it obviously does not compensate for the sacrificed piece.

Let us sum up. Objectively Fischer was right; Simagin's bold attack could have been refuted. However, from the practical standpoint, Black's risk seems to me to be justified. In the majority of variations he creates lethal threats.

Even after 20 IId3 his position still looks menacing, and he has reason to hope that he will still find ways of reaching at least a draw. In addition, the likelihood that his op-

ponent will analyse the position infallibly and discover the strongest moves over the board is fairly slim. Such chances are worth taking!

11 Attacking after Castling on **Opposite Wings**

Mark Dvoretsky


The subject of this chapter is one with which most of you are sure to be familiar. It is treated in numerous books on the middlegame. I can hardly say anything new about it, nor am I attempting to. We are simply going to examine a few games. In the course of analysing them, we shall recall the chief principles applicable to positions where the kings have castled on different sides and we shall practise putting those principles into operation.

T. Georgadze - Dvoretsky USSR Spartakiad, Moscow 1967 French Defence

1	e4	еб
2	d4	d5
3	Dc3	Df6
4	e 5	包fd7
5	f4	c5
6	包f3	Dc6
.7	dxc5	i b

This move promises White no advantage. 7 \(2e3! \) is thematic.

 $\triangle xc5(D)$ 7 ... 7... 2xc5 is not had either.



W

8 Ad3

8...0-0? is a mistake in view of the standard bishop sacrifice 9 **a**xh7+! **a**xh7 10 **a**g5+. The move played is perfectly logical - I prepare to castle, and at the same time I exchange the strong central pawn on e5. Other moves have also been played here: 8... 4b4, or 8...a6 followed by 9...\\colon\ sortie isn't to my liking - White

may simply withdraw his bishop to e2, but he can also permit an exchange on d3 and recapture with the c-pawn. Is it worth losing two tempi in the opening, even for the sake of exchanging the opponent's powerful bishop?

9 exf6 **€**0xf6 10 We2 96


I could simply have castled, but was attracted by the idea of a positional trap. The enticing 11 f5?! would allow an advantageous pawn sacrifice: 11...e5! 12 ②xe5 ②xe5 13 \square xe5+ \square f7, and the white king, stuck in the centre, will be exposed to a dangerous attack.

> 11 \Quad d2 0 - 0**쌀c7** 12 0-0-0

After castling in different directions the players usually carry out pawn-storms on opposite wings; each tries to be the first to weaken the enemy king's cover. From this point of view, the moves 12...b5 13 g4 b4 would appear logical. Then, however, White replies 14 20a4! 2d6 15 g5, and 15...(4)h5? is bad on account of 16 20e5. Hence, before beginning the pawn attack, Black must make a preparatory move to fortify his position in the centre. Control of the centre must not be forgotten even when conducting sharp flank attacks.

> 13 g4 **b5** (D)

Of course, taking the g-pawn was unthinkable.



W

Now, a question: what would you play if you had White here?

With the kings on opposite flanks you must play as energetically as you can, and try to seize the initiative at all costs. In such situations the slightest delay tends to be fatal.

The principle itself is perfectly clear, but its implementation is sometimes anything but simple. Here, for example, the attempt to undermine the opponent's centre with 14 f5?! exf5 15 g5 fails against 15... 2e4 16 2xd5 \frac{1}{2}f7.

To me, the sharp continuation 14 g5! Oh5 15 De5! seems correct. Acceptance of the pawn sacrifice is then extremely dangerous: 15...Øxf4 16 ≜xf4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf4 17 \(\overline{Q}\)xc6 響xc6 18 響h5 (18 罩hf1!?) 18...g6 19 鱼xg6 hxg6 20 豐xg6+ \$h8 21 4)xd5.

Tamaz Georgadze must have been worried about the reply 15...g6!, leaving the f-pawn patently weak. In sharp situations with the kings castled on opposite wings, you often have to make positional or material concessions for the sake of the initiative. Don't be afraid of this. White continues 16 ②xc6 \wxc6 17 ②e4! ≜d4, and then either burns his boats with 18 h4, with a view to 18... 4\xf4?! 19 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\$\ge x}}}\) \(\text{\$\fit}\) 20 2f6+ 2xf6 21 gxf6 \(\bar{x}\) ff6 22 h5, or else plays the more restrained 18 Adf1!?, intending 19 ويوري (<u>کارو</u> ع


14 Edf1?!

This might seem a sensible move - White fortifies his f-pawn in good time, and frees d1 as a retreat-square for his knight. However, even such a slight hesitation on White's part is enough to let Black launch his onslaught first.

I will take this opportunity to quote what Alexander Kotov said about mutual attacks against the kings on opposite flanks. He considered this maxim very important: "Bear in mind that a pawn-storm is in the nature of a forced variation. and that when launching it you have to calculate it just as precisely as you would a combination."

I disagree with Kotov here. It is true that in such cases the result of the battle may hang by a hair - it may depend on every tempo. Calculating variations plays an important role - but not the central one. It helps in solving particular problems, but usually (as in the present game) it does not enable you to foresee the exact outcome of the attack you are undertaking. For that reason it doesn't pay to become obsessed with calculating. and you cannot of course confine yourself to it entirely. It is important to have a feel for the position – to form an intuitive assessment of this or that course which events may take - and to gauge the prospects offered to either side.


14	•••	b4
15	Ød1	≜.d6
16	ව <u>e</u> 5	b3! (D)



W

Much stronger than crudely capturing on e5, which would lead to unclear play. Black accomplishes his main strategic task weakening the pawn protection in front of the enemy king.

17 axb3 9)d4 18 **營e1** (D)




B

Here I made what was probably my one serious mistake in the game - after a long think I accepted my opponent's offer of a draw $(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2})$. Mistakes like this need analysing; you have to clarify why they occur. The reasons may be purely technical, or psychological, or sometimes a mixture of both.

First, a reason that can be explained on the chessboard. From working out the variations, I concluded that the position after wxd2 oxe5 21 fxe5 wxe5 22 Ie1

例e4 23 皇xe4 dxe4 24 里hf1 皇b7 (D) was most likely to arise.



W

Black has an extra pawn but it is doubled, and the white knight is ready to occupy the excellent blockading square e3. I wasn't convinced that I had the advantage here, and couldn't find anything better. So I took the draw.

Do you see where the mistake was? It was in my assessment of the end position. I didn't take the weakness of f3 into account (if White had a pawn on g2 the position would indeed be unclear). As soon as the knight goes to e3, Black's rook will occupy the f3point. From there it will exert unpleasant pressure on the opponent's position, since an exchange on f3 would be quite hopeless for White.

Of course it all seems obvious when you look at the diagram, but

during the game it is quite possible to miss something at the end of a long variation. Still, is it worth making excuses? What is more important is to think how to avoid such mistakes in future.

When analysing, you may sometimes be unable to visualize the positions very clearly. (Some sectors of the board may get excluded from your field of vision; you forget the exact locations of particular pieces, etc.) In that case, special training methods are called for. Get into the habit of analysing positions that interest you without moving the pieces; go over games in books or magazines without using a board; play blindfold chess with your friends.

Now for the psychological aspect of my error. At that time I was a young and inexperienced player. I was playing (on the junior board) in the same team as such illustrious figures as Mikhail Botvinnik and Vasily Smyslov. Understandably, I was very nervous and afraid of letting the team down. Consequently I spent more time than usual on examining and re-examining the variations, so that at the moment of concluding peace I had less than half an hour for the remaining 23 moves. Incidentally, after the game I showed Mikhail Botvinnik the final position and the possibilities I

had examined in it. After asking · how much time I had left, the ex-World Champion said I was right to agree a draw.

It is clear all the same that a cool-headed, self-assured player would never have accepted the peace offer in such a position. It is essential to work at developing your resilience and toughness, your ability to keep your bearings in all circumstances - even the most complex ones - and not to be cowed by strong opponents. Without all this, you cannot expect major successes at chess.

An effort to play with redoubled accuracy and solidity at crucial moments is sometimes detrimental. You are being untrue to your usual programme of thought and behaviour, and this brings considerable danger. Why? Let me give you a simple analogy. None of you would have much difficulty walking along a tree-trunk that was lying on the ground. But if the same tree-trunk were placed across a chasm, you would be likely to fall off if you weren't prepared. On the ground, when there is no danger, our movements are to a large extent automatic; they are sufficiently well guided by our subconscious. Above a chasm, the fear of falling makes us watch every step, we exert ourselves to avoid

putting a single foot wrong. In consequence, the natural harmony between conscious and subconscious is destroyed. It is always more difficult to act according to an unaccustomed programme.

Bronstein - Dvoretsky

USSR Championship (First League), Odessa 1974 French Defence

1	e4	e 6
2	d4	d5
3	ව c3	包f6
4	e5	包fd7
5	£4	c5
6	2 f3	2)c6
7	dxc5	≜ xc5
8	a3?!	

In my view this move is antipositional. Let me explain why:


- 1) In the opening the pieces must be developed quickly, without wasting time on relatively insignificant pawn moves.
- 2) Kingside castling has been made difficult for White, but if he castles long, the advanced position of his a-pawn will help his opponent to open lines for the attack. It is highly dangerous to castle on opposite wings if there are any defects in the pawn cover in front of your king.

White wants his bishop to feel comfortable on d3, with no worries

about the black knight coming to b4. However, this is achieved at too great a cost.

8	•••	0-0
9	≜d3	f 6
10	exf6	②xf6
11	₩e2	a6
12	₫d2	≜d7 (D)

I didn't hurry to advance my bpawn, as I didn't want White to be 'scared off'. In answer to 12...h5 he would surely have played 13 ۵d1.




W

13	0-0-0?!	b5
14	g4	b4
15	axb4	②xb4 (D

The shortcomings of a2-a3 are now obvious. Black has opened lines on the queenside and gained the advantage.

16 g5?!

Pawn advances often create weaknesses in your own camp. It



 \mathbf{W}

is worth it if you obtain a strong attack in return – but if the attack fails, the weaknesses will make themselves felt. In this case it is clear that Black will be doing all the attacking, so why weaken the pawn on f4?

16 ... ②xd3+

The immediate 16... 45h5 is also playable, since the bishop sacrifice on h7 is not dangerous.


17 cxd3

If 17 \(\pi\xd3 \&\times\)h5, then 18 \(\pi\xd5\) (or 18 \(\pi\ext{e}\)2) fails to 18...\(\pi\)b5. On 18 \(\pi\ext{e}\)5, Black has 18...\(\pi\xf4\) 19 \(\px\)xf4 \(\px\)xf4, and this time 20 \(\pi\xd5\) fails to 20...\(\px\)d4.

17		Dh 5
18	d4	≜ d6
19	වe 5	②xf4
20	êxf4	IIxf4
_21	h4	业c7
22	€)xd7	營xd7
23	⊈de1	HeR!

Of course Black is not content to simplify into an ending with 23... Exd4 24 Wxe6+ Wxe6 25 Exe6 264+ 26 &b1. His advantage is much more significant in the middlegame.

24 ②xd5 **E**xd4 (D)




W

25	Dc3	. ⊈.f4 +
26	\$b1	⊈d2

26... 工位2 27 數e4 工b8 looks tempting, but after 28 數xf4 I couldn't see a way to deliver mate.

Quite a simple little poser: what is the most precise way to continue the attack?


I didn't want to exchange a pair of rooks. To avoid it, there is quite an easy tactical ploy.



В

31	≖ hg1	Z a3
32	\$ d2	₩c4
33	₩d3	∐ b2+
34	⊈e1 (D)	

Or 34 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xc3. Now an exchange on d3 followed by a check on the back rank would pick up a rook, but the move I played leads to a forced mate.



В

35	
35 罩g3 營h1+	· 36 ₩f1 ₩e4+
35	₩e4 +
0	-1

Even great chess players have bad days when they play below their usual strength. Evidently, for David Bronstein this was one of those days – which made it easier for me to win.

Let us look at one more 'light-weight' game.

Mariasin – Dvoretsky Kiev 1970 Pirc Defence


1	e4	g6
2	d4	_ <u>\$</u> g7
3	Dc3	c6
4	⊈ c4	d6
5	₩f3	e6
6	⊈e3	

6 2f4 and 6 2ge2 have also been played here.

6	•••	包f6
7	0-0-0 (D)	
7	•••	b5?!
8	≜xb5!	0-0

8...cxb5? 9 e5 is hopeless for Black.

I freely confess that I didn't sacrifice the pawn – I just blundered it away. Hence my seventh move deserves its question mark. The exclamation mark is added because



В


Black does nonetheless acquire some positional compensation (although certainly not enough) for the lost material. With the kings castled on opposite sides, it is very important to start your attack first. To speed up the opening of lines near the enemy king, it may be worth sacrificing a pawn.

In the next phase of the game my opponent's play was noticeably unsure, and the advantage gradually passed to me.

9 \@a4 10 h4

It was worth considering 10 g4, intending 11 g5 Oh5 12 Oge2 followed by 13 ②g3.


10	•••		h5! (D)
11	≜g5?!	*	€\h7
12	⊈e3		②d7
13	g4		hxg4
14	₩xg4		Ddf6



W

Of course Black cannot allow h4-h5 - the h-pawn has to be solidly blockaded. When preparing an offensive on one flank, don't forget the essential prophylactic measures on the other.

15	₩g2	Ðh5
16	②ge2	Z b8
17	€ <u></u>]g3	②7f6 (D)




W

18 ②xh5?

White is hoping to break the blockade by bringing his other knight to g3, but there is no time for this. A stronger move was 18 **2**g5, aiming for 19 **2**xf6 **2**0xf6 20 h5.

18	•••	②xh5
19	②e2	c 5
20	c3?!	₩a5
21	≜b3	≜ a6
22	Zd2 (D)	

How should Black continue the attack?




В

Going for the a-pawn is dubious: 22...c4?! 23 \(\mathbb{L}\)c2 \(\mathbb{W}\)xa2 24 ₫b1 (this is why White played 22 ■d2 - the b2-pawn is now defended) 24... \#a1 25 \@23. White threatens to go over to the attack. himself, e.g. after 25... 2xg3 26 fxg3!, with h5 to follow. It is just possible that the line 25... Lb3!? 26 **②xh5 罩fb8 27 \$\dd1!? \(\mathbb{Z}\text{xb2 28} \)**

堂e2 基xb1 29 基xb1 基xb1 30 公xg7 would turn out in Black's favour. but this is too complicated. Anyway, why close any lines on the queenside, when Black has an immediate chance to do the very onposite?

22	•••	≜ xe2!
23	E xe2	cxd4
24	cxd4	≖ xb3! (D)



W

Such sacrifices don't need to be calculated. It is clear that all the winning chances are now with Black.

25	axb3	₩a1 +
26	⊈ d2	₩xb2+
27	⊈ e1	₩ a1+
28	∲ d2	≝b2 +
29	⊈ e1	₩xb3
30	∡d2	. ■c8
21	ග්ය?	


White wants to consolidate with \$\dot{g}\$1, \dot{g}\$1 and \$\dot{g}\$2. However, in the meantime I succeeded in breaking up his centre.

> 31 ... ₩c4+! 32 **⊈**f3

If 32 \(\begin{aligned}
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\te White plays instead 32 &e1, Black has 32... "b5! (simply threatening to push the a-pawn) 33 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}f1 \mathbb{\mathbb{e}}b1+ and 34...\wxe4.

> 32 ... **d5** 33 e5 **2 xe5!** 34 Wf1 **≜**f6 35 ₩xc4 ¤xc4 36 \Psie2? (D)

He had to play 36 La1 with the idea of doubling rooks on the seventh as soon as possible. Now Black wins without any trouble.



В

36... 2g7 37 La1 2f5 38 Lxa7 êxd4! 39 耳a8+ \$eg7 40 \$ef4 \$ec3 41 Id3 Ixf4 42 Ixc3 2xh4 43 Ic7 g5 44 Iaa7 &g6 45 Id7 Of5 46 Hab7 f6 47 Hb8 4 d4+ 48 de3 \$\psi f5 49 \pm f8 e5 50 \pm xd5 \pm f3+ 51 Фе4 54 Дd7 g4 55 Дg8 f5 56 Дe8 \$\mathbb{\pi}a3 57 \$\mathbb{\pi}de7 \$\sqrt{9}\f3+ 0-1\$

Pawns attacking the opponent's king position cannot give mate on their own. The purpose of a pawnstorm is to open lines for the pieces - for the queen and rooks first and foremost, though sometimes it is the minor pieces that play the key role in an attack.


The hero of the next game is my dark-squared bishop. After occupying the long diagonal as early as move two, it never makes any more moves. Yet its influence on events is enormous.

Dvoretsky - Khramtsov

Moscow 1970 Nimzowitsch/Larsen/Simagin Attack

1	b3	e5
2	⊉b2	Дс6
3	e 3	d5
4	≜ b5	⊈ d6
5	f4 (D)	

Of course Black must not be allowed to maintain his powerful pawn centre unopposed. The break on the other wing with c2-c4 looks like a quieter line; the riskier move I played had, however, brought me success in some previous games.



В

₩e7

On 5...f6, I intended 6 對h5+!? (inducing Black to weaken the long diagonal) 6...g6 7 \black h4.

After 6...f6!?, the win of a pawn is hazardous: 7 fxe5?! fxe5 8 2xc6+ (8 2)xe5? 2xe5 9 2xc6+ \$\d8! is thoroughly bad for White) 8...bxc6 9 ②xe5 豐h4+ (9... 鱼xe5? 10 **營**h5+) 10 g3 **營**h3 (better than 10... **對e4** 11 0-0!) 11 **對e2 ②**f6. and Black has a dangerous attack. However, after the correct 7 0-0, the black centre remains vulnerable.

7 h3

I have also happened to play this position with Black. My opponents always opted for 7 fxe5 axe5 8 axe5 axf3 9 ₩xf3 ₩xe5 10 විc3 විf6 11 0-0 0-0. Objectively the chances are about equal, but this doesn't mean a draw is

unavoidable. Success will go to the side that plays more constructively.

The game Semeniuk-Dvoretsky. Sverdlovsk 1987 continued 12 **幽h3 ②e7!? 13 皇d3?! (13 罩f4! is** better) 13...De4! 14 De2 f5, and Black seized the initiative.


Alanakian-Dvoretsky, Moscow 1971 went 12 \(\textit{\Pi}\)xc6!? bxc6 13 a4? (13 對f4) 13...a5 14 對f5 耳fe8 (14...) d6) 15 里ael 里ad8 16 里e2 c5 17 對xe5 其xe5 18 其ef2 c6 19 耳f5 耳de8 20 h3 耳8e7 21 耳xe5 Ixe5 22 If4 \$f8 23 g4 \$e7, with a good endgame for Black.

≜xf3 7 ... 8 Wxf3 **多f6**(D)

In Dvoretsky-Makarov, Moscow 1971, Black went wrong with 8...e4? 9 **当**g3 f6 10 **公**c3 **当**f7 11 ②xd5!. There followed: 11...0-0-0 (11... **資**xd5 is answered by 12 or 12... g5 13 gxg5 fxg5 14 皇xg7) 12 皇c4 豐d7 13 0-0-0 a6 14 **豐g4 ②a5? 15 ②b6+! 1-0.**

How original would you say the position in the next diagram was? I was astonished to discover that the well-known theoretician Vsevolod Rauzer had discussed it several decades earlier, when annotating his game with Black against Viacheslav Ragozin in the 1936 Young Masters' Tournament in Leningrad. Rauzer indicated that after 9





12 Øc3 Afe8 the chances are on Black's side: he recommended 9 g3 with approximate equality. I think 9 4)c3!? is also worth looking at.

9 f5?!

A highly committal continuation. I sensed how risky it was, but wanted to force my opponent into as complex and unconventional a struggle as possible. At the end of the day my thinking paid off.

> 10 \#f2 h5


White would like to castle queenside. Therefore the most unpleasant move for him to meet is 10...包h5!, forcing him to castle short. Admittedly, after 11 0-0 the attempt to clamp down on the kingside immediately with 11... 20g3 is refuted by 12 f6!, but instead 11...0-0-0, for example, is not bad.

11 Dc3

I also thought about 11 g3 h4 12 gxh4, but decided it was too compromising.

> 11 ... h4 12 0-0-0 **≜**g3?! 13 当日 0 - 014 \$\displaystyle{{2}}\text{b1}(D)

Now what would you play with Black? To answer this question, it helps to think about the intention of my last move.



В

I came close to exchanging a few pieces: 14 2xc6 bxc6 15 2e2 \$e5 16 \$xe5 \mathbb{\text{w}}xe5 17 \mathbb{\text{#}}f4. After 17... wxf4 18 9 xf4 White has the better ending. Unfortunately this idea doesn't work because of the mate on a1, but after 14 \$\pi\$b1 Black has to reckon with it.


After the text (14 \Delta b1) I recommend 14...a5!, an aggressive and prophylactic move which disrupts

White's plan. Then 15 \(\textit{\alpha}\)xc6?! hxc6 16 包e2 皇e5 17 皇xe5 豐xe5 18 \ f4 is met by 18... e7! 19 a4 (19 \widehardrightarrow xh4 a4) 19...\squares fb8, and the white king is in trouble.

> ₩c5? 14 ...

A major positional error. Black must always be ready to meet 2e2 with a bishop exchange on e5, but now he lacks that possibility. In consequence, the b2-bishop acquires formidable power.

> 15 \(\text{\text{\text{\$\delta}\$}} \) ₩xc6 16 De2 **全h5**(D)



W

17 f6!

Stronger than 17 2xg3 2xg3 18 \(\psi\)f4 f6! (but not 18...\(\pri\)xh1? 19 f6 with lethal mate threats).


17 ...

I didn't even consider Black's acceptance of the pawn sacrifice. On 17... 17xf6 White would have the pleasant choice between:

- a) 18 ②xg3 hxg3 19 響f4 (or 19 **省(5)**.
 - b) 18 2 d4 (aiming for 19 2 f5).
- c) The crude 18 2xf6 \(\psi xf6 \) 19 豐xf6 gxf6 20 包xg3 hxg3 21 **L**hf1.

If Black had taken the pawn I would have had to choose between the above lines, but there was no sense in wasting time on the decision in advance.

18 **包xg**3 hxg3(D)Not, of course, 18... 2xg3 19 ₩f4.



W

19 ₩e2!

White has the advantage, but breaking down his opponent's defence is not so simple. On the kingside Black has built something like a fortress. If White plays Ahf1 with the idea of \(\mathbb{I}\)f5!, Black replies ... \\end{aligned} e6, and the rook has no entry squares on the f-file. White can transfer his queen via g4 to g5,

threatening to penetrate on h6, but the threat will be parried by ... \$\ddots h7. White would have to open up a 'second front' by undermining his opponent's centre with d2-d3 at a suitable moment.

> 19 ... 9)xf6?

Khramtsov makes my task much easier. In such situations greed is entirely out of place.

> 20 Idf1 9)h5 21 If5!

21 \mathbb{\ma account of 21...f5 22 **世**g5 **互**f7.

After the text-move the threat is 22 Exh5 gxh5 23 Wxh5 f6 24 **豐**g6+ **\$**h8 25 **罩**f1.

> 21 ... **f**6

White has two strong replies to 21... 2g7: 22 里g5 and 22 里f6 豐d7 23 Hhf1.

> **⊈**f7 23 Axh5

This obvious exchange sacrifice was hard to resist. However, 23 Infl might have decided the game even more simply.

> 23 ... gxh5 24 \wxh5+ **⊈e7**


24... 全g7 25 基f1 is wholly bad for Black. A more stubborn defence is 24... \$\div e6\$, which I in-(25 罩f1!?) 25...f5 26 豐g6+ 含d7

27 **豐**g7+ **\$e6** 28 h4!. Black then has nothing with which to oppose the advance of the h-pawn; the entire board is under fire from the bishop.

> ₾47

Again 25...\$e6 was more tenacious.

> 26. 当h7+ феб 27 **当e7+** 含f5 (D)



W


28 当27!

More precise than 28 \square f1+\dig 6 29 耳f4 f5 (or 29...耳fe8).


> 28 **H**fe8 29 If1+ 1-0

To conclude, I suggest you try to find the best continuation in the following positions with the kings on opposite sides.


Exercises




1. White to move



3. White to move




2. Black to move




4. Black to move


5. White to move



7. White to move



6. Black to move



8. Black to move

Solutions are given on pages 276-81.


12 Training Session: Making Difficult Choices

Igor Belov

A large number of the moves we play require no deep investigation of the position. It is enough to apply some standard principles of evaluation and add just a few variations. Nevertheless, in nearly every game a moment of crisis is bound to occur (sometimes several such moments arise); at that moment the right decision cannot possibly be found on the surface – and yet it determines the whole future course of the struggle, perhaps its very outcome.

It is some situations of this kind, arising from my own games, that I want to bring to your attention. In conditions of limited thinking time, try to solve the problems that confronted me. We will then compare our conclusions.

Let us start with the relatively (only relatively!) simpler examples, and end with those that are highly complex, almost unfathomable.



W

Belov – Vaulin *Katowice 1991*

Exercise 1. In this position there is an unusual balance of material. Who is playing for a win? How should White continue?

Rook, knight and pawn are worth about the same as a queen, but here Black is better off positionally. There are no weaknesses for White to fasten onto, whereas Black threatens to work up pressure against the weak d4-pawn. White can have no high ambitions.

The most precise way to equalize was pointed out by Ilia Makariev.

1 2xd5! cxd5

If 1...exd5 then 2 里e1 or 2 豐c3 a6 3 **E**e1.

2 **Zd1** Ifc8

[Black can improve with 2...b6, with a view to 3 a6?! b5 followed by 4... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\beg ter 3 axb6 \(\boxed{\pi}\)xb6 4 \(\boxed{\pi}\)c3 in conjunction with 5 La1, White seems to be out of danger. - Dvoretsky]

3 **Zd3!**

The rook heads for c3. In some lines White may even seize the initiative. The side with the queen should seek exchanges! The queen's power is easier to exploit when there are fewer pieces opposing it - the chances of breaking into the opponent's camp are increased.

Peter Svidler devised a different route for the rook (after 1 2xd5 **Qe74 Yd2** and 5 **Zc1**) 3 **Za3**. This is too artificial. Try to implement your plans in the simplest and most reliable way, or you risk missing something, which is just what Peter did: 3...耳c4! 4 對d6 耳d8.

[Once you have clearly grasped that it is imperative to bring the rook to the c-file, you may even

consider a pawn sacrifice after 1 **a**xd5 cxd5: 2 h4 **a**f6 3 **a**c1! **a**xd4 4 \(\mathbb{L}\)c7. However, after 4...b6 or 4...b5 White still has problems, so I think the manoeuvre \(\beta a 1 - d 1 - d 3 c3 is more convincing. - Dvoretsky]

All other plans are weaker. Maxim Boguslavsky, for example, suggested 1 \(\mathbb{\text{\text{w}}}\)c4 threatening 2 a6. Black replies 1...a6, and what now? Does White exchange on d5? There is something illogical about that, since Black recaptures with tempo. Vasia Emelin took the analysis further: 2 \(\textit{L}\)xd5 cxd5 (2...exd5 3 **對b4** and 4 **其e1**) 3 **對c7 其fc8** 4 ₩d6 \(\textit{\$\text tive, of course, but White has had to postpone the exchange of rooks.


An idea of Inna Gaponenko's is questionable: 1 a6 bxa6 2 \(\mathbb{W}\)c4. The black rook comes into play at once on the b-file; the bishop will try to get at the white d-pawn and attack f2.

In the actual game, I am afraid I missed my way in this position too. I understood that I had to aim for exchanges, and considered 1 \(\text{\text}\) xd5. However, I didn't see the rook manoeuvre to c3; I only looked at 3... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{ strong; if 4 \(\mathbb{I}\)c1, Black has the reply 4...**⊈**xd4!.

1 Ha4? **≙e7!**

Black of course prevents 2 ≜xd5 and 3 **□**b4. Even so, it was not too late to take on d5, but I decided to occupy the c-file with my rook first.

> 2 Ec4?! ②c7!(D)




W

Alas, this simple move escaped me completely. With the retreat of the knight, White is suddenly in trouble. My opponent is planning a multiple attack against d4. He has more pieces than I have, so the pawn is essentially defenceless. I can only hope for some random tactical counterchances.

3 单e4 罩fd8 4 豐d3 h6 5 豐e3 **\$**f6 6 **\$c2** a6!

Before placing his knight on b5, Black does well to prevent the advance a5-a6.

7 2a4 4b5 8 2xb5 axb5 9 **■b4 ■a8 10 對f4 ■d7 11 含g2 Zad8**, and Black won.



W

Kamshonkov - Belov Podolsk 1991

Exercise 2. The game had been adjourned. This is the position after Black's sealed move ... 2a5c7!, which came as a surprise to White.

Recollect the positional principles that operate in situations like this, and with their help, select a plan of defence for White.

There are opposite-coloured bishops on the board. It would help to exchange rooks and go into a 'pure' bishop ending, but unfortunately that is not feasible at present.

When defending an endgame with a material disadvantage, you should exchange pawns. This is a useful rule. Are any other general considerations relevant?

Many years ago I attended a lecture by Dvoretsky on bishops of opposite colours, and from that time on I have thoroughly absorbed the chief principles for playing these endings. One of the rules he formulated says: "The stronger side should keep its pawns on the squares of the same colour as those on which the opponent's bishop moves; the weaker side should place its pawns on the colour of its own bishop." In accordance with this rule, though in time-trouble, I had not hesitated to arrange my pawns on light squares (there was a choice between a7/b6 and a6/b5). My opponent's kingside pawns, by contrast, are on the 'wrong' squares and therefore vulnerable. All the same, oppositecoloured bishop endings have a strong drawish tendency, and in my adjournment analysis I found a forced draw for my opponent. I had hopes that he wouldn't find it, though, since he didn't know my sealed move and the saving line was not entirely obvious.

Diana Darchia suggests 1 2h3, to prepare f4-f5. Correct! We either exchange pawns or else force ...e5, when the white f-pawn will be on the 'right' square and the black e-pawn on the 'wrong' colour, that of its own bishop. The chances of a successful blockade are increased. I am glad to say that half the students in the contest sized up the position correctly and made the same choice.


1 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$a}}}} \) 1 \(\text{\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\$\$\$\$}\$}}}}}}} \end{\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}}}}} \end{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{ **ው**ሳያ 1... Id5 2 Axe6+.

> 2 f5 **e**5

3 **Ed2!?**

The rook exchange leads to a forced draw; 3 2g2 is not bad either.

> 3 ... **⊈e7 ≜**xd6 4 **E**xd6 \$16 5 Ag2 6 **\$b7!** (D)




В

On the queenside too, it is important to drive Black's pawns onto the same colour squares as his bishop. You see how easy it is to play good moves, once you know the principle.

b4 &c6!

8 \(\pm f3! \((D) \)

Simplest. I analysed a sharper continuation: 8 2e4 \delta g5 9 \delta f3 \$\document{\psi}\$h4 10 f6 h6 11 f7 \$\document{\psi}\$h3 12 \$\document{\textit{\textit{g}}\$f5+}\$ \$\preceq\$xh2 13 \text{ \textit{\textit{g}4}}, and no matter what I tried, I could find no win here either.



В

\$25 If 8...\$xf5, then 9 \$e4+ and 10 ⊈xh7.

9 d>e4 **≜c7** 10 Ad7

By now the game is obviously a draw.

In the plan of defence we have examined, an idea characteristic of opposite-colour bishop positions is consistently implemented, namely the correct arrangement of the pawns. Of course, a practical game is not a study, and there may be various possible ways of handling the position. All the same, when

you are at a disadvantage, precision and accuracy are called for, and not all methods of defence are of equal worth. For instance, 1 \$\displace{2}\$ e3 looks tempting, depriving Black's rook of d4 and aiming to meet 1... ♠b6+?! 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ e2 \$\boxed{\pi}\$d4 with 3 \$\boxed{\pi}\$d2 or 3 \$\boxed{\pi}\$c6. However, Black has the unpleasant reply 1... Idl (and if 2 \(\text{2e4}, then 2... Le1+ winning another pawn).


Sasha Chernosvitov and Inna Gaponenko recommend 1 Ic5. Why? Is the idea to attack the h7pawn? I would surrender it with pleasure if I could get at the b3pawn. My answer would be 1... Id4 2 里h5 里xf4 3 里xh7+ \$\d6. Or if 2 f5, then 2...exf5 3 **X**xf5 **X**b4 4 罩f7+ 含d8. After 5 罩xh7 罩xb3 White is hard put to survive, but otherwise he comes out two pawns down (5 \(\mathbb{L} \)f3 \(\mathbb{L} \)xh2; 5 \(\mathbb{L} \)d5 \(\mathbb{L} \)h4).

[A good defensive idea was found by Grandmaster Evgeny Bareev: 1 2 **\$**b7!. For example, 2...**\$**xf4 3 2xa6 b4 4 \(\boxed{\pi}\)d3 with a draw. The same idea can be carried out a little differently: 1 \(\mathbb{L}c5\)\(\mathbb{L}d4\) 2 \(\mathbb{L}b7!\). In this connection it is worth recalling another principle for defending opposite-bishop endings: attack your opponent's pawns with your bishop. - Dvoretsky]

Ilakha Kadymova suggested 1 ♠e4. This is just what my opponent played, and no good came of

it; the black pieces immediately sprang to life.

1 鱼e4? 里d4 2 含e3 (2 鱼b7!?) 2...**Lb4** 3 **Lc3** (D)




В

3...h5

Better than 3...h6 – the stronger side should not place pawns on the same colour squares as its bishop. The position is now difficult for White, as his pieces are tied down to the defence of his weak pawns. This is a suitable moment to recall another important principle.

If there are other pieces on the board apart from the oppositecoloured bishops, you must on no account remain passive; you have to seek counterplay and fight for the initiative at all costs.

4 h3 &b6+ 5 &f3 &d4 6 Id3 \$e7 7 f5 e5 8 \$d5 \$f6 9 \$e6 a5 10 \(\mathbb{H}\)d2 e4+! 11 \(\phi\)e2 a4 12 bxa4 bxa4, and Black won.



Lempert - Belov Katowice 1990

Exercise 3. Who is better here? How should Black continue?


Unfortunately, two students were unable to come to any conclusion at all. Vladimir Baklan suggested a move which never came into my head: 1...e3. His idea looks highly dubious, for instance 2 fxe3 2 e4 3 d6 \(\mathbb{Z}\) xc1 4 \(\mathbb{Z}\) xc1 \(\mathbb{Z}\) xd6 5 \(\mathbb{Z}\) d1 \(\mathbb{Z}\) e6 6 \(\text{\$\text{\$c}} \text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\ex

> **♠** h6! 1 ...

If Black manages to exchange the strong f4-bishop without a serious mishap, his position will be preferable.

However, if you only looked at 2 Ixc8 ②xc8 3 營c7, your move was superficial. The real test of Black's idea is 2 對xd6! 對xd6 3 其xc8. If then 3... 對f8?! 4 置c7+ \$h8 (not

4... **Ze7** 5 d6 **Zxc7** 6 dxc7 **Qxf4** 7 vantage is with White. Black has to play 3... 2xf4! 4 \(\mathbb{L}\)xe8 (D).



В

Peter Svidler reached this position in his analysis, and judged it to be in White's favour. Without the bishops on the board, this would certainly be the right verdict – the two rooks combined with the dangerous passed d-pawn are stronger than the queen. A bad line is 4... **省**d7? 5 gxf4! **省**xe8 6 d6 **省**d7 7 2c4 followed by 8 2e6, and White wins.

It was Emelin who calculated furthest - he gave 4... \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\) xg3!. After 5 Ze6, Black has 5... ₩c5 or 5... \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$xf2+}.}}\) We need to look at 5 fxg3 \wxg3+6 \omegag2. What happens now?

6...e3? is anti-positional; after 7 If 1 Black's pawns are blocked. But one recommendation, 6... wxb3!?. is very interesting. Where is the rook to go? Black's chances here are not at all worse.

I admit I only examined 6...f4!? 7 Exe4 f3 8 Ed2 fxg2. Then 9 d6 is answered by 9... Wh3 10 Xxg2 豐d3 11 罩e7+ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}}612 罩e6 \text{\$\geq\$}\d4+, with a draw. White might try 9 Lee2!?, so as to keep a rook on the d-file, but even this is unclear.

We can now give an objective assessment of the starting position. Black has some problems to solve, but after 1... h6! he is justified in expecting to save the game.

Let us now look at how the actual game went. Hardly giving it a thought, my opponent exchanged rooks.

> 2 **Exc8**?! 9)xc8

Zd8 3 **學c7**

3... Le7 is not bad either. 4 **Ec1 ≜xf4**


5 **資xf4?!**(D)

The line 5 對xd7+ 其xd7 6 基xc8 is sounder; White would certainly not lose the resulting oppositecoloured bishop ending.

Ø\d6

6 We5


Here my opponent offered a draw, but I refused. Black's pawns are excellently placed, confining the enemy bishop. The 'Nimzowitsch knight', blockading the passed d-pawn, is very strong.



В

6	•••	_ ℤe8
7	₩d4	∐e 7
8	₩ b6	■f7
9	⊈h3	₩ e7
10	₩c5	₩e5

Black has an undoubted plus. Unfortunately I later blundered twice, and let the win slip.



В

Yachmennik - Belov Smolensk 1989


Exercise 4. My opponent's last. move, 1 \(\textit{a}\)d3-b5, has set me no easy problem - that of rescuing the pinned a4-knight. Your task (like mine during the game) is:

- a) to evaluate the position;
- b) to find various ways of playing the black side, and supply the essential variations:
- c) to select the most promising line.

As to the evaluation, opinions varied. "White's better" - "White's worse" - "It's equal". The students nearly all observed that 1... xf3? fails to 2 Exa4!. They suggested 1...d3!?, some of them without giving any analysis. Three moves were analysed:

- a) Many of them gave the variation 2 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xa4 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)xa4 dxe2 4 ₩xe2 ₩a8. Black wins his pawn back and gains the advantage.
 - b) After 2 **2**f4:
- b1) Svidler analysed 2... ac3! 3 Ixc3 ₩xa5, when after 4 Ixa3 ₩xb5, the e4-pawn is under attack.
- b2) Instead Baklan suggested a line giving up two pieces for a rook: 2... 2b2 3 =xa4 =xa4 4 = xa4 exc1 5 \square xc1 \square a5. This is an ingenious idea, but we already know that there is no need for it; 2 2)f4 is more strongly answered by 2...\(\ell_c3!\).

- b3) [In addition, White has to reckon with 2... xe4!? 3 xa4 $\square xa4 4 \triangle xa4 e5$. – Dolmatov
- c) Only Makariev examined 2 2)g3!, but he stopped after 2...2c3! (the idea suggested by Baklan with the knight on f4, 2...\(\delta\)b2 3 \(\max\)xa4 Txa4 4 全xa4 全xc1 5 對xc1 對a5. is bad for Black here; White plays 6 \(\Delta \) b3, with the terrible threat of **幽h6** and **②g5**) 3 **基xc3 幽xa5** [the pretty counter-stroke 3... **X**xa2 would lead to equality in the case of 4 \\xa2? \(\frac{1}{2}xc3\) 5 \\\alpha a1\) d2; unfortunately it is refuted by the prosaic 4 \(\mathbb{L}xa4!\) \(\mathbb{L}xd2\) 5 \(\mathbb{D}xd2\) -Dolmatovk Actually the variation needs to be continued: 4 Exa3 $\mathbf{w}_{xb5}(D)$ and now:



W

- c1) 5 **X**xd3 is poor due to 5...9c5.
- c2) 5 豐xd3 豐xd3 6 基xd3 公c5 and here:

- c21) 7 Ze3 Za8 [In fact after White to exploit his material plus; his opponent's pieces are just too active. - Yusupov] 8 a3 Za4 9 2d2 is a possibility.
- c22) 7 Id4 Ia8 8 Ic4 Ia5 9 20d4. Analysing this far, I saw that I was a pawn down with a difficult position. [Black can regain the pawn with 9... 2xe4. After 10 Dxe4 (10 Db3 Le5) 10... 2xe4 11 ②b3 里e5 12 f4 里e6 13 里c8+ 當g7 14 Dc5 Ic6 15 Ixc6 2xc6 we reach a drawn ending. The conclusion is that 1...d3!? gives excellent saving chances. - Yusupov]
- c3) [As Grandmaster Bareev has shown, instead of taking the d3-pawn White has the strong intermediate move 5 \(\mathbb{L}b3!\). After 5... Wab, he continues not with 6 Id8, maintaining a substantial plus, for example: 7...f6 (capturing on e4 would lose a piece) 8 \(\mathbb{I}\)xf8+ \$\dot{x}\$f8 9 \dday{d}\$d8+ \dot{x}\$f7 10 \dday{d}\$h8. − Dvoretskyl

Are there any other candidate moves in the diagram position? Vadim Zviagintsev mentioned 1... 2c3 (though without giving any analysis). After 2 Lxa3 Dxb5 3 Lb3 Black has no compensation for the exchange.

Weighing up the variations, I came to the conclusion that in the

normal course of events I was most likely to lose. I didn't want to reconcile myself to such a dreary fate, and kept on looking. Finally I succeeded in finding an amazing chance.


In principle, Black's position does have some good points - for instance the bishop-pair and a compact pawn-chain. The idea of constructing a fortress suddenly occurred to me...

[For my own part I would like to suggest one other idea: 1... 2xe4!? 2 里xa4 里xa4 3 鱼xa4 豐a8 4 鱼b3 (or 4 = d1) 4... = xf3 5 gxf3 = xf3. Without a doubt, the resulting position is in White's favour; his passed a-pawn may become extremely dangerous. But for the moment he has to worry about his shattered kingside and deal with Black's threat to advance the centre pawns. Frankly, this continuation seems to me more promising than what occurred in the game. -Dolmatov]

1	•••	Exa2!?
2	₩xa2	₩xa5
3	₩xa4	₩xa4
4	≜xa4	ı xe4
5	②fxd4	Id8 (D)

Black has just one pawn for the sacrificed piece. Yet realizing White's advantage is not so simple. If 6 2f3 or 6 2b3, Black would continue with 6... 22a8, aiming to

penetrate with his rook to White's second rank.




W

6	වc6?!	 ■ d2
7	Dc3	Д хс6
8	≜ xc6	≜ d4
9	ଅe 4	H b2
10	E d1	≜ b6
The threat is 11f5.		

11 Hd2 Exd2


12 \mathfrak{D} xd2 (D)



 \mathbf{B}


I had seen this position a long way ahead and judged it to be drawn. White's only object of attack is the f7-pawn, and I couldn't see how both his pieces could attack it at once - since the darksquare approaches would be defended by my king and bishop. Of course I was not totally confident of a favourable result, but I think that from the practical standpoint the decision I took was justified. I had a clear idea of how White was going to win in the lines where he had an extra pawn, whereas I could not imagine how he could succeed here.

12	•••	≗ d4
13	\$ f1.	h 5
14	⊈ e2	⊈g7
15	f3	e6 (D)



In this position the game was adjourned. Analysis confirmed that

my assessment of the position was right. On resumption, there was later on an interesting episode:



W

My opponent tried 1 f5!?. After the end of the game he pointed out that even 1...exf5!? 2 2xf7 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f6 would leave him with no chance of success. As usual, the drawing potential of opposite-coloured bishops is immense!


The game continuation also led to a draw: 1...gxf5 2 2b5 2xg5! 3 hxg5 \$\dot{\psi}\$g6 4 \$\dot{\psi}\$f4 e5+! 5 \$\dot{\psi}\$xe5 \$\psixg5 6 \textit{2d3 f6+ 7 \textit{\$\phi\$e6 f4 8 \textit{\$\texti - **⊈**h4.

What main conclusion follows from the example we have just examined?

When defending a difficult position, it pays to consider the most implausible resources, to have faith in yourself and boldly transform the character of the

fight. Your opponent is most likely to cope successfully in a standard position that is technical in nature (with an extra pawn, for instance). It is much harder for him in a position with an unconventional line-up of forces - here the probability of error greatly increases.

Incidentally, having found this difficult and unexpected defensive idea, I not only saved half a point but experienced a huge emotional boost, thanks to which I began winning game after game.



Mitiaev - Belov Moscow 1989

I had had a winning position, but with the onset of the endgame I weakened and completely forgot about the possibility of getting mated.

Exercise 5. White threatens f2-f4: how does Black resist? At first I thought I was in a very bad way, but then...

Sergei Movsesian decided on 1... \$\psi f8\$. This is no good! Nearly everyone gave the variation 2 2e4 ②c4 3 ■b3 with advantage to White, and Svidler continued 3...**4**b2 4 **4**xb2 **2**xb2 5 **2**f6!. I don't know if he saw the counterstroke 5...42d2+, but it doesn't change the assessment of the position. I thought that in place of 2 2e4, a more natural move was 2 2b5 (why should White block the e-file?). For example, 2... xa2 3 ②xd6 \(\bar{a} \) 6 4 \(\bar{a} \) b3 \(\Odd) d7 5 \(\Odd) \) c4 with a clear plus. However, after 2... 2c4 3 \(\mathbb{e} = 7 + \(\mathbb{e} = 8 \) (3...\(\mathbb{e} = 8 \) 4 \(\mathbb{E} = 1 \) 4 ②xd6+ ②xd6 5 **Q**xd6+ **\Pi**d7 6 **\$\delta\$** f6 (or 6...\$\d4 7 **\(\beta\$**e7+ \$\d8) the outcome still remains unclear. Evidently the knight's move to e4 is stronger after all.

Emelin found nothing better than 1...f6 2 f4 2d7, but he rightly assessed the position as difficult for Black.

An ingenious idea (in the spirit of the preceding game) was devised by Zviagintsev: 1...f5 2 f4 \$\preceq f7!? 3 fxe5 \(\textbf{x}\)es. However, after 4 del I doubt if Black has real compensation for the sacrificed piece. In any case, White doesn't

have to take the knight - 3 \Ob5! is very strong.


There is one more possibility to consider.

But what now? Chernosvitov rightly observed that the exchanging combination 2... Ixf2+3 &xf2 ②g4+4 \$f3 ②xe3 5 \$xe3 \$xc3 leads to a hopeless ending for Black after 6 \(\Delta f4.

Most of the participants restricted themselves to the modest 2...f6 3 **h**4 **h**f7 (3...**h**g6 4 **h**b5! ②xh4 5 \(\mathre{\pi} \)e8+ \(\mathre{\pi} \)f7 6 \(\Ox\)d6+ \(\mathre{\pi} \)g6 7 Ixh8 is scarcely any better). How do we rate the ensuing position? According to Svidler and Makariev it is unclear, perhaps a shade more comfortable for White. Well, compared with me they are great optimists. I thought the position was hopeless. White has an extra pawn, and the h8-bishop has no moves. Let us look at a specific line: 4 ②e4 ②c4 5 **L**b3? f5 6 **L**b7+ \$\precepge 6 − here, without a doubt, excellent counter-chances arise. White cannot play 7 2xd6 2xd6 8 Lb6 \$\documenh{a}\$h5. But why should he go into the complications at all? I think 5 Ic3!, as suggested by Dvoretsky, throws cold water on Black's hopes. After 5... \mathbf{Z} xc3 (5... \mathbf{Z} d2+6 \mathbf{Z} e2) 6 2xc3 he probably wins back the h6-pawn, but how can he stop the outside passed a-pawn and at the same time avoid losing his d6pawn?

Let us look more closely at White's main threat of f2-f4. This move may win the game, yet in itself it is anti-positional. The second rank is suddenly weakened. and the activity of White's bishop is reduced. Can't Black somehow make use of all this, and organize a counter-attack against the enemy king?

[As Bareev pointed out, 3 4)b5!? was also strong, while the attempt to exclude this possibility by inverting the move-order - 1...f5 2 f4 g5 - doesn't work in view of 3 fxe5! gxh4 4 exd6. - Dvoretsky]




②g4 ⊈f7

5 Exh8 9)e3+

5... \(\mathbb{Z}\) xc3 is hopeless in view of 6 基xh7+ 含g8 7 基g7+ 含h8 8 基d7 罩c29 空e1!?, with 罩xd6 to follow.

6 \$\frac{1}{2}(D)



B

If Black now takes the knight, the advanced white h-pawn decides the game: 6... \(\maxx2x \)? 7 \(\maxx2x \)h7+ 堂g68 里g7+ 堂h59 h7. There is no improvement in 6... 2g4? 7 Exh7+ 曾g6 8 星g7+ 曾h5 9 包d1! 星c1 10 ⊈f1.

\$26!


By now, the main strategic basis of Black's pawn sacrifice with ...g5! is comprehensible. It was important to give the king some air and a path to freedom.

7 **Eg8**+

In answer to 7 \Db5!? I was planning 7... Exg2+8 \$h1 Exa2 9 ②xd6 ②xd5 10 **\(\)**g8+ **\(\)**gh5, and if 11 2xf5?, then 11... \$\dig 4! with

very unclear consequences, since the king jumps in at h3. Unfortunately, after 11 \(\textit{\Dolmatov}\). White wins after all. Maybe Black should try 7... 2g4 8 g3 2h2 (but not 8...\(\begin{aligned}
&c1 + 9 \plus g2 \begin{aligned}
&c2 + 10 \plus f1
\end{aligned} 包e3+11 \$\dot{g}\$1) 9 **Le8!** (preparing ≡e3, so as to destroy the wellknown drawing mechanism ... Id2 and ... ②f3+) 9... \$\delta h5! followed by tread carefully, though with correct play his position would still probably be won.

> **含h5**(D) 7 ...



W

8 Øb5?

My opponent thought for about fifteen minutes here, but still failed to find the right solution. He was clearly very keen to hang on to all his extra material. However, if he wanted to go after the d6-pawn, it was more logical to do it a move

earlier, without driving the black king forward.

The move I feared most was 8 Ig7, as I couldn't see what to do about the powerful h-pawn. For example: 8... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
2 & \delta & \delt **□**xh7 **□**xc3 11 **□**e7 **含**g4 12 h7 **含**g3 (12...曾f3 13 基xe3+!) 13 **Qh4+!**. Dvoretsky found a defence, however: 8... 20g4! 9 g3 (9 \(\frac{1}{2} \) (0 e3+) 9...里xc3 10 里xh7 里c1+ 11 含g2 里c2+12 \$\forall f1 \forall e3+13 \$\forall g1 (Black has the same answer to 13 \(\frac{1}{2} \)ellipse 1) 13... 曾g4! 14 單e7 曾f3 (threatening 15... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1+ 16 \(\delta\)h2 \(\overline{Q}\)g4+) 15 **型**xe3+ \$\dot xe3 16 h7 **型**c1+ 17 \$\dot g2 耳c2+ 18 \$h3 耳c1.


The black king isn't much more comfortable on the h-file than on the back rank. The attempt to play for mate with 8 \(\Delta e 7!? \) looks inviting. If 8... xc3 (reckoning on 9 **I**g5+ \$\dispha h4! with unclear consequences), then the quiet move 9 g3!!, found by Dolmatov, is decisive – the king cannot escape from the mating net. It follows that Black must defend with 8... \(\mathbb{L} \)c1+9 할f2 (9 할h2 ②g4+ 10 할h3 翼xc3+ 11 g3 2 f2 + 12 g2 2 64) 9... 2 g4 +10 \(\delta \)e2 \(\mathbb{\pi} \) xc3. There is, of course, not much joy here for Black, but he can still fight on.

Without doubt White's simplest method, and the most unpleasant one for his opponent, consisted in reaching a position with two pieces

against a rook - either in the previous line (with 10 Exg4 instead of 10 堂e2), or by 8 皇f6!? 其c1+ (8... 2)g49 Ig5+ and then 9... \$\dot\xh6 10 鱼g7# or 9...會h4 10 基xf5+ 曾g3? 11 외e4#) 9 曾f2 외g4+ 10 Zxg4 \$xg4 11 a4. White should be able to realize his advantage, though there are still some technical difficulties to overcome.

> 8 ... 2)g4 ②h2 (D) 9 g3

Black wants to construct the drawing mechanism I mentioned before: ...\(\mathbb{I}\)d2 and ...\(\vartheta\)f3+. An idea of Dvoretsky's also deserves to be studied: 9... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned \$\forall f1 \overline{Q} e3+ 12 \overline{g} g1 \overline{g} g4, but assessing the consequences with inadequate thinking time would be difficult.




W

At this point White wasted most of his last few minutes looking for

a forced win that is not there. He should definitely have settled for 10 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f6 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f3+ 11 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1 \$\boxed{I}\$d2 12 **□**g5+ **□**xg5 13 fxg5 **□**xd5, when Black would still have had to defend accurately.

> 10 He8?! **⊈g4** Øf3+ 11 **He3** 12 \(\psi f1?! \(D \)


12 \square xf3 \square xf3 leads to a draw.



My opponent's errors in the final stage of the game are easily explained. He considered the position won for White. He viewed my pawn sacrifice (1...g5) as desperation. The move 6... \$\preceq\$g6!, confusing the issue, came as a surprise to him. In severe time-trouble (which was mutual) he loses the thread, and even the game.

12	T	⊈xg3
13	¤ xf3+	\$xf3
14	₩el	⊈e3

15 \$f1 c4!? 2)xd6 **⊈f3** 17 ⊈e1 c3(D)



18 2xf5?? 18 \$\ddl \text{was essential, with a} probable draw.

> **Ec1#** 18 ... (0-1)

From the practical point of view, the decision I took (1...g5 and 2...f5) was, I think, correct, even though analysis has revealed more than one refutation. As in the previous example, I wanted to deflect my opponent from a purely technical course - I endeavoured to 'randomize' the position and create active counterplay at any cost. For my opponent to find his bearings in the new situation, with mutual attacks and an unconventional distribution of material. proved far from simple.

In seeking a solution, you should not confine yourself purely to examining variations. General positional considerations often come to your aid too. In this case, for one thing, I was looking for a way to utilize the defects of f2-f4, and for another thing I was trying to let my king out of its cage.

Now let me announce how the

students performed. The best score was made by Svidler. Zviagintsev was second, and Emelin third. But then, they all made quite a good showing. I hope the experience gained from solving and discussing these exercises will be of some help to them at the board, where they are sure to keep encountering such tough problems.

13 Virtuoso Defence

Mark Dvoretsky


While I was studying Grigory Sanakoev's collection of games (which we discussed in Chapter 8, Thoughts about a Book), the following exceptionally tense and fascinating duel attracted my attention. White worked up an extremely dangerous attack against the king and seemed certain of victory. Yet by cool defensive play his opponent not only managed to parry the immediate threats but even seized the initiative and eventually won. In such cases the cause of failure usually lies in errors in the conduct of the attack. Here, on the other hand, as shown by Sanakoev's analysis - which in places has been significantly refined and supplemented by the author of these lines and by Grandmaster Zviagintsev – it is practically impossible to fault White's play; the result was determined by Black's inspired defence.

Once again it is interesting to consider the contrast between correspondence and over-the-board play.

Sanakoev – Maeder 10th World Correspondence Championship 1979 84

Championship 1979-84
Sicilian Defence


1	e4	c5
2	Df3	d6
3	d4	cxd4
4	�xd4	∂1 €
5.	Dc3	a6
6	⊈g5	е6
7	f4	⊈e 7
8	響f3	豐c7
9	0-0-0	包bd7
10	⊈d3	b5 (D)



W

11	H he1	≜b 7
12	₩g3	b4
13	包d5	exd5 (D)

13...②xd5 is a mistake in view of 14 exd5 皇xd5 15 ②xe6 皇xe6 16 Exe6. 13...皇xd5 is also bad: 14 exd5 ②xd5 15 皇xe7 ②xe7 16 豐xg7 Ef8 17 Exe6! fxe6 18 ②xe6, Chudinovskikh-Semionov, USSR 1974.



W

14 e5!?


The main theoretical continuation is 14 exd5 \$\ddot d8\$, with unclear consequences.

14 ... dxe5 15 fxe5 ②h5 (D) Not 15... ②e4? 16 单xe4 单xg5+

17 豐xg5 dxe4 18 包f5 豐xe5 19 包d6+ \$f8 20 豐xe5 包xe5 21 包xb7.

16 ₩h4


The sharp try 16 e6?! is interesting. The cautious 16... 2xg5+?!



W

turns out clearly in White's favour after 17 對xg5 對f4+ 18 對xf4 公xf4 $19 \operatorname{exd} 7 + \operatorname{cxd} 7 \cdot 20 \cdot \operatorname{c} 65 + \operatorname{cxd} 6 \cdot 21$ g3 包g6 22 息h3 包e7 23 罩e3, or 17...6\df6 18 exf7+ \$\prix f7 19 6\de6 **2g4 2c8** 23 **2f1 2xe6** 24 **2xe6**+ ₩xe6 25 ¤xd5 (Lepeshkin). Black has to accept the queen sacrifice with 16... 4\(\)xg3 17 exf7+ \$\(\)xf7 18 **其xe7+ 営g8 19 hxg3 對xg3** (19... ye5 20 点f5) 20 包e6 ye5. After 21 If1, Black should play 21... \$\f8!? 22 \overline{4}f5 \overline{4}c8 23 \overline{4}e8 會f7 24 其e7+ 會g8 25 其e8, when the result is a draw (Lepeshkin). In the game Baluyev-Vadikan, correspondence 1976, Black instead played 21... 2c5? and lost: 22 2f5 ②e4? (22... ②xe6 23 **Q**xe6+ **Y**xe6 24 Exe6 h6 with advantage to White) 23 2xe4 dxe4 24 \(\mathbb{I}\)f6! 豐xg5+ 25 ②xg5 皇d5 26 罩xa6 1-0.

Weigel-Hauernherin, correspondence 1977 saw instead 18 g4 ②g7 19 e6 ②c5 20 exf7++ \$\precentgraphixf7.



В

Now 18... 2df6 is hazardous, as after 19 exf7++ 2xf7 20 If1 the threat of 21 g4 is hard to meet.


It certainly makes sense for Black to exchange queens by 18... #f4+!? 19 #xf4 \(\Omega \text{xf4} \) 20 exd7++ \(\Phi \text{xd7} \), as in the game Shakarov-Zhurav-liov, correspondence 1976. After 21 \(\mathbb{L} \) f1 \(\Omega \text{xd3} + 22 \) \(\mathbb{L} \text{xd3} \) f5 23 g4 White retains the better chances but Black's position is still defensible.

In two games in the 10th World Correspondence Championship, Maeder chose a different, riskier continuation:

18 ... 0-0?!

19 exd7 **Zad8**20 g4 **Z**g7 (D)

Black has nothing better; after 20...對f4+21 對xf4 ②xf4 22 單e7, 20...②f4 21 皇f5 (followed by 單e7) or 20...f6 21 對h4 ②g7 22 單e7 對f4+ (22...單xd7 23 ②e6) 23 單d2 對xd4 24 皇xg6 對xd2+ 25 \$xd2 hxg6 26 g5, his affairs are in a very bad state.



W

21 \(\Delta f5!?

An attractive-looking move. Defending the d7-pawn temporarily, White intends to double major pieces on the h-file. The attempt to carry out this attacking manoeuvre at once is ineffective: 21 \(\mathbb{W}\)h6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd7?! 22 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e4 23 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e2! and 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h3) 22 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e6 23 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f5 (23 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h3) \(\mathbb{Z}\)f4+) 23...\(\mathbb{Z}\)xd4 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e7 (24...\(\mathbb{Z}\)sf5? 25 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g5+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)h8 26 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f6+ \(\mathbb{Z}\)g8 27 gxf5 and wins) 25 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h3 f6.

There was, however, another plan of attack which was evidently stronger; it involved pushing the h-pawn. The game Estrin-Maeder in the same tournament went 21 h4! 基xd7 22 h5 營d6 23 營h6 全c8 24 基h1 全e8 25 基df1 基c7 26 g5 營e7 27 全c6!! 基xc6 28 hxg6 f6 29 gxf6 基fxf6 30 基fg1 全e6 31 gxh7+ 全h8 32 營g5! 1-0.


As the subsequent analysis will show (if it is correct, of course), White no longer has any advantage after the move played. However, to reach this conclusion in advance is quite impossible even in a postal game, let alone over the board.

21 ... \(\text{\chircleft{\text{\tin}\text{\tin}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tint{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texitin}\text{\texitit{\text{\texitilex{\texitit{\texitilex{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi}\texit{\texi{\texi{\texi}\tin}\tint{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi}\tint{\texitit{\

The bishop is taboo; Black loses with 21...gxf5? 22 ②xf5, or with 21...f6? 22 ③h6 gxf5 23 Ie7 If7 24 Ide1 Idf8 (24...Ixd7 25 Ie8+) 25 Ixf7 ③xf7 (25...Ixf7 26 Ie8+ If8 27 Ixf8+ ③xf8 28 ②e6+) 26 ②xf5 ②xf5 27 gxf5.

22 **Id3!?**


Which rook should go to h3? White's choice looks illogical, since after 22...2xd7 23 Wh6 (or 23 Zh3) Black will play 23...Zfe8 with tempo: White will have to lose time removing his rook from e1. Sanakoev took this circumstance into account, of course, but after a deep study of the specific variations he nonetheless preferred the text-move. Later he concluded that



W

the move he played was a mistake after all, and that he should have played 22 Ze3. From analysing the position together, Zviagintsev and I came to the opposite conclusion. I would point out once again that the truth here can only be established by analytical means; in practical play this is an insuperable task.


Let us look at the position arising after 22 \mathbb{Z} e3 \mathbb{Z} xd7 (D).



W

- a) Now 23 Wh6 seems indicated. Sanakoev gives these first three variations:
- a1) 23...gxf5 24 gxf5 f6 25 **E**g1 (25 **□**e7 **□**f7 26 **⑤**e6 is met by 26...夕xf5!) 25...重f7 (25...皇c8? 26 里h3) 26 ②e6! 鱼xe6 27 fxe6 里e7 28 In 3 is clearly better for White as Black must return the piece by 28... 基xe6 29 豐xh7+ 會f8 30 豐h8+ Фе7.
- a2) 23... 2xf5 24 Ih3 2h5 25 里xh5 gxh5 26 gxf5 豐xh2 27 包f3.
- a3) 23... Ife8 24 Ih3 gxf5 25 豐xh7+ 曾f8 26 豐h8+ 曾e7 27 **豐**xg7 fxg4 28 **基**f1.
- a4) Black's best defence is to play 23... De6! (with the idea of 24 **Land State 1 Land State 1 Land**
- a41) In the course of the game, Sanakoev thought that after 24 ②xe6 \$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\texiting{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}}}}}} \endingentine{\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{ **基xe6 對f4+27 對xf4 基xf4** the ending was level. Afterwards it occurred to him that the simple 25 ■h3 guarantees White a very strong attack, for instance: 25... Ife8 26 豐xh7+ 含f8 27 豐h6+ 含e7 28 ₩g5+, etc. This whole variation is of little importance, however, because it rests on the false assumption that after 24...fxe6 (instead of 24... 2xe6?) 25 2xg6, White wins. That is far from the truth; the obvious 25... 2c8 26 Ih3 Id7 stems White's onslaught. Thus the exchange on e6 gives White nothing.

- a42) Sanakoev wanted to play 24 \(\mathbb{I}\)f1, with a view to the winning variations 24... 2xd4 25 Ih3 Ife8 26 皇xg6 and 24...互fe8 25 公xe6 ≜xe6 26 \ and \ h3. Alas, there is a refutation: 24... and the f1-rook is en prise.
- b) The attempt to reverse the move-order with 23 \(\bar{L}\) h3 (D) (instead of 23 \\hbar h6) is interesting:



В

- b1) If now 23... 20e6?, White plays 24 2 xe6, answering 24...fxe6 not with 25 鱼xg6 豐f4+ 26 豐xf4 ■xf4, but with 25 ■xh7!. We have already seen that the variation 24... 2xe6 25 Wh6 has dire consequences for Black.
- b2) White also keeps a plus in **對xd7 25 單h4**.
- b3) Yet with the rook on h3, Black is justified in accepting the piece sacrifice: 23...f6! (or 23...gxf5


24 \\hbar h6 f6!) 24 \\hbar h6 gxf5. The point is that Black meets 25 gxf5 by the simple 25... £xf5, while after 25 \widetilde{\pi}xh7+\widetilde{\pi}f7 the black gueen obtains the important f4-square: 26 gxf5 (the threat was 26... \subseteq h8) 26... **省**f4+ 27 **含**b1 **全**xf5. Even after the relatively best 25 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f1 ₩e5!?, White's compensation for the sacrificed piece is plainly inadequate.

22 ... 皇xd7 23 Wh6 **Ife8**

Black develops his rook with tempo, though once again 23... De6 deserved attention. White gets nowhere with 24 \(\mathbb{L}\) h3 \(\mathbb{L}\) f4+ or 24 If 1 \(\mathbb{e} = 5\)! (this time, of course, not 24... 世c4?). Winning back the pawn after multiple captures on e6 leads to equality. The thematic line is 24 ②xe6 fxe6 (24... 2xe6? 25 Ih3) 25 \(\textit{L}\) h3! \(\textit{L}\) c8 26 \(\textit{L}\) xg6. An analogous position occurred in our analysis of 22 Le3, except that the white rook was then on d1. It is considerably better placed on e1, as becomes clear especially in the variation 26... Id7?! 27 Ixe6 (when 27... **国**g7 fails to 28 **Q**xh7+ **国**xh7 29 \(\mathbb{I}\)g6+). Black would have to reply 26... #f4+ 27 #xf4 #xf4 28 ≜xh7+ \precepg7, but here too the advantage is with White.

24 If1! (D)

What is Black to do now? White is threatening 25 \(\mathbb{L}\)h3. There is no



В

point in 24... \(\mathbb{U}\)c4 because of 25 b3. Taking on f5 gives White a mating attack. In reply to 24... 4e5, Sanakoev had prepared quite a complicated combination: 25 互h3! 營xd4 26 \(\textit{\textit{g}}\) \(\textit{e}\) \(\textit 型d3 營e5 29 里e3 營d4 30 全f5 里d6 31 單d1 豐c5 32 罩eel followed by 33 Wh8+. White recovers the piece and obtains a decisive plus.


24 ... **b**3!!

A magnificent riposte! Any capture on b3 has its drawbacks. If 25 Dxb3, then at worst Black has ♠xf1. If 25 axb3, there follows 25... \was as (threatening not only) 26... \#a1+, but also 26... \mathbb{Z}e1+) 26 \$b1 \$b5. In either case the initiative passes to Black. The right continuation was definitely 25 Exb3 ₩a5 26 c3, but even then, having repelled the immediate threats to his king (the rook can no longer

reach h3), Black obtains counterchances.

25 Hh3!? (D)


A brave decision! White breaks through on the h-file after all, but at a high price - the black pawn is on the verge of queening, though it may be possible to stop it with **Z**a3 or **2**b3.



B

25 ... bxa2 ₩xh7+ ФfЯ 27 Wh8+ **⊈e7**

This is the position Sanakoev was aiming for. He intended to answer 28...\$\d6 with the simple 29 La3, stopping the pawn and maintaining a strong attack. He was not afraid of 28... \$\precepter f8\$, if only because White can settle for a draw if he wants (29 \\ h8+ \\ e7 30 \\ h4+). He would also be justified in thinking about 29 \(\mathbb{W}\)f6!:



В

a) After 29...a1 + 30 + 30 Ad2 Sanakoev gives a beautiful variation leading to a won ending for White: 30... **劉**aa5+ 31 c3 **公**h5 32 **以**xh5 gxh5 33 \\ h6+ \end{a}e7 34 \\ \ e1+ \\ e6 35 Axe6 Wxh2+ 36 Ze2 Wxe2+ 37 \$\dightarrow xe2 \$\overline{\pi}\$d6 38 \$\dightarrow f5+ \$\dightarrow d8 39 2b7+. As a refutation of the attack, he gives 30...\#ca5+ 31 c3 ₩xb2+ 32 \(\(\mathbb{L}\)c2 \(\mathbb{L}\)bxc3+ 33 \(\mathbb{L}\)xc3 Ee7, but actually White wins in this line too: 34 \\hat{\psi}\h4! \Qh5 (34...\\dot{\psi}\g8 35 \psixe7) 35 gxh5 \psice c8 36 \psif3.

b) Perhaps Black should try 29...數f4+!? 30 **以**xf4 a1數+ 31 \$\d2 \$\d2\$ \$\d2\$ and now not 32...費d1+ 33 當c3 其c8+ 34 當b3、 as indicated by Sanakoev (the king on the third rank can go to a2 to escape the checks), but 32...2xf5+!. If 33 gxf5, White has to reckon with 33... 2h5, therefore he should play 33 **X**xf5 **3**d1+ 34 **3**c3 **3**e1+


35 \$\dock can choose between 35... 4b8+ 36 \$\dia a2 \$\dia a5+ 37 □a3 豐xa3+ 38 🕏xa3 (38 bxa3) 38...gxf5, and 35... Le3+ 36 Lxe3 ₩xe3+ 37 \$\dot{a}2 - and then either 37...**I**d7 or 37...gxf5. However, all these variations obviously favour White.

Unfortunately, Black has a much tougher defence at his disposal.

28 ... De6!! (D) 29 **Ee3**+

29... e6 is weaker, for if (as in the game) there follows 30 4b3 **豐c4 31 全d3 豐xb3 32 豐xf6+**, the g7-knight is en prise.

Black would lose with 29...\$17? 30 \(\text{\textit{xg6+} or 29...} \(\text{\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exitititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititi}\$\exititititit{\$\exitititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exitititit{\$\e a1岁+ 31 空d2 数ca5+ 32 c3 数xb2+ 33 Øc2.




W

30 Db3

There are no combinations, so White must retreat.

30	•••	₩c4!
31	⊈d 3	₩xb3
32	₩xf6+	⊈d6
33	₩e5+	\$ c6.
34	cxb3	a1\+
35	⊈c2	₩a5
36	.⊈xg6	IIf8
	If7 (D)	



В

At this point White was still feeling optimistic. His pieces are very active, and his opponent's material plus is not too great. Sanakoev analysed the first three of the following variations:

a) 37...里xf7 38 皇xf7 ②c5 (38...公c7 39 對f6+ \$b7 40 對xd8 ₩c5+41 \(\mathbb{L}\)c3 and wins) 39 \(\mathbb{L}\)xd5+ \$\psi_b6 40 \psi_d6+ \psi_a7 41 b4 \psi_a4+ 42 \$\doldo\rightarrow\ri ₩xd8+.

b) 37... Ide8 38 Wf6 d4 39 Ie5! 41 \(\dot{e}_{64} + \dot{e}_{b6} \) 42 \(\dot{w}_{xd4} + \dot{e}_{b5} \) 43

₩c4+ \$b6 44 ₩b4+) 41 Qe4+ \$c5 (41...\$b5 42 월b7+ \$c5 43 b4+ \$c4 44 b3#) 42 b4+ \$xb4 43 罩b7+ \$a5 (43...\$c5 44 ¥e5+ 47 **\(\mathbb{e}\)**c7#) 44 b4+ \(\mathbb{e}\)a4 45 \(\mathbb{e}\)b2! and 46 \(\text{\tint{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\tex

- c) 37... Ide8 38 對f6 對d8 39 $\square xe6+\square xe6$ 40 $\square c3+$ and the black rook on f8 will be en prise after 41 Wb4+.
- d) An interesting defence was suggested by Vadim Zviagintsev: 37...\$b6!? 38 ¥d6+ &c6 39 ¥xe6 ℤxe6 營c5+; 40 ℤe7? ℤf2+ 41 \$\document{\text{b}}1 \boxed{\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exitin{\exitin{\exitin{\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texitil{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\exititit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texititit{\$\text{\$\tex 41 罩xe8 罩f2+ 42 含b1 罩f1+ 43 \$\preceq\$c2 \preceq\$f2+ with a draw.

However, Maeder found an even stronger continuation.

> 9)c7!! 37 ...


The f8-rook is defended indi-**豐c5+.** White has to forget his ambitious plans once and for all and start fighting for the draw. Nor is it clear how he can succeed.

38 **學e**7 **I**g8!

Again the most precise move. Black loses with 38...d4? 39 Ze5 ②d5 40 基xd5!, or with 38... 基h8? 39 b4 **\(\)**xh2+ 40 **\(\)**b3. A roughly equal position would result from 38... 其xf7-39 其c3+ 含b7 40 全xf7 ②b5 41 单xd5+ \$a7 42 b4 \$b6 43 **I**c5. The game ends in perpetual

check after 38... Ife8 39 If6+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$b7 40 \$\text{2}\$xe8 \$\text{41}\$ \$\text{\mathbb{W}}\$xd7 型xe3 42 對c6+ \$a7 43 耳f7 耳e2+ 44 \$b1 \$e1+ 45 \$a2 \$ea5+ (45...**里**e7?? 46 **豐**c5+).

39 b4 **豐a4+**(D) 39...₩b5? loses to 40 &f5.




W

40 \$\d2 **ф**b7 41 Af5

From White's viewpoint, a bad symptom: he has to exchange pieces, as otherwise it is his own king that comes under attack. For example after 41 \(\mathbb{I}\)f6 (threatening 42 **X**a3), there is 41... **2**xg4!. Nor is 41 Ic3 Ige8! any good for White, for example: 42 \dd \(\mathbb{\pi} \) d6 \(\mathbb{\pi} \) e2+! 43 \$\psi xe2 \(\textit{xe2} \) \(\textit{xg4} + 44 \) \$\psi f2 \(\textit{xd6} \) 45 **□**cxc7+ **�**b8 (but not 45...**�**b6?? 46 耳b7+ \$c6 47 耳fc7#) 46 耳b7+ \$c8 47 **□**a7 **⋓**c6, or 42 **⋓**c5 **⋓**c6 43 \mathbb{e}f2, when Black must avoid 43... **岁**b6? 44 **岁**xb6+ **\$**xb6 45

43... \(\begin{aligned}
\text{w} \text{xg6?} 44 \(\begin{aligned}
\text{xc7+} \begin{aligned}
\text{\$\delta \text{xc7+}} \begin{aligned}
\text{\$\delta \text{\$\delta \text{xc7+}}} \begin{aligned}
\text{\$\delta \text{xc7+}} \begin{aligned}
\t ₩a7+; the winning move is 43...\₩d6!.

> 41 ... **Ege8** 42 **智d6**(D)



В

₩c6!

42... Exe3? is a mistake on account of 43 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}xd7!.

43 \wxc6+


43 豐xd7? 基xd7 44 鱼xd7 would fail against 44... Wh6! 45 2xe8 d4.

> 43 ... **\$**xc6!

In the case of 43... 2xc6 44 h4. the position would remain unclear - the white passed pawns are very dangerous. To deal with them, it is important above all to exchange White's strong bishop; this explains why Black takes on c6 with his king. Admittedly this allows his opponent to regain some of the lost material, but a major simplification

occurs, after which Black still has enough advantage to win.

44 \(\mathbb{L}\)c3+ **\$**d6 45 **¤**f6+ **\$e5!** (D)



46 Exc7 \$xf6 47 **Exd**7


After 47 \(\textit{\textstyle xd7}\) \(\textstyle \textstyle \text quickly works up a decisive attack with the combined forces of his two rooks and the king.

> 47 ... ¤xd7 48 \(\ell\) xd7 Zh8 49 h3 \$e5!

The king should stay in the centre while the rook copes with the kingside pawns. On 49...\$25?, play might continue 50 b5 axb5 51 常d3 基xh3+52 常d4 基b3 53 常xd5 **E**xb2 54 **\$**c5 b4 55 **\$**a4 with a draw.

> 50 g5 Ig8 **Lh8** (D) 51 h4

52 g6



By some means or other White has to swap pawns on the queenside. The immediate 52 b5 is refuted by 52...\$\d6! 53 bxa6 (what else?) 53...\$xd7 54 a7 \$\mathbb{Z}\$a8! (but not 54...\$c7? 55 h5 \$b7 56 h6 \$xa7 57 \$d3 \$b6 58 \$d4 \$c6 59 b4 \$\display\$d6 60 b5 \$\display\$e6 61 b6 and White saves himself).

> 52 **I**xh4 53 b5

There is hardly any point in 53 **≜**c8, as Black could then choose between taking both b-pawns and winning the g6-pawn.

> axb5 53 ... 54 **≜**xb5 **\$**d4!

The most precise continuation; the black king supports the advance of the d-pawn. The consequences of 54... 2b4 55 2d3 (55 皇e8) 55...基xb2+ 56 當e3 基g2 57 \$\displaystyle{\psi} f3 are less clear-cut

55 \$\doc{1}{2}


\$e1 \$e3 57 \$f1 \$f3!) 56...耳g2 (56...\$e3?! 57 \$c6) 57 \$f7 \$e4 58 b4 d4 59 b5 d3 and Black wins.

55 ... Hg4 56 Ae8 фe3 57 b4 57...其xb4? 58 全f7 58 g7 Xxg7 59 **\$**b3 **■g5**

A good move, though not obligatory. The immediate 59...d3 was also playable, for example 60 ©h5 Ig5 61 2d1 Ig1 62 2h5 ■h1 63 👲g4 🕏f4.

60 \doc{4} d361 **≜**a4 **d2** 62 **Ab3** Hg1 63 **b**5 \mathbb{Z} c1+! (D)

Not, of course, 63...d1營?? 64




64 **\$**d5 IIb1 0 - 1

"I have played about 300 games by correspondence and won most of them, but few of those victories have given me so much creative satisfaction as this unsuccessful attack. The excitement of the imaginative contest took such a hold of me that at a certain point the bare result ceased to be all that important; creativity occupied the foreground...

"In this game, heaven knows, I did everything that was then in my power. My opponent played better - all praise to the winner! However. I conducted the attack without heed for the circumstances. and in the final analysis human beings are responsible for their actions, not for the result... Of course it was madness to let the black pawn get to a2, but 'he who has never done anything reckless is less wise than he thinks' (La Rochefoucauld). Surely creative pleasure counts for no less than miserable half-points or even a full point? And did not Caissa repay me a hundred-fold for those glorious deeds of recklessness which I permitted myself not only in this game but in others that did not end so sadly?" (Sanakoev).

Examining this game, I cannot help recalling a vivid article by Bent Larsen. (It was published in

the 5th issue of the Danish magazine Skakbladet for 1982.) I call the reader's attention to the following extract.



В

Rivas - Mestel Marhella Zonal 1982 (notes by Larsen)

When annotating this game for Ekstrabladet [a Danish tabloid newspaper], I was influenced by Rivas's analysis and also by the editor Dinesen, who was doing his best to hurry me. And so... I confirmed that in this position Black was doomed: 24...gxh5? 25 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{W}}\)g5; 24... \(\) e6? 25 \(\) g5 \(\) xd5 26 \(\) xg6+ fxg6 27 h5, and White wins (according to Rivas, the sequel could be 27... \widetilde{\psi} xf6 28 hxg6+ \widetilde{\psi} g8 29 豐xd5+ \$g7 30 罩h7+ \$xg6 31 **營**h5#—beautiful, without a doubt). I would point out one instructive


feature: the queen on g5 blocks the g6-pawn (this would normally be a pawn's job).

Maybe Mestel overlooked something here, seeing that he lost in another four moves. As he thought for a full hour over move 26 in a vain effort to find a defence, it is precisely here, at move 24, that a diligent reader should be looking for Black's last hope. We will come back to the diagram position, but first let us see what happened in the game.

> 24 ... **Ee8??** 25 **學g5!!** Ϊe5

What else could he do? White was threatening 2xg6+ and h5.

26 De7! (D)




В

26 ... **學g8** The main variation is 26... Ixg5 27 hxg5 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xe7 28 fxe7 \(\mathbb{\text{g}}\)e6 and then 29 \(\dot{d1} + \dot{g7} 30 \(\dot{a4} \) or 29

\(\text{\pm}e2+\) and 30 \(\text{\pm}b5\). We shall presently see why I mention this second possibility. The d1-a4 diagonal might have been blocked!

Apart from this line, there is 26...豐f8 27 鱼xg6+ 當h8 (27...fxg6 28 h5) 28 \(\text{\$\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$29}\$ exf5}\$}\$}\$} \) 30 ②g8!!. Perhaps this is just what Mestel overlooked? And yet 30 20g8 isn't hard to find if you ask yourself how White is going to

27 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d1 **\$h8** (D) Or 27...\sum xe7 28 h5.



W

28 Wh6+ 1-0

Very pretty. But let us return to move 24 - when Mestel clearly had plenty of thinking time - and see what moves and ideas were available aside from 24...gxh5. 24... e6 and 24... Ee8.

One possibility, for instance, is 24... e8. The queen supports the g6-pawn, and also eyes the square e5 (as the rook did after 24... \(\mathbb{Z}e8\)) and the e4-pawn. There might follow 25 2e7 c4 26 gg 5 b5, but we already know the refutation: 27 **≜**xg6+! fxg6 28 h5.

So 24... e8 fails to save Black.

but it was worth looking at it all the same; eccentric moves sometimes lead us to the right ideas. [Let us recall what was said about Reshevsky - that he deliberately slipped into time-trouble after first analysing all (!) the tactical refinements of the position, and then played with complete assurance 'with his flag dangling'. This is an obvious fabrication. He couldn't have grasped all the tactical refinements – new ones would have cropped up.] But there is something else for us to think about: at every move since the seventeenth, the possibility of ...b3 has been in the position. There you are! At the moment Black is not threatened with mate in two, and on 24...b3 White has cause for alarm about ... bxa2. If 25 a3, we come back to the ... We8 idea: 25... e8 26 De7 ea4!, and Black has unexpectedly come to life. The queen attacks c4, d4 and e4, for example 27 ②xg6? \(\mathbb{U}\)c4+!, or 27 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\ext{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\exitt{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exitti White has a pawn for the exchange and some positional trumps, so the chances are about equal.

The idea of ...b3 (which was there all along) in conjunction with ... We8 (which has just become possible) is something that comes to light when you survey the position in desperation - when you see that all the natural replies are unsatisfactory. At the fateful moment you play 24...b3!! without even looking at 25 \$\displaystyle b1 or 25 axb3.

After 25 \$\displaystyle b1 (the king is on a light square!), there is of course no point in taking the a2-pawn. A good also playable, so as to take on e4 with check (25 \$\displays b1? \$\displays b7!? 26 **豐g5 皇xd5 27 皇xg6+? fxg6 28 h5** \(\text{\tinx}\text{\ti}\text{\tex{

After 25 axb3, Black can occupy the open a-file. The defensive idea ... Xxb3-h3 also suggests itself, but unfortunately it does not work. The simple 25... Za8 forces the reply 26 &c2, and again the king is on a light square. Black can play 26... \$2 b7 or even 26...c4, but why give White another pawn for the exchange?

There is scope here for lengthy analysis. However, in practical play, the most plausible course of events is 24...b3!! 25 a3 \(\mathbb{e}\)e8!, and now the optimist who is playing White will have a long think – if he has the time. Gradually his ears will go red, his breathing will become heavy, his knees will start

shaking slightly, and ... so will the whole board.

Level-headed defence saves many a point. I have seen Jonathan Mestel wriggle out of tighter corners than this. I am convinced that after 24...b3 he would even have won the game. Optimists on the attack are very bad at readjusting to changed circumstances.

The trouble for annotators is that games ending in a beautiful, overwhelming victory can be hard to analyse objectively.

14 Errors and What Lies Behind Them

Mark Dvoretsky


'To err is human.' It is a truism that no chess player has the gift of playing faultlessly. Sometimes blunders stem from the sheer difficulty of solving the problem in hand, or from some chance conjunction of circumstances. Very often, however, mistakes conform to a distinct pattern; they result from some of your failings as a player or as a person. This applies not only to ordinary chess players but also to the leading grandmasters and even the World Champion.

The most difficult thing for any of us is to handle unfamiliar types of situation in which we lack adequate experience. To some extent this deficiency can be cured by purposeful training, but unfortunately there are few players who engage in this.

It is well known that one of the main strengths of Garry Kasparov lies in his deep, large-scale opening preparation. For many years he himself, the members of his team

(which he constantly replenishes) and, latterly, some powerful computers have been working tirelessly to perfect his opening arsenal. As a result he gets into difficult positions comparatively rarely; in this department his experience is quite modest. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that defence is one of his relatively vulnerable points. When he is compelled to defend, Kasparov always does so as actively as he can; he immediately tries to undertake something, to alter the complexion of the fight by sharp play. This characteristic of his was discussed, in particular, by Grandmaster Evgeny Bareev in a lecture he gave in 1992 at a session of our chess school.

In the diagram on the following page, Black has the choice between exchanging queens and sharply sacrificing a piece on e4 (17... #c7? is anti-positional; White continues 18 \Da3 followed by \mathbb{I}c1 and \Daf2).




Bareev - Kasparov Linares 1992

In Bareev's opinion the right move is 17... **對**xd2+!. Then 18 **\$**xd2? **②fxe4+** is too risky for White, and so is 18 \(\textit{\textbf{x}}\) xd2?! (with the idea of developing the knight on a3) 18....皇xg4! (better than 18... 夕fxe4 19 fxe4 ②xe4 20 ②c3) 19 fxg4 Dexe4 (intending 20... 2xd5), and if 20 \$13, then 20... 2xd2 and 21...e4. White would have to play 18 ②xd2 b5 19 ②f2 耳fc8 with approximate equality.

"We all have our own styles, our own idiosyncrasies as players," Bareev remarked in his lecture. "In Black's place I would have resigned myself to the queen exchange. However, Kasparov doesn't like positions where he hasn't any counterplay. He didn't want to go into a quiet and (as he thought) slightly

inferior ending, so he decided on rather a dubious piece sacrifice..."

17	•••	②fxe4?!
18	fxe4	②xe4
19	₩xa5	≝ xa5
20	②c3! (D)	




В

"Simple and strong. If 20... 2xc3 21 bxc3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd5, then 22 \(\overline{Q}\)f2 and White will set up a light-square blockade. Without counterplay, Black's three pawns are not enough for the piece. He needs to have some dynamic weapon, such as two connected passed pawns" (Bareev).

There followed: 20... 2g3 21 **I**g1 ②xe2 22 \$\dispxe2 e4 23 **I**ac1! f5 24 gxf5 **E**xf5?! (24...**e**e8) 25 2) f2 &e8 26 \(\mathre{L}\) h1 \(\mathre{L}\) b5+ 27 \(\alpha\) xb5 **Ixb5 28 Ic8+ \$h7** and now, instead of 29 \(\mathbb{I}\) d1? \(\mathbb{I}\) xb2+ 30 \(\mathbb{I}\) d2 a3!, with an unclear position - as occurred in the game - White

could have gained a decisive advantage with the simple 29 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b1! \(\pi\)fxd5 30 b4! axb3 31 axb3.

In many cases active defence is precisely what holds out the most promise, but this is by no means always so. Any kind of one-sidedness is a bad thing. There are times when you need to parry your opponent's threats calmly and cope with the problems patiently and accurately. A lack of flexibility in his methods of fighting makes a player vulnerable.



W

Anand - Kasparov World Championship match (9), New York 1995

Interestingly, in his match with Anand (New York 1995), Kasparov more than once opted for active defence in positions where it

was wholly out of place (though in the second half of the match Anand was demoralized and unable to punish him for it).

27 **Ed5!**

Obviously, accepting the Indian grandmaster's positional exchange sacrifice is extremely dangerous: the attacking force that it gives White in the centre and on the queenside is too strong. Black should have parried the threat of 28 **全c7** with 27... 其ec8! (not fearing 28 基xe5 豐xc4, and envisaging ... \u00e4c6 at a suitable moment). Black's position would still be unpleasant but by no means lost.


> 27 ... 9)xd5? 28 exd5 ₩26

Kasparov took the rook all the same. Why? As I see it, the explanation is that he was hoping for active play of his own. His queen has targeted the white rook as well as the squares c2 and d3. The active move ...e5-e4, attacking the bishop, is coming... Alas, these are all delusions. The strategic strengths of White's position count for far more.

> 29 c5 **e4** 30 **≜**e2 **¤e5** 31 **學**d7! **Ig5?** (D)

In Chernin's view, 31...e3 would have put up much stiffer resistance, e.g.: 32 If1 Ig5 33 ad3 e2! 34 鱼xe2 里xg2 35 鱼d3 里g1+! 36 ≡xg1 \subseteq xd3, and the position is

still sharp. 32 **Zg1** is better, but rather than transpose to the game with 32...**Zg5**, Black could play a different, more useful, move.



W


32	Eg1	e3
	d 6	■g3
34	₩xb7	₩e6
35	⊈ h2! ·	1-0

Black resigned as after 35... we5 36 wxa8 he has no good way to make use of the discovered check.

In the next diagram, the e7-pawn is under attack. After the natural 27...\$\precept{278}\$ Black would have had an acceptable though somewhat inferior position. Instead, Kasparov played 'actively'.

27 ... **\$e6**?

In the actual game his stratagem paid off, because his opponent was tempted into an unsound continuation based on a fork: 28 b4? axb4



B

Anand – Kasparov World Championship match (11), New York 1995


29 axb4 \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \) b6??. I should add that Anand only took a few minutes over this sequence and played the fateful knight move almost instantaneously. Why? On the one hand, evidently, the immense nervous strain - intensified by the emotions of losing the previous (tenth) game - was taking its toll. On the other hand. Anand is lacking in the discipline of scrutinizing variations intensively and painstakingly. He possesses remarkable intuition many of his decisions (including quite difficult ones) are taken quickly, and yet speed of thought is partly at odds with correctness and precision of calculation.

Now there followed 30... Ixb4+31 &a3. White assumed he was

winning the exchange for a pawn – after, for instance, 31... Lbc4 – but had missed the terrible rejoinder 31... Lxc2!. He could only resign at once (0-1), seeing that after 32 Lxc2 Lb3+ 33 \Delta 2 Le3+ Black comes out two pawns up.

In this case Kasparov was just lucky. In actual fact the move he played was bad! By capturing on e7 White could have forced a double rook ending with an extra pawn and excellent winning chances:

28 ②xe7! **Le8**29 ②d5 **L**xd5 (D)



W

30 b4! axb4 31 axb4

White could also have reached this position via the alternative move-order 29 b4 axb4 30 axb4 \(\begin{array}{c} \frac{1}{2} \rightarrow \dot{1} \frac{1}{2} \


31 ... Ic4 32 Ixd5 White could have reached this position by force. Of course we will not stop here. Some specific but not very complicated analysis is needed to take the variation to its logical conclusion. It is amazing that neither Anand (during the game) nor Kasparov (in his commentary for *Informator*) was equal to the task.

32 ... **Xxb4**+

If 32... Lec8? (suggested by Kasparov after the game), then 33 c3! (stronger than 33 Le2 Lxb4+ 34 \displace2ct Lc6 35 Led2 La6) 33... Lxc3 34 Le2 with 35 Lxb5 to follow.

33 \$\document{\phi}\c3 (D)

Not, of course, 33 \(\price c1? \) f5 with equality.



В


33 ... **I**c4+34 **\$\preceq\$b**3 **II**ec8

34...f5 is more tenacious, but after 35 Exb5 Ed4 36 &c3 Black is left with a difficult position.

35 He2

Black loses one of his pawns. and his chances of salvation are highly problematic.

I am sure that if Anand had calculated this variation accurately he would have played it. White's advantage here is greater than in the position he was trying to reach with 28 b4?. (If anything that position is drawish.)



В

Anand - Kasparov World Championship match (17), New York 1995

In this position Black should play 32...a6, removing his pawn from attack. An important point is that on 33 \$\displaystyle d2 (with the positional threat of &c3-d4) Black has 33...c3+! 34 bxc3 \(\begin{aligned} \begin{al the game should be drawn. However, Kasparov again chooses an

'active' line in place of the 'normal' one.

> **¤c5?** 32 ... 33 Xxa7 **g**5

Black seems to have everything under control; White loses his gpawn after 34 hxg5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg5, or his fpawn after 34 g3 gxh4 35 gxh4 If5. However, Anand finds a splendid rook manoeuvre to refute his opponent's idea.

34 **Ea8!** gxh4 35 He8+! **⊉**d7

Evidently 35...\$f5 was even worse: 36 **E**e4 **e**g5 37 a4!?.

> 36 He4 **c3**

At this stage White is faced with rather a difficult choice. The Indian grandmaster simply decided to win a pawn:

> 37 **E**xh4?! cxb2+ 38 **\$**xb2 IIg5 39 a4

However, in the position that has resulted White's pawns are disunited and his opponent has real chances of saving himself (given the drawing propensities of rook and pawn endgames). Indeed Kasparov eventually secured the draw.

With a little more self-confidence (his failures in the preceding games were weighing heavily on him), Anand would most likely have preferred 37 b4! **Eg5** 38 **Exh4 Exg2** 39 \$\displaystyle b1. In this case White has yet to win a pawn, but he holds a major

positional trump - two connected passed pawns on the queenside. If he manages to transfer his king to b3 (as in the variation 39... If 2 40 **I**xh5!? **I**xf3 41 **a**2), the position is definitely won for him. Black's only counterchance (but I doubt if it is sufficient) lies in pushing his d-pawn to d4 with the white king on b1.

The moral of these examples (more of them could be added to the list) is obvious. For chess players of all levels it is extremely important to analyse your own games thoroughly and unearth the hidden. underlying causes of your errors. This is always the indispensable first step towards the goal of eliminating them.

15 Analysis of a Game

Mark Dvoretsky

We are going to look at an interesting game played by Sasha Chernosvitov. He has annotated it in great detail, giving a wealth of variations and explaining what he was thinking about during the game, what he was afraid of, what points he missed. His analysis is not fault-free. Errors are of course inevitable in cases like this: when you are examining complicated variations, it is not surprising if you go wrong somewhere. However, your mistakes sometimes serve to reveal characteristic defects in your manner of thought, in your approach to chess. I selected this game for discussion for the very reason that some errors committed both in play and in the notes seemed to me instructive.

Denisov – Chernosvitov

Moscow Junior
Championship 1991
Queen's Gambit Accepted

2 m		
1 d4		d5
2 c4	/ -	dxc4

3	e3	Df6
4	≜xc4	е6
5	包f3	c5
6	0-0	a6
7	a4	Dc6
8	₩e2	≝c7
9	Dc3	⊈ d6
10	dxc5	

Other moves to have been played are 10 b3, 10 d5 and 10 Id1. In his annotations Sasha sets out his detailed views on the theory of this variation. However, as his opening ideas are to some extent a personal matter, there is no need to discuss them here. The problems arising later will be of more interest to us.

10 ... **2.**xc5

11 e4 is more thematic, though White then has to reckon with 11... 2g4 (threatening 12... 2d4) or with an immediate 11... 2d4. White wants to advance his epawn in complete comfort, but in the opening every tempo matters; with such slow play you cannot count on an advantage.

11 ... 0-


12 e4 ②d4! 13 ②xd4 ②xd4

The opening phase of the game has ended favourably for Black. He controls the central squares, the c4-bishop is obstructed by the e6-pawn, while the white e-pawn is kept in restraint and in some variations even comes under fire (for instance 14 \$\(\text{\Delta}e3?\) \$\(\text{\Delta}xc3\) 15 bxc3 \$\(\text{\Delta}xe4\). Black only has to develop his light-squared bishop, and his position will be preferable.

14 \d2?!

Chernosvitov recommends 14 \(\text{\Delta}\)d3, preparing to bring the other bishop to e3.

14 ... b6 15 **Hac1 2**b7 16 **2**d3 (D)



В

The threat of 17 2d5 (or 17 2b5) is completely obvious. But what will White do after the black

queen has left the c-file? Perhaps exchange the dark-squared bishops with 17 \(\Delta = 3 \), but most likely he will prepare f2-f4 by moving his king to h1. Can Black make it hard for him to carry out these plans?

16 ... **当g3!**

An excellent manoeuvre! It is much stronger than 16... 響e5 17 堂h1 ②h5 18 豐g4.

17 **\$h1 ₩h4**


The queen is splendidly placed on h4. From here it pressurizes the white e-pawn and at the same time eyes his king. If appropriate, the knight will jump to g4. If 18 f4, then 18... h5 19 \(\frac{1}{2}\)eq 1 \(\frac{1}{2}\)g3+ 20 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xg3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xg3 with the better chances for Black. Perhaps this was the least of the evils for White.

18 Ece1 Efd8

The white pieces on the d-file are starting to feel uneasy. Now on 19 全c2 (with the idea of 全h2 and g3, or 實f3-g3), Chernosvitov suggests 19...g5! 20 實f3 全e5 21 星e2 星d4. If 19 包d1 (preparing 20 全c3), then 19...b5 20 axb5 axb5 21 全c3 e5 22 實f3 全xc3 23 bxc3 (23 包xc3 b4) 23... 其a2, and Black has a considerable plus. Sasha considers that the relatively best defence is 19 實f3!? 全xf2 (19...全e5 20 包d1) 20 星xf2 星xd3 21 豐xd3 豐xf2 22 豐e3!? 豐xe3 23 全xe3 包xe4 (23...包d7 24 星d1) 24 ②xe4

exe4 25 exb6 with chances of salvation (for example, 25...f5?! is ineffective in view of 26 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 \(\precent{\pi}\)f7 27 **拿d4**).

19 \$\dot{\phi}h2? (D)




В

Now the combination in the last line gains dramatically in strength.

19	•••	≜ xf2!
20	Exf2	 Xxd3
21	₩xd3	包g4+! (D)
22	⊈g1	₩xf2+
22	chh1	1 1

Chernosyitov has conducted the first half of the game very powerfully. He has completely outplayed his opponent and gained an advantage quite sufficient for victory. However, from this moment on. another player seems to take over.

How should Black proceed now? 23... Wh4 looks inviting, but then unpleasant. Therefore Black should



W


first of all consider the more solid 23... ②e5!. White's reply 24 ₩e3 is forced. Let us continue the variation: 24... wxe3 25 exe3 5 c4 26 皇c1 (26 皇f2 包xb2 27 皇xb6 里c8 is also dismal, for example 28 2d4 里c4 29 里b1 里xd4 30 里xb2 里d7) 26... Id8 27 b3 De5 28 Af4 (28 de3 Zd3) 28...f6 and Black will exploit his extra pawn with no particular trouble.

Why didn't Sasha play this? He wanted to carry on the attack - out of inertia, and for fear that White might save the endgame thanks to the opposite-coloured bishops. The main point, though, is that he underestimated his opponent's threat, imagining that the queen sortie to d7 was unplayable because of the loss of the e4-pawn. In actual fact, after 23... 對h4 24 對d7 ②f2+ 25 \$\dot{\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$}}\text{h2} \dot{\text{\$\delta\$}}\text{xe4}, White can capture on e4 and then fork two

pieces with \(\mathbb{U}\)c6 or \(\mathbb{U}\)b7. To go in for such adventures you need to be armed with the most precise analysis. I would certainly have stopped at this point and discarded the whole variation (if I hadn't done so already, the moment I spotted 24 **쌀**d7).

When exploiting an advantage you must pay strict attention to all the opponent's active tries and prevent any unnecessary sharpening of the fight. It may happen that your advantage hangs by a hair, and that to maintain it you need to exert yourself and calculate some long, complicated variations. However, the situation here is clearly different - Black has a sound extra pawn, and there is a safe way to preserve all his assets.

₩h4? 24 \(\mathbb{d}\)7! (D) What should Black do now?




24... Lb8? is thoroughly bad: 25 豐c7 豐d8 26 全f4. Therefore Black must choose between 24... \models d8 and 24...9)f2+

With his last move Sasha made a typical psychological mistake: realizing he had obtained a decisive advantage, he relaxed and played carelessly. It now dawned on him that matters were not as simple as they had seemed - and his second psychological error followed. (You will recall Tarrasch's famous dictum: "Errors never come singly.") As often happens, the sudden appearance of difficulties dismayed him and prevented him from coolly examining the variations - which in the present situation are quite complicated. He even failed to solved this problem later, when analysing the game at home.

25 響xb7 異xd2 on account of 26 **Ee2**. However, this is too early to break off the variation; Black can play 26...h5! (or 26...h6!), giving his king some luft. His rook is taboo, and his threats look quite dangerous.

Incidentally, in this kind of position the pawn is usually pushed two squares rather than one, as it may join in the attack. However, in the present case both moves are of roughly equal value.

White's reply is obvious: 27 **豐xb6**(D)(not 27 豐xa6? 其xb2! or 27...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c2!). The next problem is to decide how Black should utilize his trumps?



В


The simplest solution -27... xe2 28 ②xe2 \(\mathbb{U}\)e1+ 29 \(\overline{Q}\)g1 \(\overline{Q}\)f2+ 30 \$\frac{1}{2}\$h2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xe4 − seems to me unconvincing. After 31 2 f3 (or 31 \bullet b8+ \$\ddotsh7 32 \darkled{Q}f3) the co-ordination of Black's pieces is to some extent spoilt, and White simply threatens a rapid pawn advance on the queenside. For example, 31...\#g3+ 32 \$\psig1 \psid6 33 \psixd6 \Qxd6 34 b4, with 2)d4 to follow.

Let us try 27... 2)f2+!. On 28 \$\dock plays 28... \dock xh3+! 29 gxh3 =xe2 30 @xe2 =e1+31 eg2 ₩xe2+, and the queen ending is a win. In this line the pawn is clearly better placed on h5 than on h6, but having it on h6 would still not alter the verdict (if 32 \$\dot{g}3\$, then 32...₩e1+ followed by 33...a5 is good enough).

If White plays instead 28 \(\pm h2, \) Black has a splendid knight sacrifice: 28... 2xh3! 29 gxh3 Id3! with an irresistible attack, for example 30 數b8+ \$h7 31 \$g1 基xh3 32 耳h2 ₩g5+!, etc.

If White tries to evade the mate he ends up in a lost endgame: 29 **L**xd2 **2**)f4+30 **c**g1 **w**e1+31 **c**h2 ₩xd2, or 29 ₩b8+ \$\psih7 30 \psig3 豐xg3+ 31 \$\dot xg3 \ \dot d3+ 32 \$\dot h2\$ 包g5 (or 32...包f4) 33 里c2 a5.

In place of 26 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e2, we still have to look at 26 If1! (D). Now how should Black continue?



В


White's answer to 26...f6? is not 27 \subseteq xb6? \subseteq f7 (threatening 28... \(\mathbb{g} \) and 28... \(\alpha \) f2+), but 27 ₩e7!. So Black must choose between 26...h6 and 26...h5.

A line that looks good is 26...h6 27 Wxf7+ \$h7 28 Wxe6 夕e3 29 **I**g1 **W**g3, and White is defenceless. However, 29 Ig1? is not obligatory; 29 ②d5! ②xf1 30 当f5+ leads to perpetual check.

Black's attack can be strengthened with 26...h5! (instead of 26...h6) 27 豐xf7+ 空h7. If 28 豐f3, the simplest course is 28... De5 29 ₩e3 Xxb2, coming out a pawn up. Sharper play (although still favourable to Black) results from ₩c4! (30... 2)g6 31 2)e4), and if 31 耳f4, then 31... 對c6 32 包e4 對c2.

The main variation is 28 wxe6 De3. This time, 29 Dd5 doesn't work: 29...夕xf1 30 賞f5+ \$h6 31 ₩e6+ g6 and the checks run out. Instead White plays 29 Ig1, intending to counter 29... \mathbb{\mathbb{W}}g3 with 30 \frac{\pi}{1}f7 (as you see, having the pawn on h5 has a minus side as well as a plus side). Black must reply 29... \wg5!, but then White has 30 g3! (D). How should the attack be continued now?

30...h4 31 gxh4 \\ h5 32 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g3 while 30... xb2 31 \(\text{\alpha} \)d5 leads only to a draw. The strongest move queen of the f5-square and threatening 31... 2f1 or 31... 2g4 32 hxg4 hxg4! (but not 32...\dot\dot\dot\dot\ Ig2!). The best defence is 31




В

₩xb6, but there follows 31... 2g4! (31... If 3 32 Wxa6 is unconvincing) 32 hxg4 \dd 33 \dd xf2 \dd xf2 34 里g2 (34 gxh5 豐xb2) 34...豐f1+ 35 \$\dispha hxg4 36 e5 \$\displag8!?, and Black retains substantial winning chances.

Grandmaster Dolmatov discovered another unexpected and interesting way to handle the attack. After 24... Id8 25 Wxb7, he suggested 25...h6!? (D) instead of taking the bishop.

Now 26 He2 Hxd2 would transpose into lines we have seen already. However, in reply to 26 \(\mathbb{I}\)f1, the capture on d2 is not compulsory. Black has the much stronger 26... ②f2+! 27 **基**xf2 **豐**xf2, when the bishop cannot escape.

The best defence is probably 26 ②d5! exd5 27 If1 (27 exd5 is no good at all in view of 27... 2f2+ and 28... (De4), but then Black has



27... 2f2+28 \$\disph2 (28 \$\dispsi g1 2)xh3+ 29 gxh3 豐g3+ 30 \$h1 豐xh3+ 31 \$\delta g1 \delta g4+!, etc., is hopeless for White) 28... 2xe4 or 28...dxe4 29 **2**e1 e3, emerging with an extra pawn.

This is another good moment to recall Tarrasch's view that you have to resort to combinations in order to make up for your previous errors. I should point out, incidentally, that an over-the-board decision to go in for such intricate tactical complications is not all that difficult if you apply the process of elimination - if you satisfy vourself at the outset that all other tries are unpromising. Strange though it may seem, Sasha saw that he would gain nothing from 24... 2f2+ 25 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ h2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ xe4, but nonetheless quickly rejected 24... \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligne Such, evidently, was the psychological effect of the mistake he


made beforehand, of which I have already spoken.

> **分f2+** 24 ... 25 **⊈h**2 **≜**xe4?

As Evgeny Bareev observed, it was not too late to revert to lines like those we have analysed, by playing 25... \(\mathbb{Z} d8! \) 26 \(\mathbb{Z} \) \(Only this time, Black should meet 27 **里**e2 (27 **豐**b8+ **里**d8 28 **豐**g3 294+!) not with 27...h5 or 27...h6, in view of 28 營xa6! (28... 2g4+ 29 \(\mathbb{g}_{1}! \)), but with 27...g5!. For Id3, or 28 對xa6 Ixe2 29 對xe2 g4 30 \(\mathbb{e}\)e3 (30 \(\mathbb{e}\)g1 gxh3!) 30...gxh3 31 **省**g3+ **省**xg3+ 32 **全**xg3 **②**d3 33 gxh3 ②xb2 34 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f4 f6, with an easy win in the knight ending. Incidentally, with this order of moves, just as in Dolmatov's line that we considered earlier, Black deprives the opponent of his best defence - \(\mathbb{I}\)!.

26 ②xe4? (D)

White misses a golden opportunity. He had to play 26 Exe4! ②xe4 27 省c6 省g3+ (after 27... 基d8 28 ②xe4, the d2-bishop is defended – this is why White had to take with the rook, not the knight) 28 \$\text{gl} \boxed{\text{Id8}} 29 \Delta xe4. Then 29... ye5 is answered by 30 wxb6 **營**d4+31 **Q**e3, while on 29...**營**b8 (which Chernosvitov wanted to play), White has 30 \(\mathbb{Q} e 3! \) b5 31 a5 h6 32 豐xa6 基d1+ 33 雲f2 豐e5 34 ②c3 with equality.



 \mathbf{B}


In endgames a rook often proves stronger than a bishop and knight if it manages to break into the enemy camp in good time, attack the queenside pawns, and set up a passed pawn in that part of the board. However, in this case the endgame is still a long way off, and anyway it is Black's queenside pawns, not White's, that will come under attack first.

26	***		②xe4
27 .	₩c6	÷	₩g3 +
28	⊈g1		₩f2+
29	cbh2		₩~3_

Repeating moves helps to save thinking time.

_	⊈g1	豐f2+
31	\$h2	■d8
32	Exe4	₩xd2
33	`₩vh6 (ות.

Black has a sound extra pawn. Ought he to exchange queens or retain them?




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Of course it is better to play with the queens on. The white king is exposed and can easily come under attack. Chernosvitov illustrates this verdict with the following sample variations: 33...h6 34 b4 (34 豐xa6 豐xb2) 34... Zd6 35 豐b8+ \$\frac{1}{2}\$h7 36 b5 axb5 37 axb5 f5! 38 \(\begin{aligned}
\begin{aligned}
\begin{alig some threat of 39... \subseteq 65+, is much simpler - Dvoretsky) 39 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 \(\mathbb{G}\)f4+ 40 g3 **基**d2+ 41 **基**xd2 **營**xd2+ 42 曾g1 曾e3+ 43 曾g2 e4 44 曾f4?! ₩e2+ 45 �g1 ₩xb5.

Instead Black decided to go into a rook endgame. This was a false assessment of the position! Even if the ending is a win, it is clear that exploiting Black's advantage would have been much simpler with queens on the board.

110 0	I the bot	au.
33	•••	₩d3?
34	ℤe 3	₩d6+
35	₩xd6	Exd6 (D)

An interesting rook endgame has arisen. In examining it, I came across quite a few questions which Chernosvitov either ignores or answers unconvincingly in his notes.



36 **Lb**3

White is preparing a4-a5 and **16.** This idea is attractive, but he should also have considered the more conventional plan starting with 36 b4 (the rook will station itself behind the passed pawn). After 36...\$f8 37 b5 axb5 38 axb5 der 39 Zb3, Black must avoid 39...\$\d7? 40 b6 \$\displays c8 on account of 41 \(\mathbb{L} \c3+ \(\mathbb{L} \tag{b8} \) 42 \(\mathbb{L} \c7. \) The right move is 39... 156, after which Black should win, though it is not that simple. If his king goes to c5, White replies Ic3+; hence Black will need to sacrifice a tempo with ... \$\mathbb{L}\$ b6-b7. Meanwhile White will be preparing kingside counterplay. How? For example, with 40 \$\pm\$3 \$\bar{\mathbb{L}}b7 41 \$\pm\$14 \$\pm\$d6 42 g4 and then 42...\$\text{f6}\$ 43 g5 \$\pm\$c5 44 \$\bar{\mathbb{L}}e3\$, or 42...\$\pm\$c5 43 \$\bar{\mathbb{L}}c3+ \$\pm\$xb5 44 \$\pm\$e5, intending \$\bar{\mathbb{L}}c8-g8\$.

36 ... g6?


A very strange move, on which Sasha makes no comment at all. It is clear that Black will have to advance his kingside pawns. Then why not push a pawn two squares right away – why waste a tempo? The play may become sharp, a race may begin, in which every tempo will count. In this instance, Black's delay may not alter the verdict on the position. Later, however, a similar error will do so.

Of course 36...g5!? was stronger than the text-move. Also 36...f5!? looks no less attractive, aiming to bring the king to f6 and then play ...h5-h4 and ...e5-e4. For example: 37 a5 (37 \$\mathbb{L}b7\$ a5!?) 37...\$\mathbb{L}f7\$ 38 \$\mathbb{L}b6\$ \$\mathbb{L}e7!\$ (gaining another tempo) 39 \$\mathbb{L}b7+ \$\mathbb{L}f6\$ 40 \$\mathbb{L}b6\$ \$\mathbb{L}d2\$ 41 b4 \$\mathbb{L}d4\$.

37 **Zb8**+

Here Chemosvitov observes: "It looks as if White had an immediate draw with 37 a5 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$d5 38 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$b8+ \$\pi\$g7 39 b4 \$\pi\$f6 40 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$b6 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$d4 41 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$xa6 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$xb4 42 \$\mathbb{\pi}\$a7 (D)."

Roughly the same position can arise in many variations, and its evaluation is important for a correct understanding of the entire




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endgame. Is it drawn? The black rook is excellently placed to the rear of the passed a-pawn. I don't see how White can oppose the advance of the black kingside pawn armada. For example, 42...h5 43 a6 \$\mathbb{L}a4\$ 44 \$\partial g3\$ h4+ 45 \$\partial f3\$ e5 46 \$\mathbb{L}a8\$ (46 \$\partial e3\$ and then 48...g5 and 49...\$\partial f4\$. Note that the f-pawn is well placed on its original square; after 49 \$\mathbb{L}f8\$ \$\mathbb{L}xa7\$ it is defended by the rook. A typical mistake would be 48...f6?, when \$\mathbb{L}f8\$ becomes a much stronger answer to ...\$\partial f4\$.

37 ... \(\pm\gq \gq 7\)
38 a5 \(\pm\d \ld 2 \left(D \right) \)

Another plan is to bring the black king into the centre, but then Black would have to give up one or two kingside pawns. Chernosvitov's analysis goes: 38...\$\displayside 39\$\textbf{25} 6 \displayside 5 40 \textbf{26} 5 41 \textbf{25} 15 41 \textbf{25} 15 42 \textbf{25} 65 43 \textbf{25} 65 45 \textb

This line is interesting but not forced. Right at the end, in place of 49...e3?, Black has the much stronger 49...\(\precepe{c}\)e3!, after which I am not convinced that White can save himself – the e-pawn is just too dangerous. On the other hand it is not entirely clear why White used up two tempi advancing his a-pawn before going after the g6-pawn. In answer to 45...\(\precep{c}\)f4, either 46 \(\precep{La6}\) e5 47 \(\precep{Lxg6}\) or 46 \(\precep{Le8}\) e5 47 g3+ seems indicated.



 \mathbf{w}

39 \$\psig g3 \$\psif 6 \$\pm 40 \ b4 \$\pm 1b2\$

41 **E**b6 **\$e5?**

Pushing the kingside pawns. with 41...h5 or first 41...g5, would be more natural. Incidentally, after ...h5, the king's move to e5 gains in strength, for when the white rook goes to the seventh Black simply replies ...f5, and the h-pawn will not be en prise.

42 **L**b7

Chernosvitov comments: "Both players missed the two-move variation 42 Exa6 Exb4 43 Ea7 with a draw." Well, we have already discussed a similar position; in fact after 43...\$f6, Black should probably win. Another attractive line is 43...f5 44 \(\mathbb{I}\) xh7 \(\mathbb{I}\)a4 45 \(\mathbb{I}\)a7 g5 followed by ... Za3+.

When analysing endgames it is very important to make a correct assessment of the key positions that can arise from different variations. Sasha misjudged one such position, and his entire understanding of this endgame was distorted.


I would point out that White has no time to bring his king to the queenside. A typical variation is: 42 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f5 43 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ e3 g5 44 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ d3 f4 45 \$c3 \textbf{\textit{x}}xg2 46 \textbf{\textbf{x}}xa6 f3 47 \textbf{\textbf{z}}a8 (47 47...h5) 47...h5 48 a6 **Z**a2 49 **\$**b3 **■**xa6! 50 **■**xa6 f2 51 **■**a1 g4 52 hxg4 hxg4 53 b5 \$\dot{\dot}d5! 54 \dot{\dot}c1 g3 55 b6 g2 56 b7 f1 数 57 b8 数 数 xc1.

f5 42 ...

43 Exh7

This is the consequence of Black's omission of ...h5. The outcome of the game is now in doubt.

> 43 ... '**⊈e4!?** (D)



W

How is White to defend this endgame? Straightforward tries are unsuccessful, for example:

- a) 44 **Z**a7? f4+ 45 **\$h**4 **Z**xg2 with an easy win.
- b) 44 **I**g7? f4+ (better than 44... 基xb4 45 基xg6 含e5 46 h4) 45 \$\frak{\text{\$\pi}}\$h2 f3 46 \square \text{\$\pi}\$xg6 e5 intending 47...f2.
- c) According to Chernosvitov's analysis, 44 h4! would have saved the game. White frees the h3-square for his king. There could follow: 44...f4+45 當h3 e5 46 單a7 當e3 47 **E**xa6 e4 48 **E**xg6 **\$**f2 49 a6 e3 50 耳f6 e2 51 耳xf4+ 空e3 52 耳f8 e1豐 53 罩e8+ 當f2 54 罩xe1 當xe1 and then 55 \$\dig g4 \text{ or 55 a7 \$\boxed{\pi}a2 56 \$\dig g4\$.


44 \(\mathbb{H}\)h4+?

A decisive loss of time.

œe3 45 Ec4 e5 46 \coprod c3+ (D)

Or 46 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c6 f4+ 47 \(\mathbb{D}\)h2 e4 (threatening 48...f3) 48 \$\displays g1 \boxed{\boxed}b1+ 49 曾h2 罩xb4 followed by …曾f2

and ...e3.




46	•••	Ġe2	
47	E c6	 ■ xb4	
48	Exg6	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	
Or 48	⊑ e6 f4+	49 🕏 g4 f3+ 50	C
g3 f2 5	1 X xe5+	⊈ f1.	

f4+ ⊈h2 **e4** Xxa6 **e**3 **Lb6 Za4** 51 52 **⊈**f2 **a6** 0 - 1

When analysing complex endings we sometimes come across

special positions which, although not perhaps arising by force, are of interest in themselves. One such position is analysed by Chernosvitov.



In his view, this position is a case of mutual zugzwang. It is not hard to see that White loses if it is his move (1 g3 f3; 1 h4 g4; 1 **Z**g8 **基**xa7 2 **基**xg5 **\$**f2 3 **基**f5 f3 4 gxf3 e3). However, I cannot agree with Sasha's conclusion that with Black to move the game is a draw. White's king is too awkwardly placed. I would play 1... **基**a2 2 **含**g1 **基**a6! 3 알h1 (3 알h2 翼a1) 3...g4! 4 hxg4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f2 5 g5 \frac{1}{2}\$g3 with inevitable mate.

There is also another, more striking solution: 1...\$f2 2 Ze8 g4! 3 h4 (3 hxg4 **\(\bar{z}\)**xa7) 3...\(\bar{z}\)a3!! (3...f3! is also strong: 4 a8₩ 型h1+!!) 4 \$\dip h1 (if 4 a8\dip or 4 ■xe4, Black plays 4... ■h3+! 5

gxh3 g3+) 4... **X**xa7 5 **X**xe4 **X**a1+ 6 **2**h2 g3+ 7 **2**h3 f3 8 **X**f4 **X**h1+ 9 **2**g4 **2**xg2.

Let us sum up. In the second half of the game, Chernosvitov's play was decidedly shaky and even his annotations, albeit thorough, were none too convincing. Two serious failings came across distinctly here:

1) Weakness in exploiting an advantage. We recall that in a won position Black needlessly allowed his opponent to complicate. Subsequently he didn't even make the effort to fathom the complexities that had arisen. Finally he failed to solve the problem of exchanging,

and went into an ending instead of playing for mate. Furthermore, any technician would surely have pushed his g-pawn two squares in one go, not just one. He would also have chosen the right moment to advance the h-pawn; Sasha left it on h7, where it perished.

2) An unsure grasp of rook endings. Some typical ideas and plans escaped Chernosvitov's attention; his general assessments and specific recommendations often proved erroneous.

Sasha would be well advised to do some work on rook endings – better still, on the theory and technique of the endgame as a whole.

16 Some Achievements of Our Pupils

Artur Yusupov

As has become traditional, at the end of our book we present examples of achievements by students of our school (their ages are given in brackets). The young people have played and annotated a whole range of interesting games; some of them will be offered here for the reader's judgement, with minor amendments to the analysis. The writer had a difficult problem of selection; after all, nearly every young player produces good examples of attacking chess. Nor is this surprising; attack, risk and imagination are naturally associated with youth. But let the games speak for themselves.

Boguslavsky (14) – Lep	in
Moscow 1989	
Modern Benoni	

1	d4	②f6
2	c4	e6
3	②c3	c5
4	d5	exd5

5	cxd5	d6
6	e4	g 6
7	f4	⊈g7
R	e5	

This is characteristic of Maxim Boguslavsky's style – right from the opening, White chooses the sharpest line.

8 ... dxe5
The alternative is 8... Dfd7 at once.

9 fxe5 **②fd7** 10 e6 **②f6?**

11 **L**b5+ **L**f8

11...\$e7 is also dangerous in view of 12 \(\extrm{\$\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$\genta\$}}}} \) ft 4 fxe6 13 d6+ \(\extrm{\$\text{\$\genta\$}}\) f7 14 9)f3.

12 9f3 fxe6

12...a6 looks a little more precise, although after 13 \(\extrm{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}} \)e2 fxe6 14 0-0 exd5 15 ②g5 \$\dot{\pi}\$g8 (not 15...≜f5?? 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf5: Black also loses with 15...d4 16 數b3 數d7 17 **2**g4) 16 **2**c4 b5 17 **2**xd5+ **2**xd5 18 2 f7 White has a very promising position.

> 13 0-0 exd5 14 **Dg5 \$**28

It was worth thinking about 14...h6, although in that case, after 15 **省**xd5 **省**xd5 16 **2**xd5 hxg5 17 2xg5, White regains his piece and keeps the initiative in the ending.

Now, however, the king's rook is shut in the corner, and White has a chance to carry on his attack virtually unhindered.


15 9\xd5

15 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\$} \) \(\text{\$\delta\$} \) \(\t 17 2 f7 is not bad either; the idea is to answer 17... ₩d7 with 18 4\h6+ ♠xh6 19 ♠xh6, with decisive threats.

15 ... 9xd5

When defending your king, you should usually try to exchange queens. In the present case, this would have brought no particular relief: 15... **省**xd5 16 **省**xd5+ **公**xd5 17 &c4 &d4+ 18 \$h1 \$g7 19 皇xd5 里f8 20 里xf8 (20 包f7!? is

quite good too) 20...\$xf8 21 \$2e6+ 2xe6 22 2xb7, winning material. 16 **②f7**(D)



В

16 ... **≜d4+?**

In a difficult position Black goes wrong and is mated elegantly. The unfortunate thing is that a fine queen sacrifice which Boguslavsky had prepared remains on the sidelines. Black's best is 16... #e7: then after 17 **②**h6+ **2**xh6 18 ₩xd5+ \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\delta}\$}}\)e6 (bad alternatives are 18... \$g7 19 其f7+ 對xf7 20 \$xh6+ and 18... we6 19 Qxh6) 19 wxe6+!! ₩xe6 20 \(\textit{\rm xh6}\) xh6 a fantastic position arises, where White has only one piece for the queen and yet the advantage is on his side - because Black's rook is shut out of play and his king is in a mating net. The following variations, based on Boguslavsky's analysis, support this paradoxical conclusion:

- a) 20... If 7 loses at once to 21 **⊈**c4.
- b) 20... **公**d7 21 **国**ae1 **對**d5 (or 21... 對xe1 22 **Qc4+**) 22 **Ze7** 對d4+ 23 \$\diph1 \Qif6 (23...\Qib6 24 \mathbb{\mathbb{E}}e8+) 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf6 and mate is inevitable.
 - c) 20... 2c6 21 **Z**ae1 and now:
- c1) 21... wxa2 22 Ze4! (22 全xc6? bxc6 23 罩e7 ₩xb2 24 罩ef7 is weaker because of 24... \alphaa1!) 22... 對f7 23 皇c4 對xc4 24 罩xc4 20d4 25 g4, and despite his two extra pawns Black's position is unenviable.
- c2) 21...豐d5 22 b3 **②**a5 (if 22... 2e5, then 23 Exe5) 23 Ee7 ₩d4+ 24 \$\display\$h1 and Black has no answer to the threat of 25 \(\text{\pm} e \).
- c3) 21... 對f7!? 22 b3 (22 罩xf7 is weaker: 22...\$\dot\dot\xf7 23 \dot\c4+ \$\psi f6 24 \boxed{\boxed}f1+ \psi e5 25 \boxed{\boxed}g7+ \psi e4 and Black equalizes) 22... 2a5 (if 22... 對xf1+ 23 其xf1 包e5. White has 24 Hel a6 25 Afl 2)f7 26 £c4, tying up all the black pieces) 23 **a**e2 **a**d7 24 **a**d1 **a**xd1 25 Exd1, continuing the king-hunt.

17 ₩xd4! cxd4 18 2h6+ 1-0

Teplitsky (14) - Parutin Tashkent 1989 Grünfeld Defence

1	包f3			d 5
2	c4	,	,	c6
3	e3			Df6

4 2 c3 **g6** 5 d4 **⊈g**7 6 ≜e2 0-0 7 0-0 9)bd7

The Schlechter Variation of the Grünfeld has arisen by transposition. Black's last move is considered inaccurate, since White can now exchange on d5 without worrying about the black knight going to c6 - its best square in this line. Thus, in Botvinnik-Blau, Tel-Aviv Olympiad 1964, White gained a clear plus after 8 cxd5 cxd5 9 對b3

8 b3 **e6**

In a game against Kantsler, Teplitsky found an antidote to another of Black's possibilities; on 8...b6, there followed 9 a4 a5 10 cxd5 ②xd5 11 ②xd5 cxd5 12 单a3 罩e8 13 \(\mathbb{L} \) c1 \(\mathbb{L} \) a6 14 \(\mathbb{L} \) b5! with the better game.

9 \c2 ℤe8 10 **♠**b2 a5 ②h5 11 **Z**ad1 12 \(\mathbb{a}\)a3!

Up to now White has just been developing his pieces sensibly. At this point he reacts to his opponent's plans and takes prophylactic measures against ... f5, which would now be answered by 13 2d6, con-


> 12 ... **b6**

trolling the dark squares.

Black revises his plan, but his knight turns out to be poorly

placed on the edge of the board (Dr Tarrasch's famous dictum inevitably comes to mind!). White achieves a good game by simple means: he prepares a central advance.

13	L fe1	≗ b7
14	e4	Xc8
15	₩ d2	dxc4 (D)



.

16 e5!

An unconventional decision. Such moves are very easy to miss. White is now threatening to win a piece with 17 g4. The 'automatic' 16 bxc4 would give Black more chances of counterplay after 16...e5 17 d5 \(\Delta f8!? \) (but not 17...\(\Delta c5? 18 \) \(\Delta xc5 \) bxc5 19 d6 \(\Delta b8 \) 20 \(\Delta a4 \) with a decisive plus for White).

16...cxb3 would be met by 17 g4 b5 18 ②e4 b4 19 ②d6 bxa3 20 ②xb7 ₩e7 21 ②d6, with advantage. Black probably had to opt for

16...b5!?. After 17 g4 b4 18 ②e4, he should avoid 18...bxa3 in view of 19 ②d6 罩b8 20 ②xe8 豐xe8 21 盈xc4, but might try a recommendation of Dvoretsky's to muddy the waters: 18...②hf6!? 19 exf6 ②xf6 20 ②xf6+ 豐xf6 21 盈c1 c5.

17 exf6!?

Interesting play, although the quiet 17 bxc4 would also have ensured White the better chances.

This move leads to great complications. White gives up two bishops for a rook and pawn. The consequences of such an exchange are usually very hard to assess correctly. In many cases, particularly in the middlegame, the two pieces prove stronger, since they can create more threats against the enemy. In this position, Teplitsky rightly took into account the activity of his major pieces - which will seize the only open file - and the weakening of Black's castled position; these factors outweigh the potential strength of the bishops, which at present are dozing.

18	***	b5
19	⊈ xe6+	E xe6
20	Д хеб	b4
21	≝e2!?	bxa3

If 21...bxc3, then 22 **Ze7** c2 23 **Y**xc2 with an attack.

22 **L**e1 **L**f8

23 夕g5 **≜b4** (D)

	I	*
	4	
€		
<u>&</u> <u>\</u> \		//// 2 / 2

24 **H**d6!!

Freeing e6 for the decisive invasion by the white queen.

W

After 24... axd6 25 we6+ ag7 26 wxd6 (but not 26 wf7+? ah6 27 2e6, on account of 27... g8), Black is helpless against the concerted pressure of the white pieces; there is no adequate defence against the threats of 27 2e6+ or 27 ze7+. Black's attempt to counter-attack in the e-file proves futile.

25	₩e6+	\$h8
26	¤ xd7	≖e8
27	#xb7+1	

Destroying Black's last illusions. White now obtains a decisive material plus, and Teplitsky confidently conducts the game to victory.

27	•••	4)xh7
28	₩xe8	②xg5
29	₩xg6	包f7
30	ℤe 3	≝ g7
31	₩ e6	≜ d6
32	II h3+	⊈g8
33	②e4	₩xd4
34	€)f6+	\$ f8
35	₩e8+	⊈g 7
36	L h7+	\$ xf6
37	₩xf7+	1-0

Boguslavsky (15) – Morozevich Moscow Junior Championship 1990 King's Indian Defence

1	d4	Df6
2	c4	g6
3	Dc3	<u> </u>
4	e4	0-0
5	Df3	d6
6	⊈e2	e5
7	0-0	₩e8

This line is rarely seen; its chief merit is that the game now leaves the well-trodden paths.

8	dxe5		dxe5
9	⊈e3		

In answer to 9 2d5, Boguslavsky gives 9... 2a6 10 2xf6+ b4 ②e6 14 c5 里d8 15 豐c2 皇g5, with an equal game. The last word spoken on this system by theory is 9 b4!?, played by Ivanchuk against Judit Polgar at Novgorod 1996. After the continuation 9...c6 10 b5 ₩e7 11 a4 \ \ d8 12 \ \ a3 \ \ \ e8 13 16 \bullet xb7 the game turned clearly in White's favour.

9 ... 、句fd7?!

Theory prefers 9...b6, probably not without reason. After 10 2 d5 (4) a6 White has tried out various continuations, but has not gained the advantage with any of them:

- a) 11 \(\mathbb{U}\)c2 \(\alpha\)g4 12 \(\mathbb{L}\)d2 c6 13 ②e3 ②xe3 14 ≜xe3 ②b4 with unclear play, Gostiša-Kupreichik, Belgrade 1988.
- b) 11 \(\Delta g5 \(\Delta xe4!? \) 12 \(\Delta e7 \) c6 13 ≜xf8 ₩xf8 gives Black good compensation for the sacrificed exchange, Vučičević-Kupreichik, Belgrade 1988.
- c) The line 11 2d2!? 2d7 12 ₩a4 ♠b7 leads to an unclear position, Dreev-Gelfand, European Under-20 Championship, Arnhem 1988/9.

10 **學**d2

10 ...

The immediate 10 b4!?, followed by c5 and 42d2-c4, is also not bad.

с6

11 b4 f5?!

Premature activity. With incomplete development, it is extremely dangerous to open the game.


12 exf5 gxf5 13 **h**6 **⊈xh**6 14 Wxh6 ₩g6 14.... If 6 was worth considering.

15 We3 **a**5 ℤe8 16 a3 **營g7?**(D) 17 c5

This is a serious mistake. Although behind in development, Black makes another move with a piece already in play. He should have continued with 17...f4, and if 18 \(\mathbb{e}\)e4 (or 18 \(\mathbb{e}\)d2 e4 with counterplay) 18... 2 f6 19 \(\mathbb{W}\) xg6+ hxg6 20 \(\dot{\phi}_c4+\dot{\phi}_g7\) 21 \(\dot{\phi}_g5\), then (as Dvoretsky has shown) 21... 2f5 (preparing ... ②a6) 22 ②f7 ≜d3! 23

2xd3 \$xf7 with a defensible po-

sition.



W

18 **≜c4**+ **₫h**8 19 9 g5 Ïe7

It is too late now for 19...f4? on account of 20 6)f7+.


> 20 9)e6 **当f6**

Boguslavsky intended to answer 20... **對**f7 with 21 分c7 對xc4 22 ②xa8 axb4 23 axb4 \widetilde{\pi}xb4 24 2b6 (24 2a4 is also possible); a sample continuation is 24... ②xb6 25 cxb6 f4 26 **對**d2 **對**xb6 27 **以**a8 互d7 (27... 對c7 28 耳xb8) 28 對c2 ₩c7 29 **L**c1 b5 (29...②a6 also fails to save him: 30 \(\Oddsymbol{2}\) b5 \(\oddsymbol{\text{d}}\) d8 31 \(\oddsymbol{\text{Q}}\) a7 耳c7 32 耳d1 響e8 33 響d2) 30 公xb5 ₩b7 31 Exb8 ₩xb8 32 ₩xc6, and Black's position collapses.

21 Dc7 ¤a7 22 b5!

Proceeding to the decisive action.

> 22 ... a4(D)



W

夕7d5!?

Of course there is no doubt about White's advantage, yet it is often hard to decide whether the moment for tactical operations has come. Here White had a good chance to improve his position further with 23 Zad1. Still, the exchanging combination which Boguslavsky carries out, and which is reminiscent of the ideas of the previous game, is also good: White begins the tactics just when his opponent's pieces are least prepared for co-ordinated action.

> 23 ... cxd5 24 2 xd5 f4

This intermediate move in no way alters the verdict on the position. The black centre pawns remain under fire from the major pieces.

> 25 對d2 ₩g5 26 ②xe7 ₩xe7 27 Ife1

Black is unable to unravel his tangle of pieces on the queenside. His pawn-hunting excursion can be explained by the good old principle of being hanged for a sheep rather than a lamb. Boguslavsky quickly finishes the game with energetic play.

27 ... ₩xc5 28 Hac1 ₩xa3

If 28... \widetaff8, White simply plays 29 \(\frac{1}{2}\) e6 \(\frac{1}{2}\) b6 30 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xc8 \(\frac{1}{2}\) xc8 31 Exe5 and wins.

30 Exe5 is possible too.

30 ... b6

31 **L**xe5 **W**f6 32 **L**g5!

A nice stroke, though not complicated. As taking the queen allows immediate mate, Black can only try to postpone this inevitable fate by a couple of moves.

> 32 ... h6 33 耳g8+ 堂h7 34 ¥d3+ 1-0

Zviagintsev (13) – Nachev Voskresensk 1990 Slav Defence

> 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Øf3 Øf6 4 Øc3 dxc4 5 a4 @g4

A somewhat risky system, which Nikolić has championed in a number of games. Without a doubt, White has to play most energetically to cast doubt on it.

6 **②e5 ♣h5** 7 h3!

The most unpleasant variation from Black's point of view. White wants to seize the centre with his pawns at a favourable moment, and therefore prepares to unpin his e-pawn.

7 ... ②a6

Zviagintsev-Frog, Moscow 1989 illustrates what can happen if Black renounces the fight for the initiative: 7...\(\overline{D}\)bd7 8 g4 \(\overline{Q}\)g6 9 \(\overline{D}\)xc4 e6 10 \(\overline{Q}\)g2 \(\overline{D}\)bd 11 0-0 0-0 12 a5! \(\overline{D}\)d5 13 \(\overline{D}\)bd b5 14 axb6 \(\overline{D}\)7xb6 15 e4 \(\overline{D}\)xc3 16 bxc3 \(\overline{Q}\)e7 17 f4!. White has successfully carried out his plan to seize the centre.

10 e4 would be answered by 10...₩xd4.

Better than 10... 2d7?! 11 2xc4 with advantage to White, Gelfand-Khuzman, USSR 1987.

Obscure complications arise from 12 \(\mathbb{E} f4!? \) h6 13 \(\mathbb{L} e3 \), Levitt-Flear, British Championship, Plymouth 1989. Against 12 a5, with the unambiguous threat of pushing the pawn further, current theory recommends 12...e6, ignoring the threat. After 13 a6 \(\mathbb{E} c7 \) 14 axb7 \(\mathbb{E} xb7 \), Campos Moreno-Rogers, Manila Olympiad 1992, White still has to prove that he has enough compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

12 ... Dc2

12...包xe4? 13 豐xb4 包d6 is bad because of the striking retort indicated by Gelfand and Kapengut: 14 豐xb7!! and White wins.

13 Dc5

If 13 2xc6, then 13... b6! (Gelfand and Kapengut).

13 ... wxd4

13... 2d5, as played in Bellon-Pomes, Playa de Aro 1994, requires further tests.

14 ②xb7 ②d5

14... 響xd2? is a mistake because of 15 兔xc6+! 響d7 16 ②xd7 ②xd7 17 罩d1 f5 18 罩xd7 ②xa1 19 罩d8+ 墊f7 20 罩xa8, Khenkin-Sapis, Leningrad 1989.

15 ₩g5!


Zviagintsev's pre-game preparation sets Black some unpleasant problems. The alternative 15 ②xc6 Wxd2 16 ②xd2 is less dangerous on account of 16...e6 (Gelfand and Kapengut), with a roughly equal game.

Now White threatens both 16 Dxc6 and 16 \mathbb{\mathbb{H}}f5.

15 ... e6!? (D)

Against the uncompromising 15...f6!?, Zviagintsev intended 16 Wh5+ g6 17 \(\Delta xg6 \) hxg6 18 Wxh8 g5 19 h4! with the initiative. If instead 15...Wb6, then according to his analysis a strong reply is 16 Wf5 Wxb7 17 Wxf7+ \(\Delta d8 18 \) d1 c3 (18...\(\Delta xa1? 19 \) \(\Delta xd5 \) \(\Delta xd1 \) 20 \(\Delta xc6 \) \(\Delta xc6 \) \(\Delta xc6 + \Delta c7 22

单f4+ \$xc6 23 ¥xc4+; 18...②b4 19 单f4) 19 ②xc6+ ¥xc6 20 单xd5 单xd5 21 耳xd5+ \$c8 22 耳d3!.



W

16 \(\mathbb{A} e 3!!

A most unpleasant move for Black to have to face. It turns out that capturing the bishop is bad; 16... \(\times \) dxe3?? loses at once to 17 \(\times \) xc6+, while after 16... \(\times \) cxe3 the f-file is opened and White obtains an extremely dangerous attack: 17 fxe3 and then 17... f6 18 \(\times \) xf6 gxf6 19 \(\times \) h5+ (Horvath) or 17... \(\times \) xb2 18 \(\times \) answered by 20 \(\times \) xg7! \(\times \) xg7 21 \(\times \) d6+ \(\times \) d8 22 \(\times \) xc6#.

16 ... Wxb2
17 \$\hat{\pi}\$c5!


White increases the pressure.

17 ... 2xc5

17... 2xa1? loses to 18 2xd5 cxd5 19 2d6+. In reply to 17...h6, White had prepared 18 \(\mathbb{U}\)f4!! f6 19

쌜e4 쌜xe5 20 쌜g6+ ७d7 21 쌜f7+ \$\$c8 22 \$\alpha\$a5 \$\bullet\$b8 23 \$\alpha\$xf8, with a very powerful attack.

18 **對xg7!** (D)



 \mathbf{B}

This zwischenzug, with its mate threat, is the point of White's play.

18 ... IIfx

Relatively the best continuation. A queen sacrifice with 18... wxe5 19 \#xe5 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\exitit}}}}}}}}}} \ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititt{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititt{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\ lief, because the threats created by the queen in conjunction with the knight would be too strong. For instance. 20 \d6 \(\text{\$\exitt{\$\exitt{\$\xrighta}\$}}}} \exitting \ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\exittit{\$\xrighta}\$}\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xrighta}\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\xrighta}\$}\text{\$\ext{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\}\$}}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\exitit{ \$\delta f8 22 \Qd6 \delta g7 23 \delta xd5 exd5 24 4)f5+ would end in mate.

The insertion of 18... xf2+ only opens up another line of attack: 19 \$\dot{\phi}h2! (19 \overline{\pm}xsf2 \overline{\pm}xa1+ 20 \overline{\ph}h2 If 8 21 Ixf7 leads to unnecessary complications after 21...\\xe5+) 19...其f8 20 夕d6+ \$e7 21 夕xc6+ \$\psixd6 22 \psixb2 \textsqc5 23 \psie5+

 \Leftrightarrow xc6 24 \triangleq xd5+ exd5 25 \equiv f6+ and Black is helpless.

> 19 9 xc5 0-0-0!


In such a position it is easy to overlook something. Thus, after 19...夕xa1? 20 夕xe6! 幽a3! 21 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\) xd5 cxd5 22 \(\textit{\textit{D}}\)c7+ \(\textit{\textit{e}}\)e7 (or 22...曾d8 23 豐f6+ 曾c8 24 豐c6) 23 **曾g5+ f6 24 曾g7+ Black loses** at once.

20 Hab1! ₩₩

Again best; 20... #c3 is weaker due to 21 ②e4, and so is 20... ₩a3 in view of 21 2xb3 cxb3 22 2xc6.

21 ②cd7?! (D)

Against stubborn defence it can be very hard to play the attack faultlessly. A simpler line was 21 ②xb3! cxb3 22 \square xb3, when the contrasting situations of the two kings would surely tell. The operation that White has in mind gives his opponent unexpected saving chances.



21 ... G)c3?

Black thinks he has to return blow for blow. With his king exposed, this leads to a quick catastrophe. Of course, 21... \(\max\) xd7? is bad: 22 費xf8+ 單d8 23 費xd8+! \$\price xd8 24 \Phi xc6+. The sole defensive possibility lay in 21... Ife8!! 22 e3!? (22 \(\textit{\textbf{x}}\) xd5 exd5!) 22...\(\textit{\textit{w}}\)c3 23 ②c5!? \(\bar{\text{\$\sigma}}\)e7!, and if 24 ②e4. then 24...f5!. True, White would have good chances of victory in this line too. He would continue 25 **豐xe7 豐xe5 26 豐c5!?** (26 豐g5 is also worth considering) 26...fxe4 27 \subsection xc6+ \(\oldsymbol{\infty} \c7 28 \oldsymbol{\infty} \c2 \text{with the} \) better game, for example: 28... \(\mathbb{I}\)d5 29 全xd5 營xd5 30 營xd5 公xd5 31 異xb3 cxb3 32 異b1 ②c3 33 異xb3 ②xa4 34 \ □b5.

> 22 9)xf8! 9)xh1 23 Axc6 ₩/b6

23... #f4? is no good in view of 24 Dxe6.

> c3

24... 2)d4 is relatively better, but is adequately met by 25 Ad7+ \$\displays b8 26 \boxed{\boxed}\text{xb1}. The move played loses even more material.

> 25 ≜d7+ 1-0

When we talk about attack, this naturally conjures up thoughts of beautiful combinations and finely calculated sacrifices. In many cases, though, the attacker succeeds without any brilliancy. The

following game is a case in point victory was gained without any outward show, by methods that look perfectly simple. Yet such simplicity is deceptive; finding a quiet move to strengthen your position is often harder than striking a tactical blow.

> Nikitin – Makariev (15) CIS Junior Championship. Jurmala 1992 King's Indian Defence

1	d 4	D f6
2	c4	g6
3	වc3	⊈g7
4	e4	d6
5 :	f3	0-0
6.	⊈e3	Dc6
7	වුge2	a6
8	а3	

The main line is the natural 8 ₩d2, but the move chosen here, preparing queenside play, also contains some poison. Ilia Makariev, however, is well prepared for this turn of events, and plays as theory recommends.

> **≜d7** 8 ... 9 b4 ₩b8!?

Black prepares ...b5 without hurrying, since in this line it is simpler for White to react to his opponent's operations than to carry out his own plan. An immediate 9...b5 would be met by 10 cxb5 axb5 11

d5 De5 12 Dd4, and if 9...e5, then 10 d5 De7 11 g4 De8 12 Dc1 f5 13 Db3, Korchnoi-Stein, USSR Championship, Leningrad 1963.

10 \\ddata{d2}

If 10 Oc1, the reply 10...b5 is quite in order, since after 11 cxb5 axb5 the b5-pawn is indirectly defended (12 2xb5 2xb4). If 10 d5 Фе5 11 Ød4, then 11...с6 12 dxc6 (12 f4 is met by bringing a knight to g4; 12 \(\hat{L}e2 \) cxd5 13 cxd5 \(\hat{L}c8 \) 12...bxc6 13 ♠e2 a5, with counterplay.


b5 10 ...

If the pawns are now exchanged on b5, the threat of capturing on b4 arises. Black can also play Boleslavsky's recommendation: 10... Ze8!? (this move is very useful if White removes his knight from e2, since ...e5 then gains in strength) 11 g3 b5 12 c5 a5 13 罩b1 e6 14 空f2 翼b7 with equal chances.

11 24

A bold decision, but White is conducting his attack on too broad a front. On the other hand, continuations like 11 d5? De5 12 cxb5 2c4, 11 cxb5 axb5 12 d5? 2xb4 and 11 20cl e5 are none too impressive. A playable alternative is 11 c5!? a5 12 \(\mathbb{I}\)b1 axb4 13 axb4. maintaining his central position. Organizing counterplay for Black would then be a good deal more complicated (13...dxc5 14 bxc5);

the open file in his hands would as yet play no particular role.



W

12 h4

On 12 Lb1, Black was planning 12...e5 13 d5 2a7 (13...2e7, aiming for ... De8 and ... f5, is also playable) 14 a4 c6, with counterplay.

It was worth thinking seriously about 12 g5!?. Then 12... De8 would be met, not by 13 f4, in view of 13...e5! 14 dxe5 \(\text{g4} \) 15 exd6 (or 15 2g3 dxe5 16 f5 2d4) 15...2xd6, but by 13 h4! e5 14 d5 (14 h5!?) 14... De7 15 h5 with unpleasant threats. Black would probably have to opt for 12... 2h5!? 13 2g3! e5 14 ②xh5 gxh5 (14...exd4? 15 ②xg7 dxe3 16 \bubbellet b2) 15 \bubbellet d5 (15 dxe5!?) 15...exd4 (15...4)xd4? 16 \$\text{\$\text{x}\$d4 exd4 17 \$\tilde{\tilde{0}}\$f6+, and now, on Dvoretsky's advice: 16...\$h8 17 \$xd4 (17 \$\infty xd7?

dxe3) 17...②xd4 18 \\ xd4 \\ \ellee6. with prospects of queenside counterplay with ...c5 or ...a5.

12 ... h5

It was essential to put a brake on White's kingside advance. The unexpected 12...a5 13 b5 42b4?! is too pretty to be true. White can choose between the unpretentious 14 axb4 axb4 15 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xa8 bxc3 (15...\(\mathbb{Z}\)xa8?! 16 2a2) 16 2xc3 \ xa8 17 \ xc4 with the better game, and the more refined 14 2c1!? threatening **2**b1.

13 g5 4)h7 14 **Hb1**?! (D)


This move seems to hand the initiative to the opponent. Instead, 14 f4!?, threatening 15 d5, is more consistent. If 14...a5, then according to Makariev's analysis White should continue 15 b5 2 a7 16 4 b1 (16 a4 c6!) 16...₩e8 17 a4 ②c8 18 2g3 2b6 19 f5. It definitely makes sense for Black to sacrifice a pawn by 14...e5!? 15 dxe5 \(\hat{1} g4 16 exd6 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(a\)}}\) f3, with a double-edged game.

14 ... ₩d8!

By modestly bringing his queen back, Black prepares counterplay in the centre.

15 f4

Black would answer 15 d5 with 15...De5 16 Dd4 e6! 17 f4 (17 dxe6 c5!) 17...exd5 18 2xd5 (18 fxe5 dxe5) 18... 294 with numerous threats.



 \mathbf{B}

15 ...

Black starts the central counterattack.

16 fxe5?

16 d5? is a mistake in view of 16...exf4. Now, however, Black's central position is strengthened even more. It was time to think about development and preparation for castling with 16 \(\mathbb{L}\)g2.


16 ... dxe5 **②a7** 17 d5 18 a4

Parrying the obvious threat of ... 4b5, White allows a more sinister plan. However, it is hard to recommend anything more suitable. Neither 18 2xa7 Xxa7 (threatening ...f6), 18 2c5 Ze8 nor 18 d6 cxd6 19 \wxd6 \Db5 would bring White any comfort. The pawn Black happened to snatch on c4 is looking more and more like a healthy extra one...

4)c8!

The knight heads for d6, where it will not only defend the c4-pawn but also pressurize White's centre. Black's advantage is growing.

19 **公g3 公d6** 20 **单e2** (D)



В

Black would like to play ...f6, after which White's position on the kingside should collapse. However, the immediate 20...f6? would be answered by 21 \(\Delta \text{xh5!} \), with wholly unnecessary complications. Black's subtle prophylactic move prepares the decisive offensive without loss of tempo.

21 \alpha a2

Stopping his opponent's most obvious and least dangerous threat.

21 ... 22 **E**g1 f6 fxg5 23 hxg5 響e7 24 響d2 單f4!

The decisive blow! After Black's 'quiet' 20th move his attack proceeds on oiled wheels.

25	. ⊈.xh 5	gxh5
26	②xh5	Hg4
27	Exg4	ı xg4
28	4)g3	IIf8
29	g6	2)f6
30	. ⊈.c 5	包h5
at .	0-1	

To conclude my story of achievements by our youngsters, I would like to give another, more recent, game by Vadim Zviagintsev. It was declared the best game in *Informator* 62.

Cifuentes - Zviagintsev (18)

Wijk aan Zee 1995 Semi-Slav Defence

1	d4	d5
2	c4	е6
3	Df3	Df6
4	Dc3	c6
-5	e3	包bd7
	₩c2	b6!?
7	≜e2	

7 ♠d3! ♠b7 8 0-0 is more energetic; if 8...dxc4?!, then 9 ♠xc4 c5 10 ₩e2.

7	•••		盒b7
8	0-0		≜e 7
9	I d1		


In Zviagintsev's view, 9 b3 is more precise.

9	•••	0-0
10	e4	dxe4
11	②xe4	₩c7!

It makes sense to prevent \(\frac{1}{2} \)f4.

12 \(\frac{1}{2} \)c3?! \((D) \)

This way White cannot count on any advantage. If he wanted a comfortable game, he shouldn't have avoided exchanges. Either 12 \Dxf6+!? or the simple 12 \Dxf5 c5 would have given approximate equality.



В

12 ... c5 13 d5?!

A risky conception, but 13 2b5 **b8 14 g3 cxd4 15 2bxd4 **Le8 also promised White nothing. Perhaps he should have completed his development with 13 2g5.

> 13 ... exd5 14 cxd5 a6

15 **Dh4**

Cifuentes's aim of exchanging Black's blockading piece will not be achieved; 15 a4 at once was better. It was also worth considering the simple 15 \(\text{\textit{g}}5\) or even the hyper-active 15 \(\text{\text{\text{W}}}f5!?.

15 ... g6

> 16 **点h6** 耳fe8 17 **對d2**?!

At this point 17 a4!, to restrict his opponent's queenside play, was imperative.

17 ... \(\mathbb{\parallel{1}}\)d6

With his thematic move Black counters his opponent's elementary threats of 18 d6 and 18 265.

18 g3 b5 19 \(\text{\$\delta} \)f3

If 19 \$\oldsymbol{\Omega}f5\$, then 19...b4 is unpleasant.

19 ... b4

19... De5 also deserved attention.

20 De2

White reckons on creating counterplay after a3 or 255.

20 ... ව්e4

Again Black had a chance to play 20... De5. The text-move allows White to bring his king's knight into the game and strengthen his position.

21 **省**c2

Ø}df6

22 Dg2!

The knight is heading for e3, and on to c4 if the opportunity arises.

22 ...

₩d7

23 9 e3

In the event of 23 \$\,\mathbb{L}\$f4, Black planned to decline the bishop exchange by 23... £f8!, with somewhat the better chances


23 Rhell

Zviagintsev brings his last reserves into the battle. The combination 23... 2xf2? 24 \$\precepx\$f2 \$\precep\$h3 25 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}} \) f4 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}} \) was premature on account of 26 Dxf4 (but not 26 gxf4 Exe3! 27 \$\preceq\$xe3 \$\Q\g4+\). Black also gains nothing from 23...\#h3 24 £f4 Had8 25 ②c4.

24 \(\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\texitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\texitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\tex{\$\exitin{\$\texitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\texitin{\$\texitin{\$\texitin

White covers the h3-square, and in some lines threatens f2-f3. However, despite its natural appearance, this manoeuvre proves to have a tactical flaw. There was not ther, as on 25 Dc4 Black has the simple 25... 2xd5. White should have followed his opponent's example and brought his rook into play, because the sacrifice on f2 doesn't yet work: 24 \(\mathbb{I}\) ac1 \(\oldsymbol{Q}\) xf2?

25 \$xf2 \$\mathbb{w}\$h3 26 \$\mathbb{L}\$f4 \$\mathbb{w}\$xh2+ 27 ②g2 &xf4 28 ②xf4.




В

24 ... 4)xf2!

This sacrifice is merely the prelude to the real combinative fireworks. The white king is drawn into the centre, into the line of fire of the black pieces.

25 \$\psi xf2

 \mathbb{Z} xe3! (D)



W

26 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}} \)

If White had foreseen the fate in store for him, he would surely have preferred 26 \$xe3 \$2g4+27 \$d2 ②xh6 28 c1 We7 - though even then the chances are with Black. who has a pawn for the exchange and good attacking prospects.

26 ... 2)24+ **②xh2+** 27 **⊈**f3 ②g4+ 28 **⊈**f2 29 \$f3

White was probably hoping his opponent would repeat moves; after all, Black is a rook down! However, Zviagintsev keeps finding new attacking resources.

> 29 ... ₩e6! 30 \@f4

Although this move loses, it should perhaps not be condemned. Other continuations would most probably have led to the same result:


- a) 30 \wedge e4 \wedge xe4+ 31 \dot xe4 Ξe8+.
- b) 30 2c1 c4! 31 We4 (or 31 \mathfrak{D} f4 \mathfrak{D} h2+ 32 \mathfrak{D} f2 \mathfrak{L} c5+ and mates) 31...\wxe4+ 32 \&xe4 \&2f2+ 33 ded4 ②xd1 with a material and positional plus.
- c) 30 \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$a}}\$} \) \(\textit{\$\textit{\$a}\$} \) \(\textit{\$\textit{\$\textit{\$a}\$} \) \(\textit{\$\textit{\$a}\$} \) \(\textit{ 32 \$\preceq\$xg4 \(\text{\\circ{\exitin\ \$\precent{2}\text{f3 fxe6} with a winning attack.

30 ... He8!

This looks the most energetic way to continue the attack. Instead, 30...\(\textit{\textbf{2}}\) xd5+ 31 \(\textit{\textbf{2}}\) xd5+ 32 ₩e4 was clearly weaker, though 30...\(\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}\) xf4 31 \(\text{\$\geq}\)e4!? \(\text{\$\geq}\)xe4+ 32 \$\preceq\$xe4 \(\textrm{\textit{\textit{g}}}\)5 and also 30...f5!? were perfectly playable alternatives.

31 **營c4**(D)

There is no other defence against 31...**⊈**xd5+.



В

31 ... ₩e3+!!

The most elegant solution, leading to a forced mate - although the prosaic 31... xf4 would also have won:

- a) 32 gxf4 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)e3+ 33 \(\mathbb{\psi}\)xg4 **2**c8+34 f5 (34 **2**h4 **2**f2+35 **4**g3 **E**e3) 34.... **Q**xf5+ 35 **全**h4 **¥**f2+ 36 ②g3 **E**e3.
- b) 32 ②xf4 ②h2+ 33 \$\psi f2\$ ₩e3#.

In my view, a dual solution like this hardly detracts from the aesthetic effect of Zviagintsev's wonderful attack.

Or 34 \$h4 \$e7#.

Mate follows even more quickly after 32 \$\preceq\$xg4 \$\preceq\$c8+ 33 \$\preceq\$g5 (33 \$\preceq\$h4 \$\preceq\$e7+) 33...其e5+.

34 ... h6+!

The finishing touch; 34... \$27 would have prolonged the game in view of 35 單h1 (or 35 豐xc5).

35 &xh6 **L**e5

0-1

There is no defence against mate next move (... 2f8# or ... Ih5#).

Solutions to Chapter 1 Exercises

1. Berg-Hort, Biel 1985

Black has the advantage as his king is more active. His basic threat is ...\$\colonglece{2}c6-b5\$. White's main counterchance lies in the pawnbreak g3-g4!, but at the present moment it clearly fails. It can only be carried out with the white king on the e-file. In that position the king is within one move of stopping Black from queening a pawn on either the c-file or the g-file.


The most natural king move, 1 \$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} e3?, proves weakest, since after 1...\$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} c6! 2 g4 hxg4 3 f5 gxf5 4 h5 f4+! it is not hard to see that Black will queen first. Nor does it help to play 2 \$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} d2 \$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} b5 3 g4 (3 \$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} c3 f5) 3...hxg4 4 f5 g3, or 2 \$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} e2 \$\dispersecond{\pmatrix} b5 3 g4 f5!.

The drawback to having the king on e3, then, is that White exposes himself to the tempo-gaining ...f5-f4+. Realizing this, White played 1 \$\circ\$e2? (with a view to the drawing line 1...\$\circ\$c6? 2 g4! hxg4 3 f5). However, after 1...\$\circ\$d5! he unexpectedly found himself in zugzwang. We already know what happens after 2 \$\circ\$e3 \$\circ\$c6 or 2 \$\circ\$d2

\$\psice 6\$, while if 2 \$\psice 1\$ Black wins with 2...c3. The game continuation was 2 g4 hxg4 3 f5 g3! 4 fxg6 g2 5 \$\psice f2 \$\psice 6\$ g7 \$\psice f7\$ 0-1. White resigned in view of 7 b5 c3 8 b6 c2 9 b7 g1 \$\psice +!\$ 10 \$\psix xg1\$ c1 \$\psi +.

There is nevertheless a way for White to save himself:

1 \$\preceq\$e1!! (D)



В

1 ... \$\preceq\$c6

After 1...\$\Delta d5 2 \Delta e2!\$ we reach the same zugzwang position as before, but this time it is Black's move. Now 2...\$\Delta c6\$ is answered by 3 g4!. If instead 2...\$\Delta d4\$, White should not play 3 g4? f5 4 gxf5 gxf5 5 \$\Delta d2 c3+6 \Delta c2 \Delta c4 7 b5

\$\psixb5 8 \psixc3 \psic5, but simply 3 \$\psid21 \text{ with a draw}

iz: willi a liiav	٧.	
2 g4!	hxg4	
2f5 3 gxf5 g	xf5 4 ⊈ d2.	
3 f5	gxf5	
4 h5	g 3	

4...c3 5 h6 c2 6 \$\Price d2\$ leads to similar play.

5	h6	g2
6	⊈f2	c3
7	h7	c2
8	h8₩	g1₩+
9	\$xg1	c1 当 +
	\$ £2	

The position is drawn.

King and pawn endings are an excellent training ground for the technique of analysing variations!

2. Bobrov-Platonov, *Chernovtsy* 1963

1 Wh5


This occurred in the game.

1	•••		£xg5
2	_ ⊈ e4		♣h6!! (D)

There is no doing without this move; on 2... 27, 2... 27, 2... 27 or 2... 37.

It is very important to find out at once which attacking line White is going to choose: 3 \widetilde{W}\text{xh6 or 3 \widetilde{W}f5.}

If 3 \(\mathbb{U}\)f5, then 3...\(\mathbb{Z}\)c7? 4 f7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf7 is hopeless for Black. However, he has the pretty defence 3...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d7!! 4 \(\mathbb{U}\)xd7 (4 f7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf7 5



W

wxf7 wc7 or 5... 2c7) 4... 2c7!?, and White's attack peters out (after 4... wc7 5 wxc7 xc7 6 f7 he still has some saving chances based on 6... 2f8 7 xc1).

3 \\ \mathbb{w}\text{xh6} \quad \mathbb{\mathbb{\pi}}\text{c7!!}

Conclusion: the tempting combination 1 \(\mathbb{W}\)h5? is unsound. White should simply have played 1 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h5, maintaining a strong attack.


3. Jansa-A. Sokolov, Biel Interzonal 1985

White wants to play his bishop to g5. The only question is whether to do it at once or after exchanging pawns on the queenside.

In the game, White played 19 axb5?! axb5 (19...exf4? 20 bxc6 is bad for Black) 20 \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}}} \) 20 \(\text{\$\$\text{\$

Now let us look at the immediate $19 \triangleq g5$.

19 2g5! (D)



В

19	•••		b	4 🗼	
20	âx	f6	. b :	xc3	
21	رف	æ7	4	xb3	
₩	xe7	22	₩хс3	≜ xa4	23

21... wxe7 22 wxc3 exa4 23 wa3 is no better for Black.

23 bxc3

In contrast to the game continuation, the a-file is closed and White keeps his extra pawn.

Let us see whether avoiding the pawn exchange gives the opponent any new possibilities. Black can try 19... 2d7, counting on 20 axe7? 2c5! 21 22 (21 b4 a5!) 21... 2xe7 with a good game. However, the intermediate exchange 20 axb5! puts Black in a difficult position, for example 20... 2xe7 2c5 21 bxc6, or 20...axb5 21 2xe7 2c5 22 b4.


He probably ought to choose 19...bxa4!? 20 wxb7 oxb7, though after 21 oxf6 gxf6 (21...oxf6 22 oxa4 White has the better endgame chances. For example 22...互c8 23 oc3, followed by oxa4 oxd1-e3.

4. Timoshchenko-Vaganian, USSR Championship, First League, Baku 1977

Black's h6-pawn is en prise. He can defend it with his king, but should also consider the active continuations 20... xh3 and 20... y3.

Vaganian decided on a combination without working out its consequences to the end: 20...2xh3?
21 **\text{Wxh6}\$ (threatening both 22 *\text{Wxh3}\$ and 22 *\text{Qg5}\$) 21...*\text{Wg3}\$ 22 *\text{Wxh3}*\text{Wxf2}+(22...\text{2xf2}+23 *\text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$}\text{f1}\$ \$\text{2xe1}\$ is unsatisfactory for

Black) 23 \$\psi\$h1 \$\psi\$g7 (23... \$\psi\$xc2 24 \$\Og5!). Now the threats of 24... \$\mathbb{L}\$h8 and 24... \$\psi\$xc2 look dangerous, but White goes over to the counterattack: 24 \$\mathbb{L}\$f1! (D)



В

24... 對xc2 25 ②g5 皇f2 (25... 其h8 26 其xf7+ 當g8 27 其h7!) 26 對h7+ 當f6 27 對h4! 其h8 28 其xf2+ 1-0. Black resigned due to 28... 對xf2 29 ②h7+ and 30 對xf2.

From the test position, Black has two other continuations of roughly equal value:


- a) 20...\$g7!? 21 Ie5 (21 Iad1? \$\preceq\$xh3) 21...\$\preceq\$c6.
- b) 20... \(\mathbb{G}\)g3!? 21 \(\Delta\)d4! (the alternative 21 \(\mathbb{W}\)xh6? fails against 21... \(\mathbb{L}\)xf2+22 \(\mathbb{C}\)h1 \(\mathbb{L}\)xe1 and then 23 \(\Delta\)g5 \(\mathbb{C}\)h4 or 23 \(\mathbb{L}\)xe1 \(\mathbb{L}\)fe8) 21... \(\mathbb{L}\)h4.

In either variation Black stands worse but is quite able to defend himself.

Solutions to Chapter 4 Exercises

1. Smyslov-Gurgenidze, USSR Championship, Tbilisi 1966

45 h4! (D)



В

It is essential to fix the black pawn on the vulnerable square h5, so as to attack it with the bishop and create a dangerous passed hpawn when the occasion arises. Black will scarcely be able to guard both his weaknesses, a7 and h5. White should win.


The game continuation was 45 \$\ddot d5? h4! 46 \text{ Le2 } 2\delta f8 47 \ddot e4 (if White goes after the a-pawn, his king will be shut in the corner by ...\$\dot c7) 47...\$\ddot g5 48 \ddot d5 \ddot f6 49

②g4 ②g6 with a clear draw. When a passed h-pawn appears, Black will be able to give up his knight for it, provided his king can get back to b8.

2. Jochelson-Belavenets, correspondence 1974-9

25 ...

28xe6! (D)




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(With most of these exercises the answer consists of a single move, but sometimes it's a continuation of two moves or more. In such cases the trainer makes the reply and starts the clock again — and so on until the full solution is played out.)

3. Beliavsky-Chernin, Tunis Interzonal 1985

If 21 wxc4 dxc4, Black would stand quite well.

21 \bullet{\psi}b4! (D)




White has in mind 21...公xc3 22 Ixc3 and then 22...豐xe2 23 Ic7 Ie7 24 豐xd6 or 22...豐xb4 23 axb4 Ixe2 24 Ic7 Ib8 25 Ixb7, winning. He also has a plus after 21...豐xb4 22 axb4 公f6 23 e3 Ie7 24 公e2 g5 25 ②c8!.

In the game followed 21...a5 22
\(\text{\text{\text{wxb5}}} \) \(\text{\text{2xc3}} \) 23
\(\text{\text{\text{wxc4}}} \) dxc4 dxc4 24 bxc3
\(\text{\text{\text{Bab}}} \) 25
\(\text{\text{ddf}} \) 12
\(\text{2c} \) 26
\(\text{2a} \) 28
\(\text{2a} \) 15
\(\text{2a} \) 29
\(\text{2a} \) 15
\(\text{2a} \) 27
\(\text{2a} \) 12
\(\text{2a} \) 27
\(\text{2a} \) 12
\(\text{2a} \) 28
\(\text{2a} \) 13
\(\text{2a} \) 27
\(\text{2a} \) 14
\(\text{2a} \) 27
\(\text{2a} \) 14
\(\text{2a} \) 27
\(\text{2a} \) 14
\(\text{2a} \) 28
\(\text{2a} \) 15
\(\text{2a} \) 28
\(\text{2a} \) 38
\(\text{2a} \) 28
\(\text{2a} \) 38
\(\te

4. Miles-Makarychev, Oslo 1984

White's queen is almost in a position to attack the black queenside pawns, but first he has to forestall his opponent's kingside counterplay. 37 堂c6? is premature in view of 37...全xg3 38 堂xg3 豐g1+, and 37 包f1? 豐b2 is similarly useless. On 37 包e2? Black has 37...豐e1! (38 豐xe5+?? fails to 38...全f6).

37 包h1!!(D)




В

5. Pinter-Larsen, Las Palmas 1982

Obviously White should prepare active operations on the kingside.

However, the hasty 25 \$\precept{\text{c}}\frac{1}{2}\$? would come up against the exchange sacrifice 25...\$\precept{\text{Z}}\text{xg5!}\$ 26 fxg5 \$\precept{\text{D}}\text{g6}\$, making the position unclear.


25 Ah4! (D)



Putting paid to the threatened sacrifice. If now 25... 2g6, then 26 2f6; otherwise White will play 2f2 and 2f3, concentrate his forces on

the kingside and prepare to break with g3-g4.

25... 全e8 26 全f3 夕d7 27 全f2 全g6 28 星h1 全f7 29 全g5 饗a5 30 g4! 全g8? (D) (30...fxg4 31 皇xg4 全e4 is more tenacious)



31 Af6 Uf7 32 gxf5 exf5 33

h5! ⊘xf6 34 exf6, and Black is defenceless.

Solutions to Chapter 11 Exercises


1. Forintos-Zedek, Imperia 1991

White needs to open the h-file for attack, but 17 h4? is answered by 17...g4!. The object of attack must first be fixed.

17 g4!

≜xg4

18 h4! (D)



Black is defenceless. If he plays 18... ≜xf3, then 19 hxg5+ ≜xh1 20 ₩h2+ (of course, 20 \mathbb{I}xh1+ also leads to mate).


Nor is 18...g6 any better: 19 **≜**xg6 **≜**xf3 (19...fxg6 20 **₩**xg6) 20 hxg5+ \pmg8 21 \pm\ h8+ (or 21 **省**h2) 21...曾g7 22 **基**h7+ **全**g8 23 鱼xf7+ 罩xf7 24 ₩g6+.

In the game, Black resigned after the further moves 18...f5 19 hxg5+ \$\preceq\$g8 20 g6 \$\preceq\$xe3+ 21 \$\sqrt{2}\$xe3 **E**f6 1-0.

2. Kholmov-Naumkin. Moscow Championship 1983

12 ...

h6! (D)



W

Black aims to play ...g5, not only starting an offensive against the king but also preparing to attack the e5-pawn by means of ... 20g6, and ... \(\hat{\pi}\)g7, followed if necessary by ...g4 or ...h5. White is powerless to stop this plan.

13 h4

g5!

14 hxg5 **②**g6 Black has obtained a big advan-

15 &g3 &e7! 16 &d3 **2dg8** 17 c4 dxc4 18 2xc4 hxg5 19 Wb3 ②f4 20 Ifd1 Ig6! 21 Axf4 gxf4 22 a4 Hhg8 23 \$\psi f1 \$\psi b8! 24 a5 **\$c6 25 a6 ■**xg2 26 **\$xe6 \$h4 27** Id2 2xf3 28 2xg8 Ig1+! 0-1


3. A. Petrosian-Beliavsky, Riga 1973

In the Sämisch Variation of the King's Indian, as in certain other openings, we sometimes witness a strange scenario. After castling long, White conducts a queenside attack, advancing the pawns in front of his own king - while Black attacks on the kingside. (The classic instance of this strategy is Kotov-Szabo, Zurich Candidates tournament 1953.) At first sight the actions of both players seem paradoxical, but the explanation is simple. Each player attacks on the wing where he is stronger where he controls more space (as determined by the central pawn structure) and has more pieces.

In the position in front of you, White has a clear plan - to advance his pawns to a4 and b5, then pick up the d3-pawn. However, the enemy bishop must first be deprived of the c4-square. This can only be

done by the king, which strides boldly forward.

23 **\$\delta\$b3!** (D)




В

The advance of the white pawns cannot be stemmed. Beliavsky's attempts to complicate are unsuccessful: 23... \(\textbf{Z} \) c8 24 a4 c6 25 dxc6 Exc6 26 b5 d5 27 2xd5 2f8 28 豐xd3 豐d6 29 \$b2! 里b8 30 里hc1, and White won.

4. Liublinsky-Simagin, Moscow 1939

≜h8! (D) 12 ...

A positional exchange sacrifice - typical of this kind of structure which occurred several times in Simagin's games. Black needs his bishop much more than his inactive rook. The bishop will be useful both for defending its own king and for attacking the opponent's.



W

₩xf8 13 Axf8 14 a3?

Except when strictly necessary, you should not make pawn moves on the part of the board where you are weaker. 14 20a4 is better.

> 14 ... ThR

The rook co-operates splendidly with the bishop; the two pieces exert tremendous pressure against b2. White's position is probably hopeless already.


15 Ad3 c5! 16 exd5 2xd5 17 Øa4 åd7! 18 ₩a5 åxa4 19 ₩xa4 ₩h6+ 20 f4 Øxf4 21 耳d2 2xb2+ 22 \$\d1 \$\d2 23 \$\pi f2 \$\pi b1# (0-1)

5. Van der Wiel-Larsen, Reykjavik 1985

In the 'normal' course of events White has no proper compensation for his pawn, as the actual game continuation showed: 31 2 d2? 全f7 32 對d3 单e6 33 ②c4 對d5! 34 ②xb6+ (desperation: 34 ₩f1 ②d4 is quite hopeless for White) 34...axb6 35 ₩xd5 ♠xd5 36 ᡚxb6 êxf3 37 \$f2 \$c6! 38 g4 \$\frac{11}{2}\$cf8 39 gxf5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf5+ 40 \(\psi\)e3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g2! 0-1.

White's best chance was to sharpen the play by sacrificing a piece:

31 ②a5! (D)



B


For example, 31...bxa5 32 \(\bar{L}\)b7+ \$\psi d8 33 \psi xa5+ \psi e8 34 \psi xa7 with a position difficult to assess.

6. Pcholkin-Tolonen. Russian Correspondence Championship 1980-3

One of the most difficult questions in chess is how to combine attack and defence correctly.

avoiding both the Scylla of excessive caution and the Charybdis of over-aggression which borders on recklessness.

> 23 ... **26!** (D)



W


By defending against White's threat g5-g6, Black maintains an excellent position. White will have to give very serious thought to the threats of 24...d5 and 24...2 b5.

On the other hand if Black is impatient and tries to carry out one of these threats at once, he allows White to launch a dangerous attack against the king, which outweighs Black's queenside operations. For instance, 23... 4b5? 24 g6! 4a3+ $(24...\cancel{2})c3 + 25 \cancel{2}c1) 25 \cancel{2}a1 \cancel{2}xc4$ or take on c4 with the queen.

Instead Black played 23...d5?, when White should have continued 24 g6!!. In the game, White

shied away from the piece sacrifice and chose 24 \(\text{\Phi}\)d3?. There followed: 24...g6 25 里g3 包b5 26 里h3 豐a3!? (26...2)c3+!?) 27 Axb5 axb5 28 耳xd8 31 单c1 豐a6 32 f4 耳c8 33 ₩c2 exf4 34 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xc3, with a roughly equal game.

The variations after 24 g6!! (D) are as follows:



B

24 ... dxc4 If 24...fxg6 25 fxg6 hxg6, then

26 耳xd5! 夕xd5 27 耳d1 耳b5 28 xd5 xd5 29 ♠b6 and White wins.

> 25 Wh4 fxg6 26 fxg6 h6


Nor is 26...hxg6 any better: 27 ₩xc4+ \$\dot\notan h8 28 \quad \quad g3.

> 27 Axh6! gxh6 28 g7

and White's attack is irresistible.

7. Simagin-Petrosian, Moscow 1956

17 h4! (D)



В

A good example of astute prophylaxis with the kings on opposite sides! "This move looks risky, but is just the way to paralyse Black's kingside attack" (Simagin). The important thing is to deprive the opponent of ...h4 or ...g5. To this end, it is even permissible to violate the principle stated in our comments on another Simagin game (see exercise 4). Possessing two powerful bishops, White has the better chances. He threatens c4-c5. Instead, the immediate 17 c4 g5! 18 c5 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e7 19 \(\mathbb{Q}\)xf4 gxf4 (19...₩xf4) 20 ②e2 is only sufficient for equality.

17...24d5 18 2e4 2xe4 19 2xe4 2f6 20 2c2 2g4 21 g3 Ihe8 22 a5! e5 23 \$g5! f6 24 \$d2 (threatening 25 \$g6) 24...exd4 25 cxd4 Ixe1+ 26 Ixe1 c5! 27 a6! cxd4 28 \$a5?!

A tempting move, but not the best. 28 \(\text{\$\texit{\$\text{\$\}\$}}}\$}}}}}} \endotinitiles \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\

28...b6 29 单d2 夕e5 30 豐g2 d3 31 单a4

We have now reached the position in the next exercise.

8. Simagin-Petrosian, Moscow 1956

All White has to do is play 32 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)c1, and Black will be in a bad way in spite of his extra pawn. Let us see how the game concluded:


31...全c5? 32 Ic1 当f7 33 b4 全d4 34 全b3 当e7 35 全f4 b5 36 当c6 当d7 37 当e4 全b6 38 Id1 Ie8 39 Ixd3 当c8 40 全f7 Ie7 41 全xh5 当c4 42 当h7! (42 全f3!?) 42...全c7 43 Id2 当xb4 44 当g8 Id7 45 Ic2+ 全c5 46 当a8 全d6 47 Id2+ 全d4 48 全c3 全c6 49 当e8+全f5 50 g4+全e4 51 当a8+Id5 52 Ixd4+1-0

With 31... 工c8, Black could have stopped the enemy rook from occupying the c-file (32 工c1? 豐xc1+33 全xc1 工xc1+34 全h2 ②g4+35 全h3 工h1+! 36 豐xh1 ②xf2+), but after the reply 32 全b5!? his position would still have been difficult

due to the exposed position of his king and his lack of any real counterplay.

Only a player who sensed the full strategic danger of Black's position could resolve to complicate with 31...b5. After all, he would have to reckon with the seemingly deadly reply \$\Delta 5\$. In actual fact, that move is dubious; while winning the exchange, White removes the blockade from the strong passed pawn on d3.

31 ... b5!! (D)



W

32 \(\text{\text{\text{\$\sigma}}} \) xb5

If 32 **Qa5**, then 32...**慢**c6! 33 **慢**xc6 (33 **Q**xd8 can be met by 33...bxa4 or 33...**Q**f3+ 34 **Q**h1 bxa4) 33...**Q**xc6 34 **Q**xd8 bxa4! 35 **Qa**6 (35 **Qa**8 **Q**xd8 36 **Q**xd8+ **Qa**7) 35...**Qa**65 with advantage to Black.

32 ... **W**b6

Black needs to eliminate the white a-pawn. Again the bishop sortie to a5 is not dangerous.

33 单a5?! **当xb5**

34 \(\prec{1}{2}\)xd8 \(\delta 2\)!

But not 34...營xa6? 35 營d5, nor 34...②c6? 35 罩e8.

35 **ℤ**d1 **⋓**b3

36 ₩b7+

The exchange of queens is forced. Neither 36 2xd2? 2f3+ nor 36 12f3+ nor 36

36 ... ₩xb7

37 axb7 **2**b4

What is White to do now? The threat is not only 38... 2c4, but also 38... 2c6 trapping the bishop. A good example of an opportune counter-attack.

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